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 Synopsis 
 
This thesis analyses foreign intervention in oil-rich African states which have 
contributed to the resource curse problem in the latter. It concentrates on the role of 
former colonial powers-France and Britain-as well as new players-the United States, 
China and multinational agencies who have deployed policies and carried out 
practicHVLQVHFXULQJ$IULFD¶VRLOUHVRXUFHV 
 
7KLVVWXG\DUJXHVWKDWµForeign intervention contributes to the likelihood of the 
resource curse through both political and economic means¶EDVHGPDLQO\RQWKH
resource curse theory and concept of neo-colonialism. Apart from factors addressed 
by the existing literature on the resource curse, namely, economic malfunctions, 
government policies, social foundations, resource types, country size and initial 
conditions, this research hypothesizes that foreign interventions display a strong 
linkage to the resource curse. African countries have experienced poverty and 
conflicts even if they have had the greatest dosages of foreign interventions from the 
slave trade through to the present date, as explained by neocolonialism. This is 
contrast to the neo-liberal economists which promote foreign interventions and 
resource exploitation which they argue are necessary for African economic and 
political development. 
 
This study includes two theoretical approaches which address the relationship 
between continuing foreign intervention and the resource curse in Africa: neo-
Marxism and realism. Marxist dialectical materialism allows us to look back over the 
history of the relations between Africa and foreign powers both materially and in 
UHJDUGWRKRZWKHVHUHODWLRQVWLPHDQGDJDLQDIIHFWDQGVKDSH$IULFD¶VVWUXFWXUH%\
GLVFXVVLQJWKHµZRUOGRUGHU¶LQWHUPVRISURGXFWLRQVWUXFWXUHWKDWOHDGVWR
exploitation, oppression, enslavement and the struggles of the lower social classes in 
weaker states, Marxist perspectives shed light on the relationship between foreign 
LQWHUYHQWLRQVDQG$IULFD¶VXQGHUSHUIRUPDQFH:LWKUHDOLVWPDLQDVVXPSWLRQVRI
power and profits maximization, this study explains that foreign interventions in 
African oil-rich countries will be maintained and will intensify as global situations 
surrounding oil become more hostile.  
I offer to use these theories to explain specific policies and practices of foreign 
interventions with relation to the African oil industries. The foreign powers involved 
LQWKHLQWHUYHQWLRQVIRU$IULFD¶VRLOWKHPHFKDQLVPWKURXJKZKLFKWKH\DUHFDUULHG
out and the outcomes of these actions are neither addressed nor evaluated in these 
theories. Although the abovementioned Marxist strands indicate that neo-colonialism 
will contribute to poor performance in Africa, it does not relate to the resource curse 
discussion which mainly assumes that resource-rich countries are doomed to fail. 
This is the gap which this study has filled by linking these theories to real-world 
practices. By applying the concept of neo-colonialism, this study compiles the 
empirical evidence of continuing interventions by former colonial powers and new 
powers as they seek oil security in African states. The result of this study is that oil-
related foreign intervention is linked to the resource curse discussion. In effect, the 
resource curse theory is refined by stating that a foreign intervention variable must be 
included into its discussion and policy considerations. 
This study records oil-related incidents of foreign interventions in Africa and 
systematically categorizes oil-related foreign interventions using political and 
economic approaches. Foreign political interventions include the balkanization of 
Africa, the use of state policies, political meddling and military involvement.1 
Economic approaches used by foreign players to secure African oil are categorized 
into two central themes: financial involvement and business conduct. The former 
refers to the following practices: neo-liberal policies, petrodollar monetary order, 
economic sanctions, financial support and money corruption. With regards to 
business conduct, the following practices will be investigated: circumventing 
environmental standards, enclave oil operations and unsuitable philanthropic 
projects.  
This study examines these interventions from the first scramble in Africa during the 
colonial era, through to the second scramble during the Cold War and the current 
VFUDPEOHRI$IULFD¶VUHVRXUFHV7KHVWXG\GLVSOD\VWKHVHRFFXUUences in any oil-rich 
African countries including Angola, Sudan, Libya, Gabon and Equatorial Guinea. A 
specific case study is devoted for Nigeria which is the biggest oil-rich African 
countries but paradoxically experiences endemic poverty and conflicts. Primary data 
and interviews conducted in the Niger Delta, Lagos, Cape Town, and London are 
used extensively. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1
 Balkanization is the shaping of states comprised of populations of different homogeneous entities. 
The term was initially coined at the end of World War I to describe the ethnic and political 
fragmentation that followed the breakup of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans. Balkanization has 
occurred in places other than the Balkans, including Africa (Encyclopædia Britannica Online, 2011). 
Under the use of state policies, I analyse foreign policy, energy policy, oil diplomacy and the 
formation of special initiatives and institutions responsible for enhancing oil interests. Under political 
meddling, practices such as election fraud, regime change and financial support used in promoting 
specific political groups in return for oil interests, are explored. In the military involvement section, I 
discuss the support of arms, military training and assistance and military deployment used for 
enhancing the oil interests. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
The ǯǣ
States? 
 
Conventional wisdom indicates that the large revenues natural resources bring should 
generate wealth within the countries that possess them.1 Nonetheless, much evidence 
shows the opposite. Empirical studies find that resource abundance and poor 
economic performance, civil war and political instability are interrelated. Half a 
century of extraction and resource-based economic policies, underdevelopment, 
social instability and poverty persist in Africa, for instance, despite its rich natural 
resources. Many observers are puzzled as to why the blessing of natural resource 
abundance has not brought wealth in most resource-rich countries. Instead, it has 
turned into a curse. Experiencing the resource curse in Saudi Arabia, Sheik Ahmed 
<DPDQLWKHIRUPHU6DXG2LO0LQLVWHUH[SUHVVHGµAll in all I wish we had discovered 
water¶ (quoted in Shahnawaz, 2004: 1).  
$FDGHPLFVKDYHWULHGWRWHVWDQGH[SODLQWKHµUHVRXUFHFXUVH¶SKHQRPHQRQDQG
suggest solutions through which a country can best utilize its resources for 
development. However, an important causal link is missing in the existing literature. 
The linkage, which this research aims to contribute, includes foreign exploitation as a 
contributing factor to the resource curse. Until this is addressed, the solutions for 
overcoming the resource curse will not be effective. It is crucial to note that each 
natural resource contains characteristic variations in its nature and the players 
involved. For clarity, oil is chosen as the focus of this study. 
This chapter serves mainly as an introduction to the key ideas underlying the thesis 
and also serves to lay out its research design. It begins by explaining the research 
TXHVWLRQIROORZHGE\WKHGLVFXVVLRQRIWKHPDLQDUJXPHQWµIRUHLJQLQWHUYHQWLRQV¶LQ
Africa. It then discusses theories on which the study is based and the hypothesis 
arising from the theoretical assumptions of this topic. The following sections discuss 
the research method and research objectives and finish by outlining the structure of 
this thesis.  
 
                                                          
1
 µ&RQYHQWLRQDOZLVGRP¶ is a term used to describe ideas that are commonly accepted by the public. 
The ideas are stated so frequently they become conventional wisdom whether or not they are true. 
None would argue about this accepted truth. Even though conventional wisdom is outranked by new 
ideas, there may still be considerable preferences for the previous thinking (Galbraith 1958). The 
conventional wisdom regarding natural resource abundance views that natural resources are the source 
RIDQDWLRQ¶VULFKQHVV$VDUHVXOWSRSXODWLRQVRIWKHQDWLRQVZKLFKKDYHQHZO\-discovered the 
resources expect that the resource exploitation will improve their living standard and bring 
development to the nation as a whole.   
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Research Question 
Having discovered that foreign exploitation, despite its remarkable significance, has 
rarely been discussed as a contributory factor to the resource curse and the puzzle of 
why, after extensive investments and extraction by foreign actors, the resource 
industries have not brought wealth to the African states, this thesis explores the 
SURFHVVHVLQYROYHG,WDUJXHVWKDW$IULFD¶VIDLOXUHWRWXUQthe potential of oil into 
wealth and development are considerably due to the predatory nature of historic, on-
going, foreign exploitation. It studies how such continued foreign interventions play 
a part in the resource curse of African countries. Essentially, the research seeks to 
H[SORUHµwhat impacts oil-related foreign interventions have on Africa and 
whether they have a tendency to contribute to the resource curse?¶ 
This thesis uncovers the conduct of foreign interventions as part of oil security, to 
explain how these relate to the resource curse and to develop the resource curse 
theory accordingly. It concentrates on foreign players who dominantly intervene in 
African oil-rich countries; these are, the US, China, France and Britain as well as on 
transnational agencies using the largest African oil-producing country, Nigeria, as a 
case study.  
No research has given sufficiently-detailed accounts of foreign interventions with 
relation to oil in Africa because the oil sector is relatively new there. This is contrary 
to the subject of foreign interventions relating to the Middle East oil issues, 
particularly with the recent attention arising from the Iraq invasion. By studying 
foreign interventions for African oil, this thesis balances an emphasis on the study of 
foreign interventions in the Middle East oil.  
Thus, for this research to discover the impacts of foreign interventions on the 
political and economic performance of African countries and measure if they have 
contributed to the resource curse, the research first has to answer what these oil-
related interventions are. Simply said, before answering the second part of the 
TXHVWLRQFRQFHUQLQJµWKHUHVRXUFHFXUVH¶WKHILUVWSDUWFRQFHUQLQJµZKLFKDFWLRQV¶
must be answered. An in-depth exploration of these interventions is presented in the 
following chapters.  
 
The primary research question of this study, what impacts oil-related foreign 
interventions have on Africa and whether they have a tendency to contribute to 
the resource curse, involves four groups of sub-questions the answers to which 
compose this thesis. The first group surrounds the resource curse topic: what it is, 
what its causes are and how it can be overcome. The second group of questions 
addresses foreign interventions including what they are; what counts as an oil-
directed foreign intervention; who the players are and where they take place. The 
WKLUGJURXSH[DPLQHV$IULFDQVWDWHV¶SHUIRUPDQFHhow different African oil-rich 
countries perform; whether this can be attributed to foreign interventions and how 
these outcomes relate to the resource curse. The last group of questions addresses 
causation and theory development; that is, whether foreign intervention and the 
resource curse are in a causal relationship; what evidence shows the linkages; what 
theories can be used in explaining the phenomenon and how theories can be 
developed according to research findings. The discussion of this thesis is engrained 
in the concept of the resource curse which is predominantly used to explain the 
developmental failures of resource-ULFKFRXQWULHV7KHPDLQDUJXPHQWVµIRUHLJQ
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LQWHUYHQWLRQV¶LVGLVFXVVHGIXUWKHULQWKHIROORZLQJVHFWLRQZKLOHWKHµUHVRXUFHFXUVH¶
is discussed in chapter 2.   
 
Ǯ	ǯ 
7KLVVHFWLRQGHILQHVWKHWKHVLV¶SULPDU\FRQFHSWVRIµIRUHLJQLQWHUYHQWLRQ¶7KHWHUP
µIRUHLJQLQWHUYHQWLRQ¶LQFOXGHVWKHIXOOUDQJHRISUDFWLFHVDQGSROLFLHVZKHUHE\D
variety of foreign parties including states, non-state and transnational players become 
involved in the internal affairs of another state (Vincent, 1974; Crocker, 2001). Stern 
(1997) also refers to intervention as forceful interference. Coady (2002) believes that 
intervention occurs only when the state targeted disagrees with this intervention. 
Lang (2002) places the focus of interventions on the changes of the political system 
of a sovereign state. The report on the Responsibility to Protect (2001) states that any 
form of interference qualifies as intervention when it forces directions on the internal 
affairs of a state. Indeed, such direct interventions have serious consequences. But 
these should not be viewed as the only types of intervention. It is important to 
include a more resilient notion of foreign intervention in order to call attention to 
other forms of interactions that may cause internal changes that would otherwise not 
occur if the country was left to its own internal processes. Hoffmann (1996) and 
Ramsbotham (1997) believe that actions qualified as foreign interventions with or 
without consent from the targeted states. Even when a government asks for help, this 
is considered intervention. Coming from the Marxist school, Anise (1989) considers 
the essence of foreign-centred modes of production, the continuing incorporation of 
Africa into global capitalism, imperialist influence and unequal international terms 
IRU$IULFDDVIRUHLJQLQWHUYHQWLRQV7KHVHUHVXOWLQ$IULFD¶VLQWHUORFNLQJGHSHQGHQF\
Gegout (2012) provides a detailed description of foreign interventions including 
those by economic, political, cultural, institutional, legal and military means. 
As with Hoffmann, Ramsbotham and Anise, this thesis includes both coercive and 
non-coercive actions as interventions. With specific relations to oil, this thesis 
recognises two forms of intervention: political and economic. 
In general, foreign political interventions come in various forms including foreign 
support for authoritarian regimes in order to gain economic and political benefits. It 
may also come through the mediation of special envoys with African governments 
and rebel movements or through the creation of political institutions. Political 
interventions can also be in the form of organised and monitored elections, 
intelligence links, political meddling, toppling of ruling regimes, military force, 
supplying and selling of arms, the creation and operation of military bases and 
assistance with military training and funding. Encouraging the operations of private 
military companies is also considered as political intervention (Francis 1999). 
Economic interventions include conditionality for aid and trade; sanctions; and 
economic relations with a hidden agenda. Economic intervention also includes 
dominating practices of international corporations in another state which are seen as 
HTXDOO\UXQQLQJWKHVWDWH¶VHFRQRP\,QWHUYHQWLRQVFDQFRPHLQWKHIRUPRIIRUHLJQ
penetration of domestic economic structures, institutions and the global patterns of 
exchange. Multinational corporations (MNCs), for instance, can engage in practices 
which distort allocations of resources and revenues while also solidifying structures 
of dependency (Gutkind and Wallerstein, 1976; Cohen and Daniel, 1981; Shaw 
1985). All phases of African development today are the result of the historical chain 
C h a p t e r  1  | page 9 
 
of foreign penetration and economic incorporation of Africa that has been on-going 
for over three centuries (Anise 1989; Simensen 2009). Accordingly, a state in Africa 
cannot compete with states in the developed world (Stoneman and Suckling, 1987). 
The reality of foreign interventions in Africa is more diverse than described here 
(See more in Gegout, 2012). This thesis focuses on oil-related foreign interventions. 
It is often difficult to distinguish between interventions that are intended to directly 
secure oil and those that are designed to facilitate oil control, to maximize the profits 
of businesses based on or related to oil and those intended to increase national 
security and hegemony. These practices can range widely from meddling in local 
politics to global monetary control. Nonetheless, I identify oil-related interventions 
by political and economic means. I argue that oil-related interventions by political 
means are defined as the balkanization of Africa, the use of state policies, political 
meddling and military assistance (see Chapter 4). As for economic means, I argue 
they focus on financial involvement and business conduct. Financial involvement 
includes neo-liberal reforms, petrodollar monetary order, economic sanctions, 
financial support and money corruption. Business conduct includes circumventing 
environmental standards, enclave oil operations and unsuitable philanthropic projects 
(see Chapter 5). This study examines foreign interventions both through political and 
economic means in African oil-rich countries with the specific case study on Nigeria 
(chapter 6).  
The complex oil-related foreign interventions do not exist in a vacuum but are an 
LQGLVSHQVDEOHSDUWRIWKHFRQWLQXHGµVFUDPEOHIRU$IULFD¶UHVources, which has been 
on-JRLQJIRUFHQWXULHV7KHWHUPµVFUDPEOHIRU$IULFD¶ZDVILUVWXVHGWRUHIHUWRWKH
process surrounding the 1884-85 Berlin Conference. The second scramble was the 
VXSHUSRZHUV¶ULYDOU\IRUSROLWLFDOFRQWURORI$IULFDGXULQJWKH&ROG War followed by 
the modern scramble for oil involving the great powers and multinational companies 
*KD]YLQLDQ&ODUNH$OOWKUHH³VFUDPEOHV´DUHFORVHO\LQWHUUHODWHG
complicated and intertwined with various factors. The processes impact heavily on 
$IULFD¶VSUHVHQWVWDWXVDQG will continue to shape the future.  
 
7KHRULJLQDOµ6FUDPEOHIRU$IULFD¶EHJDQDVHDUO\DVthe 1880s and 1890s when the 
European nations - predominantly Britain, France, Germany and Belgium - invaded 
Africa, following by the formal partition of Africa at the 1884-85 Berlin conference 
which legitimised the political, military and economic suzerainty of those European 
nations over Africa (Sanderson, 1974). This opened the door for the colonial power 
to acquire all kinds of natural resources in the continent. The search for oil first took 
place in the late nineteenth century in Algeria and in Nigeria before the First World 
War. In 1910, Egypt was the first country that produced oil and in that period became 
the first key African oil-SURGXFLQJFRXQWU\+RZHYHU$IULFD¶VRLOSURGXFWLRQ
remained relatively small in the international oil markets until decolonization (Frynas 
and Paulo, 2007). 
The second scramble for Africa continued immediately after the first one ended with 
the granting of political independence to African states and during the ensuing Cold 
War (1947-1989) which transformed the newly independent African countries into 
proxy battlefields between the US and the Soviet Union, the post-WW II 
superpowers. African conflicts had little to do with the US and Soviet ideological 
rivalries, the former claiming to promote capitalism and the latter to promote 
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communism. Gaining strategic global power and securing African resources were the 
primary reasons behind their involvement (Clarke, 2008).  
Significant oil deposits began to be found and production in Africa increased rapidly 
during this period. ,Q$OJHULD¶V(GMHOHKDQG+DVVL0HVVDRXGRLOILHOGVEHJDQ
production in significant quantities (Aissaoui, 2001). In the same year, the first oil 
H[SRUWIURP*DERQWRRNSODFH<DWHVZKLOH1LJHULD¶VRLOSURGXFWLRQEHJDQ
(Frynas, 2000). In 1961, Libya entered the industry (Gurney, 1996). Between 1960 
and $IULFD¶VRLORXWSXWLQFUHDVHGPRUHWKDQ-fold. See Table 1 below for 
African oil output as a proportion of the world output in the period 1950-2010.   
Table 1: African and world oil output (million metric tons) (1950-2010) 
Year African output World output 
Africa as % of 
total world 
output 
Africa's 
main oil-
producin
g country 
1950 2.6 522.1 0.5 Egypt 
1953 2.9 659.4 0.4 Egypt 
1955 2 774 0.2 Egypt 
1957 2.7 887.4 0.3 Egypt 
1960 13.8 1,056.90 1.3 Algeria 
1962 38.9 1,220.80 3.2 Algeria 
1964 82.4 1,409.60 5.8 Libya 
1966 135.4 1,700.60 8 Libya 
1968 191 1,990.90 9.6 Libya 
1970 292.3 2,355.20 12.4 Libya 
1972 275.1 2,636.60 10.4 Libya 
1974 264.9 2,875.20 9.2 Nigeria 
1976 289 2,969.00 9.7 Nigeria 
1978 298 3,103.10 9.6 Libya 
1980 300.6 3,087.90 9.7 Nigeria 
1982 230.5 2,795.60 8.2 Nigeria 
1984 248.8 2,814.60 8.8 Nigeria 
1986 260.6 2,936.00 8.9 Nigeria 
1988 274.9 3,069.10 9 Nigeria 
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1990 320.9 3,170.60 10.1 Nigeria 
1992 335.3 3,189.70 10.5 Nigeria 
1994 333.9 3,236.90 10.3 Nigeria 
1996 355.9 3,375.90 10.5 Nigeria 
1998 363.9 3,547.60 10.3 Nigeria 
2000 373 3,613.80 10.3 Nigeria 
2002 375.2 3,593.70 10.4 Nigeria 
2004 441 3,865.30 11.4 Nigeria 
2006 473.3 3,908.80 12.1 Nigeria 
2008 488.1 3,928.80 12.4 Nigeria 
2010 517.5 4,216.54 12.3 Nigeria 
Source: 1950-64 data from Baker (1977 as illustrated in Frynas and Paulo, 2007); 1965-2008 
data (BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 2009); 2009-2010 data (US Energy 
Information Administration, 2011). 
 
1LJHULD¶VGDLO\RLOSURGXFWLRQURVHIURPEDUUHOVSHUGD\LQWRRYHU
million barrels in 1973 (Frynas, 2000) while 1LJHULD¶VRLOH[SRUWVLQSURSRUWLRQWRLWV
total exports rose sharply from 10 percent to 83.14 percent. Between 1970 and 1974, 
WKHUHZDVDVKDUSLQFUHDVHLQ1LJHULD¶VRLOFRQWULEXWLRQWRWRWDOJRYHUQPHQWUHYHQXH
from 26.3 to 82.1 percent (ibid.7KHµ2LO 6FUDPEOH¶OHGWRVLJQLILFDQWSROLWLFDO
economic and social changes, particularly in the key African oil-producing states 
such as Libya, Algeria and Nigeria. Many would expect Africa to escape from 
external exploitation after the national independence movements of the 1950s. 
However, Africa continued to fall prey to competing intervention between the US 
and the Soviet Union to secure resources from Africa during the Cold War era (1945-
1990) (Schraeder, 2001).  
However, the end of the Cold War did not end the international rivalry in Africa but 
was replaced by the Cold Peace in which most great powers compete for economic 
supremacy and a degree of political control in Africa (ibid.). Oil, economic and 
political interests were the main incentives. New powers emerged in this period of 
capitalism and globalization with the rising need in energy. The recent threats from 
terrorism urge on the issue of international security and the need for secure supplies. 
Given the new factors evolving as the twenty-first century started, the African 
continent has once again become a vital strategic area. The modern Scramble for 
$IULFD¶VRLOKDVVWDUWHGDQGWKLVWLPHPRUHFRPSHWLWLYHWKDQEHIRUHZLWKa diversity of 
foreign players and companies becoming involved. In 2006, there was a record 
growth of more than 78 percent in foreign direct investment, 50 percent of which was 
directed to oil and the rest concentrated in a few resource industries, namely gas and 
mining (World Investment Report, 2006). The region is now the scene of one of the 
most sweeping resource grabs (Behar, 2008). A senior official of the US State 
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'HSDUWPHQWVXJJHVWHGWKDW$IULFDQRLOLVQRZWKHµRQO\JDPHLQWRZQ¶)U\QDVDQG
Paulo, 2007: 247). Many new frontiers were tested and new production came on-
stream. Foreign players are using new strategies that have never before been applied 
in this new oil game. Few existing local maps of Africa are rarely as extensive as the 
maps drawn out by the oil companies which contain activities such as oil exploration 
blocks, operations and facilities rather than political, geographical or ecological 
features. Modern oil cartography has assisted penetration into Africa and its future 
development (Clarke, 2008). 
A recent report by oil giant Royal Dutch Shell suggests that the scramble for oil is 
the only possible option for the time being. The report predicts that in the next 
decade the worst-case scenario would be that the world's governments will engage in 
an increasingly ruthless "scramble" to secure energy supplies and natural resources, 
possibly causing global conflicts and severe environmental destruction. The best-
case scenario Shell predicts could happen if the governments coordinate "blueprints" 
for the future which uphold sustainability, acting with co-commitments, efficiency 
and speed (Behar, 2008) but this is unlikely to occur in the foreseeable future. Map 1 
below shows that oil activities in Africa are now active. 
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Map 1: Oil Activities in Africa 
 
  
Source: National Geographic (2005); Garry and Karl (2003: 43)
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Africa is an area of intensive foreign interventions involving many players seeking a 
varied combination of self-interests. There are a number of discussions on foreign 
intervention in Africa that are worth highlighting here. Although they are not the 
focus of this thesis, they form part of the foreign interventions in Africa which 
undermine African political, economic and societal systems and rob Africa of the 
chance to fully develop its resource potential. 
Amin (1976) and Gordon (2001), for instance, discuss how colonialism and its 
legacies underdevelop Africa in general. Taylor and Williams (2004) explore in 
detail the special relationship between France and Africa and the lower key but still 
special relationship between Britain and Africa. Despite Britain lacking an African 
policy, Williams (2004) shows that Britain continues to provide significant military 
VXSSOLHVWRVHYHUDO$IULFDQVWDWHV9DOOHHH[DPLQHV)UDQFH¶VVWURQJ
Francophone monetary policy, which has preserved French influence throughout 
Africa and in return provided France with enormous gains.  Brune (1995) and 
Adebajo (1997) explain French political meddling and its support of corrupt regimes 
in Africa and how this undermines good governance. Apart from France, there are 
discussions on the heavy involvement of other main players in Africa, such as the 
US, Germany and Japan, whose active policies and actions continue to affect the 
future of African politics and society (Aluko, 1987; Nester, 1992; Schraeder, 1994; 
Hofmeier, 1994; Morikawa, 1997). Patman (1990) discusses Russian influence in 
$IULFD7KHUHDUHDOVRGLVFXVVLRQVRI&KLQD¶V35&RQ-going diplomatic battle with 
Taiwan in Africa for the purpose of political recognition (Larkin, 1971; Snow, 1988; 
Xuetong, 1988).  Some explore other communist-bloc countries that once established 
privileged relations with Africa (Mesa-Lago and Belkin, 1982; Winrow, 1990). 
+DYLQJGHILQHGµIRUHLJQLQWHUYHQWLRQV¶WKLVFKDSWHUQRZPRYHRQWRGLVFXVVWKHRULHV
surrounding foreign interventions and the role of Africa in the world, followed by the 
WKHVLV¶K\SRWKHVLVGHYHORSHGIURPWKHVHWKHRULHV 
 
Theories and Hypotheses 
African issues are infrequently debated in terms of international relations theories 
while the debates between different IR schools on international systems are often 
quite fierce (Clapham, 1987). Although Africa has been engaged in global trade 
VLQFHWKHQLQHWHHQWKFHQWXU\WKHFRQWLQHQW¶VSRVLWLRQLQWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOV\VWHPLV
PDUJLQDO(QJHODQG2OVHQFDOOWKLVµDVWULNLQJGXDlity between 
PDUJLQDOL]DWLRQDQGJOREDOL]DWLRQ¶0XFKRIZKDWH[LVWVRQ$IULFDLQ,5WKHRULHVLVDV
a part of North-South relations, with the emphasis in the North. African debates 
FRXOGEHJURXSHGLQWRWZRPDLQWKHPHVWKHDVVHVVPHQWRI$IULFD¶VHFRQRPLFand 
VWUDWHJLFUROHIURPWKH1RUWK¶VYLHZSRLQWDQGWKHFKDQJLQJVWUXFWXUHRI$IULFDQ
states. Empirical research on Africa generally has dealt with specific problems rather 
than theories (ibid.). Exclusion from the IR mainstream means there is little 
theoretical content to better understand Africa (Croft, 1997). Hans Morgenthau, a 
FODVVLFDOUHDOLVWIRUH[DPSOHVWDWHVWKDW$IULFDZDVDµSROLWLFDOO\HPSW\VSDFH¶EHIRUH
the First World War (Morgenthau and Thompson, 1985: 369). Waltz (1979) 
demonstrates that the discussion of IR theories is based on the great powers. With 
regard to interventions, realists see these as ordinary means to secure power in an 
international anarchy (Hoffmann, 2001).  
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Interdependency theories, coming from a neo-liberalist perspective, FULWLFL]HUHDOLVWV¶
focus on the great powers as being too narrow when theorizing international 
relations. They argue that countries are tied together in a complex system of 
interdependency and that states are not the only important actors. Although it could 
be expected that this notion should lead to more focus on the peripheries, this did not 
happen.1 
$IULFDQRLOKDVORQJDQGKLVWRULFURRWV$IULFD¶VUHVRXUFHVSRWHQWLDOKDVEHHQ
recognised for well over half a century. However, published work barely mentions 
ZKDWKDSSHQVLQVLGH$IULFD¶VRLOJDPH7KXVDODFNRINQRZOHGJHRI$IULFD¶VRLO
history and many prevailing myths hinder the understanding of the impact of the oil 
industry on Africa (Clarke 2009). The lack of theoretical debate on Africa, its place 
in global politics - with specific reference to the oil industry - is the core inspiration 
of this thesis. Realism may explain the reasons states intervene, focusing on power 
DQGVXUYLYDO+RZHYHUUHDOLVPGRHVQRWDQVZHUWKHµKRZ¶TXHVWLRQWKDWLVKRZ
foreign interventions contribute to the resource curse phenomenon and this leads to 
the hypothesis below.  
Historical research shows that the neo-colonialism concept explains foreign 
interventions better with particular respect to how foreign interventions are carried 
out and what impacts these actions may have, which are the focus of this research. 
Neo-colonialism explains the sustaining system of colonial exploitation and 
dependency even after a colonised territory has achieved independence (Asante, 
1989). It refers to the involvement of more powerful countries in the affairs of less 
SRZHUIXORQHV(YHQZLWKRXWGLUHFWPLOLWDU\FRQWUROWKH\WHQGWRPDLQWDLQDµde 
IDFWR¶ control over less powerful nations via indirect domination by political, 
economic, social, military and technical means. In other words, neo-colonialism can 
be defined as the survival of the colonial system.  
By and large, neo-colonialism assumes the continued control by former colonial 
powers as well as that of the new players. The concept of neo-colonialism was 
predominantly described by dependency theory (a neo-Marxist variant) that 
resources are extracted from the periphery of poor underdeveloped states and flow 
towards the rich states at the centre in order to sustain their economic wealth. This 
LPSRVHGLQWHJUDWLRQRI$IULFDLQWRWKHµZRUOGV\VWHP¶UHVXOWVLQGHHSHU
impoverishment. The Marxist standpoint has thus been selected for answering the 
research question of this study and for analysing the negative linkages between the 
neo-colonial foreign scramble of Africa and the resource curse. However, the 
Marxist view contrasts with that of free market economists, who argue that full 
integration into the world market is beneficial and necessary for economic 
development. It is also contrary to tKHYLHZWKDW$IULFD¶VXQGHUGHYHORSPHQWLVFDXVHG
by African internal politics (Bayart, 1993). Chapter 3 discusses theories related to 
foreign interventions and neo-colonialism in oil-rich African countries in detail. 
This study revolves around a fundamental research hypothesis.  It proposes that: 
µ)RUHLJQLQWHUYHQWLRQVPD\FRQWULEXWHWRRULQFUHDVHWKHOLNHOLKRRGRIWKHUHVRXUFH
FXUVH¶7KHK\SRWKHVLVWKLVUHVHDUFKIRUPVLVEDVHGPDLQO\RQWKHUHVRXUFHFXUVH
                                                          
1
 The only impact liberalism and neo-liberalism had on theorizing Africa was the theories of 
development and not Africa in IR (Dickson, 1997; Engel and Olsen, 2005).  
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theory and neo-colonialism concept. Apart from factors addressed by the existing 
literature of the resource curse, namely government policies and misallocation, social 
foundations, resource types and the country size (detailed in Chapter 2) this research 
hypothesizes that foreign interventions create a strong linkage to the resource curse. 
Multiple foreign players, by globally reproducing and expanding capital through the 
FRQWURORIRLODUHOLQNHGWR$IULFD¶VUHVRXUFHFXUVH 
 
Operationalisation 
This section discusses what the independent and dependent variables for the research 
design are; why African oil-rich countries and certain foreign players are chosen for 
the research and why oil is a crucial matter for interventions; and what research 
methods are used in finding out the answer. 
Independent and Dependent Variables 
Foreign interventions, as discussed above, are the independent variable with the 
VSHFLILFLQGHSHQGHQWYDULDEOHEHLQJIRUHLJQLQWHUYHQWLRQLQ$IULFD¶VRLOLQGXVWULHV
The dominant actors are the US, UK, France, China and transnational agencies. To 
measure foreign intervention, we explore the policies and practices used by foreign 
players to secure oil supplies. For states, the overwhelming need for energy security 
crosses departments dealing with foreign affairs, defence, finance, the economy, 
development and the environment. For transnatinal agencies, activities used for 
enhancing their oil profits are explored. Foreign players use a combination of 
instruments to deliver these oil-related policies including the military, trade 
negotiations, sanctions, financial aid and arms deals. 
The dependent variable of this research is the resource curse, the symptoms of which 
are any one of poor economic performance, civil war and bad governance. That is to 
say, oil-related foreign interventions tend to contribute to the resource curse in 
Africa. This study does not aim to claim that any of these symptoms is caused by 
foreign interventions only. Rather, foreign interventions may contribute to the 
resource curse which, in many cases, is an intimate combination of the three 
symptoms above. For example, foreign intervention may start by prolonging and 
intensifying an existing conflict and allowing bad regimes to continue, which over an 
extended period results in economic collapse of the state. When these policies are 
implemented, especially in the context of, or at the expense of, other states, 
particularly poor developing ones with low institutional capacity, they may 
contribute to the resource curse. In conclusion, this research attempts to link foreign 
intervention as a contributory causal mechanism of the resource curse. Thus, foreign 
intervention in the African oil industries is an independent variable of this research 
while the consequent resource curse is the dependent variable. 
 
Location 
Being one of the richest continents in natural resources, Africa represents one of the 
most obvious examples of the resource curse. Africa is estimated to possess 99 
SHUFHQWRIWKHZRUOG¶VFKURPHUHVRXUFHVSHUFHQWRILWVSODWLQXPSHUFHQWRILWV
tantalite, 68 percent of its cobalt and 54 percent of its gold. It has significant oil and 
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JDVUHVHUYHV$IULFD¶VRLOUHVHUYHVUDQNVHFRQGWRWKH0LGGOH(DVW¶VZKLOHSURYHGJDV
reserves comes third to the Middle East and Eurasia (BP Statistical review of World 
Energy, 2011). Africa also holds timber, diamond and bauxite deposits (Alao, 2007). 
If the conventional wisdom which indicates that natural abundance equates to 
economic development is true, Africa should be a very wealthy continent (Yager, 
Bermúdez-Lugo et al., 2007). Yet, it is more impoverished today than before the 
discovery of these resources. Wars have been on-going and political instability is 
endemic.  
7DEOHEHORZVKRZVWKDW$IULFD¶VVKDUHRIWKHH[SRUWYDOXHRIIXHOVRUHVDQG
metals ranks second highest aQGKLJKHVWIRUDJULFXOWXUDOUDZPDWHULDOV<HW$IULFD¶V
financial development ranks almost the lowest. The table also shows the contrasting 
case of North America whose resource exports rank among the lowest but whose 
financial development is strikingly high. Figure 1, following, further shows that 
resource-poor countries have high economic growth. These are China, Korea, Hong 
Kong and Thailand with almost no resource exports. Resource-rich countries, on the 
contrary, suffer economic decline despite having 80 percent of their exports as 
resource commodities. These countries include Nigeria, Zambia and Venezuela. 
7DEOH:RUOG¶V5HVRXUFHVDQG*URZWK9RODWLOLW\DQG)LQDQFLDO'HYHORSPHQW 
 
Source: Van der Ploeg (2007) 
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Figure 1: Growth and Natural Resource Abundance 
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Africa is one of the largest oil-exporting regions, ranking third to the Middle East 
and the former Soviet Union respectively (BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 
2011). The production trend is likely to increase dramatically in the upcoming years 
VLQFHPRVWRIWKLVUHJLRQ¶VRLOUHVRXUFHVKDYHQRW\HWEHHQGHYHORSHG7KHHFRQRPLF
potential is high, when compared to other sources such as Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, 
Norway and the US whose resources are mature. Africa, especially the Gulf of 
Guinea, is becoming an increasingly important energy supply source to the world as 
an alternative to the politically unstable Middle-East. A new actor with rising energy 
QHHGVLVDSSHDULQJLQ$IULFD¶VRLOLQGXVWU\QDPHO\&KLQD7KHDWWHQWLRQWRRLOLV
being shifted to Africa which has become a region of strategic geopolitical 
importance and a target for foreign interventions (Shaxson, 2007; Ghazvinian, 2007; 
ECON Analysis AS, 2004). 
Africa is also specific in that it had been colonized by various foreign powers and for 
a much longer time than other oil-exporting regions. The colonial era left ties, on-
going interventions and intricacy as legacies. However, this study does not claim to 
argue that Africa is the only case which suffers from the oil-struggle. The foreign 
scramble for oil apparently also causes negative outcomes in the Middle East. 
Although the former Soviet Union is the second largest oil exporter, the complexity 
of foreign interventions in this region is less than others. Oil has been mainly 
controOOHGE\5XVVLD¶VWLJKWJULSRQLWVQDWLRQDORLOFRPSDQ\*D]SURP,WVPDLQRLO
exports go to Europe and China. It has not been colonized unlike other oil-exporting 
regions such as the Middle East, Africa or Latin America.  
The factor behind the growing attention to African energy supplies is that the world 
oil production is only just meeting the rising world demand and old fields are being 
drained at a rate faster than new production can be brought in. This factor raises 
issues of national security which will intensify as world oil demand increases. It is 
SUHGLFWHGWKDWµHDV\RLO¶LVQRZUDUHDQGWKDWWKHDJHRIµWRXJKRLO¶KDVDUULYHGZKHQ
extraction requires complex technology and involves hazardous environmental 
impact often in conflict-prone locations (Hubbert, 1959; Klare, 2008). In the midst of 
rising demands and depleting supplies, sub-6DKDUDQ$IULFD¶VSURYHQUHVHUYHV
increased by 56 percent between 1996 and 2006, compared to 12 percent for the rest 
of the world (BP Statistical Review, 2007).  
Although $IULFD¶VSURYHQSHWUROHXPUHVHUYHVDUHQRWDVJUHDWDVWKH3HUVLDQ*XOI¶VLW
has more than enough potential for the region to provide production to keep markets 
calm when supplies from elsewhere are unstable. In other words, it can act as a 
µVZLQJUHJLRQ¶DQGDVDFRQVHTXHQFHLWLVWKHVXEMHFWRIILHUFHFRPSHWLWLRQSince the 
1970s Arab oil embargo, oil supply diversification has been an international goal and 
is a prerequisite to freedom of action in foreign policy. The African Oil Policy 
Initiative GrouS$23,*UHSRUWVWDWHGWKDWµ:HVW$IULFDRIIHUVWKH
TXLFNHVWPRVWVHFXUHDQGOHDVWFRPSOLFDWHGSRWHQWLDOIRUVXFKDQLQFUHDVH¶2LO-
LPSRUWLQJVWDWHVKDYHXQGHUVWRRGWKDWWKHZRUOG¶VRYHU-reliance on a few hot spots for 
energy supplies creates a great risk of supply disruptions and price volatility; hence 
they attempt to reduce their dependence on Middle Eastern oil (Klare, Volman et al., 
2006).  
For the US and China, it is obvious that both are increasingly putting assets into 
Africa at a time of growing instability and greater competition for resources 
(McLeary, 2007). Africa will increasingly play an important role in global energy 
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markets as it is predicted to provide more than 25 percent of North American oil 
imports by 2015 (National Intelligence Council, 2000). This projected oil volume 
would put Africa well ahead of Saudi Arabia as a supplier for the US. Besides, much 
RI$IULFD¶VRLOLVRIIVKRUHPDNLQJLWLPPXQHIURPGRPHVWLFSROLWLFDORUVRFLDOXQUHVW
and can be delivered directly and swiftly to the US via open sea (AOPIG, 2002). 
Western Europe has placed a similar emphasis on West Africa. Export volumes from 
WKLVUHJLRQDUHOLNHO\WRLQFUHDVHGXHWRLWVµVZHHWFUXGH¶TXDOLW\ZKLFKLVFKHDSHUWR
refine. West African producers also have not yet developed production conservation 
policies, making them highly export-oriented (Clarke, 2008). 
$IULFD¶VRLOPDUNHWVDUHJHQHUDOO\RSHQWRIRUHLJQSDUWLFLSDWLRQForeign companies 
find it more appealing to do business in Africa than in the Middle East, Venezuela, or 
even the Caspian region, where state-owned firms like Saudi Aramco, PdVSA and 
KazMunaiGaz operate under tight government supervision, restricting opportunities 
for profitable deals (Gary and Karl, 2003). There are also political risks, smaller 
opportunities, overly-tough fiscal terms and nationalization attempts in the Middle 
East, Latin America and the Caspian region. Consequently, Africa continues to 
attract foreign oil companies, especially when they have few trained professionals of 
their own to develop the oil industry. 
Over 50 percent of all foreign direct investment in Africa goes to oil investment and 
almost 90 percent of all foreign mergers and acquisitions since 2003 have been in the 
mining and petroleum sector (Watts, 2006). Since 1990, the petroleum industry alone 
has invested more than $70 billion in Africa, which accounts for the largest 
LQYHVWPHQWLQWKHFRQWLQHQW¶VKLVWRU\7KUHHRIWKHZRUOG¶VODUJHVWRLOFRPSDQLHV- 
$PHULFD¶V&KHYURQ7H[DFR)UDQFH¶V7RWDODQG%ULWLVK-Dutch consortium Shell - are 
spending a huge amount of their global exploration and production budgets in Africa 
(over 35 percent, 30 percent and 15 percent respectively). The US oil companies 
have invested more than $50 billion in the region over the last decade. 
ChevronTexaco alone invested $20 billion in African projects over a five-year period 
(Klare, 2005). By 2010, the major oil consulting company IHS Energy predicts that 
African oil production, especially in the Gulf of Guinea (see Map 1), will attract 
massive exploration investment of over 30 percent of the total world oil investment 
(Watts, 2006). 
The reason for attention and intervention in Africa today is precisely what made it 
attractive to foreign predators in previous centuries: a vast abundance of vital raw 
materials contained in a deeply divided and weak continent, remarkably open to 
international exploitation (Klare, 2008). Africa LVWKHZRUOG¶VJUHDWHVWIURQWLHULQRLO
exploration. This, however, happens in the midst of continuing struggles within 
African states for a share of the oil wealth. The struggles often involve armed 
conflicts, a pattern likely to continue in the future (Clarke, 2008). 
 
Intervening Players 
After discussing why Africa is chosen for this study, we now look at why certain 
intervening players are chosen as another part of the operationalisation of this thesis 
and why oil is such a crucial subject as the goal of interventions. Based on the 
concept of neo-colonialism, the study covers both old and new players, of which 
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there are many. This study focuses on the main ones: Britain, France, the US, China 
and transnational agencies. Most investment in Africa originates from Britain and 
France with which there are historical colonial ties. French oil company Total has 
made large investments in Francophone countries including Chad, Gabon, Senegal 
and Cameroon (Gary and Karl, 2003). Furthermore, Britain and France have 
provided exceptional aid and debt reliefs to former colonies, particularly oil-
exporting countries such as Nigeria and Cameroon, in exchange for oil benefits while 
aid to other poorer states is comparatively low (Klare, 2008). These moves are 
considered to be neo-colonial.1 
Neo-colonialism assumes continued foreign interventions have not only taken place 
but have been there for centuries from the discovery of the African continent, the 
colonial era and the new scramble for Africa (Ghazvinian, 2007; Clarke, 2008). Neo-
colonialism explains that former colonizing states and other economically powerful 
states maintain a continuing presence in the economies of former colonies, especially 
where raw materials are concerned. Stronger nations are thus accused of intervening 
in the governance and economies of weaker nations to maintain the flow of such 
material, at prices and under conditions of excessive self-interest. The forces of neo-
colonialism did not comprise former colonial powers alone, however. Theorists also 
saw other powerful states such as the US and China as increasingly dominant 
purveyors of neo-colonialism in Africa, especially where oil is involved (see Chapter 
3). The US  involvement became prominent in Africa during the Cold War while 
China has dramatically established its position in Africa since becoming an economic 
superpower following its open-market policy in the late 1990s/ early 2000s (Taylor, 
2006).  
In addition to state players, international organizations and multinational 
corporations (MNCs) play very important roles in oil industries and development in 
Africa and are thus included as another neo-colonial player. MNCs are frequently 
used as a tool to advance state foreign policies. European imperial power was 
predominantly exercised through multinational companies as they expanded their 
empires abroad. China and the US have now joined as dominant players in using the 
strength of their companies to gain strategic power overseas while companies also 
receive considerable support from their states. China, particularly, has successfully 
used this formula in Africa. However, oil companies have often acted individually as 
their influence is increasingly growing both domestically and overseas. Oil 
FRUSRUDWLRQVSOD\DQLPSRUWDQWUROHLQ$IULFD¶VIXWXUH$SSUR[LPDWHO\RLO
companies now participate in African oil exploration (Clarke, 2008). Based on neo-
colonialism, which helps explain continued interventions, this thesis examines both 
old and new foreign players which intervene in Africa for its oil. Oil is a crucial 
subject for interventions. Oil is QRZFRQVLGHUHGWKHZRUOG¶VPRVWYDOXDEOHUHVRXUFH
,WLVWKHOLIHEORRGRIWKHQDWLRQV¶HFRQRPLFDFWLYLWLHV(LJKW\-five percent of global 
transportation depends on oil. Petroleum also provides basic raw materials for most 
industries such as plastics, pharmaceuticals and textiles. Agriculture needs these key 
materials such as pesticides and herbicides and petroleum. Affordable travel has also 
generated a boom for the tourism/recreation industry (Yergin, 1993). Without cheap 
                                                          
1
 Exploitation of African elites is discussed in Chapter 3 where neo-colonialism is further discussed. 
However, this is not the topic of this study which focuses on foreign players. Furthermore, this study 
argues that foreign players take part in shaping and exacerbating the troubled African political terrain.  
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oil, many large enterprises like automobile manufacture, chemical industry and large 
airline and freight companies would be unable to start or survive. These firms have 
generated much national wealth from massive employment.  
Superpowers rely on oil. Europe (by 2008) was importing more than half of its oil 
consumption from overseas and this trend is expected to exceed 70 percent in 2030 if 
no significant strategy is put in place (Euractiv, 2011). For Europe, Africa is the 
second largest oil exporter after the former Soviet Union. One-fourth of European oil 
supplies are already coming from Africa. The United States now also relies on 
imported petroleum for over half of its total supply; 25 percent of this comes from 
Africa. With domestic reserves facing long-term decline, it can only become more 
intensely dependent on foreign sources. Thus, the US is increasingly exposed to the 
violence and disorder that accompanies oil extraction in politically unstable, and 
often hostile, oil-SURGXFLQJFRXQWULHV.ODUH&KLQD¶VPRYHIURPEHLQJDQRLO
exporter to an oil importer in 1993 was a significant objective in its development of 
oil industries in Africa.  
China needs massive energy supplies to sustain its rapid economic growth of around 
9 percent every year in the last decade (Zweig and Jianhai, 2005). In 2003, China 
H[FHHGHG-DSDQWREHFRPHWKHZRUOG¶VVHFRQG-largest energy consumer. In 2010, 
&KLQDKDVEHFRPHWKHZRUOG¶VODUJHVWHQHUJ\FRQVXPHURYHUWDNLQJWKH86
(Andrews-6SHHGDQG'DQQUHXWKHU&KLQD¶VFRQVXPSWLRQLVWKHVRXUFHRI
percent of the growth in world oil demand in the last four years (US Energy 
Information Administration, 2010; the Council on Foreign Relations, cited in Frynas 
and Paulo, 2007). In 2020, this consumption will amount to 450 million tons, 60 
SHUFHQWRIZKLFKZRXOGEHLPSRUWV&KLQD¶VIDVW-growing thirst for oil has led 
Beijing to seek new supplies throughout the world, especially for untapped reserves 
in faraway places (Leech, 2006). The US-led military occupation of Iraq in 2003 and 
WKHGLVSXWHVRYHU,UDQ¶VQXFOHDUSURJUDPPHDUHIDFWRUVPDNLQJWKH0LGGOH(DVWOHVV
attractive for investment (Alden, 2007). This search has taken Chinese firms into 
many parts in Africa.  
As a result, international competition for the same unreliable sources of supply is 
destined to grow. Besides, while energy officials continue insisting that supplies will 
NHHSH[SDQGLQJVRPHH[SHUWVDUJXHGWKDWRLORXWSXWZLOOUHDFKµSHDN¶SRLQW
worldwide and then begin a permanent decline (Hubbert, 1959). If these predictions 
prove correct, less oil will be available, competition for it will increase and, 
unavoidably, the struggle for its control will become more pressing.  
Security strategists and policymakers acknowledge the essential role oil plays in 
national security. Oil is a determinant of well-being, of national security and 
international power (Ebel, 2002). It is more than a single commodity to be bought 
and sold on the international market. Nations have depended on foreign supplies for 
critical materials like copper and cobalt, but this dependence has rarely shaped 
government policy (Klare, 2005). Oil, however, has been treated far more seriously. 
As Yergin (1993: 774) put it, oil is IXQGDPHQWDOµQRWFKHDSRLOEXWUDWKHURLODVD
FULWLFDOHOHPHQWLQWKHJOREDOEDODQFHRISRZHU¶2LODQGH[WHUQDOPLOLWDU\
involvement have been linked since the beginning of the twentieth century. Oil has 
always been associated with wars. Both World Wars had an element of oil as a 
reason for the war, an incentive of securing supplies and a way allowing war to carry 
RQ*HOSNH&DGXIIHWDO2LO¶VDVVRFLDWLRQZLWKZDUVLQFOXGHVWKH(J\SW-
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Israel war, Iraq-Iran war, the Palestinian problem, Darfur, the Gulf Wars and the 
US/UK Iraq insurgency of 2003.  
More oil is coming from less stable places (ibid.). As Vice President Dick Cheney 
VDLGZKLOHWKH&(2RI+DOOLEXUWRQµ7KHSUREOHPLVWKDWWKHJRRG/RUGGLGQ¶WVHHILW
to always put oil and gas resources where there are democratic governments 
3HWUROHXP)LQDQFH:HHN¶2LOKDVDQLPPHQVHLPSDFWRQWKHPDVV
population. A state wishing to thrive faces the need to secure oil supplies. Petroleum 
plays an essential role in national defence to power the ships, planes, helicopters and 
armoured vehicles, to transport troops and deliver weapons into battle. Without a 
reliable supply of oil, the Defence Force could neither rush to distant battlefields nor 
maintain its capacity once deployed (Painter, 2002)$VVXSHUSRZHUV¶RLOUHVHUYHVDUH
depleting due to sharp rises in consumption, they started to bind oil interests to 
foreign policy and national security (DeNovo, 1956; Rutledge, 2005).  
Oil security is suEMHFWWRD³IHDUIDFWRU´'LVUXSWLRQVRIWHQIROORZDFWVRIZDULQWHUQDO
unrest, or an act of terrorism. Any of these disruptions tend to push up prices. The 
graph below shows that oil prices vary in response to the world events including the 
Iranian revolution, Iraq invading Kuwait, the Asian Economic Crisis and the 
Invasion of Iraq.  
 
Figure 3: Crude Oil Prices 1861-2010 (US Dollars per Barrel) and the World 
Events 
 
Source: BP Statistic Review of World Energy (2011) 
Energy security policies mostly include seeking a stable oil supply, at affordable 
prices, from multiple suppliers. The global oil market strains in 2004-2005 upgraded 
WKHLPSRUWDQFHRIWKH*XOIRI*XLQHD¶VRLOVXSSO\*ROGZ\QDQG0RUULVRQ
David Goldwyn, a former Assistant Energy Secretary in the Clinton administration, 
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QRWHGLQµ:HDUHLQQRSRVLWLRQWRHQGXUHDVHULRXVRLOVXSSO\GLVUXSWLRQIURP
WKH*XOIRI*XLQHDWRGD\7KHJOREDORLOPDUNHWLVVWUHWFKHGWRFDSDFLW\¶/HHFK
2006: 113). The US is an obvious case demonstrating that oil security is important to 
national security. Any external threat to energy supplies could trigger a direct 
military response from the US (Fuerth, 2005).  
Oil is non-renewable and its supplies are finite. The energy consumption of new 
industrializing nations such as China and India has dramatically increased. The ever-
JURZLQJJOREDOGHPDQGIRURLOUHVXOWHGLQDUDFHWRFRQWUROWKHZRUOG¶VUHVHUYHV
&KLQD¶VHFRQRPLFJURZWKVXJJHVWVWKDWLWPD\VRRQEHFRPHWKHQH[WVXSHUSRZHUWR
seriously challenge US hegemony, which could potentially lead to a new cold war 
PRWLYDWHGQRWE\LGHRORJ\EXWUDWKHUDGHVLUHWRFRQWUROWKHZRUOG¶VUHVRXUFHV/HHFK
$SDUWIURPWKHDFFHVVWR$IULFD¶VFKHDSDQGUHOLDEOHORZ-sulphur oil, the 
strategic interest of the US is also to keep the aggressive new actors in African oil 
industries such as China, India or Islamic terror at bay (Watts, 2006). For a world 
VXSHUSRZHUOLNHWKH86&KLQD¶VULVLQJGHPDQGDQGFRPSHWLWLRQIRURLOUHVRXUFHV
especially in Africa, is a threat. SiPLODUO\WKHQHZHPHUJLQJVWDWHVWKUHDWHQ(XURSH¶V
African interests so European states have increasingly sought to secure oil interests 
there (Chapter 3 further discusses foreign involvements in securing oil interests).  
$SDUWIURPVWDWHV¶DQGFRPSDQLHV¶involvement, it is worth noting that there are also 
a large number of informal sectors such as criminal networks, rogue companies, 
shadowy brokers and middlemen who are involved in the illicit exploitation of oil 
resource, some in collaboration with rebel groups and government elites in conflict 
realms, although the latter is not the focus of this study (Feeney and Kenny, 2005). 
While the majority of oil produced in the developing world fuels the economies of 
the developed world, it has been a cause of conflicts and economic and political 
underdevelopment in the former. There are thus non-negligible moral, political, and 
even legal obligations for governments and companies in the developed world that 
arise from their commercial linkages with local conflicts and underdevelopment 
(Ballentine and Nitzchke, 2005).  
 
Methods 
Having discussed what the independent and dependent variables of this study are, 
and why oil-rich African countries and certain foreign players are chosen for this 
study, we now turn to discuss methods used in finding out the answer as the last part 
LQRSHUDWLRQDOL]LQJWKHUHVHDUFKGHVLJQ7KHUHVHDUFKTXHVWLRQµwhat impacts do oil-
related foreign interventions have on Africa and do these have a tendency to 
contribute to the resource curse?¶WDps into two major underexplored topics: 
IRUHLJQLQYHQWLRQVLQ$IULFD¶VRLOULFKFRXQWULHVDQGLWVUHODWLRQWRWKHUHVRXUFHFXUVH
This requires an extensive amount of investigation. While examining the overall 
impacts of foreign interventions on African oil-rich countries, this study devotes a 
particular focus on Nigeria as a case study.  
,QDQVZHULQJWKHIRUPHUSDUWRIWKHUHVHDUFKTXHVWLRQµZKDWLPSDFWVRLO-related 
IRUHLJQLQWHUYHQWLRQVKDYHRQ$IULFD¶RLO-related foreign interventions must first be 
described. This research compiles a series of oil-related foreign interventions in 
African countries by drawing historical evidence from a number of different sources. 
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Due to the secrecy nature and the limited data availability on the topic, data are often 
contradictory and disaggregated. This study avoids bias and misinformation by 
deliberately seeking data from various sources.  
Primary data is derived from analyses of documents such as official government 
publications, policy papers, international organizatLRQV¶VWDWLVWLFVPHHWLQJEULHILQJV
memos, relevant periodicals from both local and international sources, oil 
FRPSDQLHV¶DQG1RQ-JRYHUQPHQWDO2UJDQL]DWLRQV¶1*2VEXOOHWLQVQHZVOHWWHUVDQG
press releases. To supplement existing data, in-depth interviews, focus group 
discussions and participant observation are also selected as primary sources. In-depth 
interviews are conducted among policy makers, oil workers, academics, 
environmental specialists, community leaders, affected locals and leading activists 
directly related to the African oil industry. Focus group discussions were carried out 
with community groups and organizations such as Environmental Rights Actions 
(ERA) and Social Action.  
The primary data collection was carried out in South Africa, an African industrial 
and political centre, as well as in Nigeria, which is the case study of this thesis. For 
Nigeria, interviews with politicians, oil executives and oil-related business personnel 
were conducted in Lagos while interviews with affected locals, community leaders, 
specialists and activists were mostly conducted in a number of oil-hosting 
communities in the Niger Delta. The list of interviewees is provided in the appendix. 
Secondary data is extracted from literature, academic journals, seminar papers, 
unpublished theses and electronic databases. 
That this area remains sparsely researched in the academic literature may reflect the 
SUDFWLFDOFKDOOHQJHVLQYROYHGLQFOXGLQJWKHVHFUHF\RIRLO¶VFRQWURYHUVLDOPDWWHU
Interviews with key political figures DQGVWUDWHJLFFRPSDQLHV¶SHUVRQQHOFRXOGRQO\
be conducted using snowball sampling and after much sought-after access through a 
gatekeeper. Interviews were begun with a few key informants whom I had identified 
from literature, previous contacts and internet searches. I then asked them to name 
other key informants to be seen relevant to the subject. The information collected 
was then used to develop hypotheses or tentative generalizations for further research. 
Snowball sampling is more suitable for in-depth interviewing than survey research 
(Burnham et al., 2008). I used open-ended questions to allow informants the freedom 
to bring up issues they feel are important. Data obtained from interviews and focus 
group discussion also provided substantial answers to the latter part of research 
question about the tendency of foreign interventions to contribute to the resource 
curse. 
I interviewed 102 people, conducted 12 focus group studies, and extract relevant data 
from 7 speeches, 6 conferences, workshop and roundtable. The interviewees 
comprise various groups of people directly associated with oil operations and their 
impacts including international and national diplomats, local leaders and policy 
practitioners, local populations, church leaders, NGO activists, policy drivers in 
transnational agencies, consultants, experts, journalists, leading staff in financial 
companies, oil companies and oil services companies. 
The international diplomats I interviewed, for instance, included the Deputy Director 
General of the Norwegian Ministry of Environment; The Gabonese Honorary Consul 
of the Kingdom of the Netherlands; the Second Secretary Political Affairs and 
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+XPDQ5LJKWVRIWKH5R\DO1HWKHUODQGV(PEDVV\LQ1LJHULDWKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQ¶V
Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid. The national diplomats I interviewed are 
mainly Nigerian diplomats since Nigeria is a specific case of this study, including the 
Director of Nigerian Central bank, the Presidential Candidate of Nigeria, the Director 
of the Nigerian Department of Petroleum Resources, Chairman Subcommittee on 
Local Content and the Member of Parliament for Delta State and the Ministry of 
$JULFXOWXUH¶V3URJUDPPH'LUHFWRUthe Former Trade Union Leader; the Former 
Nigerian Civil Defense Leader; and the former State Secretary. Additionally, I also 
interviewed national diplomats of other African nations including, for example, Head 
RI3HWUROHXP([SORUDWLRQDQG([SORLWDWLRQ'HSDUWPHQWRIWKH5HSXEOLFRI1LJHU¶V
Ministry of Mines and Energy; Minister of Mauritanian Energy and Petroleum; 
'LUHFWRU2SHUDWLRQRI(TXDWRULDO*XLQHD¶V0LQLVWU\RI3HWUROHXP3HWUROHXP
&RPPLVVLRQHURI1DPLELD¶V0LQLVWU\RI0LQHV+HDGRI3HWUROHXP2SHUDWLRQV-
(WKLRSLD¶V0LQLVWU\RI0LQHVDQG(QHUJ\+HDGRI2IILFHRIWKH6LHUUD/HRQHDQ
President Petroleum 5HVRXUFHV8QLW8JDQGD¶V+HDGRI3HWUROHXP([SORUDWLRQDQG
Production Department; and the former Presidential Candidate of Ghana. Moreover, 
I also interviewed local policy practitioners in Nigeria including the Chairman of 
Governance Technical Team, Bayelsa state; the Chairman of Central Development 
Council for Ibaramatu Community. These interviews provide insights to the 
international and national policy engagement behind the oil industries of Africa and 
the mechanisms and channels through which these policies are implemented at the 
local levels.  
To understand the impacts and experiences related to oil industries, I interviewed 
local populations whose areas are directly affected by oil operations; as well as 
religious leaders, in several communities in the main oil-producing states of the 
Niger Delta including Rivers State, Bayelsa State and Delta State. Speaking with 
former combatants also provided a better understanding underlying the reason they 
engaged with fighting against oil companies and states. Interviewing NGO leading 
activists resulted in well documented and contextualized details of the impacts of oil-
related activities carried out by various players. The NGOs I interacted for my data 
collection included the Revenue Watch, Publish What You Pay, Our Niger Delta, 
Leadership Centre for Peace, Integrity and Transformation (LCPIT), Social Action, 
Environmental Rights Action, Friends of the Earth Netherlands, Community-
Environment Development Network, and Movement for the Survival of Ogoni 
People (MOSOP).  To examine the advantages and disadvantages of oil industries, I 
also interviewed a number of businesspeople directly and indirectly interacting with 
the oil industries both in the Niger Delta and in Lagos such as the Manager of 
Nishizawa Nigeria and the Victoria Crowne Plaza hotel owner. 
To understand the economic and political component of oil-related foreign 
interventions and their impacts in Africa, I interviewed experts from a number of 
reputable international research centres, think tanks and transnational agencies 
LQFOXGLQJWKH,QWHUQDWLRQDO0RQHWDU\)XQG,0)WKH:RUOG%DQNWKH8.¶V
Chatham House, the US Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the 
African Economic Research Consortium, and the Oxford Centre for the Analysis of 
Resource-Rich Economies (OxCarre).  
I also interviewed a number of leading international, national and local journalists 
including Upstream the International Oil and Gas Newspaper, Les Dépêches de 
Brazzaville, and the Niger Delta Women Issues Newspaper. The list of interviewees 
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also includes consultants whose work involves with the oil industries such as legal 
practitioners of Aelex, Templars, Banwo and Ighodalo, HERMON in Nigeria; the 
president of Globalpacific; the adviser to Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources; 
and the security consultant to the Nigerian Government. The financial companies 
whose leading staff I interviewed include JGC Corporation, Sumitomo Mitsui 
Banking Corporation Europe Ltd, Earth Resource Investment Group, and the 
6WDQGDUG%DQN¶V2LODQd Gas Sector. These interviews provided a well-rounded 
understanding to the international and African oil industries, the market side of these 
and the different component and complex webs of players and activities involving 
with oil businesses.  
The last group of people I interviewed are the leading staff of international and 
national oil companies and oil-serviced companies. The interviewed staff of 
LQWHUQDWLRQDORLOFRPSDQLHVLQFOXGHIRUH[DPSOH6KHOO¶V6HQLRU%XVLQHVV
Development Manager; Shell Nigeria¶VHead of Technical Section, Head of Audit, 
Programme Director of Environment Issue Management, State Licensing Manager; 
6KHOO1LJHULD¶VIRUPHUHQJLQHHUWKHVice President of Sub-Saharan Africa Exxon 
Mobil; the Manager in Environment Quality Assurance Section of Elf Nigeria; the 
General Manager for Business Development of TOTAL Africa; Administrative 
Director of Mitsubishi Operation Gabon; Manager of Exploration and Production of 
Mitsubishi Corp; and the Managing Director of Petrobras Brasileiro Nigeria Ltd. 
Those of national oil companies include the General Manager of Japan Oil, Gas and 
Metals National Cooperation; the Deputy Chief Executive Officer of Seychelles 
National Petroleum Company; the Promotion Manager of Petrosen-Senegal; the 
Executive DirectoURI6DR7RPHDQG3ULQFLSH¶V1DWXUDO3HWUROHXP$JHQF\DQGWKH
+HDGRI6RQDQJRO¶V*HRSK\VLFDO'HSDUWPHQW7KHLQWHUYLHZHGVWDIIRIRLO-serviced 
companies include those from Century Energy Services Limited, Schlamberger, 
Maersk Oil Angola, Onstream Group Netherlands, and Samsung Heavy Industries. 
While interviews with oil companies and oil-serviced companies may provide some 
contrasting data to the local sources, it was important to highlight that many 
frustratingly spoke out about the ways oil operations are conducted that only benefit 
the exploiters, leaving the local marginalized.  
In addition to interviews, I conducted 12 focus group studies which can be 
thematically divided into four categories: direct associations with oil operations; 
local experiences; NGO activism and business relations from oil industries. 
I conducted two focus group studies with the people who have direct associations 
with oil operations in order to find out the policies pursued and the actual practices 
implemented. The first focus group study in this category is among leading 
HPSOR\HHVRILQWHUQDWLRQDORLOFRPSDQLHVRSHUDWLQJLQ$IULFDLQFOXGLQJ(OI¶V)RUPHU
Vice President for Africa, Senior Business Adviser of Total, and Vice President of 
7RWDO¶V([SORUDWLRQ$IULFD7KHVHFRQGIRFXV group studied under this category 
FRPSULVHVSHRSOHGLUHFWO\DVVRFLDWHGWRWKHRLO¶VRSHUDWLRQVLQ'HOWD6WDWHLQFOXGLQJ
6KHOO¶V+HDG&RUSRUDWH8WLOLWLHV6KHOO(QJLQHHU&KHYURQ(QYLURQPHQW3HUVRQQHO
and teacher and missionary in the Delta Creeks. 
To find out local experiences of oil operations, I conducted eight focus group studies 
in several Niger Delta villages and communities including Omadino, Ebema, Goi, 
Bodo, and Ikarama. These focus group studies and the associated site visits and 
participant observation contributed to primary revelation of actual practices of oil 
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operations which my thesis demonstrates that are different from what are portrayed 
on policy papers and publication. Practices such as military involvement, 
circumventing environmental standards, enclave oil operations, acquisition of land, 
and unsuitable philanthropic projects became illuminated using this method as well 
as the impacts of these practices borne by the local communities. The participants of 
these focus groups come from various backgrounds such as the Paramount Ruler; 
community chiefs; community spokesman; Member Council of Elders; former 
Commander in Chief; former combatants; missionary; local villagers; farmers; 
community youths; affected landlords; school principal, teacher and students of 
Shell/ NNPC joint-venture school; and doctor, doctor secretary, lab scientist, and 
hospital registrar of Chevron/NNPC joint-venture hospital; oil spills plaintiffs. The 
last category of focus group studied business associates who witness how oil 
operations are carried out in Nigeria and whose actions contribute to the status quo 
and/ or are related by benefiting or losing out from oil industries. This group 
includes, for instance, Managing Director and Director of Sojitz; Project Manager of 
Mitsubishi Nigeria; and Chief Executive Officer of Toyota Nigeria.  
Moreover, primary data in relation to oil-related interventions and the impacts these 
practices produce were also collected in a number of conferences and roundtables 
through speeches, personal conversation and debates. Samples of speeches are those 
JLYHQE\WKH3UHVLGHQWRI/LEHULD1LJHULD¶V3UHVLGHQWLDO Candidate for the Congress 
for Progressive Change and Former Head of State; Special Adviser to the President 
of Nigeria on Niger Delta Affairs and Chairman of the Amnesty Committee; 
President of TOTAL Africa; Director of Oxford Centre of Analyses for Resource-
ULFK(FRQRPLHV([WUDFWLYH,QGXVWULHV7UDQVSDUHQF\,QLWLDWLYH(,7,¶V+HDGRI
Africa and the Middle East; and the Director of NorZD\¶V2LOIRU'HYHORSPHQW
Similarly to interviews and focus groups, I ensured that these represent views from 
diverse perspectives possible and that data collected are used for the analyses and 
thoroughly integrated in the thesis content. The discussion of primary sources here; 
though appears extensive, presents only some samples of data collection conducted. 
See appendix for full details.  
However, there are some restrictions to research on this topic are due to the secrecy 
of such matters. Many interview requests were denied and sensitive issues were not 
to be discussed. Activists and local people also face threats when openly discussing 
the issue of oil. As a consequence, where the sensitive issues are concerned, names 
are not disclosed. Furthermore, security risks on the ground are significant with 
travel bans imposed in many parts of oil-producing regions. Only by securing contact 
with key pan-African missionaries, well-recognised regional activists, respected 
politicians and top oil executives could the fieldwork in Nigeria, especially in the 
Niger Delta, become possible.    
 
Obtaining official data is also limited due to the 30-year rule on information from 
sources such as the UK National Archives or the US Presidential Libraries where 
information related to oil-oriented foreign policies may be found. The US has only 
EHHQDFWLYHLQ$IULFD¶VRLOLQGXVWU\VLQFHWKHV$Q\UHOHYDQWLQIRUPDWLRQWKXVLV
not yet due for release. Moreover, information concerning sensitive issues which 
may undermine national security or social cohesion can be withheld for up to fifty 
years. Confidential governmental reports may even be destroyed and never become 
available to the public. Available reports from states and industries (such as the US  
Energy Information AdministUDWLRQWKH:RUOG%DQN¶V2LO*DVDQG0LQLQJ'LYLVLRQ
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Shell and British Petroleum) on the subject of oil can be either overly positive or so 
YDJXHWKDWWKH\DUHDOPRVWPHDQLQJOHVVDQGDUHRIWHQIDUIURPWKHµUHDOZRUOG¶
practice. Information available from these sources has been found contrary to 
findings from other sources (such as Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International 
and Revenue Watch) and must be treated with caution. For China, such data inquiry 
is out of the question.  
 
There are scattered reports of dubious deals made between states or deals between 
companies and states as well as reports of some political and economic engagements 
(see Ghazvinian, 2007; Shaxson, 2007) with oil incentives in a series of newspaper 
articles, historical literature and informal interviews but none has given a sufficient 
chronological account from the perspective of either the intervening or affected 
states. Any reliable, published, raw data, if it exists are difficult to obtain due largely 
to secrecy, corruption and the lack of capacity. For example, there is considerable 
uncertainty about the number of oil barrels produced in Nigeria. Agreements on the 
use of military forces are not made public. In Angola, revenues publications from oil 
activities were redacted.1 In most African oil-rich countries, there is a lack of press 
freedom, academic discussion and independent assessments, especially concerning 
oil -- the sector upon which the national economy heavily depends and from which 
the political elites benefit hugely. With limited official data, the study is for 
exploratory rather than experimental purposes. 
 
However, restraints in attaining a substantial amount of reliable evidence for oil-
related foreign interventions should not obstruct further study of this topic. There is 
high value and merit in seeking intervening incidents and probable impacts from the 
collected series of oil-related foreign interventions. While necessary/sufficient causal 
mechanisms could not qualify in order to avoid problems of internal validity, this 
research design suggests a probabilistic causal mechanism1. In sum, the research 
explores any African countries where oil-related foreign interventions took place 
based on historical accounts of interventions traced with a specific case study on 
Nigeria in Chapter 6. Despite being the largest African oil-rich countries, Nigeria has 
suffered the poverty, bad governance and conflicts.  
 
Some may suggest that a comparative study is more suitable for establishing a causal 
relationship. However, there is a threat of validity in choosing comparative studies 
between African oil-rich countries. To specify an empirical relationship between two 
variables in comparative political science, the potential effects of all other variables 
on that relationship must be held constant. However, in political science such 
explanations are rare because the research environment is impossible to control fully 
(King, Keohane et al., 1994). The selection of cases can reduce this problem. 
However, the ideal cases are not available for the subject matter, as discussed below.  
                                                          
1
 For a necessary causal mechanism to apply, x always causes y. That is, foreign interventions always 
and alone can lead to the resource curse. For the sufficient cause inference, the presence of x (foreign 
interventions) implies the presence of y (resource curse). However, another cause z (bad governance) 
may alternatively cause y. Thus, the presence of y does not imply the presence of x; that is, the 
resource curse may occur without the presence of foreign interventions. However, no case of oil-rich 
countries which suffer the curse without the presence of foreign interventions exists.  
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There are two basic comparative research designs: most similar and most different. 
Most different research design allows us to conclude that x (independent variable) 
caused y (dependent variable) if other units of comparative cases are the same in 
every respect, except that in case A y occurs and in case B y does not occur and 
except that in case A x was present and in case B x was absent (Burnham et al., 
2008).  
If the method of difference was to be applied to establish a causal mechanism 
between the resource curse occurrence (y) and foreign interventions (x), the 
comparison will be conducted between a case (case A) where the resource curse 
occurs and another case (case B) where the resource curse does not occur whilst 
other units of these cases are the same in every respect, except that in the first case 
foreign interventions are present and in the latter case foreign interventions are 
absent. We will now explore this further by looking at cases of oil-rich countries.  
Cases of oil-rich countries where the resource curse (y) occurs are exhaustive, 
including Nigeria, Angola, Sudan, Equatorial Guinea, Congo, The Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC), Chad, Cameroon, Libya, Azerbaijan, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, 
Iran, United Arab Emirates, Russia, Mexico and Venezuela (Auty, Kiiski et al., 
2001; Dell, 2004). 
Cases of oil-rich countries where the resource curse (y) does not occur are Norway, 
Malaysia and Indonesia (Auty, Kiiski et al., 2001; and Bevan, Collier et al., 1999).1 
For the method of difference to be applied where x caused y, other units of cases 
(except for x and y) must be the same. However, further research into the cases above 
shows that other units between the oil-rich countries which suffer the curse and those 
that do not suffer the curse vary immensely. These are the level of human capital 
accumulation, the country size, the level of the resource prevalence on GDP, political 
factors and initial economic conditions. A deterministic causal relationship cannot be 
established between foreign interventions and the resource curse without running the 
risk of the presence of spurious relationships. &UDPHU¶VVWXG\RISRVVLEOHUHODWLRQVKLS
between income inequality and conflict in least developed countries faced a similar 
challenge (Cramer 2006). He concluded that there is unlikely to be a straightforward 
correlation between income inequality and conflict and that a broader range of 
factors need to be taken into account. He further argued that the relationships 
between these factors will contribute to complex causal explanation in a way that no 
functional relationships will hold even if comprehensive sets of variables are 
included in a model. 
Another way to conduct a comparative case study to establish an empirical causal 
relationship is through most similar research design. Contrary to the method of 
GLIIHUHQFHDERYHµVLPLODUUHVHDUFKGHVLJQVFRPSDUHWZRRUPRUHFDVHVWKDWDUHDV
different as possible in terms of the independent variable(s) and as similar as possible 
                                                          
1
 However, Norway faces chronic Dutch disease where oil sectors cause inflated real exchange rates 
and make other tradable sectors become unprofitable. Despite being a large industry, the oil sector is 
capital intensive rather than labour intensive. It makes small contributions to the distribution of 
employment and wealth among populations. Malaysia and Indonesia also suffered from Dutch disease 
ZKHQRLOLQGXVWULHVILUVWEHJDQ,WWRRNDQXPEHURIJRYHUQPHQW¶VLQWHUference policies to stabilize 
their economies (Bevan, Collier et al., 1999). See Chapter 2 for a detailed discussion of the resource 
curse; what it entails, its causes and how to overcome it.  
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on all thHVSXULRXVDQGLQWHUYHQLQJYDULDEOHV¶%XUQKDPet al., 2008: 75). With the 
independent variable being foreign interventions, to apply this similar comparative 
method, let us now look at the list of oil-rich countries which experience foreign 
interventions and those which do not. 
The list of oil-rich countries which experience foreign interventions is extensive, 
including most countries mentioned above. Those that do not experience direct 
foreign interventions are countries such as Russia, China and Mexico which have 
nationalized their oil companies and have relatively strong economic and political 
leverage and hence have chosen to preserve oil industries from any international 
engagements. Yet if they are not economically independent, they still face indirect 
economic pressure from foreign players such as sanctions and political pressure in 
Mexico. Other oil-rich countries that do not experience foreign interventions are 
dominant countries such as the US and Norway which would not allow another state 
player or company to intervene in their country. 
Again, the author finds that intervening variables are not similar between cases 
where the independent variable differs. Like the method of difference, a similar 
comparative design cannot be applied to establish a causal relationship between 
foreign interventions and the resource curse.  
Burnham  et al. (2008: 74) admitted that this logic is more easily said than done in a 
social research project, mainly because the ceteris peribus µDOOWKLQJVEHLQJHTXDO¶
assumptiRQQHYHUKROGVµWZRFDVHVDUHQHYHUH[DFWO\DOLNHH[FHSWIRUWKHFRQGLWLRQ
we want to investigate. One way of getting around this that might seem reasonable 
would be to observe the same case twice (say A), once with x DQGRQFHZLWKRXW¶DVD
so-called longitudinal design. However, based on historical research, the author finds 
that soon after oil was discovered in Africa, interventions took place. And in most 
parts of Africa, the interventions had been there, making it easier for foreign players 
to ensure that exploitation and control would remain with the rise of the oil industry. 
No African oil-rich countries had experienced a period of oil benefits in the absence 
of foreign interventions. Thus, neither a comparative case study nor a longitudinal 
design can be implemented. 
 
An additional problem for the logic of the most similar design is that the dependent 
variable of the cases has to be different, or else it will not be possible to specify 
whether particular conditions make it possible or impossible for the resource curse to 
occur. This is why there is a threat of validity in applying comparative study between 
African oil-rich countries because all of them suffer the curse. In addition, other 
independent variables are also similar including experiences of foreign interventions, 
political factors, the level of human capital accumulation, the initial economic 
conditions and the level of their economic dependence on oil. The consequence is 
that no new causal mechanisms can be exposed about the effects of foreign 
interventions on the resource curse by comparing any of these cases.  
 
7KHFRQGLWLRQNQRZQDVµWRRPDQ\YDULDEOHVQRWHQRXJKFDVHV¶LVWKHUHDVRQZK\
experimental control is rarely an option in political science (Burnham et al., 2008: 
83). Drawing a causal inference from a limited number of cases would risk a 
reductionist fallacy. A logical error occurs where conclusions are drawn about 
groups based on data gathered on few (Ibid.). This applies especially to the subject 
matter of this research. There is the fundamental problem of causal inference 
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between foreign interventions and the resource curse in Africa. While the 
methodological framework maybe useful, there are other crucial political, security, 
and social dimensions to the resource curse that cannot be neglected and controlled 
in the analysis (Cramer, 2002; Cater, 2003). Understanding various relationships is 
the prerequisite for devising appropriate strategies (Ballentine and Nitzschke, 2005).  
An implementation rival to a comparative study design could be found by 
preliminary research into statistical records which would normally demonstrate the 
economic and political performance of African oil-rich countries over the period of 
several years.1 Although this may be useful, it cannot establish whether bad 
performances are attributed to foreign interventions or to some other factors. This 
type of data, like the comparative method, cannot specify whether the presence of 
foreign interventions and the resource curse are causal relationships or correlations 
because it cannot explain how interventions produce the curse.  
The author also finds that there are direct rivals and commingled rivals for the 
H[SODQDWLRQRI$IULFD¶VUHVRXUFHFXUVH2 Direct rival for the relationship between 
foreign interventions and the resource curse may be that authoritative regimes 
facilitate foreign interventions that cause the resource curse. Authoritative regimes 
tend to be corrupt and benefit from foreign players in several ways. Equally, foreign 
players benefit vastly from these regimes and interventions can easily be manipulated 
where there is a lack of transparency and a checks-and-balances system fails. An 
interview with Chidi from the NGO Rally for Nigeria revealed information 
confirming that this is often the case for African oil-rich countries (27 August, 2010). 
A commingled rival explanation to the foreign intervention-resource curse 
relationship explanation may be that foreign intervention is not the only cause but 
other existing variables (see Chapter 2), especially governance. Statistical research 
and comparative methods similarly struggle to limit the number of variables to be 
analysed. It would also be problematic to explore which of the sufficient causes 
would be the more important (one that is more frequently present). Assessing 
frequency of a cause relative to an outcome requires more than one case (ibid.). 
+RZHYHUDVGLVFXVVHGDERYHWKHSUREOHPRIµWRRPDQ\YDULDEOHVDQGQRWHQRXJK
cases¶ arises for this causal inference to be applied. 
Besides, the available statistics often have huge discrepancies depending on the 
sources, including the World Bank, EITI, oil companies and African states. This is 
for a number of reasons: different measurements used, lack of real data 
µJXHVVWLPDWLRQ¶DQGVHFUHF\DVGLVFXVVHGDW WKHµPromoting Democratic 
0DQDJHPHQWRI$IULFD¶V2LO:HDOWK¶ Conference, Chatham House, August, 2010). 
Thus, this reliability problem concerns both data and sources.  
An interview method can be used to develop the context of how foreign interventions 
relate to the resource curse. Interviews give an insight into this relationship; that is, 
how the interventions take place and how they contribute to the country performance. 
However, the results from interviews are not indicative and a necessary/sufficient 
causal relationship cannot be inferred from this method alone (King, Keohane et al., 
                                                          
1
 Implementation rival is another method or implementation process which accounts for the result 
better than the one initially proposed. 
2
 'LUHFWULYDOLVDULYDOH[SODQDWLRQZKHUHDQLQWHUYHQWLRQ³VXVSHFW´RWKHUWKDQWKHWDUJHW
LQWHUYHQWLRQ³VXVSHFW´DFFRXQWVIRUWKHUHVXOW&RPPLQJOHGULYDOLVDULYDOH[SODnation where other 
interventions and target intervention both contributed to the result (Burnham et al., 2008). 
C h a p t e r  1  | page 33 
 
1994). This study attempts to eliminate possible errors attached to interviews by 
using a triangulation of methods to answer how oil-directed foreign interventions 
relate to $IULFD¶VUHVRXUFHFXUVH7KHVHPHWKRGVDUHWKHXVHRIVWDWLVWLFDOUHVRXUFHV
document analysis, archival analysis, participant observation, analysis of historical 
secondary materials and interviewing from different contrary sources.  
Combining comparative case study, statistical research and interviewing would be an 
ideal research design for such a new and complex topic but this undoubtedly exceeds 
the scope of one research project due to the constraints of time and resources. 
Furthermore, the high level of secrecy on foreign engagements makes it impossible 
to compile precise foreign activities. An investigation of such topic is unlikely to 
yield results which can certainly be determined as direct outcomes of foreign 
engagements. The deterministic perspective of causal explanation, though ideal, is 
unrealistic. Hence, this thesis aims for the probabilistic perspective. Instead of 
VD\LQJ³,I[WKHQ\´WKLVVWXG\LQGLFDWHV³WKHSUHVHQFHRI[LQFUHDVHVWKHOLNHOLKRRG
RUIUHTXHQF\RI\/LHEHUVRQ´7Ke criteria for interpreting the findings by 
which the study is judged successful is the likelihood of the resource curse 
occurrence - displayed in poverty, conflicts and bad governance. 
 
This chapter has so far presented the research question, defined the main idea, the 
theories framing them and the methods used in finding out the answer. It now turns 
to discuss the research objective, followed by the research outline. 
 
Research Objective 
Based on Marxist explanations and the resource curse theory, this study aims to 
develop hypotheses and propositions for further inquiry; that is, interventions could 
contribute to negative impacts that are worthy of future research. If foreign 
LQWHUYHQWLRQVKDYHQHJDWLYHLPSDFWVRQ$IULFD¶VSHUIRUPDQFHthey need to be 
understood. This is what this research project sets out to do: to serve as a building 
block for further inquiry from which causal relationships could be developed. 
Previous studies have been preoccupied primarily with domestic political and 
economic issues to explain the resource curse.  
 
Regarding foreign interventions in Africa, most previous literature explores military 
activities on the basis of conflict resolution or in terms of financial aid funnelled 
through International Financial Institutions and governmental and non-governmental 
organizations (Duffield, 2001; Duffield, 2007; Ballentine and Nitzschke, 2005; 
Cramer, 2006; Chandler, 2006; Pugh, Cooper, et al., 2006; Cooper, 2007; Pugh et al., 
2008; Richmond, 2010). While Cramer (2006) suggested that external relations play 
a role in provoking conflicts as these contribute to unequal distribution, his study did 
not look specifically at the distribution of natural resources or the roles of external 
players in this distribution and was not linked to the resource curse discussion. 
Besides, it was not conclusive that unequal distribution of wealth or growth collapse 
would lead to wars but instead Cramer suggested that a complex web of different 
factors matters more.  
 
No prior research has been conducted on oil-related foreign intervention in Africa. 
:KHUHDV*KD]YLQLDQWRXFKHVRQWKHVFUDPEOHIRU$IULFD¶VRLOEURDGO\IURP
both foreign and domestic perspectives, Shaxson (2007) looks specifically at a few 
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key persons involved in African oil and Leech (2006) studies the US oil-related 
interventions around the globe. Neither established any kind of relationship between 
foreign intervention and the resource curse. In pointing out the significance of this 
relationship, Perelman (2003: 33) argued  
 
A rich natural resource base makes a poor country, especially a relatively 
powerless one, an inviting target - both politically and militarily - for 
dominant nations. In the case of oil, the powerful nations will not risk letting 
such a powerful resource fall under the control of an independent 
government, especially one that might pursue policies that do not coincide 
with the economic interests of the great transnational corporations.  
 
Essentially, it seems to explain recent US-led attempts to control Iraq, one of the 
most oil-rich countries, situated strategically in the Middle East and led by the 
unfriendly regime of Saddam. The new scramble for African oil and the various 
resulting practices and policies also seem to demonstrate this statement. The pressing 
international energy need, in the midst of the Middle East troubles and new emerging 
industrial countries, have significantly impacted on the oil-endowed countries. 
However, Perelman did not give a further explanation for this relationship and the 
impact of these foreign involvements on the resource curse.  
For conceptual framework and hypotheses of note, there is no literature available. 
Neo-colonialism discusses foreign interventions but with vague actual policy 
implications and broad negative outcomes. Neither specificity on the policies related 
to oil, nor linkages to the resource curse were addressed. This study, unlike previous 
ones, addresses both historical and contemporary natures of the current African oil 
curse. Through this approach, it becomes easier to see the curse as a product of both 
the oil industry and the direct relationship between Africa and foreign players dating 
back to the fifteenth century. It advances the study and understanding of 
developmental crises in African oil-rich countries.  
 
By identifying the approaches foreign players take to secure oil in Africa and 
whether such foreign interventions harm African countries, it seeks to develop the 
neo-colonialism concept and challenge the resource curse theory. The result of the 
study develops neo-colonialism, which assumes that continuous foreign exploitations 
underdevelop Africa, by presenting the outcomes of these foreign interventions. The 
research specifically deals with oil-related interventions which neo-colonialism has 
never addressed.  
 
The results also contribute to the development of the resource curse theory. If neo-
colonialist interventions in oil lead to negative outcomes in Africa, the result 
challenges the resource curse in that it must consider this fact as another possible 
cause in addition to those proposed by the existing literature. Thus, the agreed-upon 
consensus among scholars that policies are the main route to changing the curse into 
a blessing may be inadequate since there is a huge missing link. A poor developing 
country may not be able to break free from the resource trap by all well-intentioned 
means and effective policies if foreign players continue to carry out activities that do 
damage to their society, economy and governance. If the oil-related foreign 
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interventions in the African countries bring a curse rather than a blessing, it is 
important to address this issue in order to find ways to avoid it. If the causes of the 
resource curse are not understood completely, the cures are unlikely to be effective.  
 
This failure to understand the inter-connection between bodies of theory related to 
political and economic perspectives, customarily treated by social scientists in 
isolation from each other, is a motivation for the writing of this thesis. The studies of 
neo-colonialism are focuses mainly of political science, geography and history while 
the resource curse is mainly examined by economic scholars. My exploration of the 
foreign dimension in the resource curse phenomenon is necessarily incomplete. Yet, 
by drawing attention to both the theoretical schools in social science and to the 
empirical evidence of the increasing oil-related foreign interventions, the author 
hopes that further work will be inspired at both the theoretical and the empirical 
levels.  
 
Despite being an increasingly important topic, very few know what really happens in 
resource politics. Today, much activity is driven by the need to secure resources. 
Mostly the political decisions are oil-related, disguised as policies for energy, 
security, development or trade. This study reveals the secretive nature of foreign 
interventions and the attached motives which differ from what appears in policy 
papers. It is worth noting, however, that there is an extensive literature dealing with 
extractive industries ranging from the Western geopolitical perspective to their 
environmental and social implications for the host countries.1  
International extractive industries have been approached as a separate issue. 
Literature related to oil is mostly examined by country-specific cases and from the 
industry perspective that features loosely in the African political and economic 
structure. Main industry sources such as IHS Energy, IEA, Wood Mackenzie and 
PFC Washington mostly provide techno-economic approximations, typically on 
supply and demand, oil market projections and country risk reports (Clarke, 2008). 
7KH\W\SLFDOO\FRQFHQWUDWHRQWKHµELJILUP¶SHUVSHFWLYHDQGLQWHUHVWVLJQRULQJDQ\
discussions on the relationship between oil firms and states. There is no literature 
which DQDO\VHVWKHKLVWRULFDOFRPSRVLWLRQRI$IULFD¶VRLOLQGXVWU\DVDZKROH:KLOH
1*2V¶SXEOLFDWLRQVGHPRQVWUDWHGLUHFWH[SHULHQFHVDQGGLVFXVVWKHSUREOHPRI
foreign involvements, they rarely see the bigger picture.  
While the resource curse literature addresses the political and economic structures, 
LWVIODZLVWRRYHUORRNIRUHLJQVWDWHV¶LQWHUYHQWLRQVLQUHVRXUFH-rich countries as a 
                                                          
1
 Based on Western geopolitical perspectives, there have recently been a number of examinations of 
IRUHLJQVWDWHV¶H[SORLWDWLRQRIRLO-rich counWULHVHVSHFLDOO\DIWHUWKHµ,QYDVLRQRI,UDT¶(QJGDKO, 2004; 
Clark, 2005; Kalicki and Goldwyn, 2005; Klare, 2005; Mcquaig, 2005; Rutledge, 2006; Leech, 2006; 
Klare, Volman et al., 2006; Bronson, 2006; Heinberg, 2006; Kaldor, Karl et al., 2007; Gelpke, Caduff 
et al., 2007; Duffield 2007; Ghazvinian, 2007; Shaxson, 2007; Clarke, 2008). This subject is 
addressed from the aspect of power, energy security and oil conflicts with broad practices and impacts 
rather than establishing a relationship between these variables and the resource curse. Energy issues 
have often been debated in their own technical terms rather than their broader policy context 
(Hamilton, 2005). For countries hosting resource industries, the existing literature predominantly 
focuses on humanitarian and environmental impacts of MNCs but does not look closely at how these 
undermine the political and economic infrastructure of the hosting countries and hence has not gone as 
far as making a relationship between the negative outcomes and the resource curse discussions. 
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contributory factor. In addition, none has applied the neo-colonialism notion to the 
QHZVFUDPEOHIRU$IULFD¶VRLOThus, existing literature fails to deal sufficiently with 
the wider complexity of components of the African oil game; that is, the grand 
strategy pursued by foreign powers, states, African elites and companies and the 
context of Africa across time in which the oil industry has grown and continues to 
mould the highly complex African economic and political landscape. Literature fails 
WRDFNQRZOHGJHWKDWUHFHQWJURZWKRIDQRLOHFRQRP\LVDSKHQRPHQRQLQ$IULFD¶V
long and complicated resource-dependent economy. Most analyses related to oil and 
$IULFD¶VXQGHU-performance is restricted to the mainstream principal theoretical and 
empirical context resulting in a partial and often misplaced analysis, other 
dichotomy. The flawed model contributes to a lack of clear understanding of Africa 
which has been reshaped over time.  
 
Only recently, critiques on the role of Chinese oil players in the continent have begun 
(De Oliviera, 2007). The role of social forces in shaping development outcomes in 
resource-abundant countries has rarely been touched upon. The solution drawn in 
this incomplete context is thus unlikely to be effective. This thesis, by adopting a 
historical dialectic perspective from Marxism, thus provides discussion of how 
GLIIHUHQWSOD\HUVLQWHUDFWDQGVKDSH$IULFD¶Voutcomes during the life span of 
resource extraction. The study, thus, contributes an understanding of the on-going 
complexity of the relations between Africa, foreign players and the integration into 
the global capitalist economic system. In this respect, this study sheds new light on 
an emerging research agenda. It is an ambitious, yet highly significant, endeavour. 
 
In sum, this thesis seeks to draw linkages between the actions and impacts of oil-
related foreign interventions and how they potentially contribute to the resource 
curse. It aims, thereby, to evaluate whether foreign intervention increases the 
OLNHOLKRRGRIWKHUHVRXUFHFXUVH¶VRFFXUUHQFHWRXQFRYHUWKHSOD\HUVDQGVWUDWHJLHV
LQYROYHGDQGWRLQIOXHQFHGHEDWHVFRQFHUQLQJ$IULFD¶VRLOERRPDWWhe moment of 
heightened attention. By revealing oil-related foreign interventions in Africa, the 
thesis contributes to the body of knowledge of neo-colonialism which argues that 
continued foreign interventions undermine the development of countries subject to 
intervention. The findings of this thesis about whether oil-related foreign 
LQWHUYHQWLRQVXQGHUPLQHWKHFRXQWU\¶VSHUIRUPDQFHDUHWKXVOLQNHGWRWKHUHVRXUFH
curse discussion thereby seeking to fill the gap in the resource curse literature.  
 
Research Outline 
This thesis consists of seven chapters. The first chapter is an introduction to the topic 
RIWKHIRUHLJQVFUDPEOHIRU$IULFD¶VRLO,WGHVFULEHVWKHFRQWH[WDQGSDUDGR[
VXUURXQGLQJWKHUHVHDUFKTXHVWLRQDQGGHILQHWKHNH\WHUPµIRUHLJQLQWHUYHQWLRQV¶,W
also gives the theories whereupon the research hypothesis is formed. Further, it 
covers research design and its operationalisation explaining the locations and players 
of the study and what methods are used in finding out the answer. The end of this 
chapter discusses what the study aims to achieve and what contributions it will bring.  
In attempting to answer the primary research question about the impacts oil-related 
foreign interventions have on Africa and whether they have a tendency to 
contribute to the resource curse; four groups of sub-questions relating to the topic 
are identified. The first group of sub-questions which relate to the resource curse 
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topic - what the resource curse is, what its causes are and how it can be overcome - 
are answered in Chapter 2. The second group of questions addresses foreign 
interventions including questions about what foreign interventions are; what actions 
are accounted as oil-directed foreign interventions; who the players are and where 
they occur. Chapter 3 gives the result of these in theoretical terms while Chapters 4 
and 5 offer empirical evidence from African oil-rich countries with a specific focus 
on Nigeria, discussed in Chapter 6.  
 
The third group of sub-questions stemming from the primary research question set 
out above examines how African oil-rich countries perform; whether this can be 
attributed to foreign interventions and how these outcomes relate to the resource 
curse. The last group of questions is devoted to causal establishment and theory 
development about whether foreign intervention and the resource curse have a causal 
relationship; what theories can be used in explaining the phenomenon and how 
theories can be developed from the research findings. Chapter 7 offers answers to 
these questions.  
 
Chapter 2 is the literature review of the resource curse and the associated arguments 
and discussions. It explains what the resource curse is, why oil revenues have rarely 
been transferred into wealth and what policy suggestions have been offered.  
The reVHDUFKTXHVWLRQRIWKLVVWXG\µwhat impacts oil-related foreign interventions 
have on Africa and whether they have a tendency to contribute to the resource 
curse?¶SULPDULO\UHODWHVWRWKHVHFRQGDQGWKLUGFDWHJRU\RIUHVRXUFHFXUVH
arguments. By evaluating the impacts of oil-related foreign interventions on Africa, it 
DVVHVVHVWKDWWKHVHLPSDFWVFDQEHFDWHJRUL]HGDVWKHµUHVRXUFHFXUVH¶$IWHUWKH
symptoms are linked, by analysing the relationship between foreign interventions and 
the resource curse as a probabilistic causal mechanism, this contributes an 
explanation of what causes the resource curse. The discussion of this thesis is 
engrained in the concept of the resource curse which is predominantly used to 
explain developmental failures of resource-rich countries.  
Chapter 3 discusses the concept neo-colonialism revealed in continued foreign 
interventions in Africa, especially for seeking oil. The main political theories that 
relate to the topic of foreign interventions are reviewed.  
Neo-colonialism explains continued interventions from former colonial powers as 
ZHOODVQHZJOREDOSRZHUVLQ$IULFDDQGWKDWWKLVLVUHVSRQVLEOHIRU$IULFD¶V
underdevelopment but not the particular players and their modus operandi. By 
merging the theoretical concept of neo-FRORQLDOLVPDQGWKHµUHDOZRUOG¶FRQWH[W
together using analyses of raw data and historical record, France, Britain, the US, 
China are revealed as the main neo-colonial players. The agents of neo-colonialism 
are no longer simply nation states but include transnational agencies such as major 
multinational companies, The World Bank and the IMF. 
Chapter 3 also records oil-related incidents of foreign interventions in Africa and 
systematically categorizes oil-related foreign interventions using political and 
economic approaches. This reveals that players sometimes cooperate in these 
practices. Because oil is an international commodity, there is an absolute 
international link. The local problem of Africa thus has an international dimension. 
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By examining foreign iQWHUYHQWLRQLQ$IULFD¶VRLO-rich countries the chapter deals 
with the context of the independent variable. 
Chapter 4 studies the political approaches used by foreign players in order to secure 
African oil and categorizes foreign political interventions that are related to oil 
interests in African countries into four central themes: the balkanization of Africa, 
the use of state policies, political meddling and military involvement. The history of 
balkanization in Africa is examined. The use of foreign policy, energy policy, oil 
diplomacy and the formation of special initiatives and institutions responsible for 
enhancing oil interests are discussed. With regards to political meddling; practices 
such as election fraud, regime change and financial support used in promoting 
specific groups in return for oil are explored. The military involvement section 
includes a discussion on the provision of arms, military training and assistance and 
military deployment used for enhancing oil interests.  
As Marxist historical dialectic approach explains the relationship between continued 
LQWHUYHQWLRQVLQ$IULFDDQG$IULFD¶VXQGHUGHYHORSPHQWWKLVFKDSWHUDGRSWVWKLV
approach in analysing real incidences of foreign interventions for African oil that has 
been ongoing in order to assess (in chapter seven) how this links to African resource 
curse. By this, the study sheds light on the unaddressed relationship between the 
foreign resource scramble, neo-colonialism and the resource curse discussion.  
Chapter 5 examines the economic approaches used by foreign players to secure 
African oil. They are categorized into two central themes: financial involvement and 
business conduct. The former refers to the following practices: neo-liberal policies, 
petrodollar monetary order, economic sanctions, financial support and money 
corruption. With regards to business conduct, the following practices: circumventing 
environmental standards, enclave oil operations and unsuitable philanthropic projects 
are examined. The economic practices, though different from political interventions 
in nature, are equally statist. Moreover, these policies are adopted and/or imposed in 
every corner of the globe. Economic interventions are often more complex, less 
direct and involve more than a single approach and player. ,QWKHPRGHUQµOLEHUDO¶
world, they often come in form of multilateral attempts in spreading wealth and 
democratic freedom.  
Some foreign practices discussed in Chapters 4 and 5 such as political meddling, 
military involvement, neoliberal policies and economic sanctions can be linked to 
existing neo-colonialism discussions. However, these are in general themes rather 
than being specific to oil geopolitics. Other approaches to foreign intervention not 
previously discussed are identified in this study using real-world incidents and 
categorized as neo-colonial practices. These two chapters expand the context of the 
independent variable further as well as discussing particular experiences of 
LQWHUYHQWLRQVLQ$IULFD¶RLO-producing countries. Chapter 6 is devoted to a specific 
case study of Nigeria where oil-related foreign interventions, both political and 
economic, are examined. 
Chapter 7 assesses the impacts of foreign interventions in African oil-rich countries 
with the specific focus on Nigeria and draws together the work in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 
and identifies the negative outcomes such as the artificial entities created by 
balkanization and the fabrics of traditional societies destroyed by divide-and-rule 
tactics, both of which left African countries divided and weak. The heavy 
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militarization in African oil-producing region further increases the use of violence 
and repression of the people. Foreign military assistance also contributes to increased 
criminality in the region. Foreign assistance to oppressive regimes and political 
meddling upholds their legitimacy, further deepening corruption and the lack of 
transparency. Economic approaches designed to increase resources and financial gain 
in open markets have destroyed weak African economies and worsened poverty. This 
thesis seeks to provide a regional overview and in some cases, except Nigeria, 
explanations of incidents could only be snapshots. It is hoped that this study will 
stimulate additional research. 
Chapter 7 then relates these negative outcomes to the dependent variable of this 
study, the resource curse, which is displayed in bad governance, poor economic 
performance and the prevalence of conflicts. The chapter also assesses the research 
hypothesis by linking foreign scrambles, as a probabilistic cause, to the resource 
curse. Although neo-colonialism assumes that continued foreign interventions lead to 
WKHPDUJLQDOL]DWLRQRI$IULFDLQWKHZRUOGDQGFDXVHV$IULFD¶VXQGHU-development, it 
does not explain how, and if ever, it is linked to the resource curse theory. By linking 
the IRUHLJQVFUDPEOHRI$IULFD¶VRLODQG$IULFD¶VUHVRXUFHFXUVH&KDSWHUWKXV
serves as a theoretical development chapter. The chapter also highlights how 
Marxism can provide better explanations for the relationships between the foreign 
scramble, neo-FRORQLDOLVPDQG$IULFD¶VXQGHUGHYHORSPHQWWKDQRWKHUWKHRULHV 
 
 
Diagram 1 below concludes how this thesis fits into the resource curse discussion 
with further description in the relevant chapters. 
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Diagram 1: Research Scope 
 
Resource 
Curse 
Existing 
Literature  
Are natural 
resources bad 
for 
develoment? 
What is the 
resource 
curse? 
Research question: What 
impacts do oil-related 
foreign interventions have 
on Africa ?  
What causes 
the resource 
curse? 
Does it have a tendency 
to contribute to the 
resource curse? 
Theories: Resource Curse Theory, and Neo-Marxism 
Context of study:   
- Intervening players: dominant states i.e. UK, France, US, 
China and Transnational Agencies using economic and political 
apparatuses. 
- Location: Africa's oil-rich countries. 
Result:  The new causal 
mechanism  'foreign 
interventions contribute to 
resource curse' refines 
resource curse theory.  
How can the 
resource 
curse be 
overcome? 
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-Chapter 2- 
 
Literature Review: The Resource Curse 
 
&KDSWHUODLGRXWWKHWKHVLV¶PDLQLGHDVDQGVWUXFWXUHVXUURXQGLQJWKHIRUHLJQ
VFUDPEOHIRU$IULFD¶VRLODQGGHILQHGNH\WHUPVµIRUHLJQLQWHUYHQWLRQ¶7KLVFKDSWHULV
devoted for detailed discussion of the resource curse theory.  
The resource curse is a well-established theory with many existing arguments that 
can be categorized into answering four subsets of questions: 1) whether natural 
resources create or hinder development; 2) what is the resource curse; 3) what causes 
it; and 4) what are the cures of the resource curse? The research question of this 
VWXG\µwhat impacts oil-related foreign interventions have on Africa and 
whether they have a tendency to contribute to the resource curse?¶SULPDULO\
relates to the second and third questions. By evaluating the impacts of oil-related 
foreign interventions on Africa, it assesses whether these impacts can be categorized 
DVWKHµUHVRXUFHFXUVH¶$IWHUWKHUHVRXUFHFXUVHV\PSWRPVDUHOLQNHGE\DQDO\VLQJ
the relationship between foreign interventions and the resource curse as a 
probabilistic causal mechanism, this contributes to the section which explains what 
causes the resource curse. As discussed in Chapter 1, Marxist variants explain that 
foreign exploitation of resources lead to underdevelopment of weaker states. This, 
however, has not been linked to the resource curse theory. Before the resource curse 
theory can be developed, this chapter lays out the discussion of the resource curse in 
detail. The next chapter then discusses theories explaining foreign exploitations in 
detail.  
The existing arguments in the resource curse literature are summarised in Table 1 
below. 
 
Table 1: Resource Curse Literature 
 
 
Resource Curse Literature 
 
 
 
 
 
 
16th century 
Resource abundance, not necessarily leading to the wealth of 
nation (Bodin as quoted in Sachs and Warner, 1999). 
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Background  
 
 
of resource  
 
 
curse  
 
 
literature 
 
1940s-1960s before the arrival of resource curse argument 
x The staple theory of growth (Innis, 1956; Watkins,1963). 
x 7KHµELJSXVK¶WKHRU\5RVHQVWHLQ-Rodan, 1943). 
 
The second half of 20th century resource curse discussion at the 
forefront 
x Primary product exports having negative impacts to the 
economy (Singer, 1950; Hirschman, 1958; Prebisch, 
1959; Seers, 1964; Baldwin, 1966). 
x 1950s-1970s: the question of resource abundance at the 
centre of the debates between mainstream development 
scholars and their Marxist/ non-Marxist critics. 
 
1970s after the first oil shock 
x Natural resource projects are bad for development 
(Mabro and Monroe, 1974; Neary and Van Wijnbergen, 
1986). 
x The debate on Dutch Disease (Corden, 1984; Roemer, 
1983; Van Wijnbergen, 1982). 
 
1990s 
A connection between the presence of natural resources and 
political performance (Gelb, 1986; Auty, 1990). 
 
Most recent 
1DWXUDOUHVRXUFHSURMHFWVKLQGHULQJ0'*¶VSRYHUW\DOOHYLDWLRQ
in poor developing countries (Ross, 2001). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Do natural resources hinder development? 
 
 
x Natural resources hinder development (Collier, 2007; 
Sachs, 2005; Sachs and Warner, 1997; Sala-i-Martin and 
Subramanian, 2003). 
x Natural resources facilitate development in certain 
countries (Ross, 2001; Wright and Czelusta, 2002). 
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Content of 
 
 
resource 
 
 
curse 
 
 
literature 
 
 
What is resource curse? 
 
 
x Poor economic growth (Gelb et al., 1988; Leite and 
Weidmann, 1999). 
x Civil war (Doyle and Sambanis, 2000; Reynal-Querol, 
2002; Collier and Hoeffler, 2005). 
x Bad governance (Jensen and Wantchekon, 2004; Ross, 
2001). 
 
 
What causes resource curse? 
 
 
x Negative impacts of resource revenues on economy: 
Dutch Disease (Brohman, 1996), revenue volatility, 
short-term boom and long-term bust (Mikesell, 1997), 
crowding-out effect (Stevens, 2003) and negative genuine 
saving rate (Hamilton, 2001). 
x Lack of human capital accumulation (Birdsall, 1999; 
Birdsall, 2001). 
x Country size (Auty, 2001). 
x Resource type (Auty, 2001; Birdsall, 2001; Woolcock, 
Pritchett et al., 2001). 
x Political factors (Ross, 1999): cognitive explanations 
(Leite, 1999; Bhagwati, 1992; Sachs and Warner, 1997; 
Auty, 1998; Sarraf and Jiwanji, 2001; Karl, 1997), 
societal explanations (Barboza and Cordero, 2001) and 
state-centred explanations (Shambayati, 1994; Auty and 
Gelb, 2001; Lal, 1995). 
x &RXQWU\¶VLQLWLDOFRQGLWLRQV%HYDQDQG&ROOLHUet al., 
1999). 
 
 
How can resource curse be overcome? 
 
 
x Macroeconomic policies: export commodity 
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diversification (Ross, 2001), revenue sterilization, 
creation of stabilization and oil funds (Gelb et al., 1988; 
Gylfason, 2001), adoption of correct investment policies 
and trade openness (Arezki and Van der Ploeg, 2007). 
x Human capital investment (Birdsall et al., 2001). 
x Political reforms (Auty, 2001; Mitra, 1994; Mbaku, 
1992). 
x International assistance (Bannon and Collier, 2003; 
Shaxson, 2005; Stevens, 2003; Auty, 2004; Ballentine 
and Nitzschke, 2005; Sachs, 2005; Collier, 2007). 
 
 
This chapter now explains this table in details.  
Ǯǯ 
%HIRUHWKHGHEDWHRQWKHµUHVRXUFHFXUVH¶FDPHWRWKHIRUHIURQWWKHREVHUYDWLRQRI
natural resource abundance and its linkages date back to the 16th century. Jean Bodin 
(cited in Sachs and Warner, 1999), the French philosopher, argued that resource 
abundance did not necessarily lead to the wealth of nation. He explained that fertile 
land provided comfort and imposed no need for men to work hard. This passivity 
would hinder industrial progress which otherwise is more likely to occur in harsh 
barren environments as men try to escape or conquer.  
3ULRUWRWKHDUULYDORIWKHµUHVRXUFHFXUVH¶DUJXPHQWVRPHHFRQRPLVWV,QQLV
Watkins, 1963) in the 1940s-1960s suggested that underdevelopment of states could 
be tackled by utilising their natural resource industries. This is because developing 
states were thought to suffer from imbalances in the factors of production with 
surplus labour but shortages of investable capital (Ross, 2001: 6). They believed that 
the key problem these poor states faced was attracting foreign capital. The staple 
theory of growth further explained that states with abundant resources could defeat 
their capital shortages by attracting foreign firms to invest in their natural resources. 
The profits from extractive industries would boost the local infrastructure. The 
profits would then be re-invested into other industries connected to resource 
industries such as in engineering, services, finances and transportation. The result 
ZRXOGEHDGLYHUVLILHGSDWWHUQRIJURZWK7KHµELJSXVK¶WKHRU\RIHFRQRPLF
development had a similar explanation (Rosenstein-Rodan, 1943; Murphy et al., 
1989). It suggested that poor states remain poor because they were caught in the 
SRYHUW\WUDS7KH\QHHGDµELJSXVK¶WRHVFDSHWKLVWUDS2QHIRUPRIWKLVLVDERRP
in natural resource exports that would encourage private firms to invest in 
industrialization leading to a self-sustaining pattern of growth. The later evidence of 
KRZSRRUO\WKHZRUOG¶VUHVRXUFH-dependent states performed; however, shifted the 
focus away from this argument.  
Studies on the resource curse became more central toward the second half of the 20th 
century. However, in the early study of this topic, natural resource exports were not 
yet tackled individually but addressed as primary product exports, which also 
included agricultural commodities. Several academics (Singer, 1950; Hirschman, 
1958; Presbisch, 1964; Seers, 1964; Baldwin 1966), for instance, claimed that 
primary product exports had negative impacts on the economy. They argued that 
primary products are subjected to declining terms of trade making the exporters of 
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these products become disadvantaged when trading with industrialized countries. 
Furthermore, the linkages from primary products to other industries are also limited, 
especially when compared to manufacturing. The later studies on this subject, 
nonetheless, showed that not all primary products are equally harmful to the 
economy. Agriculture instead increases the buying power of the poor and thus 
improves the human foundations of society, despite making the national economy 
more prone to the staple trap.1 In contrast, natural resource rents are concentrated 
among many fewer hands. This aggravates inequitable growth. Ross (1999) 
concluded that during this period (1950s-1970s), the question of resource abundance 
was at the centre of the debates between mainstream development scholars and their 
Marxist/non-Marxist critics.2 The following decade, nonetheless, saw the study of 
resource abundance become less ideological and more empirical.  
$VDUHVXOWRIWKHILUVWRLOVKRFNLQWKH¶VWKHIRFXVRIFRQFHUQZDVVKLIWHGWR
natural resources as a separate topic, rather than the primary products as a whole. 
Mabro and Monroe (1974), Neary and Van Wijnbergen (1986), for instance, tackled 
natural resources independently by speculating that oil, gas and mineral projects 
create large revenues which are paradoxically bad for development. The debate on 
Dutch disease took place in the period following the discovery of the Groningen gas 
field in the Netherlands (Corden, 1984; Roemer, 1983; Van Wijnbergen, 1982).3 The 
petroleum industries caused the appreciation of the real exchange rate. Other 
industries became unprofitable. It led to a decline in manufacturing. For developing 
countries, Dutch disease could damage the agricultural sector, which is an important 
IRXQGDWLRQIRUWKHFRXQWU\¶VHFRQRPLFGHYHORSPHQWEHFDXVHLWLVODERXU-intensive 
rather than a capital-intensive resource industry that only benefits a few elites. The 
LPSDFWRI'XWFKGLVHDVHORZHUVDFRXQWU\¶VFKDQFHVWRGLYHUVLI\LQWRPDQXIDFWXULQJ
and service exports.  
,QWKH¶VVFKRODUVEHJDQGUDZLQJDFRQQHFWLRQEHWZHHQWhe presence of natural 
resource revenues and the political performance of the nation. Gelb (1986) and Auty 
(1990) discussed the relationship between oil, gas and mineral revenues and 
government behaviour. They explained that large windfall revenues drawn from 
WKHVHSURMHFWVDIIHFWJRYHUQPHQWEHKDYLRXULQZD\VZKLFKGDPDJHWKHFRXQWU\¶V
development prospects. 
$QHZSHUVSHFWLYHRQWKHµUHVRXUFHFXUVH¶GLVFXVVLRQDSSHDUHGLQ5RVVZLWK
respect to poverty alleviation according to the UN Millennium Development 
                                                          
1
 Staple trap refers to economic or social forces which trap a nation within the export of a particular product. This restricts the 
diversification in management of trade, labour force, financial methods and transportation routes. Consequently, an economy 
finds it difficult to move away from a major reliance on staple products although they may not bring as much profit as other 
commodities. 
 
2
 Development scholars (Rosenstein-Rodan 1943; Murphy et al., 1989) during this period propoVHGWKHµ%LJ3XVK7KHRU\¶LQ
the form of a boom in natural resource exports of developing countries which would encourage private firms to invest in 
industrialization. Contrarily, Marxist critics argued that natural resource exploitation is destructive as the rents are concentrated 
among few hands explaining that investments largely benefit big firms and political elites while creating clashes and wider 
discrepancy as local workers receive little return. In this respect, non-0DU[LVWVDUJXHGWKDWELJILUPV¶investments in natural 
resources kick start other industries such as services and infrastructure (Vernon, 1971).  
3
 Dutch Disease refers to the influence of two effects created by resource booms. The first is the appreciation of the real 
exchange rate caused by the sharp rise in exports. The second is the tendency of a booming resource sector to draw capital and 
labour away from manufacturing and agriculture sectors, raising their production costs. These effects can lead to a decline in 
agricultural and manufactured goods exports and can inflate the cost of goods and services that cannot be imported (Neary, 
1986). 
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Programme which aims to cut world poverty in half by 2015. He put forward that 
resource projects hinder poverty alleviation by creating conflicts in poor developing 
countries. Thus, he suggested that the poor states should avoid export-oriented 
extractive industries altogether.  
Having discussed the background of the resource curse literature, the chapter now 
moves on to discuss the four questions mentioned above: 1) whether natural 
resources create or hinder development; 2) what the resource curse is; 3) what causes 
it; 4) and what are its cures? 
 
Do Natural Resources Hinder Development? 
The first question the resource curse literature asks is whether natural resources 
KLQGHUGHYHORSPHQW&ROOLHU¶VVWXG\VKRZVWKDWDSSUR[LPDWHO\SHUFHQWRI
thHZRUOG¶VSRRUHVWSHRSOHOLYHLQFRXQWULHVLQZKLFKUHVRXUFHZHDOWKLVGRPLQDQW+H
WHUPVLWµUHVRXUFH-ULFKSRYHUW\¶7KLVQXPEHUVKRZVWKDWWKHQDWXUDOUHVRXUFHULFKHV
might not benefit the population. In order to evaluate whether natural resources are 
bad for development, scholars have compared the performance of resource-rich 
countries with resource-poor countries as well as that of poorly-performing resource-
rich countries with successful resource-rich countries. This section first addresses the 
argument about whether natural resources hinder or support development.  
Firstly, natural resources are believed to hinder development. Sachs (2005) argued 
that after extractive industries operate in resource-rich countries the economic 
growth paradoxically declined and the rate of poverty rose. He explained that half a 
century ago the economic performance of resource-rich African countries was better 
than resource-poor Asian countries such as South Korea, China and India. Contrary 
to resource-rich economies, the resource-poor Asian countries used agriculture as a 
base to diversify their export structure and so achieved rapid economic success. 
Besides, most countries were all equally poor two centuries ago. Resource-poor 
European countries were as poor as resource-rich African countries. One of the 
explanations is that the rich and lootable traits of resources distract people away from 
investing in the right sector. Hence, natural resources inhibit development (Collier, 
2007).  
Specifically, Sachs and Warner (1997) examined ninety-seven countries over a 
nineteen-year period, using regression analysis to measure the impact of mineral and 
other resource exports on GDP growth. The study shows that states with a high ratio 
of natural resource exports to GDP have abnormally slow growth rates, even after 
controlling growth-related variables which are initial per capita income, trade policy, 
investment rates, region, bureaucratic efficiency, terms-of-trade volatility and income 
distribution. 
In addition to comparing the performance of resource-rich with resource-poor 
countries, scholars (Ross, 2001; Wright and Czelusta, 2002) look further into 
comparing the performance of resource-rich countries that prosper with resource-rich 
countries that suffer the curse. Examples of resource-rich countries which have been 
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studied and categorized to have suffered the severe resource curse are exhaustive 
while those that have not are few.1 
For some such as Nigeria and Venezuela, the failure has been much more 
catastrophic and differs severely from the promise of petroleum (Gary and Karl, 
2003). Take Nigeria as an example. Before the oil boom in 1970, 19 million 
Nigerians lived below the poverty line. Now despite the over $400 billion of oil 
revenues, more than 90 million Nigerians live in poverty (Sala-i-Martin and 
Subramanian, 2003: 4). Furthermore, Bevan, Collier et al., (1999) conducted a 
descriptive study comparing Nigeria and Indonesia. The study explained why growth 
did not take place in Nigeria when it was under similar initial conditions and had the 
same opportunities as Indonesia. Collier (2005) even went on to claim that cases 
where natural resource wealth is a channel to prosperity are an exception.  
While there is considerable empirical evidence suggesting that natural resources 
hinder development, there are opposing arguments stressing that the natural 
resources may have beneficial effects. Ross (2001), for instance, studied Botswana, 
Chile and Malaysia whilst Wright and Czelusta (2002) studied Norway, all of which 
are resource-endowed countries. They argue that in these countries the resource 
abundance is a blessing rather than a curse due to the correct policies employed that 
create the difference.  
Botswana, a diamond-rich country, for example, despite being small, agriculturally 
marginal, landlocked and bordered by unstable states, has attained developmental 
VXFFHVV6FKRODUVDJUHHXSRQWKHFRQFOXVLRQWKDWWKHµDJDLQVW-all-RGGV¶VXFFHVVLQ
%RWVZDQD¶VFDVHLVGXHWRLWVDGRSWLRQRIJRRGSROLFLHV$FHPRJOX-RKQVRQet al., 
2003). Botswana has a distinct institutional equilibrium. Its pre-colonial tribal 
institutions allowed public participation and put constraints on the political actors. 
British colonization hardly changed these institutions because Botswana was of 
comparatively little interest to Britain. Besides, the post-independence political 
leaders, particularly Seretse Khama and Quett Masire, were strong leaders and took a 
number of exceptionally good economic decisions in resisting the resource failure for 
Botswana (Wiseman, 1980). However, there is still a consensus that natural 
resources are a curse to host states and that those which benefit from them are 
exceptional.  
 
What is the Resource Curse? 
After discussing whether resources hinder development, we now examine further 
what symptoms would be characterized as a resource curse. Based on the resource 
curse theory, poor economic growth, civil war and bad governance are interrelated 
ZLWKWKHSUHVHQFHRIUHVRXUFHDEXQGDQFHDQGWKLVLVZKDWLVWHUPHGµUHVRXUFHFXUVH¶ 
This sWXG\SULPDULO\DVNVµwhat impacts oil-related foreign interventions have on 
Africa and whether they have a tendency to contribute to the resource curse?¶
The former part of the question, by evaluating whether African performances could 
be categorized as a resource curse, based its analysis on the definition set out above.  
                                                          
1
 See chapter 1 for the list of resource-rich countries that fail in contrast to those that succeed (p 22).  
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First, natural resource abundance is found related to poor economic growth (Gelb et 
al., 1988; Leite and Weidmann, 1999). Gelb et al. (1988) studied the 1971-1983 
boom period and concluded that mineral economies experienced a more serious 
deterioration in the efficiency of domestic capital formation, leading to negative 
growth in hard mineral economies and dramatically worse in oil exporting 
economies. Between 1970 and 1993, oil-exporting countries experienced continual 
dramatic falls in living standards whilst those without oil grew four times more 
rapidly (Gary and Karl, 2003). 
Another negative trait found correlating with natural resource abundance is the 
prevalence of civil war. Doyle and Sambanis (2000), Reynal-Querol (2002) and 
Collier and Hoeffler (2005), for example, conducted studies proposing that natural 
resource abundance is associated with the onset, duration and intensity of civil war. 
Reynal-4XHURO¶VVWXG\H[DPLQHGWKHDVVRFLDtion between natural resources and the 
onset of ethnic and non-ethnic civil wars. She used data from a sample of 138 
countries between 1960 and 1995. By this, Reynal-Querol found that resource 
abundance was an essential causal mechanism explaining the incidence of non-ethnic 
civil wars as well as other political violence. Considering natural resource abundance 
as a causal mechanism of conflicts, Reno (2003) and Ikelegbe (2006) expressed that 
the resource by itself does not create conflicts. Rather, it is the complex struggles 
between various players, national and international, classes and groups in the process 
of resource extraction and distribution of benefits that create and fuel armed 
conflicts. According to their views, it can be concluded that resources are not an 
independent variable in this causal relationship but instead an antecedent variable, a 
factor leading to struggles between various players and between different classes. 
With regard to conflicts, this study takes a similar stance; that is, the complex 
struggles between various players in African oil-rich countries are what contribute to 
or prolong conflicts.  
A number of studies in the resource curse literature also suggest the negative linkage 
between resource abundance and bad governance. Jensen and Wantchekon (2004), 
for instance, concluded that resource-abundant countries in Africa were more likely 
to be authoritarian and experience breakdowns in democracy. Ross (2001a: 356) 
examined data from 113 states between 1971 and 1997 and concluded that resource-
dependent countries tend to be less democratic; that this is not caused by other types 
of primary exports and is not limited to the Middle East, Africa, or small-sized 
countries.   
 
What Causes the Resource Curse? 
Finding that resource abundance paradoxically does not bring prosperity lead to 
another aspect of the debate about what causes the resource curse. There exists a 
large volume of literature which provides explanations, each varying according to the 
approaches or perspectives of the scholars.1 This thesis groups the existing 
                                                          
1
 Rosser (2006) grouped these perspectives into five main sets: behaviouralist, rational actor, state-centred, historic-structuralist 
and social capital. Behavioural perspectives suggest that natural resource abundance leads to irrational behaviour by political 
elites, causing poor economic policy-making and political deterioration (Wallich, 1960; Levin, 1960; Mitra, 1994; Krause, 
1995; Useem, 2003). On the contrary, the rational actor perspective views political elites as rational, profit-maximising actors, 
seeking rent from natural resources (Ascher, 1999; Torvik, 2002). State-centred perspectives portray that natural resource 
DEXQGDQFHOHDGVWRSRRUHFRQRPLFSHUIRUPDQFHE\LQIOXHQFLQJWKHVWDWH¶VLQVWLWXWLRQDOFDSDFLW\LQZD\VZKLFKKLQGHUHFRQRPLF
development (Mahdavy, 1970; Luciani, 1987; Chaudhry, 1994; Vandewalle 1998). Historico-structuralist perspectives explain 
that resource abundance has negative economic impacts because of its unequal distribution to different social classes (Urrutia, 
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explanation of the causes of the resource curse into six causal variables. These are 
the impacts of resource revenues on the economy, the human capital foundation of 
the society, the country size, the resource type, SROLWLFDOIDFWRUVDQGWKHFRXQWU\¶V
initial conditions. The latter part of the research question about whether oil-related 
foreign interventions have a tendency to contribute to the resource curse belongs to 
this section of the discussion.  
Rather than pointing out that one of these variables has more explanatory power than 
another, this thesis acknowledges the inter-connection between them in a society. 
The negative impacts created by a foreign resource scramble in the context of these 
variables make it harder for African oil-rich states to perform well. Foreign 
interventions may precede, follow or entangle with some of these variables. For 
example, foreign interventions may create conditions such as poor governance and 
economic collapse in which fluctuating oil revenues are harder to manage. Foreign 
LQWHUYHQWLRQVWKDWFRPHLQIRUPRIWKH,QWHUQDWLRQDO0RQHWDU\)XQG¶V6WUXFWXUDO
Adjustment Programme which mainly requires public spending cuts will make the 
development of human capital foundation unfeasible. Foreign interventions can exist 
in countries of whatever size and can create, exist alongside or intensify a bad 
political system in countries where the quality of governance is poor. However, the 
linkages between these variables are not the focus of this study. This study looks 
especially at the unaddressed causal variable- oil-related foreign intervention and the 
resource curse.  
The purposes of this section are to: 1) discuss existing arguments so that further 
reference regarding the resource curse in this thesis and why African oil-rich 
countries fail to develop can be generally understood; and 2) demonstrate that the 
existing variables are not enough because the linkage between foreign interventions 
and the resource curse have not been included. That this is not only an African 
problem and laying out the existing arguments will benefit future research. 
The first factor explained as leading to the resource curse is the negative impacts of 
the large revenues streaming from the resources into the economy. These impacts 
LQFOXGHWKHµ'XWFK'LVHDVH¶UHYHQXHYRODWLOLW\VKRUW-term boom and long-term bust, 
crowding-out effect and negative genuine savings rate. These symptoms make it 
extremely difficult for a country to pursue sound fiscal policies, especially a poor 
country with weak managerial institutions.  
Mikesell (1997), for example, found that regions with high primary export shares 
experienced terms of trade volatility two to three times greater than industrial 
countries. To make matters worse, windfall revenues from fluctuating export prices 
tend to be consumed rather than invested (Sachs and Warner, 1998). Furthermore, 
the sudden large resource revenues would cause the appreciation of the real exchange 
rate, which consequently contracts the tradable manufacturing, agricultural and 
VHUYLFHVHFWRUV7KLVLVFDOOHG³'XWFK'LVHDVH´&RQWUDFWLRQRIWUDGDEOHVHFWRUVFDQ
cause chronic slow growth. Unlike tradable sectors, the natural resource sector lacks 
positive externalities. The problems increase when governments subsidize the 
contracting sectors by using the resource revenue windfalls. These revenues are 
subject to fluctuations due to world market demand; therefore, the cushioning of 
other sectors with this money will become unsustainable and fragile. The 
                                                                                                                                                                    
1998; Broad, 1995). Social capital perspectives suggest that resource abundance undermines social cohesion and consequently 
OLPLWVJRYHUQPHQWV¶FDSDFLW\WRDYRLGHFRQRPLFVKRFNV+DXVPDQ, 2003).  
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government burden of these payments is heavy when the price busts. Several 
resource-rich governments use up their capital this way. In response to the problem, 
they use the prospect of resource abundance to borrow externally in order to sustain 
these subsidized programmes, leaving the country heavily indebted. Examples 
include Nigeria, Mexico, Argentina and Costa Rica (Auty, 2001). 
Resources are priced according to world demand. When the prices soar, the supply 
rises. The extended-period of high-prices discourages demand which results in prices 
plunging sharply. Contrary to tradable sectors, the resource sector terms of trade are 
subject to long-term decline. Managing rising revenues followed by a period of 
GHFOLQHZRXOGRYHUVWUHWFKJRYHUQPHQW¶VFDSDELOLW\DQGUesult in poor economic 
performance (Brohman, 1996). The oil crises in 1973 and 1979, for example, left oil-
dependent economies such as Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Nigeria stumbling in the period 
of price decline that followed. Due to prospective high profits for oil, gas and 
mineral projects, the investment in these projects is prioritised. This is particularly 
true in smaller countries which resource projects take a large portion of the entire 
economy while capital resources are scarce. In this case, the rest of the economy 
finds it difficult to secure the support essential for development (Stevens, 2003). 
Natural resources, in particular oil, being high-rent commodities entail high depletion 
rates. Hamilton (2001) finds oil-rich countries, especially the small ones, likely to 
have the lowest genuine saving rate (barely positive) despite very high rates of gross 
saving when compared to the large resource-poor countries that exhibit relatively 
high gross and genuine savings rates.1 Negative genuine saving implies that welfare 
must decline at some point in future on the optimal development path; that is, 
negative genuine saving implies non-sustainability. 
Another cause of the resource curse is the lack of human capital development in 
resource-ULFKFRXQWULHV7KHµFLUFOHRIKXPDQFDSLWDODFFXPXODWLRQ¶LVWKHNH\WR
equitable growth. Birdsall (1999) explained that countries can achieve rapid, 
equitable growth by encouraging the poor to invest in the assets they control, 
including their human capital. Raising the rates of return on human capital and other 
assets leads to increase in work effort, higher savings and, consequently, higher 
investment, while generating higher productivity and lower inequality over the 
extended period. This lower inequality itself fosters further growth, providing the 
incentive for yet more savings and investment by the poor. Birdsall (2001) further 
explained that resource abundance, however, lures the governments away from 
investing in human capital because the rate of return on the agricultural and human 
capital investments is meagre compared to investment in resource projects due to 
Dutch disease. Besides, resource rents only accumulate among small elite causing 
high inequality and thus lower growth. The circle of human capital accumulation is 
broken in several places in the presence of the resource wealth. These are the µFKRLFH
of development strategy, the level of inequality, the lack of incentives for investment 
in education and the creation of ZHOIDUHVWDWH¶(Birdsall, 2001: 58).  
                                                          
1
 The genuine saving rate is used as a measurement for economic sustainability by taking account 
several factors including depletion of natural resources, costs of environmental pollution and long-
term environmental damage. 
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The size of resource-abundant countries is another factor determining whether they 
will suffer the curse. Auty (2001a) argued that large resource-abundant countries 
have greater scope to absorb external shocks. Although they still failed to avoid 
growth collapses, they recovered faster than small ones. Large resource-abundant 
countries have bigger market sizes, likely more various resources and tend to be less 
economically dependent on mineral resource exports in comparison to smaller 
resource-abundant countries. Thus, the large resource-abundant countries are more 
able to diversify their economy and have a higher rate of trade openness which 
would, in turn, give the economy a comparative advantage. However, for African oil-
rich countries, this assumption does not apply. Angola, Sudan, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Ethiopia and Nigeria are all large by size, population and oil 
ventures but their dysfunctions are apparent (Clapham, Herbst et al., 2001). Thus, 
WKLVFRXOGEHDWWULEXWHGWRWKHIDFWRURIWKLVVWXG\¶Vfocus that these countries have 
been marginalized for centuries so that their foundations became too weak to manage 
the challenges of oil wealth when their oil industries began.  
Not all resource-abundant countries face the same risks. The type of natural 
resources the country has is another factor designating whether the resource 
abundance is a blessing or curse. Existing literature groups natural resources into two 
categories using the concentration of rents derived from the resources as criteria: 
point-source and diffuse-source resources. Plantation crops as well as oil and hard 
minerals, typically associated with highly-concentrated ownership, are point-source 
resources. Diffuse-source resources are smallholder export crops and staples (wheat, 
rice, coffee and cocoa). Auty (2001) suggested that mineral economies are 
potentially more vulnerable to policy error than countries with more diffuse 
economic linkages. Birdsall (2001) concluded that concentrated rents drawn from 
point-source resources lead to high inequality. Governments are unlikely to pursue 
labour-demanding growth paths, leading to low returns on investment in human 
capital and resulting in negative economic growth trajectories. Contrarily, diffuse-
source resources display a varied pattern of socio-economic linkages. Low barriers to 
entry mean that wealth is more evenly dispersed. The lower rate of return and high 
maintenance demand also make diffuse-source resources less attractive for elites to 
take over (Woodcock, Pritchett et al., 2001). The result is the country is less prone to 
massive resource-driven corruption and a deteriorating political system.  
For foreign players, point-source resources such as oil and minerals are more 
attractive as there is a high rate of return and decisions and operations can be 
managed by fewer hands. Moreover, oil also has strategic and security importance. 
Their large investment is largely favoured by local governments, making it harder for 
countries with point-source resources to develop the production of diffuse-source 
resources.   
While acknowledging that existing variables contribute to the resource curse, this 
study particularly agrees that political factors are an important variable in this causal 
mechanism. Foreign interventions may cause hostile political factors. Equally, weak 
political systems may allow negative foreign interventions to occur. Often, both 
variables are intertwined. I now discuss in further detail how political factors lead to 
the resource curse. 
0XFKRIµUHVRXUFHFXUVH¶ZULWLQJLVGHYRWHd to the role of government. Ross (1999) 
classified political explanations of the resource curse into three groups: cognitive, 
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societal and state-centred. Cognitive perspectives explain that resource booms 
produce a type of short-sightedness among policymakers leading to corruption, rent-
seeking and misallocation (Leite 1999).1 Huge profits attached to rent-seeking lead to 
the formation of powerful groups who will lobby and block any economic and 
SROLWLFDOUHIRUPVWKDWZRXOGEHJRRGIRUWKHFRXQWU\¶VSHUIRUmance but discourage 
their interests. This not only causes the monopoly of power, but also entirely harms 
the economy (Bhagwati, 1992; Sachs and Warner, 1997; Auty, 1998). The 
expenditure in rent seeking creates no social value and distorts markets. Rent seeking 
is a particularly serious problem in Africa (Collier, 2007). According to Collier and 
+RHIIOHUUHQWVHHNLQJRU³JUHHG´LVPRUHKLJKO\FRUUHODWHGZLWKWKHRQVHWRI
FRQIOLFWWKDQDUHHWKQLFVRFLRHFRQRPLFRUSROLWLFDO³JULHYDQFHV´$OWKRXJKWhe 
³JUHHGWKHVLV´ZDVLQIOXHQWLDOLWZDVKLJKO\FRQWHVWHG%DOOHQWLQHDQG1LW]VFKNH
2005). 
GovernPHQW¶VZURQJSROLF\FKRLFHVKDYHDOVREHHQIRXQGWR contribute to the 
µUHVRXUFHFXUVH¶HIIHFWV/DUJHZLQGIDOOUHYHQXHVIURPUHVRXUFHVDUHEHOLHYHGWROHDG
to poor decision-making by governments. As large revenues from oil and mineral 
projects generally raise expectations among the population for development, 
governments feel pressures and respond too swiftly (Auty, 2001). States try to do too 
much too soon, leaving the government administratively overextended (Karl, 1997). 
Spending revenue is more likely to be distorted. The decision-making in spending the 
resource windfall also involves fewer people when compared to a peasant-cash-crop 
economy, making it more vulnerable to mistakes and misallocations. The importance 
of making the right choices is also lower because the revenues are plentiful (Sarraf 
and Jiwanji, 2001).   
Government misallocations are manifested in both investment and industrial policies. 
Sarraf and Jiwanji (2001) highlighted that unproductive investment booms emerge in 
many resource-ULFKFRXQWULHV7KHUHDUHDOVRPDQ\µZKLWHHOHSKDQW¶FRQVWUXFWLRQ
projects ranging from palaces to massive international airports, unnecessary for basic 
economic development (Collier, 2007). These are evident in African oil-rich 
countries (ibid.). The influx of foreign exchange the resource revenues bring 
magnifies the problems in investment decisions. Large resource revenues led Mexico 
and a number of other resource-rich countries to adopt import-substitute industrial 
policies during the 1970s-V8VXL,WDOVROHGWRVWDWHV¶JUHDWHU
intervention in the economy by providing subsidies and protectionism. The relaxed 
market discipline and related accumulative market distortions, however, retard 
competitive diversification. Wealth is accrued by a small number of industries, 
hindering equitable growth and human capital accumulation. The consequences are 
shock-prone economies and growth failure.  
Ross (1999) proposed societal explanations to the second political factor of the 
resource curse. He argued that resource exports tend to empower sectors, classes, or 
interest groups and enhance the political leverage of non-state actors who favour 
growth-impeding policies. Take Costa Rica as an example (Barboza and Cordero, 
2001). Costa Rica is different than other resource-abundant countries in that it has a 
high level of human development. Although this has helped Costa Rica to avoid 
                                                          
1
 Rent seeking is the behaviour which various parties compete for artificial transfers, an income 
without a need to work to earn it. Rent VHHNLQJFRPSHWLWLRQLVH[WUHPHO\ILHUFHZKHQUHQW¶VYDOXHLV
concentrated such as in oil or other hard minerals because the wealth is only available in the public 
sector or in a small number of companies. 
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socio-political tensions, the social capital was a trade-off with growth. Costa Rica 
used resource revenues to pursue a support-led development plan whereas Malaysia 
insisted on a growth-led strategy. Sustainable economic growth requires market 
discipline. The social capital build-up in Costa 5LFDWKHUHIRUHOHGWRµ2OVHQHIIHFWV¶
which explains the ambitious social supports exceeding the capacity of the economy 
to sustain. This policy choice retarded the much needed economic reform of the 
resource-dependent economy. 
The third political factor put forward is the state-centred explanation (Ross, 1999). 
He explained that resource booms tend to weaken state institutions and concluded 
that theories of the rentier state are the most common explanations.1 They argued 
that when governments gain most of their revenues from external sources, such as 
resource rents, they are freed from the need to levy domestic taxes and become less 
accountable to the societies they govern. Shambayati (1994) suggested that rentier 
states face little social pressure to improve their economic policies, since their low 
taxes and generous welfare programmes discourage opposition groups from 
mobilizing around economic issues.  
Rentier states may generate rents by monopolies, trade restrictions and subsidies. 
They tend to nationalize the resource extraction industries. Ross (1999) suggested 
WKDWPXFKRIWKHUHVRXUFHFXUVHLVFDXVHGE\WKHVWDWH¶VRZQHUVKLSRIUHVRXUFH
industries. From the 1950s to the mid-1970s, many foreign-owned resource firms 
were nationalized with harmful results, especially for developing states whose 
economies became directly exposed to international market shocks without foreign 
companies. With state ownership, the governments often relax budget constraints 
creating fiscal laxity and a tendency to over-borroZ$VDUHVXOWWKHVWDWH¶VHFRQRPLF
programmes become seriously inefficient and draw out more funds when they need 
to improve productivity. Examples of rentier states include oil-producing states such 
as Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Iraq, Iran, Venezuela, Libya, Nigeria and 
Gabon (Anderson, 1987; Beblawi, 1990; Yates, 1996; Van Genugten, 2011). 
 
The nature of rentier states provides a particular explanation for the presence of 
authoritarian regimes and the lack of democracy in resource-rich countries (Smith, 
2004; Beblawi 1990). In the absence of taxes, citizens have fewer motives to put 
pressure on the government. Often, the government uses resource rents to back up 
populist strategies, such as extensive social welfare programmes, to secure continued 
political support (Feldman, 2003). To further complicate the matter, the lack of 
democracy worsens the quality of capital allocation as there is no check and balance 
system (Lal, 1995). Such behaviour hinders economic growth.  
 
Furthermore, governments of predatory and factional states tend to perform worse in 
comparison to the developmental states (Auty and Gelb, 2001).2 They explained that 
                                                          
1
 A rentier state is a state which extracts all or a substantial portion of their national revenues from the 
rent of domestic resources to external clients. The term is most frequently used for states rich in highly 
valued natural resources. A state is a rentier state when rent extraction dominates; when the economy 
relies on a substantial external rent and thus does not require a strong productive sector; when rent is 
concentrated in a small number of population and when the government is the main recipient of the 
rent. 
2
 Predatory states are states whose government tends to use the state tools to loot what would 
otherwise be investable surplus without any regard for the welfare of the citizens. In return, they 
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these governments prefer non-transparent methods for deploying rents in order to 
maximize the scope for political manoeuvring. The favoured channels are trade 
protection, job creation and over-extended public expenditure. During the first oil 
cycle (1973-IRUH[DPSOHWKHZLQGIDOORI1LJHULD¶VRLOUHYHQXHJDYHULVHWR
government expenditure, enhancing the opportunities for corruption. It gave 
excessive profits on government contracts to the private sector and favoured terms 
IRUIRUHLJQDFTXLVLWLRQV,QWKHSXEOLFVHFWRUWKHJRYHUQPHQWSURYLGHGµNLFNEDFNV¶RQ
contracts and import licences. Although the government spent the oil revenue 
acquired in the boom, the return on investment shown in per capita private 
FRQVXPSWLRQGLGQRWLQFUHDVHDVJUHDWO\DVWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VVSHQGLQJWUHQGZRXOG
suggest (Bevan, Collier et al., 1999).  
 
However, Collier (2007) pointed out that democracy is not necessarily beneficial to 
resource-rich countries. He explained that democracies tend to under-invest. 
Governments are so obsessed with winning the next election that they disregard what 
might happen afterwards and so neglect investments that only come to fruition in the 
future. Furthermore, Sachs (2005) proposed that the failure of states to enforce 
property rights has a linkage to the resource curse. When the enforcement of property 
rights is weak, manufacturing firms often find it difficult to operate since they risk a 
loss of investments. However, resource extraction, Ross (1999) suggested, can still 
thrive because resource revenues are vast enough for firms to afford to pay criminal 
gangs, private militias or rebel groups for securing their properties. Particularly in 
states where the rule of law is already weak, the presence of resource firms may help 
these groups form or expand by giving them lucrative interests and means. It may 
HYHQSURPRWHWKHULVHRIRUJDQL]DWLRQVWKDWVHHNRXWµSURWHFWLRQUHQWV¶7KLVLV
particularly true for Nigeria (see Chapter 6). In this way, foreign players operate 
resource industries in ways which weaken state institutions. More often than not, 
foreign resource industries indirectly undermine the force of property rights by 
acquiring land from the government without proper compensation to the local 
populations. The rise of non-resource industries then becomes less likely. The result 
is the severe form of resource curse with a state facing economic decline, conflicts 
and bad governance. This explains why in states where the economy and legal 
system have broken down - Burma, Nigeria, Sudan, Iraq, Angola, Congo-Kinshasa, 
Congo-Brazzaville and Sierra Leone - resource industries still flourish. 
 
Governments can have a huge role in the resource sectors particularly in developing 
countries. Theoretically, they have the policy tools to mitigate economic or social 
adversities. For example, by investing in the productivity of their resource sectors 
and by diversifying their exports, they can counterbalance the declining terms of 
trade. They can cushion their economies from revenue volatility by using 
stabilization funds. They can prevent Dutch Disease by maintaining tight fiscal 
                                                                                                                                                                    
provide very little back in the ways of collective goods. This process hinders economic progress 
(Evans, 1989).  
Developmental states, on the contrary, tend to foster long-term entrepreneurial perspectives among 
private actors by increasing incentives to engage in investments and lowering the risks involved in 
such investments. They may not be immune to rent-seeking or using the social surplus for their ends. 
However, the overall results of their actions endorse transformation (White and Wade, 1988). 
Developmental states require two components: strong elite with an ideology that promotes economic 
development and the institutional capacity to implement those policies without being overpowered by 
narrow private interests (Stevens, 2003). Examples of developmental states are the new industrial 
countries in East Asia whereas Zimbabwe is a distinct example of a predatory state. 
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policies, temporarily subsidizing agricultural and manufacturing sectors and 
GHSUHFLDWLQJWKHLQIODWLQJH[FKDQJHUDWHV7KHVWDWH¶VIDLOXUHWRWDNHPHDVXUHVWR
transfer resource abundance into development has arguably become the most 
puzzling part of the resource curse (Ross, 1999). While this study agrees that 
OHDGHUVKLSSUHGDWLRQDQGSROLWLFDOGHILFLHQFLHVDUHODUJHO\UHVSRQVLEOHIRU$IULFD¶V
XQGHUGHYHORSPHQWLWSRLQWVRXWWKHGHHSHUVWUXFWXUHVWKDWKDYHPRXOGHG$IULFD¶V
economic and political world and that positive state behaviour and policies alone 
would fail to remove the resource curse under this context.  
0RVWRIWKHDQDO\VHVH[LVWLQJLQWKHµUHVRXUFHFXUVH¶OLWHUDWXUHZHUHEDVHGRQ
contemporary events. However, Bevan and Collier et al. ¶VFRPSDULVRQ
between Nigeria and Indonesia brought a different light by not only considering the 
contemporary events but also looking into the history of both countries and 
investigating them for a period of over 50 years in order to find explanations about 
why they make certain decisions and consequently cause variations in their economic 
performance. They explained that Nigeria and Indonesia in the 1970s shared similar 
initial conditions - political structure and economic growth. Economic theories would 
suggest that policies and performances derived under these conditions would be 
similar. However, the countries adopted different policies following the period. To 
understand policy divergence, they propose that history matters.    
The atypical approach of Bevan and Collier et al., though contributory, only focused 
on domestic structures, overlooking how external pressures influenced domestic 
policies and capacity. For centuries, the scramble for resources has led to exploitative 
practices and leaving considerable impacts, the relationship which remains 
underexplored. The resource curse discussion has been made trivial by the lack of 
historical perspective.  
Negative elements associated with oil, such as corruption and economic 
mismanagement, on which a great deal is written, are a small part of a wider impact 
arising from the continued scramble for Africa. The existing literature fails to capture 
$IULFD¶VFRPSOH[RLOKLVWRU\WKHORQJFRPSOH[JDPHSOD\HGE\GLIIHUHQWSOD\HUV,W
is not just a modern oil rush but the on-going clashes between Africa and the 
exploiters in the breadth and intensity of the scramble for Africa which affects the 
management problem in African states. 
This study agrees that initial conditions matter but a fully effective analysis requires 
an overall approach which must include the lengthy foreign scramble for African 
resources. The existing literature has not addressed the way in which foreign 
interventions have contributed to the resource curse. This study fills the gap by 
H[SORULQJWKHH[SORLWDWLRQRI$IULFD¶VUHVRXUFHV 
This chapter so far shows that while there is now a significant body of literature 
examining various dimensions of resources and political economy nexus, current 
literature and policy on this topic has not been conceptualised in relation to the 
broader debates on the nature of contemporary conflicts and global governance. The 
exception is the study of Pugh, Cooper et al. (2006) which examined thematic factors 
(borderlands, markets, regulation, role of the UN, liberal peace ideology) that 
significantly contribute to durable FRQIOLFWV7KHDXWKRUV¶IRFXVKRZHYHUZDVRQthe 
attempt to transform war economies, linking it more broadly to the issues of global 
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governance and intentionally avoiding the conventional approach that is centred on 
the resource curse.  
 
After explaining what causes the resource curse, we now turn to discuss arguments 
surrounding its cures.  
 
How can the Resource Curse be Overcome? 
+RZWKHµUHVRXUFHFXUVH¶FDQEHRYHUFRPHLVGLVFXVVHGH[WHQVLYHO\7KHVROXWLRQVWR
the resource curse include macroeconomic policies; human capital investment; 
political reforms and international assistance. However, if foreign interventions 
contribute to the resource curse, suggested solutions which focus on domestic 
reforms are likely to be inadequate. The problem is because the foreign dimensions 
LQ$IULFD¶VUHVRXUFHFXUVHKDYHEHHQRYHUORRNHG:KLOHH[LVWLQJVROXWLRQVPD\EH
beneficial, many that have been imposed do not suit the African context and 
represent neo-colonialisation. Thus, this study argues that the solutions for the 
resource curse must come from within Africa itself.  
To cure the resource curse, scholars primarily suggest macroeconomic policies 
including export commodity diversification, revenue sterilization, the creation of 
stabilization and oil funds, the adoption of correct investment policies and trade 
openness.  
Export diversification would reduce the importance of the oil and mineral sector to 
the economy by developing other sources of value added (Ross, 2001). When facing 
Dutch disease, a deliberate policy of exchange rate depreciation would also ease the 
effects and prevent other tradable sectors, which are of less value per unit yet create 
diffuse socioeconomic linkages, from being crowded out by higher-priced resource 
exports. This policy will ensure the competitiveness of non-oil and non-mineral 
exports. Indonesia adopted an exchange rate depreciation policy on several occasions 
during the 1973 and 1979 oil booms to protect other sectors. The implementation of 
this policy is however problematic and unpopular as it involves strongly-restricted 
fiscal control, spending cuts and slow growth. It requires strong visionary leadership 
to effectively achieve the plans that Indonesia had during the oil shock periods and is 
DFFRXQWHGDVRQHRI,QGRQHVLD¶V policy successes (Bevan, Collier et al., 1999). 
Revenue sterilization is also suggested as a cure for the resource curse. The policy 
should be used to neutralize the impact of large windfall revenue inflows on the rest 
of the economy. The government must resist spending pressures and accumulate 
budget surpluses into other funds. A stabilization fund could be adopted to stabilize 
spending in order to ensure stable and moderate growth (Gelb et al., 1988). This 
involves putting assets outside the domestic economy for future generations. Saudi 
Arabia has accumulated such a fund (Auty, 2001) as well as Norway (Gylfason, 
2001). This will also help cushion the economy for when the oil resources are 
depleted. Shaxson (2005); however, disapproved of predatory governments using this 
policy, because the large amount of money will encourage its seizure by the 
government. Besides, a fund accumulated overseas is hard to control, especially 
where levels of transparency are low. Gabon is one of the countries he cited to have 
faced this problem.  
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Furthermore, the resource curse is particularly severe for economic performance in 
countries with a low degree of trade openness. Adopting policies directed toward 
trade openness may soften the impact of a resource curse (Arezki and Van der Ploeg, 
2007).  
Investment policies should be based on human capital as crucial means to avoid 
economic pitfalls in the resource-dependent economy (Birdsall, 2001). Sustainable 
rates of return on investment can be enhanced by using resource revenues to invest in 
the poor, such as in high-quality education. Governments must resist temptations to 
pursue a capital intensive growth strategy, even though the latter has a prospect for a 
higher one-off return. The mass population can become the engine of growth. In this 
way, the virtuous circle of human capital accumulation with equitable growth can be 
achieved. The success of Indonesia, an oil-rich country, demonstrated this. It 
invested in agriculture, aiming at strengthening the tradable agricultural sector, while 
Mexico, another oil-rich country under similar pressure, opted for oil-based 
GHYHORSPHQW7KHUHVXOWZDV0H[LFR¶VHFRQRP\IDLOLQJWRSHUIRUPDVZHOODV
,QGRQHVLD¶VFurthermore, growth must be sought on the basis of inclusion, primarily 
through employment, rather than the difficult-to-achieve redistribution of assets 
(Cramer, 2006).  
Political changes are addressed widely in the literature as a way to tackle the 
resource curse. Auty (2001) argued that economic success requires institutional 
structures that promote the growth of a developmental state. Securing a 
developmental rather than a predatory state could minimize the resource curse 
tendency. State capacity-building and institutional reform will prevent growth 
collapses. However, in the presence of the resource-rich prospect, governments are 
unlikely to pursue favourable economic policies. Mitra (1994) concluded that a 
change in the mind-set of political elites in these countries is needed. They need to 
begin seeing commodity booms as temporary so as to scope down utopian policies 
WKDWFRPHZLWKWKHERRPV$XW\VXJJHVWHGHGXFDWLQJµSUHGDWRU\¶OHDGHUV
about the outcomes of their rent deployment behaviour by drawing examples from 
other countries. Mbaku (1992) further proposed de-politicising resource distribution 
in order to reduce rent-seeking behaviour. He suggested the free market as a way to 
take politics and bureaucrats away from resource allocation processes. Such a policy 
would also reduce pressure for massive spending followed by fiscal crisis during the 
downturns. However, the transformation will be politically difficult and needs to be 
long-term oriented. This will become particularly problematic when the ruling elites 
lack social concern and an association with the public. 
The strengthening of civil society could also bring the constraints and alliances 
necessary for supporting a developmental state (Stevens, 2003). It has also been 
suggested that the international community should decline investing in predatory 
states. However, many are concerned that this will not bring the change needed. The 
poor will be most affected while the government may carry on looting the resources 
and turn to other business counterparts who do not impose restrictions and are 
willing to trade.1  
                                                          
1
 The international sanctions on Iraq in 1990-2003, for example, created much controversy over the 
humanitarian impact illustrated in the rising rate of child mortality, illiteracy, poverty and famine. The 
Iraq case also highlighted questions regarding the purpose, sincerity and willingness of parties 
involved in oil-rich countries. 
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International assistance has been suggested as a means to overcome the resource 
curse ILUVWWKURXJKZKDWLVNQRZQDVWKHµ:DVKLQJWRQ&RQVHQVXV¶. Sachs has been 
DPRQJWKHFKLHIDUFKLWHFWVRIVWUXFWXUDODGMXVWPHQWDQGDQDGYRFDWHIRUWKH³VKRFN
WKHUDS\´XQGHUWKHJXLGance and monitoring of the international financial institutes, 
which had devastating consequences for vulnerable sectors in the Russian federation, 
Latin American and Africa (Pugh et al. 2008). Although there is now a debate that 
the Washington Consensus is rather an abuse to development and the neo-liberal 
agenda are now contested more seriously than in the 1990s, the liberal peace project 
is still being actively implemented (Maxwell, 2005).1 
 
To address WKH,0)DQGWKH:RUOG%DQN¶VGLVDSSRLQWLQJSHUIRUPDQce, Bannon and 
Collier (2003) suggested new mechanisms be implemented by these institutions to 
help resource-rich countries reduce negative effects of price instability on their 
economies. Similarly, while international initiatives such as the Kimberley Process 
and Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative have been widely evaluated as 
unsuccessful attempts, revision is proposed (Auty, 2004; Jackson, 2005; Collier, 
2007).2  Hayman and Crossin (2005) suggested revenue transparency as part of 
reform strategies in extractive industries which should be promoted and implemented 
by key actors such as export credit agencies, regional organizations, and donor 
organizations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).  
The International Financial Institutions (IFI) and the investing companies could also 
provide training to bureaucrats on building institutional capacity. Shaxson (2005) 
suggested that revisions of contracts between governments and international resource 
companies should help resource-abundant countries deal with price shocks.  
Companies and policy initiatives are now becoming increasingly aware of the 
negative projection of resource industries and the need to address the regulation of 
business actors. Currently, the debates on regulation centres around the voluntary-
versus-mandatory option. Companies, industry organizations and home governments 
strongly advocate for voluntary self-regulation while NGO activists and legal experts 
called for mandatory rules (Lunde and Taylor, 2005). Given the highly diverse set of 
players engaged in oil trade, Ballentine and Nitzschke (2005) suggested that policy 
efforts will need to make use of the full spectrum of regulation, from both voluntary 
initiatives to mandatory international law. Furthermore, they also argued that 
financial oversights in banking sector and border control are crucial for improved 
implementation of international efforts to solve conflict trade and war economies that 
attribute to the resource curse syndrome.  
                                                          
1
 Neo-liberal policies are often mistaken for neo-liberalism theory in international relations. Neo-
liberal policies are market-driven approaches centred around deregulation and privatization in order to 
maximize the role of the private sector (Larner, 2000). Neo-liberalism in international relations, 
however, believes that nation states are concerned first with absolute gains rather than relative gains to 
other nation states. While the former is concentrated on economic policies, the latter addresses 
political ideology. The two terms have little in common.  
 
2
 The Kimberley Process (KP) is a joint government, industry and civil society initiative to control the 
flow of conflict diamonds - rough diamonds used by rebel movements to finance wars against 
legitimate governments - E\LPSRVLQJUHTXLUHPHQWVRQLWVPHPEHUVEHIRUHµFRQIOLFW-IUHH¶GLDPRQd 
trade certification is given. The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) promotes 
improved governance in resource-rich countries through the verification and full publication of 
company payments and government revenues from resource projects. 
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In addition to improving economic performance, neoliberalism has now been 
recently linked to peacebuilding. Sachs suggested foreign direct investment as the 
engine of growth in counterbalancing conflicts which hinders growth. 7KH³OLEHUDO
SHDFHSURMHFW´ZKLFKUHTXLUHVPDUNet liberalization becomes an aggressive orthodoxy 
as the correct path of peacebuilding for underdeveloped states and war-torn societies.  
The liberal peace project, which is derived from the failed Washington Consensus, 
was barely contested but has gained enormous strength from the rationale of 
globalization (Cox, 2002; Van der Pijl, 1998; and Murphy, 2005). The 81¶V
sponsorship of the High-level Panel Report (HLP) A More Secure World: Our 
Responsibility in 2004 and the 2005 UN Secretary-*HQHUDO¶VUHIRUPSURJUDPPHµ,Q
/DUJHU)UHHGRP¶ZKLFK drew on from 6DFKV¶LGHDV, recommended more intensified 
81¶VDWWHQWLRQWRWKHSURYLVLRQIRULQWHUQDWLRQDOILQDQFLDOLQVWLWXWLRQVWREHPRUH
actively involved in peace processes (ibid.). The UK government specifically 
supports the UN reform programme (Department for International Development, 
2005: 22). These highlighted the merging between neoliberal economic development 
and peacebuilding. 
 
Pugh et al. (2008) expected that the renewed efforts of external reconstruction 
assistance in underdeveloped countries may perpetuate asymmetries as this 
intensifies the grip of capitalist-dominated financial institutions. The notion that 
market liberalization is the means for achieving good life emerge from the 
predominant capitalist discourse which represented it as the only commonsensical 
option. Economic wisdom essentially resides with the powerful. Thus, political 
inequality leaves many with no control over the major decisions that affect their lives 
(Murphy, 2005).  Duffield (2001) also opposed the involvement of international 
actors in economic reforms of conflict countries particularly through market 
liberalisation, explaining that this practice can facilitate violence by tolerating the 
war or even by making warfare easier. Duffield showed that strategic actors, 
including politicians of powerful states, officials of donor organisations and 
international interests, by supporting market liberalisation, contributed to the 
processes of complicity and accommodation in action of violence in southern Sudan.  
 
Apart from externally imposed economic reconstruction, the international military 
assistance has been suggested under conditions which natural resource wealth makes 
a country conflict-prone (Collier, 2007). Easterly (2006), however, seriously 
challenged international assistance to less-developed states. The policies delivered by 
most international organizations are top-GRZQDQGSURYLGHµRQH-size-fits-DOO¶
solutions. He claimed this failed to consider the diversity of each locality and 
accounted for the disappointing outcomes of such programmes. He suggested the 
bottom-up approach, in which policies proposed by locals who understand all 
dimensions of the problem and see what likely to work, as a better solution.  
Richmond et al. (2010) also challenged externally imposed peacebuilding efforts, the 
liberal peace praxis, due to its inefficiencies, cultural biases, and its distant executors. 
The disconnection from the local environment is one of the most problematic 
features. They argued that the rights and the needs of local people must be included 
in order to create a stable peace. This is because culture and the strength of local 
social orders contextualise war and peace (Brigg, 2010). However, peace-building 
actors tend to favour commercial over social contracts and fail to respect historical 
and social welfare arrangements which leads to local resistance against the intended 
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operations (Pugh, 2010). $FFRUGLQJWR&RRSHUWKHVHµOLEHUDOSHDFH¶
RSHUDWLRQVDUHRQWKHµFULVLV,QVWHDGRIthe top-down and internationally-driven 
approach, local concerns, practices and traditions must be connected with the basic 
components of the recent liberal peace efforts which include democratisation, 
economic liberalisation, civil society, human rights, and the rule of law (Richmond et 
al. 2010). Richmond et al. (2010) suggested that this could initially be carried out 
through local-liberal hybrid operations, potentially combining international and 
regional organisations, states, and local actors, which in the long run are led by the 
local side. This approach ensures that priorities, processes and needs of both sides are 
accepted. The authors believed that the operations may need troops and resources 
from several sources in order to gain legitimacy and to meet the demand in the given 
conflict situations.  
 
This thesis agrees with the inclusion of local context which the latter liberal peace 
critics advocate. While the thesis does not take neoliberalist analysis approach like 
Easterly, it agrees with his notion of bottom-up approach. The best solution must 
come from within Africa and be integrated at grass-root level. When there is felt 
ownership of a development programme, it is likely to be sincere, accountable and 
sustainable. External players could provide assistance with skills, training and 
NQRZOHGJH7KHUHDUHQRµRQH-size-fits-DOO¶SROLFLHV1XPHURXVH[WHUQDOVXJJHVWLRQV
have been made with little knowledge of the complex structure of African society, 
economy and politics. Africans must find their own solutions that suit locality, 
tradition and their own pace.  
 
In order to ease the burden of resource-rich countries to escape the resource curse, 
the OECD countries should also reduce subsidies provided to their own agricultural 
sectors because they drive down international commodity prices and detrimentally 
affect agricultural exports from developing countries (Oxfam 2009). This will make 
it harder for resource-abundant countries to diversify their exports away from higher-
priced natural resources.  
 
Although oil industries have brought many ills to Africa, this study agrees with the 
mass African consensus in believing that oil industries can be a blessing, against 
some who argue that resources should be left in the ground (Goodman, 2006). Oil 
industries operate using modern technologies, provide revenues and could lead to job 
creation and skill acquisition if properly managed. However, this must operate in a 
way that African gains are enhanced, if not equal and that all parties involved must 
be sincere, transparent and committed to international best practices. Equitable 
benefits to all parties would contribute to a hitherto unexperienced sustainable energy 
security.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter discussed extensive existing arguments on the resource curse theory in 
four sections: whether resources hinder development; what is the resource curse, 
what are the causes and the cures. This identifies the gaps in the resource curse 
theory. The linkages between the role of foreign interventions in the scramble for 
African resources and the resource curse are what this study proposes to identify.  
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One of the main objectives of this study is to relate the concept of neo-colonialism to 
the above linkages. By examining existing arguments on the resource curse theory 
this chapter explains how this study can contribute to the resource curse discussion. 
7KHUHVHDUFKTXHVWLRQRIWKLVVWXG\µZKDWLPSDFWVRLO-related foreign interventions 
have on Africa and whether they have a tendency to contribute to the resource 
FXUVH"¶SULPDULO\ relates to the second and third sections of the resource curse 
arguments. By evaluating the impacts of oil-related foreign interventions on Africa, it 
DVVHVVHVZKHWKHUWKHVHLPSDFWVFDQEHFDWHJRUL]HGDVWKHµUHVRXUFHFXUVH¶$IWHUWKH
resource curse symptoms are linked, by analysing the relationship between foreign 
interventions and the resource curse as a probabilistic causal mechanism, this finding 
contributes to the section which explains what causes the resource curse. Chapter 3 
examines neo-colonial practices revolving around the oil scramble in Africa in 
greater detail. 
 
 
C h a p t e r  3  | page 62 
 
 
-Chapter 3- 
 
Theoretical Framework and Mechanisms of Intervention 
 
&KDSWHUGLVFXVVHVWKHJHQHUDOFRQFHSWRIWKHVFUDPEOHIRU$IULFD¶VRLOWKHSDUDGR[
between on-going foreign e[SORLWDWLRQRI$IULFD¶VRLOZHDOWKDQG$IULFD¶
developmental failure, the hypothesis drawn out of the topic and the theories used for 
testing the hypothesis as well as the context in which the study is carried out. Chapter 
2 provides an insightful understanding of the resource curse phenomenon based on 
existing literature. This chapter is devoted to discussing on-going foreign 
H[SORLWDWLRQRIZKLFKWKHODWHVWµVFUDPEOHIRU$IULFD¶VRLO¶LVDSDUW2Q-going 
foreign involvement is what the author argues is overlooked in the resource curse 
WKHRU\ZKLOHLWVLJQLILFDQWO\DFFRXQWVIRU$IULFD¶VIDLOXUHWRPD[LPL]HLWVRLO
SRWHQWLDODVWHUPHGWKH$IULFDQµUHVRXUFHFXUVH¶SUREOHP 
The chapter discusses two main topics: the theoretical framework and mechanism of 
continued foreign interventions suggested by neo-colonialism assumptions. It begins 
by defining neo-colonialism before moving on to engage with the theoretical 
framework by putting into three parts discussions on the theories framing this topic 
of study. First, theories which lay the groundwork for the core concept of neo-
colonialism- WKHUHODWLRQVEHWZHHQFRQWLQXHGIRUHLJQH[SORLWDWLRQDQG$IULFD¶V
underdevelopment- are discussed. Second, theories that link to non-mainstream 
discussions of neo-colonialism, followed by theories which offer opposing ideas on 
neo-colonial relationships are addressed. The third part explicates theories which 
explain why foreign states intervene in Africa in their efforts to secure the oil. 
 
As the theories section shows, neo-colonialism explains continued interventions from 
former colonial and new global powers in Africa and that this is responsible for 
$IULFD¶VXQGHUGHYHORSPHQW+RZHYHUQHR-colonialism does not explain how the 
interventions take place, what mechanisms are used and by which particular players. 
,WEURDGO\DUJXHVWKDW$IULFD¶VUDZPDWHULDOVQRWVSHFLILFDOO\RLODUHWKHSUL]HIRU
foreign interventions. Seeing this gap, this chapter moves on to operationalise the 
PHFKDQLVPVRILQWHUYHQWLRQE\DQDO\VLQJµUHDOZRUOG¶incidences of oil-related 
foreign interventions in Africa in order to reveal the forms and actors of oil-seeking 
interventions. The operationalisation section reveals that in order to secure the oil, 
foreign interventions take political and economic forms, after which the players 
involved- France, Britain, the US, China, transnational agencies and African elites- 
are examined. The following chapters explain in detail political and economic 
interventions in African oil-rich countries followed by those carried out in the 
VSHFLILFFDVHVWXG\RI1LJHULD$IULFD¶VODUJHVWRLOSURGXFHU7KHILQDOFKDSWHU
establishes a linkage between oil-related foreign interventions and the resource curse 
in Africa.  
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Defining Neo-colonialism 
There are terms related to or ideas preceding neo-colonialism such as imperialism 
and colonialism, which must be explained before further discussion of neo-
colonialism.  
Imperialism has been the essence of colonialism and neo-colonialism. Said (1993: 8) 
defines imperialism as the practice, the theory and the attitudes of dominating 
countries ruling a distant territory. Similarly, Doyle (1986: 45) defines imperialism 
as the process or policy of establishing an empire. He suggested that the empire 
under which the sovereignty of a subordinate state is controlled by force, political 
schemes or economic, social or cultural dependence can be formal or informal. For 
Lenin, imperialism is the ways powerful states used for acquiring resources, such as 
labour and raw materials, from weaker states. The approaches of securing the 
resources include dispossession and unfair terms of trade (Wallerstein, 1974; Frank, 
1978). Lenin viewed imperialism as the last stage of capitalism which is 
demonstrated in the global market monopoly where states attempt to use national 
economic and political power to protect state enterprises from competition by their 
foreign rivals (Kearns, 2009). For Smith (2003), there are two forms of imperialism: 
one based on the relative space of informal economic control and another on the 
absolute space of territorial control or colonialism. For Said (1993), colonialism is 
almost always a consequence of imperialism.  
Colonialism then is the direct political control of dominant nations over weaker 
states. European colonialism in Africa is a good example. The 1885 Berlin 
Conference, initiated by Bismarck, established guidelines for the acquisition and 
control of African territory. Although colonialism was declared illegitimate by the 
United Nations in the 1960s, imperialism continues. The new form of imperialism, 
QDPHO\µOLEHUDOLPSHULDOLVP¶DFKLHYHGPDLQO\E\HFRQRPLFPHDQVWRRNWXUQDUJXLQJ
that less-developed people would never progress without the influence of more 
developed people (Mehta, 1999; Kearns, 2009). However, Griffin (1969) argues that 
there were already historical records of wealth, diversity and cultural achievements 
in the periphery before the arrival of colonial powers. For Africa, the statement of a 
Gold Coast nationalist in the 1920s, stressed that they did not need development 
LPSRVHGE\IRUHLJQSRZHUVµZHZHUHDGHYHORSHGSHRSOHKDYLQJRXURZQ
LQVWLWXWLRQVDQGKDYLQJRXURZQLGHDVRIJRYHUQPHQW¶EHIRUHWKHDUULYDORI%ULWLVK
colonial power (Rodney, 1972:40).  
The process of continued control of dominant nations over weaker ones even after 
the decolonisation of Africa is where the concept of neo-colonialism began. It 
explains not only the continued control of former colonial players over Africa but 
also political and economic efforts for domination by new players. To facilitate 
GLVFXVVLRQZHZLOORQO\XVHWKHWHUPµQHR-FRORQLDOLVP¶LQWKLVWKHVLVZKHQFRQWLQXHG
FRQWURORIGRPLQDQWQDWLRQVRYHUZHDNHUQDWLRQVLVDGGUHVVHG7KHWHUPµIRUHLJQ
LQWHUYHQWLRQ¶ZLOORQO\EHXVHGZKHQZHDGGUHVVDOOIRUPVGLUHFWDQGLQGLUHFWRI
political and economic engagement. 
The essence of neo-colonialism is that although the target state is independent in 
theory, in reality its economic and political policy is derived from outside (Nkrumah, 
1968). Che Guevara (1965) highlighted this by sayinJµ$VORQJDVLPSHULDOLVPH[LVWV
it will, by definition, exert its domination over other countries. Today that 
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domination is called neo-FRORQLDOLVP¶7KLVQHR-colonialism is now replacing the old 
form. The approaches are more varied, covert and resistant than previously. They 
involve total penetration of economic and political systems in Africa, which allows 
foreign domination to continue without the blame of re-colonisation (Anise, 1989). 
In the former colonies, neo-colonialist foreign interventions have sustained chronic 
dependency, obstructed significant economic growth and undermined local capacity 
in political, social and technological development. On this note, Julius Nyerere 
(1976, cited in Kwesi, 1985: 64), one of the leading promoters of African thought on 
international affairs stated: 
 
The reality of neo-colonialism quickly becomes obvious to a new African 
government which tries to act on economic matters in the interest of national 
development and for the betterment of its own masses. For such a 
government immediately discovers that it inherited the power to make laws, 
to direct the civil service, to deal with foreign governments and so on, but it 
did not inherit effective power over economic developments in its own 
country. Indeed, it often discovers that there is no such thing as a national 
economy at all. Instead, there exist in its land various economic activities 
which are owned by people outside its jurisdiction, which are directed at 
external needs and which are run in the interest of external economic powers. 
Neo-colonialist foreign interventions were first carried out by European powers 
competing for hegemony in Africa, including Britain, France, Portugal, Italy and 
other less-influential European states (Anise, 1989). Later, new global powers such 
as the United States, the Soviet Union and China joined in. The new wave of foreign 
intervention in Africa reflects the growing battle for world power and is considered 
neo-colonial. Africa provides global strategic resources the importance of which is 
increasing due to global resource scarcity and competition to secure areas for 
hegemonic control (Ibid.).  
Neo-colonial interventions are anti-FKDQJHWKDWLVWRPDLQWDLQ$IULFD¶V
subordination in the world order. Peace, freedom and modernization which Africans 
accept from the West are tied with conditions purposely to ensure slavery in 
SHUSHWXLW\$QLVHYLHZHGWKH:HVWWREHµHVVHQWLDOO\WKHJXDUDQWRURI
WKHLU$IULFDQVHQVODYHPHQW¶DQGLQVWHDGVXJJHVWHGWKHQRQ-Western support to 
discontinue this slavery. These problems will not disappear; Africa seems destined 
for more undisrupted foreign intervention in future.  
 
Theoretical Framework  
The previous section defines ideas surrounding neo-colonialism and those which 
precede it, namely imperialism and colonialism. This section discusses theories 
framing the three parts of this topic as described in paragraph 2 of this chapter. 
Discussing the theories surrounding neo-colonialism provides an understanding that 
the on-going foreign scramble foU$IULFD¶VUHVRXUFHVLQFOXGLQJRLODFFRXQWVIRU
$IULFD¶VXQGHUGHYHORSPHQW:KHQWKLVLVXQGHUVWRRGDOLQNEHWZHHQ$IULFD¶V
underperformance and the resource curse theory can be established. Hence, this 
VWXG\¶VK\SRWKHVLVµRLO-related foreign interventions tend to contribute to the 
UHVRXUFHFXUVH¶FDQEHWHVWHG7KHODVWSDUWZKLFKDGGUHVVHVWKHRULHVH[SODLQLQJZK\
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IRUHLJQVWDWHVLQWHUYHQHLQ$IULFD¶VRLO-related matters helps us see that foreign 
interventions tend to continue and perpetuate the prolonged resource curse.  
 
The core concept of neo-colonialism derives mainly from Marxist thinking. Marxism 
explains the process in which rich nations exploit world markets and thereby making 
weaker nations depend on them. For Marx and Engels, the bourgeoisie could not be 
sustained without revolutionizing the instruments and relations of production (Marx 
and Engel, 1971). When a production structure becomes global, so does the potential 
for exploitation (Strange, 2000). To achieve this, the bourgeoisie must seek to exploit 
the world market for cheaper raw materials and labour from the remotest zone 
(Hobson, 1902). For industries to survive in the capitalist world, the pattern of 
exploitation in securing cheap materials and labour must be perpetual (Harvey, 
2005). Their products must also be consumed, not only at home but worldwide. This 
EULQJVDERXWWKHXQLYHUVDOµLQWHUGHSHQGHQFHRIQDWLRQV¶0DU[DQG(QJHOV
However, there is an asymmetry in the level of interdependence (Hobson, 1938; 
Luxemburg, 1972). The bourgeois nations ensure effective exploitation of the nations 
of peasants by seeking political and economic control. Over time, the nations of 
peasants become dependent on the bourgeois nations (Marx and Engels, 1998: 39). 
In the late twentieth centuU\WKHµLQWHUGHSHQGHQFHRIQDWLRQV¶EHFDPHZLGHO\
recognised as globalization. While Marx and Engel addressed the problems of 
perpetual securing of materials and cheap labour by the bourgeoisie as well as 
explored British colonization in India, they did not place the focus of their analysis of 
capitalism in the global context. The relations between imperialism and 
underdevelopment were not discussed. For Marx and Engel, capitalism could also 
bring technological and industrial development.  
In 1916, Vladimir Lenin added to this theory that the rapid expansion of European 
imperialism around the world in the last decade of the nineteenth century would be 
the highest stage of capitalism (Lenin, 1950). Lenin believed that Wold War I would 
be the end of imperialism which would thus be the end of capitalism. However, 
colonialism was sustained and Western domination was accomplished by neo-
colonialism in the period that followed. Lenin¶VPLVSODFHGSUHGLFWLRQRIWKH
European imperialism stages could be why his discussion about the impact of 
imperialism on underdeveloped countries was limited. Nor could the theoretical 
framework allowed him to address neo-colonialism that emerged subsequently.   
 
5H\DOVRFKDOOHQJHG0DU[DQG(QJHO¶VQRWLRQRIFDSLWDOLVWGHYHORSPent, 
arguing that in some parts of the world capitalism can only be implanted by conquest 
causing archaic exploitation which must be overthrown by social revolutions. This 
caused WKHODWHVWDUWRIFDSLWDOLVWGHYHORSPHQWLQWKHVHFRXQWULHV&RQJRZDV5H\¶V
VSHFLILFFDVHVWXG\&RPSOHPHQWLQJ5H\¶VQRWLRQ$UULJKLDUJXHGWKDW$IULFDQZDJH
earners are subordinate to European aristocracy, maintaining the political structures 
that support capitalist growth without development (Arrighi 1970).    
 
The neo-Marxist dependency theory provided explanations that are largely related to 
neo-colonialism concept. Dependency theory explained that there are two types of 
social relations in capitalist world economy; the centre and the periphery. It derives 
IURP:DOOHUVWHLQ¶VµZRUOGV\VWHP¶ theory which H[SDQGHGFODVVLFDO0DU[LVP¶VXnit 
of analysis, arguing WKDWFDSLWDOLVPPXVWEHDQDO\VHGZLWKLQWKHµZRUOGV\VWHP¶
because capitalism must expand beyond the domestic territory. This capitalist 
H[SDQVLRQLQWKHµZRUOGV\VWHP¶OHDGVto exploitation, oppression, enslavement and 
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the struggles of the lower social classes in weaker classes (ibid.). Dependency theory 
places a particular emphasis on the relations between unequal exchange and uneven 
development in the global capitalism. It explains that resources are extracted from 
the poor periphery states and flow towards richer states at the centre (Shaw and 
Heard, 1979; Nweke, 1980; Shaw and Aluko, 1984; Shaw, 1987). Furthermore, 
Amin, Fanon and Nkrumah argued that unequal specialization allows rich nations to 
exploit the world market, pay low prices for agricultural products while flooding 
them with expensive manufactured goods, making weaker nations depend on them 
(Fanon, 1963; Nkrumah, 1968; Amin, 1976). This creates huge disparities in terms of 
trade, keeps underdeveloped countries uncompetitive and prevents them from 
economic diversification. They claimed that economies depending on raw materials 
cannot thrive because the global market imposes a ceiling on prices on these 
products. Underdevelopment of the South is a direct result of the development of the 
North (Dos Santos, 1970; Frank, 1970; Slater, 2004).  
 
OJXQGHEDMRDUJXHGWKDWWKH:HVWHUQVWDWHV¶SROLFLHVDUHPDLQO\GHWHUPLQHGE\
the needs for mineral resources which are essential to their commercial and defence 
industries. For this, Africa is the area which provides the highest profitable return. 
The Western mining ventures in Africa are detrimental as they exploit African land, 
labour and valuable minerals without just compensation. Michalet and Hymer placed 
an emphasis on multinational firms as an agent which contributes to unequal 
development between centres and the peripheries (Michalet, 1976; and Hymer, 
1976). African states receive low returns while foreign powers receive enormous 
profits. The production of cash crops as well as mineral exports could not help to 
develop Africa. Minerals taken from Africa are turned into manufactured goods and 
resold to Africa at a hefty price. This process has made the political economies of the 
African countries subject to the needs of foreign powers, which contributes to 
FRQWLQXHGXQGHUGHYHORSPHQWVWDJQDWLRQDQGORZLQWHJUDWLRQRI$IULFD¶VHFRQRPLF
sectors to the world (Asante, 1989). According to Rodney (1972) and Amin (1976), 
this is one of the ways neo-colonialism persists. 
 
Another important factor allowing for the perpetuation of neo-colonialism according 
to Nkrumah (1963: 137-ZDVWKHµEDONDQL]DWLRQRI$IULFD¶GXULQJWKHSHULRGRI
European colonialism.1  Colonial powers divided Africa into administrative units in 
order to maintain their rule. The borders remain even after African independence and 
thus colonial control persists. Furthermore, in the global market economy, wealthy 
nations will not allow governments of resource-rich developing countries to pursue 
policies that do not coincide with the interests of their multinational corporations 
(MNCs) (Perelman, 2003). Control of the productive elements of the national 
economy is obtained by multinational corporations (MNCs), which do not act in the 
primary interests of the local country (Asante, 1989). This is aggregated to a level at 
which effective control over the domestic economy is external. Ironically, the 
                                                          
1
 Britain, France, Belgium, Germany, Spain, Portugal and Italy were the main players implementing 
the balkanization process in Africa during the colonial era with Britain and France exercising the most 
prominent control. Portuguese colonial authority was considered highly centralized according to the 
Portuguese Fascist regime at home. After the colonial era, France has kept one of the strongest 
patrimonial ties with its ex-colonies. China has not been involved in the balkanization of Africa. This 
might be because during the balkanization period of some African countries, China had not yet 
become a global player. Most importantly, however, this is attributed to the Chinese emphasis on the 
non-interference standpoint in its foreign affairs. 
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dominant nations will allow the governments of resource-abundant countries to 
continue bad governance or damaging policies as long as they remain loyal. 
Moreover, Girvan (1976) argued that major world powers own the capital and 
exercise power over classes and the institutions of weaker nations for the 
appropriation of resources creating exploitation, pollution and underdevelopment. 
This includes the expropriation of human rights, lands, waters and means of 
livelihoods by their corporate firms. To Poulantzas (1975), imperialism is the 
transnationalisation of the processes of capital and labour. 
  
The core nations have a greater capacity to penetrate into the peripheral nations. The 
impetus can be delivered either unilaterally, such as by Washington Administrations, 
or multilaterally through organizations such as the IMF, the World Bank, the WTO 
and the G8 (Bromley, 2008).1 *UDPVFL¶VQRWLRQFDQEHDSSOLHGLQH[SODLQLQJWKLV
(Gramsci, 1971). He argued the Anglo-Saxon World Hegemony and forms of 
LQWHUQDWLRQDOHFRQRPLFLQWHJUDWLRQZLWKLQZKLFKµKHJHPRQLFVWDWHV¶PD\RUJDQLVH
nationDODQGµLQWHUQDWLRQDOPDUNHWV,QFRQWUDVWZHDNHU states have little capacity to 
effect changes in the hegemonic states, contributing to unequal development between 
the two. :LWKLQ$IULFD¶VFRQWH[WWhere is a crucial historical asymmetry of power 
relations between the North and Africa (Slater, 2004). 
 
Neo-Marxist Dependency theory explains foreign influence on the internal affairs of 
the peripheral powers, the African states in this case, and how the complexity of neo-
colonial structures affects continued underdevelopment of Africa. Dependency 
theory is one of the main theories explaining why external states intervene and how 
this leads to negative outcomes. It explains that resources flow from a "periphery" of 
poor and underdeveloped states to a "core" of wealthy states, enriching the latter at 
the expense of the former (Prebisch, 1959).  
International Political Economy (IPE), another variant of Neo-Marxist theories, also 
provides explanations regarding the continuing economic dependence of African 
states DQG$IULFD¶VSHULSKHUDOSRVLWLRQLQJOREDOSROLWLFV5RGQH\$PLQ
Amin, 1976; Mazrui, 1977). IPE explains that the structural limitations of poor 
countries in the capitalist world prevent them from starting their own self-reliant 
economic development. They argue that foreign policies of African states are 
strongly influenced by the global political and economic interests of the developed 
nations. African states cannot change their global position because of the structural 
factors imposed on them. The result is that Africa and other developing countries 
remain on the periphery of the world capitalist system. By focusing on the world 
structure, IPE contributes to the core concept of neo-colonialism which explains that 
$IULFD¶VXQGHUGHYHORSPHQWLVassociated with continued foreign influence.  
 
I particularly take the Marxism and Neo-Marxism definition of neo-colonialism 
ZKLFKH[SODLQVWKDW$IULFD¶VXQGHUSHUIRUPDQFHLVGXHWRFRQWLQXHGIRUHLJQ
exploitation of raw material. In addition, this thesis contributes to elaborating on this 
argument by relating neo-FRORQLDOLVPGLUHFWO\WRIRUHLJQVFUDPEOHRI$IULFD¶VRLO0\
                                                          
1
 The Group of Eight (the G8), is an assembly of world leaders who meet annually to discuss global 
issues. The G8 members are made up of the heads of government from Canada, France, Germany, 
Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States. Due to its exclusion of economically 
powerful states like China and India, the G8 is accused for failing to represent the developing world 
(www.g8.co.uk).  
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thesis seeks to fill this gap by providing the subject with real world practices 
described further in the following operationisation section.  
While the core concept of neo-colonialism which explains the relation between 
FRQWLQXHGIRUHLJQLQWHUYHQWLRQVDQG$IULFD¶VXQGHUGHYHORSPHQWZDVRULJLQDOO\
developed within a Marxist theoretical framework, neo-colonialism is also partly 
addressed by other critical theories such as post-colonialism and cultural theory as 
well as neorealism.  
Post-colonialism is a set of theories in philosophy, the arts, literature and political 
sciences as the cultural legacy of colonial rule. Postcolonial theorists view neo-
colonialism as an obstruction to develop own national cultures after the colonial rule 
(Slater, 2004).1 Cultural theorists critique neo-colonialist players for their 
perpetuation of cultural colonialism (Edgar and Sedgwick, 2008). They highlight the 
GHVLUHRIZHDOWK\QDWLRQVWRFRQWURORWKHUQDWLRQV¶YDOXHVWKURXJKFXOWXUDOPHDQV
such as media, language, education and religion for economic reasons (Gramsci, 
2000; Bieler and Morton, 2004). The continuation of these cultural elements from 
former colonial powers may be regarded as a form of neo-colonialism. Neo-realism 
(Keohane, 1986) explains that states are trapped by structure, like firms in a market. 
Their intentions do not translate directly to outcomes. By this interpretation, states 
will not be able to cure the resource curse by all well-intentioned means if dominant 
states continued to carry out activities which damage smaller states. They are trapped 
in the structure where all states are forced to behave selfishly (for profit-
maximisation) or to go out of business.  
Nevertheless, there are theories which oppose the neo-colonialist concept. A theory 
of modernization, for example, argues that after granting their colonies political 
independence, these independent countries would start to develop quickly by 
IROORZLQJWKHSDWKRIµPRGHUQ¶:HVWHUQFRXQWULHV5RVWRZ%DQDML
counter-argues that the universalist limited design of Western modernization is not 
DSSURSULDWHIRUWKHGHYHORSPHQWRIWKHSHULSKHU\$IULFD¶VXQGHUGHYHORSPHQWWRGD\
provHV%DQDML¶VYLHZ 
Other opponents of neo-FRORQLDOLVPDOVRDUJXHWKDW$IULFD¶VXQGHUSHUIRUPDQFHLV
caused by internal factors such as instability, poor economic management and bad 
governance rather than external interventions (Falola and Heaton, 2010). Instead, 
they argue that capitalist investment brings employment to the periphery as well as 
laying the basis for the development of the working class which facilitates future 
social revolutions (Warren, 1980). However, Nkrumah (1968) counter-argued that 
investment under neo-colonialism actually increases the gap between the rich and the 
poor nations, not vice versa. His attempt; however, is not to exclude foreign 
investments but rather to prevent these occurring in ways that further impoverish 
less-powerful nations. In this respect, Haufler (2001) explains that while investments 
can create economic activities and indirectly promote peace, investments in resource-
ULFKVWDWHVRIWHQOHDGWRH[SORLWDWLRQRIORFDOQDWXUDOUHVRXUFHVDWWKHODWWHU¶VH[SHQVH
He gave an example of Sudan where benefits for investments drew foreign actors to 
                                                          
1
 Postcolonialists argue that the self-deprecating identity of the performers of such knowledge is 
strongly connected with their colonial masters, theUHE\WKHODWWHU¶VVXSHULRUFRQWUROUHPDLQMXVWLILHG
Post-colonialism challenges the Western discourses of development, modernization and globalization 
by acknowledging the autonomy and resistance of the colonised societies on the economic periphery; 
thereby, highlighting the realities of global power and representation of the South. 
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take sides in on-going conflicts thereby reinforcing the dominance of particular 
political and ethnic groups.  
Fukuyama (cited in Slater, 2004) critiques dependency theory for its emphasis on the 
economic dimension. He stresses instead the importance of the desire for recognition 
of the colonized peoples in the periphery. Referring to Hegel, Fukuyama further 
SRLQWVRXWWKDWEHFDXVHRIWKHPLVSODFHGµHFRQRPL]DWLRQ¶RIRXUWKLQNLQJZH
overlook the reality that the desire for recognition is universal and is an important 
feature of the struggles in the periphery such as those against foreign domination and 
for democratic rights. 
The theoretical approach which informs the analysis in this study is that of Neo-
Marxist Dependency Theory, which is analytically superior to competing 
perspectives.  With this approach, we are able to situate Africa within the global 
FRQWH[WRIVXSHUSRZHUV¶GRPLQDWLRQ7KHFXUUHQWFULVHVLQ$IULFDFDQQRWEH
adequately understood without reference to continued foreign control, European 
colonial powers in the past and new players arising from shifts of global power. 
Marxist dialectical materialism allows us to look back over the history of the 
relations between Africa and foreign powers both materially and in regard to how 
WKHVHUHODWLRQVUHSHDWHGO\DIIHFWDQGVKDSH$IULFD¶VVWUXFWXUH 
 
The hypothesis this research forms is based mainly on the resource curse theory and 
neo-colonialism concept, explained by Marxism. ,WSURSRVHVWKDWµ)RUHLJQ
LQWHUYHQWLRQVPD\FRQWULEXWHWRRULQFUHDVHWKHOLNHOLKRRGRIWKHUHVRXUFHFXUVH¶
Apart from factors addressed by the existing literature of the resource curse, namely, 
fiscal misallocation, political factors, social foundations, resource types, the country 
size and initial conditions, this research hypothesizes that continued foreign 
interventions create a strong linkage to the resource curse. Multiple foreign players, 
by globally reproducing and expanding capital through the control of oil, are linked 
WR$IULFD¶VUHVRXUFHFXUVH 
 
Regardless of whether foreign practices are deliberate attempts for control and rule, 
in the context of resource exploitation the relationship between foreign powers and 
African states and the practices used by the former remain the same. The 
characteristics of foreign practices, rather than their intention, allow neo-colonialism 
to prevail. Hence, neo-colonialism is selected as an explanation. While colonialism 
was a deliberate full control of territory and structures within it, neo-colonialism is 
less overt and can be manifested in different forms. The forms of interventions are 
discussed more fully in the operationalisation section.  
 
 
Exploitation of African Oil: Why Foreign States Intervene. The previous 
sections discuss theories which explain the perpetuation of foreign interventions in 
$IULFDZKLFKFRQWULEXWHVWR$IULFD¶VXQGHUSHUIRUPDQFH7KLVVHFWLRQORRNVDWWKHRULHV
which explain another perspective of foreign interventions. In particular, we examine 
why foreign states intervene in Africa for oil by applying the ideas of Marxism and 
Realism. This helps us understand that oil-related foreign interventions are likely to 
continue and as a result suggest that the resource curse will persist. Although the 
relationship between the realism and Marxism logics has been conventionally treated 
as problematic and contradictory, Harvey argued that this contradictory µ(that is, 
dialectical) relationship sets the stage for an analysis of capitalist imperialism in 
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terms of the intersection of these two distinct but intertwined logics of power 
+DUYH\¶$QDO\VHVRIDFWXDOVLWXDWLRQVVKRXOGNHHSWKHWZRVLGHVRIWKLV
dialectic in motion and not to be predominated by either a solely political or 
economic side of argumentation (ibid.). Bello (2005), Gowan (1999), Harman 
(2003), Rees (2001) and Serfati (2004) have pursued a similar approach. This study 
agrees with their analysis framework; and therefore, considers both realism and 
Marxism logics in analysing the relationship between oil-related foreign 
LQWHUYHQWLRQVDQG$IULFD¶VXQGHUSHUIRUPDQFH 
Economic-centred traditional Marxists would assume that foreign intervention in 
Africa for its oil is determined by international capitalist market forces. They must 
revolutionize their means of production to survive and that is done through searching 
for new markets, raw materials, cheap labour and higher profits. For most 
superpowers, the internal frontier reached its point of closure. There have been 
problems of domestic overproduction and labour conflicts. The drive to seek out new 
territories for economic development have become more manifest (LaFeber, 1963).   
The need for resources, cheap labour and higher profits to achieve the revolution of 
production of bourgeois nations, suggested by traditional Marxism, explains the 
drive to expand and seek out control of new territories such as Africa. Marxism does 
not only explain imperial control of weaker states in order to secure resources, but 
also that this leads to inter-imperialist conflicts. On this regard, Bukharin argued that 
an increasingly integrated world economy, as a result of capitalism, becomes the 
arena for competition among capitals that tends now to take the form of geopolitical 
conflict among states. This is because capitalism is defined by two tendencies: the 
internationalisation of production, circulation and investment; and the 
interpenetration of private capital and the nation-state. The process neither bears 
attention to the implementing practices of capital accumulation and inter-imperialist 
competition nor to the result of these in the host countries (Bukharin, 1972). With 
WKLVQRWLRQZHFDQXQGHUVWDQGWRGD\¶VVFUDPEOHRI$IULFDDQGthe contradictory 
relations between expanded foreign investment aQG$IULFD¶VSHUSHWXDO
underdevelopment.    
 
There are some defects to traditional Marxism¶VHPSKDVLVRQ the economic aspect 
which tends to view the state as only an instrument of capitals (Callinicos, 2009). 
This view limits them to the analysis of different modes of production, ignoring the 
importance of states as agentWKHODWWHUZKLFKLVUHDOLVP¶VIRFXV. Strange (2000), for 
example, argued that often states dictate policies in irrational economic terms. 
Realism essentially addresses the desire of power and security as the primary 
impetus for state interactions. Marxism and realism have been contradictory logics. 
On the one hand, Marxism addresses economic competition in the emerging 
capitalist world system. On the other hand, realism addresses geopolitical 
competition as a process of political accumulation and military expansion. However, 
neo-FRORQLDOLVPZKLFKUHSUHVHQWVLQWRGD\¶VVFUDPEOHIRU$IULFDUHSUHVHQWVWKH
moment at which these two logics become integrated. Geopolitical competition can 
no longer be pursued without the economic resources that are generated within the 
framework of capitalist relations of production. Besides, capitals are involved in 
increasingly global networks of trade which immensely depend on diverse state 
support, ranging from neoliberal policies, and subsidy to the assertion of military 
power (ibid.).  
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:HQRZH[DPLQHKRZUHDOLVPFDQEHXVHGWRXQGHUVWDQGIRUHLJQSRZHUV¶
interventions in African oil-rich states. Realism explains that states are rational 
unitary actors, each seeking their own national interest (Morgenthau and Thompson, 
1985). They argue that security is the strongest motivation in international anarchy. 
In the anarchical world where there is no supranational sovereign to ensure order, 
realists argue that states are destined for unending competition to attain security. 
States must be cautious of others in attempts to look after their own security and 
material strength and so strive to gain control over scarce resources (Hobbes, 2008). 
Competitive interactions to secure resources can lead states into a security dilemma, 
DVLWXDWLRQLQZKLFKHDFKSDUW\¶VDWWHPSWVWRLQFUHDVHLWVRZQVHFXULW\UHGXFHVWKH
VHFXULW\RIRWKHUV6Q\GHUDQG-HUYLV5HDOLVWVXVHWKHµ3ULVRQHU¶V'LOHPPD¶
model as an analogy between competitive interactions of states and the mathematical 
JDPHZKHUHRQHVWDWH¶VDFWLRQWULJJHUVVXVSLFLRQDQGHIIRUWVWRFUHDWHWKHEDODQFHRI
power in another state. Eventually, this leaves everyone less secure (Snyder, 1993).  
 
Applying the security dilemma argument to the oil politics, we assume that the rising 
demand for oil and depleting reserves in rich nations would enhance the level of 
international competition to secure access to oil. Although rich states have not 
engaged in actual conflicts with each other for resources after the end of European 
colonization, the neo-colonial practices of rich states have allowed both direct and 
indirect involvements in wars in the periphery states, Africa in this case, as a scheme 
to secure oil. We will explore this in detail in the following chapters which discuss 
foreign political interventions and economic interventions respectively. Realism 
explains that security fears are the reason for foreign interventions in resource-rich 
countries. However, this can be intertwined with their predatory goals; that is, even if 
the security threats diminish, their exploitation will not cease. It is often difficult to 
separate security-driven and predatory actions. States may hold the view of Catherine 
the Great in their efforts to JDLQVXSHULRULW\RYHUWKHLUULYDOVWDWHV³7KDWZKLFKVWRSV
JURZLQJEHJLQVWRURW´TXRWHGLQ6Q\GHUDQG-HUYLV.HRKDQH
points out that states could seek hegemonic power by seeking control over raw 
materials, capital, markets and competitive advantage over high-value goods. The 
combination of these dimensions must be stronger than any other states. Based on the 
VHFXULW\GLOHPPDDQGWKHVWDWH¶VGHVLUHIRUKHJHPRQLFSRZHULWFDQEHDVVXPHGWKDW
the international competition for oil will be heightened where self-profit is 
maximized at the expense of others and more powerful states are most likely to gain. 
Therefore, we can expect that the resource curse in African oil-rich countries will 
become intensified and prolonged.   
 
With regards to competition between states, realists would assume that expansion (in 
this case heightened foreign intervention in $IULFD¶VRLO-rich states) increases power 
because it adds resources that can be used against other great powers. Interventions 
become highly attractive for states that are not self-sufficient in resources necessary 
for wars. They believe that achieving control of such resources improves their 
VHFXULW\6Q\GHU9XOQHUDEOHDUHDVLQWKHSHULSKHU\OLNH$IULFDDUHVHHQDVµ(O
'RUDGRV¶KDUERXULQg vast oil resources and being easy to control. And they must be 
FRQWUROOHGRUHOVHWKH\ZLOOIDOOXQGHUWKHRSSRQHQWV¶LQIOXHQFH7KLVH[SODLQVZK\
the two global superpowers, the US and China, now enter into an intensified 
competition for oil in Africa by using any means necessary, direct or indirect, to 
achieve that goal.  
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Realism also assumes that great powers in a multipolar world may have stronger 
incentives to intervene in weaker states for full control since they are less likely to 
have attained the necessary resources for national security than in a bipolar world. 
We can assume that the world today is multipolar, especially with regard to oil 
politics. European powers such as France, the UK, Portugal and Italy still have 
strong ties with their former colonies, the factor which has facilitated European 
access to oil in Africa. China is also gaining a foothold there with new business 
approaches whereas the US uses unilateral and multilateral efforts to penetrate 
deeper into Africa. Therefore, realists would assume in this situation that foreign 
LQWHUYHQWLRQVLQ$IULFD¶VRLO-rich countries will continue and become more 
LQWHQVLILHG(QHUJ\VHFXULW\KDVEHFRPHLQ:DWW¶VZRUGVµDWHUULI\LQJ
hybrid of the old and the new: primitive accumulation and American militarism 
FRXSOHGWRWKHZDURQWHUURU¶ 
Cooper (2004), a realist, expects such interventionist practice will increase because 
WKH:HVWHUQVRFLHWLHVQRZVWDQGDWWKHHQGRIWKHµ:HVWSKDOLDQ$JH¶-1989). In 
a globalised world, dangers lurking beyond their borders are more covert and 
difficult to control; therefore, nation states must adopt a more assertive stance to 
ensure their security.  The 9/11 incident is one of the milestones for rapid changes in 
the international energy security agenda. Diverse energy sources are aimed at 
reducing dependence on the Middle East as the fight against Islamic fundamentalism 
intensifies. In Washington, Houston, Paris, London, Beijing, New Delhi and 
elsewhere, there is a strong interest in long-term African oil plans. The Gulf of 
Guinea has rapidly drawn attention and becomes a new frontier of vital interests 
where security of access must be protected (Watts, 2006). There is also an increasing 
interest in other new locations in Africa such as Central African Interior basins, the 
Rift Valley basins, Eastern margin deep-water as well as onshore sites (Clarke, 
2008).  
Klare (2008) argues that energy is the major factor for new global order. Oil reserves 
resemble nuclear warheads, warships and military strength under the old global order 
as criteria determining the national ranking of global power. Countries are now 
categorized as energy-surplus or energy-deficit. To maintain the global hierarchy, the 
superpowers thus use varied methods to secure global oil accesses. States pursue 
their national interests - strategic or economic - by controlling oil. In international 
relations, this is the world of the calculus of interests described by Machiavelli and 
&ODXVHZLW]$PHULFDQPLOLWDU\LVXVHGPRUHLQFUHDVLQJO\DVDµJOobal oil production 
VHUYLFH¶.ODUHWRSURWHFWRYHUVHDVILHOGVDQGVXSSO\URXWHV.DOGRU.DUOHW
DO2LO¶VVWUDWHJLFLPSRUWDQFHUHPDLQVDWWKHFHQWUHRIDWWHQWLRQDQGDWWUDFWV
interventions from governments and actors, both multinational and civil (Kaldor, 
Karl et al., 2007).  
Snyder (1993) argues that foreign intervention may be used for vested interests in the 
guise of national security concerns. The groups of interests may act individually or in 
coalitions to disseminate the myth of security through interventions in order to 
DGYDQFHWKHLURZQLQWHUHVWVUDWKHUWKDQWKRVHRIWKHQDWLRQ7KH%XVKDGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶V
invasion of Iraq and the involvement of Halliburton in the event, the global military 
activities claiming it as part of the War RQ7HUURUDQGWKH01&V¶OREE\LQJDQG
justifications for the use of security apparatuses overseas in the name of energy 
security are clear examples of this notion. Realism, as discussed here, can thus be 
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used in explaining why states seek dominance and under which conditions their 
intervention may intensify. States which seek power and prosperity are more likely to 
interfere in oil-rich states in aggressive manners. Furthermore, under high 
international security concerns and turbulent Middle East situations, the control of 
African oil industries becomes more alluring and unavoidable. With the 
strengthening Chinese economy and the economic crisis battering the West, the 
competition to secure supplies and foreign meddling in African oil industries become 
immenVH7KHµ6FUDPEOHIRU$IULFD¶KDVEHJXQDQHZHUD 
To conclude, realism explains the reasons behind foreign interventions especially for 
the purpose of securing critical raw materials. However, no links have been made 
UHJDUGLQJ$IULFD¶VRLO7KHUHDVRQVZK\IRUHLJQSOD\HUVLQWHUYHQHLQ$IULFD¶VRLOULFK
states are not the focus of this thesis but it lays out the background to the contexts of 
foreign oil interventions in Africa and allows us to predict the conditions under 
which the interventions will continue. By interpreting realism and the global 
situations surrounding oil, it can be assumed that foreign interventions in African oil-
rich countries will continue. Evaluating these theories, the thesis concludes that 
critical theories (Marxism and neo-MarxismE\GLVFXVVLQJWKHFRQWHPSRUDU\µZRUOG
RUGHU¶LQIRUPVRISURGXFWLRQVWUXFWXUHDQGVRFLDOVWUXJJOHVDUHWKHPRVWUHOHYDQWLQ
KHOSLQJXVXQGHUVWDQGIRUHLJQLQWHUYHQWLRQVDQG$IULFD¶VXQGHUSHUIRUPDQFH
5HDOLVP¶VVWDWH-centric ideas of power and security cannot sufficiently explain these 
relations. Moreover, the Marxist theories are distinctive in that it does not treat neo-
colonialism as a transhistorical form of political domination as Realism, but rather 
explains neo-colonialism in the context of historical development of capitalist mode 
of production (Callinicos, 2009).  
However, specific policy and practice of foreign interventions with relation to 
$IULFD¶VRLOLQGXVWULHVUHPDLQXQH[SODLQHGE\H[LVWLQJWKHRULHV7KHIRUHLJQSRZHUV
involved in these interventions, the mechanism through which they are carried out 
and the outcomes of these actions were neither addressed nor evaluated in these 
theories. Although the abovementioned critical theories indicate that neo-colonialism 
contributes to poor performance in Africa, this linkage is not related to the resource 
curse discussion which assumes that resource-rich countries are doomed to fail. This 
is the gap which this study aims to fill. The following section on operarionalisation 
links these theories to real-world practices. By applying theories of neo-colonialism, 
this study analyses the real-ZRUOGFRQWH[WRIWKHPRGHUQVFUDPEOHIRU$IULFD¶VRLO
LQFOXGLQJKRZIRUHLJQLQWHUYHQWLRQVLQ$IULFD¶VRLODUHFDUULHGRXWDQGE\ZKRP 
 
Operationalising Foreign Interventions in Oil-Related Issues 
The previous section discusses theories underlining foreign interventions and their 
explanatory potential for the underperformance of weaker nations. This section, by 
applying the neo-colonial concept, goes further in analysing the real world context 
VXUURXQGLQJWKHPRGHUQVFUDPEOHRI$IULFD¶VRLO,WDQDO\VHVPHFKDQLVPVIRUHLJQ
powers use for oil-related interventions in oil-rich countries. While a broad definition 
of foreign interventions and the discussion of intervening players were introduced in 
chapter 1, this chapter discusses the forms of foreign interventions in Africa in 
further details. The next section discusses the main players of these interventions. 
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Neo-colonialism explains continued foreign interventions in former colonies after 
their political independence. However, neo-colonialism only loosely discusses 
foreign interventions. There is little connection to real-world practices or 
clarifications of their modus operandi. By first exploring the approaches to 
interventions discussed by neo-colonialist scholars, I describe, later in this section, 
what other approaches my study offers, particularly for the promotion of oil interests. 
The new foreign interventions, after the colonial era, are more varied including the 
use of both direct and indirect political, military and economic approaches. To 
facilitate discussion, I categorize these interventions into two approaches: political 
and economic. 
Mathews (1989) suggests that foreign political interventions in Africa take several 
forms such as sponsored FRXSG¶pWDW; creation of and/or support for opposition 
JURXSVDµSUHVVZDU¶GHVLJQHGWRXQGHUPLQHWKHUHJLPHWKHXVHRIQHLJKERXULQJ
states, mercenaries, intelligence set-ups and military intervention to destabilise the 
regime. The objective has been to achieve colonialism while preaching 
independence. The Western military maintains direct relations with the ex-FRORQLHV¶
military to provide protection of interests for the Western governments and their 
corporations. Asante (1989) likens this type of neo-colonialism to the old form of 
colonialism. Mathews (1989) argues that nations in the Western bloc pose the greater 
GDQJHUWR$IULFD¶VIUHHGRP 
$SDUWIURPWKH:HVW¶VGLUHFWPLOLWDU\UHODWLRQVZLWKH[-colonies, a new focus has 
recently been placed on state-building in what is considered as failed or failing states. 
It is becoming the dominant framework for the international regulation of non-
western states. State-building is justified with reasons that the territory of failed 
states will serve as a base for terrorists and criminals, as pathways for the illicit trade. 
However, state-building process is expensive and requires efficient national 
administrations. Unlike the colonial empires which developed schools for colonial 
administrators, there has been no technical training for these new state-building 
tasks. NGOs have been invited to carry out the social aspects of state-building such 
as health and education. The West also relies on regular police and military for 
security functions provided by the EU, the UN and NATO. However, their roles are 
proven ineffective because drug trade and trafficking in persons and weapons from 
failed or failing states are still growing (Chandler 2006). The rebuilding state 
structures in Iraq, Somalia, Liberia and Sierra Leone, for example, resembles the 
earlier colonisation.  
 
Chandler argued that both the EU and the US are empires in denial. While they have 
the aims of empires to develop states according to their own design, they do not 
admit that their new state-building effort is to turn non-Western states into their 
likeness, in effect a state without the genuine self-government. Chandler focused on 
WKH(8¶VVWDWH-building role in Kosovo. He suggested that state-building is likely to 
continue for some time. However, it is debatable whether Western-designed good 
governance would be more suitable than self-governance (ibid.).  
Another new form of foreign influence is largely concentrated on indirect economic 
approaches as opposed to direct political approaches like the old form of colonialism 
(Asante, 1989). One of the main goals of neo-colonialism is to make sure that the 
dominated countries do not have too many direct horizontal contacts among 
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themselves, particularly not economic interaction. Furthermore, contacts with the 
outside world must be vertical towards the centre. Nkrumah (1968) points out that 
the neo-colonialist economic approaches used for full appropriation of African 
UHVRXUFHVLQFOXGHWKHGHPDQGLQJRIµULJKWV¶VXFKDVODQGFRQFHVVLRQV, prospecting 
rights for resources, the rights to collect customs and to be exempt from them, to 
carry out administration and, above all, the rights to provide aid. Nkrumah believes 
WKDWDFFHSWLQJIRUHLJQDLGSURYHV$IULFD¶VGHSHQGHQF\RQH[WHUQDOSRZHUVZhich 
resembles former colonialism. He notes that foreign aid comes mostly in the form of 
high-interest-rate loans, the repayment of which contributes to the underdevelopment 
of Africa. The aid is often conditional upon agreements for economic cooperation; 
the right to meddle in internal finances, to lower trade barriers in favour of the donor 
countries and to protect the interests of private investments; and the determination of 
how the funds are to be used, to supply raw materials to and/or buy goods from the 
donor nation. Under cover of aid, the modern economic interventions are 
SHUSHWXDWLQJFRORQLDOLVPZKLOVWSUHDFKLQJµIUHHGRP¶DSUDFWLFH1NUXPDK
FDOOVµneo-FRORQLDOLVP¶ 
Neo-liberal policies are one of the main economic approaches used by the West with 
the US as their foremost promoter. Neo-liberal policies were first imposed on weaker 
countries in response to the communist expansion during the Cold War. The focus of 
neo-liberal policies is the spread of the free market and democracy. Neo-liberal 
promoters could justify interventions for a wider range of reasons than colonialism 
such as interventions for human rights protection, press freedom and fair elections. 
Although the neo-liberal approach is different from former colonialism in detail, 
neoliberal policies make interventions more sustainable by replacing draconian 
colonial practices with the promise of spreading global economic wealth in the name 
of liberalism. However, free trade favours the strong economies while harming weak 
ones. Imposing free markets prevents states from holding natural resources as 
national assets, or from remitting profits to national development. This makes 
hegemonic activities such as local property arrangements and profit repatriation by 
foreign companies legitimate. The existing disparity in economic efficiency and 
institutional capacity in the global order allows the richer states to extract lucrative 
profits from poorer states through the small advantage gained from open markets. 
Examples of neo-liberal policies in African oil-rich countries are seen in the US and 
Chinese economic approach to protecting their own national enterprises in Africa as 
discussed in the following chapter. 
Economic sanctions are another means used by superpowers to ensure that all states 
play by the rules in the global markets. Economic sanctions can be unilateral or 
multilateral, comprehensive or partial, including all services and goods or limited to 
a specific few. It is expected that economic costs triggered by sanctions will translate 
inWRSROLWLFDOFKDQJHVLQµWURXEOHPDNLQJ¶VWDWHV'H-RQJH2XGUDDWDQG6LPPRQV
2001).The Western monopoly in the world market and the international capital 
control is another economic approach used for securing resources by sustaining neo-
colonial power in Africa. In this regard, Che Guevara (1961) stated: 
We, politely referred to as 'underdeveloped', in truth are colonial, semi-
colonial or dependent countries. We are countries whose economies have 
been distorted by imperialism, which has abnormally developed those 
branches of industry or agriculture needed to complement its complex 
economy. 'Underdevelopment', or distorted development, brings a dangerous 
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specialization in raw materials, inherent in which is the threat of hunger for 
all our peoples. We, the 'underdeveloped', are also those with the single crop, 
the single product, the single market. A single product whose uncertain sale 
depends on a single market imposing and fixing conditions. That is the great 
formula for imperialist economic domination. 
 
TKH:HVWHUQPRQRSRO\LQZRUOGPDUNHWVKDVFRQWULEXWHGWR$IULFD¶VLQDELOLW\WR
diversify their export productions. While raw materials face no tariffs, high tariffs are 
imposed on finished products such as from mineral resources. This discourages the 
locals from investing in added-value raw materials which is essential for economic 
diversification in order to break free from dependence on a single commodity and an 
external power (Dell, 2004). Chapter 2 showed that one of the main macro-economic 
solutions to the resource curse is export diversification. However, in the market 
monopolized by neo-colonial players, constraints are imposed on weaker countries 
from achieving such goal. 
The existing discussion on foreign political and economic interventions has only 
revealed general methods of neo-colonialism; however, although volumous inventive 
methods exist, no direct relationships with African oil rich-countries have been 
identified. This is the gap which I seek to fill.  
For all political approaches employed and previously discussed, this thesis 
categorizes foreign political interventions that are related to oil interests in African 
countries into four central themes: the balkanization of Africa, the use of state 
policies, political meddling and military involvement. First, the ongoing 
EDONDQL]DWLRQRI$IULFD¶VWHUULWRU\DQGVRFLHW\EDVHGRQ:HVWHUQLQWHUHVWVLV
discussed. Under the use of state policies, we analyse foreign policy, energy policy, 
oil diplomacy and the formation of special initiatives and institutions responsible for 
enhancing oil interests. Under political meddling, we explore practices such as 
election fraud, regime change and financial support used in promoting specific 
political groups in return for oil interests. In the military involvement section, we 
discuss the support of arms, military training and assistance and military deployment 
used for enhancing the oil interests. Oil and politics are intertwined and therefore 
closely tied to government decisions. The position of oil at the core of politics 
contrasted with the very few people who really know what happens in the oil world 
makes this a prime topic for further research. Details of this form of intervention are 
given in Chapter 4.  
 
In addition to foreign political interventions, I categorize foreign economic 
interventions which are related to oil in African countries into two central themes: 
financial involvement and business conduct. With regards to financial involvement, 
the following practices are included: neo-liberal policies, petrodollar monetary order, 
economic sanctions, financial support and money corruption. With regards to 
business conduct, I include the following practices: circumventing environmental 
standards, enclave oil operations and unsuitable philanthropic projects. The details of 
this form of interventions are included in Chapter 5. Some practices such as political 
meddling, military involvement, neoliberal policies and economic sanctions can be 
linked to existing neo-colonialist discussions. The rest have been identified as neo-
colonial practices by my study using real-world occurrences.  
C h a p t e r  3  | page 77 
 
 
Determining the Players in Oil-Related Foreign Interventions 
 
Having discussed the mechanism used in sustaining foreign domination of Africa, 
this section moves on to discuss which key players carry out these activities. This 
section uses the same approach as the previous by applying neo-colonial explanation 
and real-ZRUOGSUDFWLFHVWRLGHQWLI\WKHPDLQSOD\HUVVHHNLQJRXW$IULFD¶VRLO:KLOH
the discussion of intervening players was introduced in chapter 1, this chapter 
discusses these actors in further details. 
Neo-colonialism suggests that foreign interventions are continued by former colonial 
players as well as new players. Using the neo-colonialist concept in including both 
former colonial and new players in the analysis of oil-related interventions in Africa 
has never been attempted before. Studies on the modern African oil scramble have 
mostly addressed foreign players separately within a certain, mostly contemporary, 
timeframe. This study applies neo-colonialism based on the Marxist historical 
GLDOHFWLFDOSHUVSHFWLYHE\DQDO\VLQJWKHVFUDPEOHIRU$IULFD¶VRLODVDSURFHVV
involving various players. This process has shaped Africa and will continue to do so.  
However, neo-colonialism has not specified the main players intervening in African 
oil-rich countries, a deficiency this section offers to remedy.  
Previous colonial states and other powerful states attempt to guard their status in 
former colonies especially their interests in raw materials. Hence, they interfere in 
the governance and economies of weak nations to maintain the flow of such 
materials at low prices with favourable conditions for their nations and multinational 
corporations. This was most common in Africa in the latter half of the twentieth 
century. European countries colonised most of Africa in the late nineteenth century 
and granted independence to colonies after WW II. However, they continue to 
control African economies. The end of colonialism also brought other powerful 
states into the scramble for African resource-ULFKFRXQWULHV1NUXPDK¶VZRUGV
highlighted this: 
Africa is a paradox which illustrates and heightens neo-colonialism. Her earth 
is rich, yet the products that come from above and below her soil continue to 
enrich, not Africans predominantly, but groups and individuals who operate 
WR$IULFD¶VLPSRYHULVKPHQW1NUXPDK 
Neo-colonialists explain that foreign interventions are sustained both by 
former colonial powers as well as new players. We will first look at 
continued interventions by former colonial players. 
Oil-Related Interventions by Former Colonial Players 
European powers drew the political boundaries of Africa during their first 
scramble for Africa (early 1880s-early 20th century). Britain, Germany, 
Portugal, France, Spain and Italy took vast pieces of Africa into their empires 
while Holland was preoccupied with the Dutch East Indies. Regional 
differences in colonial rule were determined by the nature of exploitable 
resources (Gordon, 2001). No matter what specialized geographical areas, the 
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profit-centred activities of European colonial powers clearly disregarded 
African development. Foreign-led political systems were established and 
actions taken that had an impact on cultures, language, hierarchy and local 
dominance. These created great turmoil and intense confusion in Africa.  
According to the dependency school of thought, political independence hardly 
changed the constraining economic, political, military and cultural ties that continue 
to bind African countries to their former colonial powers (Amin, 1973). These 
linkages have shaped economic and oil relationships between them until today 
(Clarke, 2008). Even after decolonization, European powers never intended to 
develop rational programmes designed to make African states self-sufficient 
(Gordon, 2001). We first discuss the French neo-colonial interventions in oil-related 
issues in Africa, followed by that of the British and other European powers. 
 
Neo-colonialist linkages are prominently displayed in the relationship between 
France and its former African colonies, primarily due to French policies designed to 
maintain their chasse gardée (see more in Suret-Canale, 1988 and Schraeder, 2001). 1 
7KLVKHOSVHQKDQFH)UHQFKDFFHVVWR$IULFD¶VRLO)Uance has personalized high-level 
contacts in their relationship with Africa, more than any other external actors. A 
small group of politicians and businessmen manages this relationship with the French 
presidency playing a key role (Taylor and Williams, 2004). Among dominant players 
of the twenty-first century in Africa, France maintains the closest political-military 
and economic relationships with African countries, particularly within francophone 
Africa (Wauthier, 1995). Over the years, France has also developed close ties with 
non-Francophone countries such as Nigeria and South Africa. From the neo-
colonialist perspective, this means that former colonial players can develop ties with 
states which were not their former colonies. The relationship is not bound by 
political territories but rather driven by economic and power incentives. Although the 
links between France and Africa were presented as cooperation, they mainly 
benefitted French interests and disregarded African concerns. Former President 
Valery GiVFDUGG¶(VWDLQJ¶VVWDWHPHQWVWUHVVHGWKLVSRLQWµ,DPGHDOLQJZLWK$IULFDQ
DIIDLUVQDPHO\ZLWK)UDQFH¶VLQWHUHVWVLQ$IULFD¶0DUWLQ7RWKLV*DVWRQ
0RQQHUYLOOHUHVSRQGHGµZLWKRXWWKHHPSLUH)UDQFHZRXOGRQO\EHDOLEHUDWHG
country today. ThaQNVWRLWVHPSLUH)UDQFHLVDYLFWRULRXVFRXQWU\¶(OD(OD
87).  
 
Colonial ties and neo-colonial influence define the oil relationships between France 
and African oil-rich countries. In Francophone Africa, France started to dominate the 
Algerian and Gabonese oil industry as soon as oil operations were established there 
(1960s). The French government pressured the Algerian government to secure 
preferential treatment for French oil companies in the granting of oil concessions 
(Aissaoui, 2001). African oil industries have been traditionally dominated by 
)UDQFH¶V(OIQRZSDUWRI7RWDO7RWDORZHVLWVH[LVWHQFHWRJRYHUQPHQWHIIRUWVWR
VWLPXODWHRLOSURGXFWLRQLQ)UDQFH¶V$IULFDQFRORQLHV<HUJLQ7KLUW\-three 
SHUFHQWRI7RWDO¶VRLOQRZFRPHVIURP Africa, more than other parts of the world. 
                                                          
1
 France VDZ$IULFDDVLWVµchasse gardée¶RUµSULYDWHKXQWLQJJURXQG¶VLQFHFRORQLDOWLPHVZKHQ
$IULFDZDVOLWHUDOO\DKXQWLQJJURXQGIRU)UHQFKHOLWHV7KHµchasse gardée¶$frica continued as the 
VWDWXVZDVWUDQVIRUPHGLQWRRQHRIHFRQRPLFDQGSROLWLFDOLQIOXHQFHDIWHU$IULFD¶VLQGHSHQGHQFH
France believed that its place in Africa should be protected against other nations. It thus opposed other 
foreign interventions even those of allies (Schraeder, 2001).   
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Total is the leading foreign investor in Congo-Brazzaville, Gabon and Cameroon 
(Total Factbook, 2010). Total now trades in all of sub-6DKDUDQ$IULFD¶VSURGXFHUV
including in non-Francophone countries (Jacques MaUUDXGGHV*URWWHV7RWDO¶V
Executive Vice-President, 3 November, 2010).  
 
After the Cold War, France faced increasing economic competition throughout 
Africa from new powers, especially in the oil sector. The penetration of the US and 
other emerging states ZDVSHUFHLYHGDVDJJUHVVLRQDJDLQVW)UDQFH¶Vchasse gardée. 
France responded to this threat in a series of policy meetings on how best to defend 
French interests against the US (Glaser and Smith, 1994; Védrine and Moisi, 2001; 
Schraeder, 2001).   
 
Similar to France, Britain continues to enjoy very close ties to some Anglophone and 
Commonwealth states in Africa. British ties with African countries have helped it 
gain a dominant foothold in the oil industries of these countries. Anglo-Dutch Shell 
has dominated African oil trade, especially in Anglophone Africa. Specifically with 
the 1914 colonial decree limiting oil licenses in Nigeria only to British oil 
companies, Shell±BP (British Petroleum) was allowed to establish a stranglehold 
GRPLQDWLRQRIWKHFRXQWU\¶s oil production (Frynas et al., 2000). With colonial ties 
and government support, BP now has operations in thirteen African states. Like 
France, Britain has expanded its engagements beyond former colonial countries. In 
Angola alone, BP expected to invest approximately $7 billion before 2010 (Williams, 
2004). Compared to the French policy, British Africa policy today has been much 
less direct (Engel and Olsen, 2005). It prefers to seek influence without the 
responsibility of direct rule. 
Although other former colonial players, aside from France and the UK, are not 
studied in this thesis, they still play a significant influence in Africa today and whose 
roles worth a brief discussion here. Italy has been actively engaging in oil operations 
in its former African colonies. One of the most prominent European firms operating 
LQ$IULFDLV,WDO\¶V(QLRULJLQDOO\VWDWH-owned but largely privatized in 1998). As a 
former Italian colony, Libya has been well staked out by Eni (Gurney, 1996). It is 
developing several large natural gas fields in conjunction with the National Oil 
Company (NOC). Eni and NOC are fifty-fifty joint partners in the massive Western 
/LE\D*DV3URMHFWZKLOH(QLLVSHUFHQWRZQHURIWKH³*UHHQ-VWUHDP´SLSHOLQH
built beneath the Mediterranean to carry gas from this project to Italy and France 
(Energy Information Administration, 2007; Kahn, 2007; Klare, 2008). Neo-
colonialism explains the colonial ties used for facilitating Italian oil exploitation of 
Libya. This is considered as an essential support for an extreme authoritarian leader. 
The money going through corrupt regimes helps sustain them. Poor governance 
established in a country like Libya is an indicator of the resource curse in the 
country. Eni is also an aggressive world player apart from in Libya. Its African 
holdings are particularly substantial, with major investments including in non-
colonies such as Algeria, Angola, Congo-Brazzaville, Egypt and Nigeria. However, 
we do not focus on Italian players here because their influence is much less 
significant than other players discussed. 
Portugal also has exhibited a renewed interest in strengthening cultural ties with its 
former Lusophone colonies, especially in oil-rich countries including Angola and 
Sao Tome and Principe (MacQueen, 1985). However, Portuguese oil production is 
still low due to the lack of high-profile supermajor companies. Other, traditionally 
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less powerful colonial powers, such as Spain, were never important diplomatic 
players due to the lack of extensive colonial holdings (Naylor, 1987). Weaker 
colonial powers mostly demonstrated sporadic interest in their former colonies only 
during times of crisis, such as Belgium's involvement during the crisis in central 
Africa.  
Numerous European energy companies have also been operating in the region for 
several decades and enjoy close links to local elites. These companies are skilled at 
participating in the international arena which ensures most Africans are excluded 
from any benefits that could derive from oil. Given the historical ties between 
Europe and Africa, European companies continue to remain the main players in the 
H[SORLWDWLRQRI$IULFDQHQHUJ\UHVHUYHV)RU(XURSHDQV$IULFD¶VUHVHUYHVDUH
attractively close. Aiming to reduce their reliance on Russian energy, European 
leaders have encouraged home-based energy firms to invest in Africa; such firms 
have recently accounted for 60 percent of new investment in West African oil and 
gas enterprises (Goldwyn, 2004; Klare, 2008). Figure 1 below shows that Europe 
today is still primarily extracting raw materials from Africa, especially oil, while 
Africa only serves as a dumping ground for manufactured goods.  
Figure 1: EU-27 trade with Africa by product category 
 
Source: Eurostat (2011) 
7DEOHEHORZVKRZV(XURSH¶VPDLQ$IULFDQWUDGHSDUtners.  
Table 1: (8¶V0DLQ$IULFDQ7UDGH3DUWQHUV (Source: Eurostat, 2011) 
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Source: Eurostat (2011) 
+RZHYHU(XURSH¶VSULYLOHJHGSRVLWLRQKDVFRPHXQGHUWKUHDWLQWKHODVWGHFDGHIURP
first the United States and its giant energy corporations, then from China, India and 
others (Klare, 2008).    
Oil-Related Interventions by New Players 
Apart from former colonial players, neo-colonialism explains that new players 
engage in foreign interventions in Africa. The modern oil boom has seen various new 
players actively involved in seeking oil in Africa.1 After political independence, the 
US and the Soviet Union joined the Europeans in a new dimension of foreign 
interventions in Africa: the ideological warfare between capitalism and communism 
in Third World countries (Bromley, 1991). China also engaged in the ideological 
warfare in Africa; however, there were differences in the kind of socialism China and 
the Soviet Union promoted (see more in Anise, 1989). In this period, direct colonial 
rule was replaced by a series of neo-colonial relationships that permitted the 
continued external domination of Africa (Schraeder, 2001).  
7KHHQGRIWKH&ROG:DUGLGQRWLPSURYH$IULFD¶VSRVLWLRQWKHGHSHQGHQF\VFKRRO
HTXDWHVWKLVSHULRGZLWKWKH$IULFD¶VLQFUHDVLQJPDUJLQDOL]DWLRQ7KH\LPSO\WKDW
African leaders will enjoy fewer options (Shaw, 1991). Aggressive foreign efforts to 
intervene in the name of democratization and economic reform suggest a 
³UHFRORQLVDWLRQ´RU³QHZVFUDPEOH´IRU$IULFD$NH6FKUDHGHU,Q
many instances the struggle for state and resources had a non-petroleum character 
(such as for minerals in the DRC, Liberia and Sierra Leone). However, from the late 
1980s, oil has become increasingly important (Clarke, 2008). It involves several 
domestic and external interests including state oil players, heads of state, political 
and commercial elites, super-majors, independents, local companies, middlemen, 
financiers, lobbyists, contractors and investors in oil-related industries (ibid.).  
$FORVHORRNDW&KLQD¶VFXUUHQWVXFWLRQRf sub-Sahara African resources showed that 
WKHNLQGRIUDYHQRXVDFTXLVLWLRQRIUHVRXUFHVGLGQRWHQGZLWK$IULFD¶V
decolonisation (Behar, 2008). Africa provides both developed and developing 
FRXQWULHVYDVWRLOUHVRXUFHV7RGD\¶VRLOERRPKDVPDUNVRIQHR-colonialism, as 
American, Chinese and other major states compete against each other to gain support 
DPRQJ$IULFDQJRYHUQPHQWV7KHUHLVOLWWOHGRXEWWKDWWKHLQWHUHVWLQ$IULFD¶VRLODQG
gas resources has caused rivalries between international actors in Africa, markedly 
the American and Chinese governments (Klare and Volman, 2006). Almost half of 
all foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows to Africa landed in five major oil-
                                                          
1
 7KHUHDUHDQXPEHURIIDFWRUVZK\WKHVHSOD\HUVKDYHMXVWHQWHUHG$IULFD)LUVW$IULFD¶VPDUNHWV
were only opened after its independence from Europe (starting from 1960s). After which, European 
powers still kept strong ties and in some countries like Nigeria, Anglo-Dutch Shell had been 
predominant. The oil industries were monopolized and in this context were difficult to penetrate. At 
the same time, there were other promising sources outside Africa for massive oil ventures. The US-
UK dominant role in Middle Eastern oil was unquestionable. Only until the Middle East crisis started 
to unravel, the attempts to nationalize oil industries in many large oil-producing countries globally, 
the creation of OPEC and the depletion of domestic and international oil production, and the rising 
global energy need accompanied by industrial growth in emerging countries that external players 
started to look at African oil-rich countries seriously. This development, however, did not take a long 
SHULRG%\WKH¶VODUJH86RLOFRPSDQLHVVXFKDV&KHYURQDQG([[RQ0RELOZHUH already well 
established in a number of African oil-rich countries (Yergin, 1993). 
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producing countries. The share of oil revenues to the total FDI was 94 percent in 
Equatorial Guinea, 93 percent in Angola and 90 percent in Nigeria (UNCTAD, 
2006). Indeed, there are no other resources more likely to ferment conflict between 
states in the twenty-ILUVWFHQWXU\WKDQRLO.ODUH7KHZRUOGVXSHUSRZHUV¶
unilateral and militaristic foreign policies to secure oil access underline the alarming 
importance of oil, especially in the mind of the policy-makers. Thus, less developed 
oil-producing countries are often caught in the struggles to defend their sovereignty, 
economic status, human rights and ecosystems (Leech, 2006). 
Among the most prominent new players in Africa, the US and China stands on top, 
especially when it comes to the oil sector. The roles of transnational agencies, such 
as companies and international institutions, in seeking African oil have also been 
increasing. We will first discuss the US interventions in Africa in further detail 
before moving on to explore China and transnational agencies respectively.  
While early involvements in Africa were claimed to be on ideological political 
grounds, an active oil scramble soon followed. The US became an active 
international player during the Cold War, especially in Third World Countries. 
Although the US never colonized a country, it was the author of direct and brutal 
imperialist activities including the repression of liberation movements throughout the 
world. Hardt and Negri (2000), however, point out that US imperialist practices go 
back earlier than that to the origin of the country, to black slavery and the genocidal 
wars against Native Americans. Overproduction, agricultural unrest and labour 
conflicts at the end of the nineteenth century drove the United States to expand for 
QHZHFRQRPLFIURQWLHUV/D)HEHU$QRWKHULPSHULDOGHVLJQFDPHLQWKH¶V
when President Coolidge noted that the property of the US citizen is part of the 
general domain of the nation even when abroad. This gave legal immunity to US 
citizens and businesses overseas and provided justification for interventionism in 
violation of the national sovereignty of affected countries (Slater, 2004). For Africa, 
the US began to consider it an area of strategic importance when Portuguese 
colonialism, defeated in the 1970s, was replaced by Marxist-inspired regimes such as 
in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea Bissau.  
Without entities to sustain African colonial ties such as the Commonwealth, La 
Francophonie and Lusophone cultural connections, the US created different 
mechanisms to promote its interests. These are the Corporate Council on Africa, 
several privDWHJURXSVDQGLQVWLWXWHVVXFKDV:DVKLQJWRQ¶V&HQWHUIRU6WUDWHJLFDQG
International Studies (CSIS) and an African Military Command structure 
(AFRICOM) (Clarke, 2008). For the US, securing oil accesses is a critical security 
matter. The oil consumption ratio of the US citizen is higher than anywhere else. It is 
the top world oil consumer and it depends largely on imports. The US production 
started a permanent decline in 1972 (Klare, 2005). By 1998, for the first time in its 
history, more than 50 percent of US oil demands were supplied by overseas sources 
and currently (2010) this figure is almost 70 percent (See Figure 2 for US 
dependence on imported petroleum (1960-2005). :LWKRQO\SHUFHQWRIWKHZRUOG¶V
population, the US consumed over 25 percent of global energy production (see Table 
2 for the Top World Oil Consumers). African oil exports to the US have been 
steadily rising, accounting for more than 25 percent of total US imports and already 
more than US oil imports from the whole Persian Gulf (United States Department of 
Energy, 2010), accounting for over 80 percent of all US purchases in the continent. 
The top five recipients of US direct investment are Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, 
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Angola, Chad and Nigeria ± the oil-producing states. Such huge demand for oil and 
heavy reliance on oil imports are primary reasons driving the US struggle for control 
over oil exporters. Figure 2 suggests increasing US reliance on imported petroleum. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: US dependence on imported petroleum 
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Table 2: Top World Oil Consumers, 2010 
  Top World Oil Consumers, 2010   
  (thousand barrels per day)   
Rank Countries Consumption 
1 United States 19,148 
2 People Rep. of China 8,746 
3 Japan 4,422 
4 India 3,215 
5 Russia 2,686 
6 Saudi Arabia 2,676 
7 Brazil 2,599 
8 Germany 2,489 
9 South Korea 2,249 
10 Canada 2,232 
11 Mexico 2,141 
12 Iran 1,898 
13 France 1,814 
14 United Kingdom 1,626 
15 Italy 1,503 
Source: Energy Information Administration (2011) 
 
The lack of domestic conservation and alternative non-oil strategies suggest that 
maintaining stable, diversified foreign oil is a matter of national security for the US. 
According to the National Energy Plan developed by Vice President Richard 
&KHQH\¶VWDVNIRUFHLQ³(QHUJ\VHFXULW\LVDIXQGDPHQWDOFRPSRQent of 
QDWLRQDOVHFXULW\DQGDSUHUHTXLVLWHWRFRQWLQXHGHFRQRPLFJURZWK´$IULFDLV
highlighted in the plan as a significant and growing source of US imports.  
Sub-6DKDUDQ$IULFDQRLOKDGEHHQWUDGLWLRQDOO\GRPLQDWHGE\)UDQFH¶V(OIWKH
Anglo-Dutch company Shell and, to a lesser extent, the US-based ChevronTexaco 
(Gary and Karl, 2003). However, the modern scramble for African oil is now having 
a much stronger American influence. New fields are being aggressively pursued by 
ExxonMobil, ChevronTexaco and by independents such as Amerada Hess, Vanco, 
Ocean and Marathon. US companies have plans for large investments in Africa. The 
US uses varied political and economic approaches to secure the oil there. The War on 
Terror and neo-liberal policies are mechanisms specific to the US. The following 
chapters discuss US foreign interventions in African oil-rich countries in greater 
detail. Through foreign practices, neo-colonialism in Africa has been sustained.  
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Another new major player seeking influence and sustaining neo-colonialism in 
Africa is China whose increasing presence is attracting world attention. However, 
Chinese milestone involvement in Africa could be traced back to the 1955 Bandung 
Spirit (Asian-African Conference held in Indonesia). Within the context of 
decolonisation and Cold War, China took a leading role in Bandung Spirit with a call 
for the liberation from the hegemony of any superpower and for building solidarities 
among the dominated states of the world order of that period. However, Chinese 
influence in Africa was limited compared to European, American and Soviet players. 
With the rapid spread of globalization as the twenty-first century turned, China made 
DVWURQJFRPHEDFN&KLQD¶VTXHVWIRUHQHUJ\VHFXULW\QRZLVPRUHWKDQDVLPSOH
commercial puUSRVH,WLVDERXW&KLQD¶VGHYHORSPHQWVWUDWHJ\PRGHUQL]DWLRQ
programme and its emergence as a world power (Jiang, 2005). Although the Chinese 
approaches attract heavy Western criticism, looking closely the pattern of Chinese 
meddling in efforts to acquire oil assets in Africa is essentially similar to that of the 
West. 7KLVVHFWLRQGLVFXVVHV&KLQD¶VVWUXJJOHWRFRQWURO$IULFD¶VRLOLQGXVWU\ 
China needs oil. However, its domestic production is in decline (Sieminski, 2005). 
As China adopted free markets, it swiftly became the second top world oil consumer. 
&KLQD¶VWRSWHQWUDGLQJSDUWQHUVLQ$IULFDDSDUWIURP6RXWK$IULFDDUHWKHRLO-
producing states (Taylor, 2006). According to the World Bank, 85 percent of Africa's 
exports to China come from five oil-rich countries - Angola, Equatorial Guinea, 
Nigeria, the Republic of Congo and Sudan (Alden, 2007) (see Table 3, below). 
China's biggest oil suppliers from Africa as of 2010 are Angola, Sudan and Libya 
while sales from Nigeria and Chad have tripled in one year. Figure 3 below shows 
that oil drives Chinese trade in Africa by far more than any other industry and to a 
greater extent than the rest of the world. 
7DEOH&KLQD¶VWRSWHQ$IULFDQWUDGHSDUWQHUV 
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Figure 3: &KLQD¶VLPSRUWHGJRRGVIURP$IULFDDQGfrom the rest of the world 
 
Source: Ye (2010) 
 
6LQFH&KLQDKDVEHFRPHWKHODUJHVWPDUNHWIRU$IULFD¶VH[SRUWVDQGWKHVHFRQG
largest source of its imports. See Table 4, below.  
 
Table 4: Major African trade partners in 2008 (US$ billions) 
Destination Exports Origin Imports 
China 49,8 United States 117,3 
France 36,9 China 56,8 
United States 28,6 Italy 56,5 
Germany 28,6 Spain 38,4 
Italy 26,4 France 38,6 
United Kingdom 15,6 Germany 27,6 
Saudi Arabia 15,3 United Kingdom 21,0 
Netherlands 15,7 Japan 20,9 
Spain 14,6 Brazil 20,7 
Japan 13,4 Netherlands 19,7 
Source: OECD (2010) based on UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics (2010)  
 
&KLQD¶VWUDGHWR$IULFDURVHVLJQLILFDQWO\IURPELOOLRQLQWRDERXW
billion in 2007 (McLeary, 2007; Hanson, 2008). American investments in Africa 
have not been able to match this growth rate over the past decade (Frynas and Paulo, 
2007) (see Figure 4 for the increase in exports from Africa to other regions). The 
increased Chinese imports of oil from Sudan and Angola have accounted for much of 
the growth in investments in Africa (Hanson, 2008). More than 800 Chinese 
companies are reportedly operating in 49 African countries (Xinhua News Agency, 
2006). China has quickly become the most aggressive investor in Africa. Chinese 
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commercial progress is the largest in sub-Saharan Africa since the end of the Cold 
War. The name "ChinAfrica" was even given to this relationship. There are now 
more Chinese living in Nigeria - from state-owned and state-linked corporations to 
small entrepreneurs - than there were Britons at the height of empire (Behar, 2008). 
Many of them work in the oilfields. Chinese state oil company champions - China 
National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), China National Offshore Oil Corporation 
(CNOOC) and China Petrochemical Corporation (Sinopec) - roam Africa as the new 
SOD\HUVRQWKHFRQWLQHQW&KLQDKDVEHFRPHWKH:HVW¶VFRPSHWLWRUIRU$IULFD¶VRLO 
China has been criticized for following a neo-imperialist trajectory, in which its 
exploitation of raw materials in Africa in exchange for dumping of manufactured 
goods only emphasizes the inequality between the North and South and thereby 
heightening the cycle of dependency of African countries on powerful nations. The 
repeated pattern of imperialism alongside ChiQD¶VUDSLGH[SDQVLRQLQ$IULFDWULJJHUV
much anxiety (Andrews-Speed and Dannreuther, 2011). Thabo Mbeki, South 
$IULFD¶VWKHQSUHVLGHQWKLJKOLJKWHGWKDW 
 
The potential danger was of the emergence of an unequal relationship 
similar to that which existed in the past between African colonies and 
the colonial powers. China cannot just come here and dig for raw 
materials and then go away and sell us manufactured goods (Business 
Day, 6 January, 2007, quoted in Taylor, 2009: 2) 
  
As with the European colonial powers, to secure oil access in Africa China uses a 
wide range of practices and policies including companies (Andrews-Speed and 
'DQQUHXWKHU7KHUHDOSROLWLNEHKLQG&KLQD¶VSHQHWUDWLRQKDVEHHQ
concentrated on interests including diversification from the Middle East, 
international competition and isolation of Taiwan on political grounds and India on 
African oil deals. The use of state-owned companies, a non-interference policy and 
unconditional cash incentives are practices specific to China which will be discussed 
in detail in the following chapters. 
The chess game among oil companies is echoed apparently in the foreign policies of 
WKHZRUOG¶VVXSHUSRZHUV7KH8QLWHG6WDWHV&KLQD*UHDW%ULWDLQDQG)UDQFHDUH
particularly engaged in an intensifying competition for oil interests in Africa. For the 
86DQG&KLQDWKHJOREH¶VELJJHVWRLOFRQVXPHUVWKHQHHGWRVHFXUHVXSSOLHVLV
massive, even to the extent of questionable meddling in oil-rich regions. New players 
like India, Malaysia, Russia and the Middle (DVWDOVRHQWHUHGWKH$IULFDQRLOµJDPH¶
albeit at a minor level (Clarke, 2008). Unlike the original scramble for Africa, the 
modern version has become a global affair. Thus, I argue that colonialism did not 
end when Africa received independence. Colonialism still exists in the presence of 
asymmetrical political relations. It may range from direct rule through to indirect 
steering implemented by advice and backed up by the threat of military intervention 
or economic sanctions. Although African states are sovereign, they are economically 
GHSHQGHQWRQ(XURSH$PHULFDDQGRWKHUSRZHUIXOQDWLRQV$IULFD¶VIRUHLJQWUDGH
depends on these countries and they remain dependent on the same external actors to 
train their soldiers and ensure security in their territories (Mathews, 1989).  
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Figure 4: The race for raw materials  
 
Source: Behar (2008)  
 
 
Apart from state players, neo-colonialism exists now in another form; that is, through 
transnational agencies including the World Bank, the IMF and MNCs, promoting 
continued colonial control of modern Africa. Jalee (1968) explains neo-colonialist 
practices can be multilateral, often through international monopolies. In this case, the 
superpowers exert their economic influence through transnational agencies. Nkrumah 
(1968) poLQWVRXWWKHLPSRUWDQWUROHZKLFKµ7KH,QYLVLEOH*RYHUQPHQW¶SOD\VLQ
NHHSLQJ$IULFDXQGHUFRQWURO1NUXPDKH[SODLQVKLVLGHDRIµ7KH,QYLVLEOH
*RYHUQPHQW¶DV:DOO6WUHHW¶VFRQQHFWLRQZLWKWKH3HQWDJRQDQGYDULRXVLQWHOOLJHQFH
services, encompassing private business firms and institutions. They are used to 
implement neo-liberal policies designed by Western powers to open African markets 
so that raw materials can be extracted and the inflow of manufactured goods 
unobstructed. Their roles are particularly crucial in the increasing international 
competition for oil. Neo-colonial ties become internationalized allowing superpowers 
to continue resource extraction without the need for overt national control (Asante, 
1989). The activities of these corporations and organizations exceed the boundaries 
of the traditional nation-state, consequently hindering the development of 
interregional relationships.  
In the early 1980s most African countries had to heavily negotiate to borrow from 
the IMF and as a precondition they had to adopt IMF programmes, often with little 
choice since there were no other accessible alternatives. Similar conditions such as 
wage freezes, higher prices and the devaluation of real exchange rates are also 
insisted on by the World Bank and most Western donor countries. These 
programmes disregard practicality or real benefits for Africa but are clearly designed 
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only to make Africa a better client for the West (Payer, 1982). Here, interventions are 
UHIHUUHGWRDVH[HUFLVHVLQµVWUXFWXUDODGMXVWPHQW¶The role of government has been 
performed by international institutions vested with foreign powers to re-order the 
economic and social policies of Third World governments. What Foucault once 
WHUPHGWKHµEHQLJQRSDFLW\¶RIHFRQRPLFSURFHVVHVKDVFHUWDLQO\Lnformed the actions 
and interventions of institutional bodies such as the IMF and the World Bank (Slater, 
2004: 93). While African governments decide how revenues are allocated inside their 
borders, these international players come close to determining the policies, actions 
and development strategies of how revenues to be spent. Multilaterally or 
unilaterally, they are more powerful than any single African government (Gary and 
Karl, 2003). 
The asymmetry of external pressure on state-welfare economies, protected 
economies, co-operative organisation and collective production denies communities 
economic options and can produce a politics of victimhood that stratifies and 
emnifies others, as occurred in Rwanda (Azar and Farah, 1981; Nafziger and 
Auvinen, 2003; Uvin, 1998).  
Neo-colonialism today relates fundamentally to the expansion of multinational 
corporations. There is an interlinking relationship between states and oil companies 
due to the significance of energy security. For some, especially China, oil companies 
are state-owned. However, MNCs also act outside state control, particularly when 
they are in situ. This study thus addresses companies as a separate actor, while 
acknowledging the tremendous support received from their home governments to 
promote oil interests.  
 
Multinational companies largely control foreign trade and exchange of technological 
know-how JOREDOO\DQGWKXVXQGHUPLQHFRXQWULHV¶DXWRQRP\LQWKHLUDELOLW\DQG
option to diversify their economy (Mathews, 1989; Bromley, 2008). Conversely, few 
governments in developing states have the technical know-how, financial capital, or 
market access required to commercialize their natural resources. They rely on 
multinational oil companies as the main agents in exploitation, trade and transport of 
such resources. Where these multinational companies operate in unstable regions, 
they may knowingly or unknowingly contribute to or exacerbate the problems 
(Ballentine and Nitzschke, 2005). Even well-intentioned community development 
programs may increase tensions between the company and local communities, within 
communities and between communities and the central government. According to 
Zandvliet, companies are never neutral but can have a positive or negative impact on 
local conditions (Zandvliet, 2005).  
For many African countries, the roles of these companies in their economies are 
tremendous. For oil-rich countries like Nigeria, Angola and Sudan, most national 
revenues are derived from the oil companies. Moreover, multinational companies are 
known for undermining the sovereignty of states, threatening to relocate if 
favourable terms are not offered on taxation, environmental regulation, or labour 
discipline (Womack, Jones et al., 2007). Some companies even directly support 
repressive regimes in order to secure access to local resources. Mathews (1989) 
views the growing partnership between African governments and multinational 
FRPSDQLHVDVDQHJDWLYHGHYHORSPHQW)RUH[DPSOH1LJHULD¶VRLOKDVHQFRXUDJHGD
partnership between the government and giant oil companies such as Shell-BP, Gulf, 
Mobil, Agip, Phillips and others. Aiming to capture foreign earnings, they invited 
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MNCs to expand the extractive sector, often with a single item export, whose prices 
are volatile in the world market. This reduced any significant autonomy for these 
countries to diversify their economic and trade linkages. 
Oil companies in many cases make non-transparent deals or payments with 
governments which make it difficult to assess what revenues governments receive 
and whether revenue management in the country is fair. Numerous studies show that 
oil companies play an inappropriately significant role in political decision-making in 
oil-exporting countries to their own benefit. This is reflected in the increase in 
lawsuits against oil companies for supporting human rights violations and 
environmental destruction such as in Nigeria and Angola. Home governments opt to 
LJQRUHRLOFRPSDQLHV¶SRRUSUDFWLFHVRYHUVHDVDQGDOO\WKHPVHOYHVZLWKDXWKRULWDULDQ
rulers in order to secure the oil.  
The private sector is often used as a tool to promote foreign policy either through 
sanctions or corporate codes of conduct (Haufler, 2001). Strange (2000: 50), for 
example, argues that US companies were a tool of US imperialism and that the 
government was only the executive committee of the bourgeoisie, providing 
American capitalism with the political support necessary for the exploitation of 
developing countries. Strange (2000: 65) concludes that multinational corporations 
are increasingly exercising a parallel authority alongside governments in 
management of the economy, technological innovation, labour relations and the 
fiscal extraction which affects the location of industry and investment. These roles 
further complicate the relationship between superpowers and African states. Tracing 
direct influence becomes impossible (Wildstand, 1975). In this system, weak states 
are unable to avoid the influence of developed states or to independently choose their 
own policy paths. Africa remains colonial in the modern world where colonialists in 
the literal sense are absent. 
 
Both private and state companies and politicians benefit from African oil politics 
whereas common Africans have been largely neglected. President Wade of Senegal 
in November 2006 declared oil-exporting African countries perform poorly because 
oil monies flee elsewhere (Afrol News). Oil giants are pocketing billions of profits 
from high oil prices. Wade came up with the Wade formula which aims to distribute 
oil profits more equally between oil companies and African states (Clarke, 2008). 
Although African governments make decisions regarding oil extraction in their 
territory, we learn that they operate in an environment conditioned by dominant 
players from the colonial period onwards. Global oil production is dominated by a 
few supermajor companies which have great control over capital and technology. Oil 
supermajor finances often dwarf the countries in which they invest. For example, 
([[RQ0RELO¶VSURILWVRIELOOLRQLQDUHPRUHWKDQWHQIROGJUHDWHUthan 
&KDG¶V*'3IRUWKDW\HDU7KLVLVWKHVDPHWKURXJKRXWWKHFRQWLQHQW7KHUHLVDQ
DV\PPHWU\RISRZHUDQGNQRZOHGJHZKLFKDFFRXQWVIRU$IULFD¶VSRRUEDUJDLQLQJ
power to win greater shares (Gary and Karl, 2003). 
The fast expanding MNCs in Africa have led to increased regional inequality. The 
differential growth may revive tensions between the rich and the poor, or between 
$IULFDQµPRGHUDWHV¶DQGWKHµUDGLFDOV¶0DWKHZV7RGD\WKHJOREDO
financiers are part of the scramble for oil in Africa. The money matrix, political 
interests and geostrategy are key drivers in the African oil game (Clarke, 2003: 3). 
De Waal (1999) suggests that non-governmental organizations (NGOs) can also 
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become the tools for neo-colonialism by imposing foreign expertise where local 
knowledge can serve better. The increasing presence of NGOs alters the power of 
local states. NGOs are moral instruments by which the neo-colonial interventions can 
be advanced while avoiding the appearance of direct control (Dunn, 2003). Duffield 
(2007) argued that the Western states make extensive use of NGOs in implementing 
µLPSHULDOLVW¶SURJUDPPHV+HYLHZHGGHYHORSPHQWDVJRYHUQDQFHDQGDSDUWDQG
SDUFHORIWKHLPSHULDODPELWLRQVLQGLVJXLVHRIWKHµOLEHUDOSURMHFW¶7KLVSUDFWLFHLV
increasingly pursued after the Cold War with the expansion of international alliance 
whereby respect for the sovereignty of other states has declined. By claiming that 
Third World states are unable to provide human security for their citizens, Western 
states with support from NGOs have been able to justify forceful interventions, a 
stage of foreign administration and even a reestablishment of statehood (ibid). 
$IULFD¶VVXERUGLQDWHSRVLWLRQLQWKHZRUOGLVPDLQWDLQHGE\WKHVHWUDQVQDWLRQDO
DJHQFLHVRUµVXSHUVWUXFWXUH¶LQ0DU[LVWWHUPV7KHREVWDFOHVDQGFRQGLWLRQVDUHWRR
great for poor African states, however rich in resources, to resist the pressures and 
develop their own potential (Lanning and Muller, 1979).  
However, neo-colonialism is not only achieved by foreiJQSOD\HUV¶LQSXWEXWLVDOVR
built into internal factors such as leadership in African own states. Fanon believed 
that the African bourgeoisie who took power at independence were favoured by the 
former colonial powers because they were willing to cooperate and maintain their 
ties with the West. They were generally Western educated and they gained from 
continuing the colonial pattern. They served their own interests and the colonial 
interests rather than the masses from which the nationalist movements were born. To 
Fanon (1963), this is the main cause of neo-colonialism. Today the Western 
governments still favour African leaders who remain loyal to the West. 
Consequently, African elites have found it advantageous to their own positions to 
compromise with expORLWDWLRQDQGDFFHSWHDV\µVROXWLRQV¶WRFRPSOH[HFRQRPLF
problems from foreign players. However, Mathews (1989) argues that this goes back 
to the European colonial legacy which left Africa ill-equipped to break out of the 
vicious circle of poverty and underdevelopment which forced African leaders to 
accept neo-colonial influence in the first place. These circumstances, combined with 
a power vacuum after decolonization, have created the ideal situation for superpower 
penetration into Africa.  
When oil industries started to take shape, some governing elites of these energy-
surplus states have been able to exploit their position for various forms of support 
from their principal customer states including international and unilateral political 
support from foreign powers, the transfers of arms and military assistance as well as 
negligence to human rights abuses in the host countries. Other leaders of African oil-
rich states that lack support remain vulnerable to invasion by powerful oil-importing 
states (Klare, 2008). The economic stakes in Africa are too high for the superpowers 
to leave the continent. Hence, we are likely to see intensified superpower 
confrontation and foreign intervention in Africa in the future with disastrous 
FRQVHTXHQFHVIRUWKHFRQWLQHQW¶Vdevelopment.  
This study acknowledges the immense importance of the roles of African elites in 
XQGHUPLQLQJ$IULFD¶VGHYHORSPHQW%D\DUW+RZHYHUIDLOXUHVLQ$IULFDQ
political systems, violations and corruption are often derived from, and accentuated 
E\IRUHLJQSOD\HUV:KLOHWKHUHDUHQXPHURXVVWXGLHVDUJXLQJWKDW$IULFD¶V
XQGHUGHYHORSPHQWRFFXUVEHFDXVHRI$IULFD¶VRZQGRPHVWLFSROLWLFVWKHUHKDVEHHQ
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QRVWXG\WKDWV\VWHPDWLFDOO\HVWDEOLVKHVIRUHLJQLQYROYHPHQWLQ$IULFD¶VUHVRXUFHV
DQG$IULFD¶Vunderperformance. Therefore, the latter perspective forms the focus of 
this study. 
In this section, we discuss the main foreign players involving in the interventions in 
African affairs as well as their specific relations to Africa. Neo-colonialism points 
out the continued control by both former colonial and new players in general but it 
does not directly relate this to the modern oil scramble for Africa. This section 
merges the theoretical concept of neo-FRORQLDOLVPDQGWKHµUHDO-ZRUOG¶FRQWH[W
together using analyses of raw data and historical records. It reveals that France, 
Britain, the US, China and their transnational agencies are the main neo-colonial 
SOD\HUVLQ$IULFD¶VRLOH[SORLWDWLRQ&KDSWHUZLOOORRNDWWKHLUDFWLRQVZLWKUHJDUGWR
political interventions in detail while Chapter 5 explores the economic interventions 
of these players. Chapter 6 examines both political and economic interventions in a 
specific case study of Nigeria. 
  
Conclusion 
7KHODWHVWµVFUDPEOHIRU$IULFD¶VRLO¶LVDFRQWLQXDtion of foreign exploitation in 
Africa. It is essential to understand this process and tackle it, if indeed the continuous 
H[SORLWDWLRQKLQGHUV$IULFD¶VSRWHQWLDOXVHRILWVUHVRXUFHVIRUGHYHORSPHQW7KLV
chapter uses the concept of neo-colonialism to explain the African resource 
exploitation by colonial powers; that the history of colonialism established Africa on 
a disadvantageous path at the advent of the oil industry; and that the renewed foreign 
interventions both by former colonial and new global powers further deepened the 
problems. Applying Marxist historical dialectical perspective allows us to assess the 
on-going process that has continued to shape Africa. Neither critical theories (most 
directly Neo-Marxist variants), nor any other existing political theories explain the 
mechanisms of how continuing foreign interventions are carried out in Africa, 
particularly in relation to the oil scramble. In this chapter, we discuss the main 
SOD\HUVRIIRUHLJQLQWHUYHQWLRQVLQ$IULFD¶VUHVRXUFHV)UDQFH%ULWDin, the US, China 
and their transnational agencies. We discuss various approaches taken by these 
players in an attempt to dominate Africa. The next chapter explores the political 
interventions foreign players carry out in Africa in order to seek and protect their oil 
access.
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-Chapter 4- 
 
Foreign Political Interventions in African Oil-rich Countries 
 
This study categorizes foreign interventions in African oil-rich countries into two 
areas: political and economic. This chapter examines the former category, the 
political approaches, which foreign players use in enhancing oil interests, while the 
next chapter discusses the latter category, foreign economic involvement. The 
mechanism of continued foreign political interventions in African oil-rich countries 
discussed below includes the balkanization of Africa, the use of state policies, 
political meddling and military involvement. There are various players involved in 
$IULFD¶VRLO7KHPDLQRQHVZKLFKFRQFHUQWKLVVWXG\DUH*UHDW%ULWDLQ)UDQFHWKH
United States, China and transnational agencies. While some categories of 
interventions may be the main tools for a state to employ, the same may not be so for 
others. For example, non-interference policy and state-controlled companies, which 
are state policies specific to China, are not policy options for the Western players.  
&RORQLDOLVPHQGHGEXWIRUHLJQHQJDJHPHQWVIRU$IULFD¶VUHVRXUFHFRQWUROFRQWLQXH
some in the old forms while others are new and more covert forms. New players are 
now involved. This process is what the study classifies as neo-colonial and is what it 
offers to uncover. Due to neo-colonial influence, Africa becomes powerless in the 
international system allowing foreign powers to dictate their roles in the geopolitics 
of Africa (Anise, 1989). As Marxist historical dialectical approach explains the 
UHODWLRQVEHWZHHQFRQWLQXHGLQWHUYHQWLRQVLQ$IULFDDQG$IULFD¶VGHYHORSPHQWWKLV
chapter adopts this approach in analysing real, on-going, instances of foreign 
intervention for African oil in order to assess (in Chapter 7) how this links to the 
African resource curse.  By this, the study sheds light on the unaddressed 
relationships between the foreign resource scramble, neo-colonialism and the 
resource curse discussion.  
To tackle the problem of the resource curse in Africa, one has to look beyond the 
present period, the business and industrial sides of oil or the domestic dimension of 
Africa. More important are the players involved, the approaches they use and how 
the history of this involvement affects Africa and hinders it from breaking out of the 
resource curse. This helps us understand the conditions which Africa was left in 
when the oil industries took place and why Africa has an additional burden to those 
of other oil-rich regions, namely, to break free from the curse. Without understanding 
this dimension and tackling the root of the problems, any cures provided by experts 
are likely to be mere Band-Aid to a gaping wound. The existing discussion on the 
resource curse does not sufficiently address the relation between foreign dynamism 
DQG$IULFD¶VUHVRXUFHFXUVH:KLOHH[WHUQDOLQYHVWRUVUHDSODUJHFRPPHUFLDOEHQHILWV
Africa has continued to suffer with wars, abject poverty and bad governance.  
 
Before addressing modern-day involvement, we first look back at the balkanization 
of Africa designed for resource control as part of an analysis of the entire scramble 
for African oil.  
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Balkanization of Africa  
The balkanization of Africa, although mainly associated with colonialism, is still on-
going to a significant extent and this is how the neo-colonialism discussion becomes 
valid. The past-SUHVHQWEDONDQL]DWLRQRI$IULFDGHILQHV$IULFD¶VVWUXFWXUHSRVLWLRQLQ
the world and the (or the lack of) dynamics of the contemporary resource scramble. 
The pattern will remain so as long as Africa supplies the world with resources as 
FUXFLDODVRLO7KLVVHFWLRQGLVFXVVHVLQGHWDLO$IULFD¶VEDONDQL]DWLRQDVDIRUPRI
political intervention securing resource control for former colonial masters and new 
players. 
 
Balkanization of Africa by Former Colonial Players 
Although Africa is just becoming the new energy powerhouse; it has experienced 
intensive foreign interventions for control of labour resources, land and raw materials 
and fallen under full, often brutal, control of the European imperialists during the 
colonization era. For full control, the 1884-85 Berlin Conference led by Bismarck 
partitioned Africa into parts for several competing European powers. National 
borders were drawn arbitrarily based largely on empire building, dispute settlement 
between the European powers and without any consideration of existing ethnic, 
tribal, religious and territorial sensitivities. Any form of African autonomy was 
eliminated, creating confusion and conflicts, destroying large parts of the traditional 
fabric that held African societies together with lasting impacts on the malfunctions of 
Africa today.  
A series of intensive ethnic and religious conflicts have broken out in most African 
countries, especially those that were highly balkanized and those which were 
considered to be strategic prizes and consequently experienced intensive colonial 
penetration. These include Nigeria, Angola, Libya, Congo and Sierra Leone. Given 
normal state-creation, locals and academics argue these areas would not been formed 
as a unitary entity. To make matters worse, colonial masters played upon local 
GLIIHUHQFHVWRµGLYLGHDQGUXOH¶DVWUDWHJ\SDUWLFXODUO\XVHGE\WKH%ULWLVK 
 
Balkanization of Africa by New players  
After WW II, European economic power declined. Europe was preoccupied by 
economic crisis, political changes and reconstruction of their homelands. The 
liberation movements in their colonies became large and widespread. Europe also 
faced pressures from the new superpower, the US, to open their coORQLHV¶PDUNHWVWR
an inflow of American goods and the outflow of African raw materials in exchange 
for American financial support in rebuilding Europe. For Europe, keeping their 
empires seemed burdensome in these circumstances. The political independence of 
African states was more the consequence of the demise of European power rather 
than their own will. However, some colonial states, especially France and Britain, 
still sought to maintain colonial ties in Africa in the face of the new players.    
WW II was followed by the Cold War when the key players in Africa started to 
change from the former European colonizers to the new US imperialists and the 
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Soviet idealists. While the USSR spread its Marxist communist ideology, the US 
promised the spread of wealth EDVHGRQ$GDP6PLWK¶VOLEHUDOPDUNHWV (Bromley, 
2008).1 In the same period, multinational companies started gaining worldwide 
influence, including in Africa. Since 2000, China and India have become 
increasingly important international players. Although new players are gaining 
influence in Africa, European power and ties remain relatively significant in their 
former colonies. France, in particular, has maintained both political and economic 
mechanisms to keep their relationships strong. 
Even if European colonialism in legal terms started to crumble in the 1960s, 
balkanization of Africa is still on-going. Below, we discuss three African oil-rich 
countries, Libya, Sudan and Angola, where balkanization has been continuous. 
During the colonial period, the players balkanising African states were evident. For 
Libya, it was Italian colonialists. Sudan fell under British control and in Angola it 
was the Portuguese.2 After colonialism ended, the balkanization process became less 
distinct. Often it was indirect, carried out through proxies and allegedly for 
humanitarian reasons or the War on Terror. Whatever the real motivation, these 
African states remain balkanized and resources still flow out to the imperial states.  
Here, we examine African oil-rich countries that were, and still are, balkanized by 
both former colonial and new players. This section discusses Libya, Sudan and 
$QJRODZKLOHWKHVSHFLILFFDVHRI1LJHULD¶VEDONDQL]DWLRQLVH[DPLQHGLQ&KDSWHU 
We will first examine the balkanization of Libya which has occurred several times 
throughout its KLVWRU\/LE\D¶VFULVLVWRGD\LVPRVWO\VHHQDVDUHVXOWRIWKHODWH
0XDPPDU*DGGDIL¶VRSSUHVVLYHUXOH+RZHYHUWKLVVWXG\DUJXHVIRUDFRQQHFWLRQ
between the pre-Gaddafi balkanized structure of Libya and the on-going conflicts 
and fragmentation of society which Gaddafi tried too violently to quell. While his 
strong leadership turned oil wealth into some palpable developments in Libya, as 
strong leadership did for Indonesia and Malaysia during the 1970s oil shock, Gaddafi 
failed by over-exploiting his power for too long. Oil-wealth leading to corrupt 
cronyism became endemic and the violent crushing of opposition was largely 
UHVSRQVLEOHIRU/LE\D¶VIDLOXUHWRGHYHORSSROLWLFDOO\DQGVRFLDOO\+RZHYHUWKHSUH-
Gaddafi balkDQL]DWLRQRI$IULFDFRXOGDOVREHVLJQLILFDQWO\UHVSRQVLEOHIRU/LE\D¶V
instability today. 
The area which is known as Libya today fell under Italian rule in 1911. It is a vast 
land, made up of three historical centres: Cyrenaica, Tripolitania and Fezzan (Stratfor 
Global Intelligence, 2011).3 Cyrenaica is located in the north-eastern coast, 
Tripolitania the north-western coast and Fezzan in the middle of what is mostly the 
6DKDUDQGHVHUW0RVWRI/LE\D¶VWULEHVOLYHLQWKHILUVWWZRUHJLRQV+RZHYHU
Cyrenaica and Tripolitania have tribal and geographic differences (ibid.). Cyrenaica 
                                                          
1
 The Soviet influence ceased, however, at the fall of the Berlin Wall.  
2
 Although LibyDDQG$QJRODZHUHQRWFRQWUROOHGE\FRORQLDOSOD\HUVWKLVVWXG\¶VPDLQIRFXVHV
(Britain and France), they are highly worthy of study as they reveal that balkanization did not end with 
colonialism. Indeed, the new balkanization of these states are largely implemented by the players 
which this study focuses on including Britain, France, the US and transnational agencies.    
3
 Before Italian rule, the centres of Cyrenaica and Tripolitania during the classical period were under 
Greek, Carthaginian and Roman occupation. In 1711-1835, they were conquered by the Ottoman 
Empire. However, they existed as separate entities and had a degree of self-rule (Wright, 1982).   
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and Tripolitania together cover 1,770 kilometres of coastline but the hinterland is 
distinct and separated by the desert. The only two real urban centres, Benghazi in 
Cyrenaica and Tripoli in Tripolitania, are 650 kilometres apart (Van Genugten, 
2011), which resulted in diverse historical developments. While Cyrenaica has been 
oriented toward more radical Egypt and the eastern Islamic world, Tripolitania has 
been oriented toward the relatively liberal Maghreb and Western Islamic world 
(Stratford Global Intelligence, 2011). Any trade routes ran from north to south rather 
than east and west between Cyrenaica and Tripolitania (Van Genugten, 2011). 
Historically, the two centres belonged to different economic and political spheres and 
never experienced a central authority until Benito Mussolini decided to bring 
Tripolitania and Cyrenaica under the same Italian colonial administration in 1934 
(ibid.), a decision without indigenous or geographic justification. See Map 1 for the 
PDSRI/LE\D¶VWKUHHKLVWRULFDOFHQWUHV 
  
0DS/LE\D¶V+LVWRULFDO&HQWUHV&\UHQDLFD7ULSROLWDQLDDQG)H]]DQ 
 
Source: Generational Dynamics 
 
Idris el Sanussi, the dominant religious leader in Cyrenaica, had initiated resistance 
against the Italian colonists. During WW II, he sided with the British having the 
promise from the British Foreign Minister, Anthony Eden, in 1942 that Cyrenaica 
would no longer be under Italian domination (House of Commons Debates, cited in 
Khadduri, 1963: 35). When WW II was over, Libya became a subject of superpower 
bickering between Britain, France, Italy and the US. When they could not agree on 
partition, the UN was brought in. Although the UN created Libya as an independent 
state in 1951, Libya was de facto under the influence of Britain and the US, with 
Fezzan as part of French-controlled Northwest Africa (Eliers, 2011). Idris el Sanussi 
was made king. He only reluctantly accepted Tripolitania under his control but his 
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power there remained limited. By 1959 when Libya started discovering high quality 
oil, the international oil companies demanded the harmonisation of business 
regulations (Van Genugten, 2011), which led the King to bring the separate 
provinces under his control. Thus, modern Libyan territory is the result of the on-
going balkanization of Africa first by the Italian colonial power and later by Britain, 
France and the US under the UN umbrella. This unlikely territorial entity was 
brought together to facilitate resource extraction and has been a significant factor in 
fuelling instability within Libya.    
2SSRVLQJWKHPRQDUFK\¶VSUR-Western policies, Gaddafi, with support from his 
native Sirte and Tripoli region, staged a bloodless FRXSG¶pWDW against King Idris in 
1969. Realizing how diverse tribal differences could undermine state stability, 
*DGGDILDWWHPSWHGWRFUHDWHXQLILHGµ/LE\DQV¶DXQLWWKDWKDGQHYHUH[LVWHGEHIRUH
However, he still privileged Tripolitania over Cyrenaica, which has always resisted 
the central authority and is more closely tied with the monarchy and religious 
establishment (ibid.). The rebel opposition that started the revolution against Gaddafi 
in 2011 was based in Benghazi the capital of Cyrenaica home of his long-standing 
ethnic rivals. 
While in power, Gaddafi played a central role in raising the bar for oil-rich countries. 
He helped create OPEC. His attempts to nationalize oil companies were copied in 
other oil-rich countries worldwide. The price of oil quadrupled in a short period and 
oil-rich FRXQWULHVJDLQHGWKHQHJRWLDWLQJSRZHUDJDLQVWWKHZRUOG¶VVXSHUSRZHUV
(Yergin, 1993). This was one of the main reasons why Gaddafi was so loathed by 
Western leaders. Before the overthrow of Gaddafi, the West had tried to undermine 
him either by sanctionsVXSSRUWIRUKLVRSSRQHQWV¶PRYHPHQWVRYHUVHDVDQGHYHQ
assassination attempts against Gaddafi himself (Stanik, 2002). 
Gaddafi was by no means blameless. He admitted being involved in terrorist acts. In 
1992 following the bombing of the Pan Am 103 flight over Lockerbie, the UN 
imposed sanctions on Libya (BBC News, October, 2004). However, Libya was still 
heavily involved in trading with countries to the South but due to the decrease in oil 
revenues Gaddafi was facing more political opposition. Thus, he was pressured to 
shift his long-standing position and eventually decided to compensate the Lockerbie 
victims in 2004. The Western sanctions were immediately lifted. Western leaders 
including George W. Bush, Tony Blair and Gerhard Schroeder among others rushed 
to hold talks with Gaddafi and to re-establish ties (BBC News, September and 
October, 2004). Oil businesses between Libya and the West resumed soon after.  
+RZHYHU*DGGDIL¶VUHJLPHEROVWHUHGE\WKHELOOLRQVRIGROODUVIORZLQJIURPRLOVWLOO
clamped down heavily on any opposition (Blas, 2011). The West claims of 
democratic support in the presence of oil interests in this case seem hypocritical. 
Figure 1, below, shows the countries which imported oil from Libya. According to 
this figure, Ireland had the highest percentage of oil imports from Libya as of total 
national oil imports and Italy imported the highest quantity of oil from Libya 
compared to other states.  
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Figure 1: Oil Imports from Libya  
 
Source: The Economist, 2011 
 
With the rise of the Arab SpULQJ*DGGDIL¶VUHJLPHZDVFKDOOHQJHG+RZHYHUWKH
rebels proved disorganised, untrained and inexperienced so, paradoxically, the future 
of a truly independent Libya was again determined by foreign assistance to bring 
GRZQ*DGKDIL¶VUHJLPH 
Oil interests LQ/LE\DKDYHEHHQTXLQWHVVHQWLDO(YHQEHIRUH*DGGDIL¶VGHDWKWDONV
were held between the West and rebel groups on how oil wealth could be used for 
post-Gaddafi Libya and how oil businesses could be smoothly operated during the 
political transitions (Black, 2011). Regardless of the real motives of the different 
parties involved, Libyan liberation represents significant progress, especially if it is a 
WUXO\µSDQ-/LE\DQ¶HYHQW+RZHYHUDEDODQFHLVQHHGHGWRDFFRPPRGDWHLQWHU-tribal 
rivalries. Some groups, especially in former Gaddafi strongholds, remain loyal to 
*DGGDIL¶VUHJLPHZKLOHRWKHUWULEDOJURXSVKROGGLIIHUHQWSUHIHUHQFHV7KHXSULVLQJ
has upset the prevailing balance. The fall of Gaddafi has allowed festering tribal 
differences to resurface. Additionally, new elements have arisen such as political 
Islamists, ranging from the Muslim Brotherhood to Al-4DHGDDQGµJHQHUDWLRQ
)DFHERRN¶+RZHYHUWKHVHFRQIOLFWVVWLOOUHIOHFWKLVWRULFDOSDWWHUQVDQGWKHODVWLQJ
legacy of continued imperial control in the balkanized society of modern Libya (Van 
Genugten, 2011). The balkanization of Libya brought rival tribes into the same 
territory.  
Similarly in Sudan, while there had been crises and nationalist movements in South 
Sudan since 1955 (BBC News, July, 2011), some underlying causes have been 
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relatively distorted. Most Sudanese oil fields are located in South Sudan but the 
benefits from oil revenues flow largely to the government in Khartoum leaving South 
Sudan marginalized and oppressed (Reeves, 2011). Sudan holds the third largest oil 
reserves in sub-Saharan Africa after Nigeria and Angola. For many years, Chinese 
companies held the majority of these oil profits. The rise of nationalism in South 
Sudan gave the West justification for interfering in Sudan similar to the assistance to 
the UHEHOPRYHPHQWRYHUWKURZLQJ*DGGDIL¶VUHJLPHLQ/LE\D7KHFRQIOLFWVEHWZHHQ
Khartoum and Western-assisted South Sudan appear intimately related to economic 
and strategic interests for all parties involved. 
 
The lawlessness in Sudan and poverty were certainly the primary causes but much of 
these have also been fuelled by outside forces either directly or through proxies in 
Africa. External involvement started as early as British colonial rule in Sudan when 
balkanization was impoVHGVRWKDWµQDWLRQKRRG¶GLGQRWGHULYHIURPZLWKLQ6XGDQ
instead had been one country with Egypt during many periods. In order to force 
Egypt to share Sudan with Britain, Britain worked through the Anglo-Egyptian 
Condominium during 1899-1956 with an attempt to divide Sudan from Egypt (Daly, 
1991). These British troops remained stationed in Sudan until 1955, even after the 
British invasion of Egypt and Sudan. Eventually, the Egyptian government decided 
to deny the legal recognition of the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium, asked the British 
to end the military occupation of Sudan and to stop preventing the re-integration of 
Egypt and Sudan. The British refused (ibid.).  
 
When Sudan became independent from Britain in 1956, there was a strong 
movement to reunite Egypt and Sudan as a single Arab country. Fearing the loss of 
interests to Egypt, British fuelled Sudanese regionalism against Egypt in the same 
way that regionalism was recently fuelled in South Sudan against the rest of Sudan 
(Federal Research Division, 1991). Under British troops, Sudan emerged as an 
Arab/African state separate from Egypt (Louis, 2006). The balkanization of Sudan 
and Egypt was completed but it did not end.   
 
New powers also became involved in the balkanization of Sudan. The US, the EU 
and Israel are the main powers behind the fighting in Darfur and South Sudan. They 
have assisted in training, financing and arming the militias within Sudan against the 
government in Khartoum since 2003 while they moved in to secure the oil fields 
(Hassan, 2010). Foreign troops and a foreign presence have assisted the division of 
Sudan and the following foreign takeover of state infrastructure, resources and 
economies. Whatever the extent of humanitarian interventions and results of this 
mission may be, resource control is a considerable part of the recent balkanization of 
Sudan whose oil fields are mostly in the South of Sudan (see Map 2, below). With 
the West helping South Sudan to break away from Sudan, Western oil profits in 
South Sudan are likely to increase in the coming years with the Chinese and other 
Asian oil companies being likely to lose their previously dominant positions in the 
Sudanese oil business and agreements made with Khartoum government (Sudan 
Tribune, August, 2011). 
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Map 2: Asian Companies are Likely to Lose Previous Oil Interests along the Border 
of South Sudan  
 
Source: Le Monde (2011) 
 
Like in many African states, there are people of diverse ethnic, tribal and religious 
origins in Sudan and South Sudan making up to 50 ethnic groups and 600 tribes 
(UNIC, 2011). Despite the recent nationalist movement and the independence of 
South Sudan, people still identify themselves based on their traditional origins. The 
lack of nationhood is due to centuries of external balkanization of this region. The 
creation of a new state on this ground risks renewed tribal conflicts (Deng, 2005). 
The oil revenue which has suddenly shifted from the regime in Khartoum to pro-
American South Sudan has also been a threat to sustainable peace (Sudan Tribune, 
August, 2011). However, the Western players have ensured that the oil-sharing 
agreement is closely monitored (Shankleman, 2011).1 Sudan remains controlled and 
balkanized.  
 
In Angola, a false national border drawn arbitrarily across different tribes by the 
Portuguese colonial rulers was one of the key factors that fuelled conflicts there. Like 
many African countries, Angola comprises peoples from diverse tribes, some rivals, 
within its border. Political opponents use tribal differences for their own gains. The 
National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) draws support from 
Ovimbundu and Bakongo ethnic tribal groups located in the northern, central and 
southern parts of the country. The Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola 
                                                          
1
 As of December 2011, several negotiations for oil agreements between Sudan and South Sudan have 
failed.   
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(MPLA) - the party largely in power - has its Kimbundu power base located along 
the coast (Hueper, 2005). This has contributed to prolonged and intensified conflicts 
in the country.  
 
The policies employed by former colonial powers were designed for colonial 
absolute control and maximum resource appropriation. Even after the Portuguese left 
Angola, other players such as the US and the USSR during the succeeding Cold War 
and oil companies which entered the country in the same period adopted the old 
colonial pattern to maintain resource extraction profits (Wright, 1997; interview with 
the Archbishop of Angola, 25 August, 2010). Colonialism left destructive legacies 
which new imperialist players picked up. The players change hands and the game 
changes its name but Angola was still controlled and exploited. Witnessing the 
$PHULFDQDQG8665¶VVWUXJJOHIRU$QJRODGXULQJWKH&ROG:DUKRZWKH\VXSSRUWHG
different sides and intensified conflicts while the presence of their oil supermajors 
was constant, immune and large whereas Angola suffered, Father Jorge Congo, a 
&DWKROLF3ULHVWVDLG³,WLVWKH$PHULFDQVZKRDUHOHWWLQJWKLVKDSSHQ«7KH
Cabindan people are starting to hate Americans. These people are just employees. 
7KH\DUHQ¶WUHVSRQVLEOHIRUWKHSROLFLHV´+HVDLGUHIHUULQJWR&KHYURQVWDII³%XW
\RXVHHSHRSOHDUHVWDUWLQJWRKDWHWKHP´*KD]YLQLDQ 
 
Ensuring peace in Africa will be difficult as national borders were drawn arbitrarily 
across tribal and ethnic lines by colonial European powers. These inherited borders 
that disregard ethnic backgrounds are at the root of some conflicts in modern African 
states as in the case of Libya, Sudan and Angola. This especially is true in oil-
producing countries in which equitable distribution of oil revenues has been 
problematic. Rent-seeking behaviour is rooted in the histories of flawed African 
states, which lack the sense of nationhood that has been developed and strengthened 
in Europe and elsewhere for centuries (Clarke, 2008). 
Misplaced national borders associated with conflicts make states too weak to manage 
the newfound oil industries, whilst falling prey to manipulation by foreign players in 
the oil industry. They support parties which hold the oil resources even if these 
parties are authoritative and oppressive in nature. ([DPSOHVDUH&KHYURQ¶VVXSSRUWRI
03/$6KHOO¶VVXSSRUWRI1LJHULDQPLOLWDU\UHJLPHV:HVWHUQOHDGHUV¶VXSSRUWRI
*DGGDIL¶VUHJLPH-HDUO\DQG7XOORZ¶VDQG&13&¶VVXSSRUWRIthe 
Sudanese government. In these circumstances, oil corporations appear careless of 
social responsibility. 
After examining balkanization of Africa as one of the political approaches foreign 
SOD\HUVKDYHHPSOR\HGLQ$IULFD¶VPRVWRLO-rich countries, we now address foreign 
SOD\HUV¶XVHRIVWDWHSROLFLHVDVDWRROWRVHFXUHUHVources. 
 
The Use of State Policies 
This section discusses the use of state policies in securing oil. The goal cuts across a 
number of state policies including foreign policy, energy policy and industrial, 
economic and security policy. To illustrate the neo-colonial perspective, we first look 
DWIRUPHUFRORQLDOSRZHUV¶XVHRIVWDWHSROLFLHVIROORZHGE\WKRVHRIQHZSOD\HUV 
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The Use of State Policies by Former colonial powers 
Britain was in fact the country that initiated the importance of petroleum today. As 
early as 1882, Britain, under Admiral Lord Fisher, started to convert its naval fleet 
from using coal to oil (Bromley, 1991). This was a risky programme as Britain was 
rich in coal but poor in oil, at the time holding only two percent of global oil supplies 
(QJGDKO7KHSURJUDPPHZDVHVWDEOLVKHGVRWKDW%ULWDLQ¶VQDY\ZRXOGJDLQ
speed, strategic advantage and future control of the seas against rivals such as 
*HUPDQ\)LVKHUDVVHUWHG³,QZDUVSHHGLVHYHU\WKLQJ´)URPWKDWSRLQWRLOVWDUWHG
to GLFWDWH%ULWDLQ¶VQDWLRQDOVHFXULW\SROLF\)LVKHUTXRWHGLQ0RKU
Securing long-term foreign petroleum security became an essential element for 
%ULWLVKJHRSROLWLFV:LQVWRQ&KXUFKLOOVWDWHG³:HPXVWEHFRPHWKHRZQHUVRUDW
any rate the controllers at the source, of at least a proportion of the oil which we 
require (Churchill, quoted in Slulgett, 1976: 103)."  
The Middle East was the first place Britain exercised its supreme influence in order 
to control the oil (Engdahl, 2004). The San Remo agreement in 1920 was an 
LQVWUXPHQWLQVKDSLQJ%ULWLVK¶V0LGGOH(DVWSROLF\)UDQN1 In a memorandum 
WLWOHGµ3HWUROHXP6LWXDWLRQLQWKH%ULWLVK(PSLUH¶WKHEORFNLQJRIWKH2SHQ-Door 
Principle was outlined. This represented the %ULWLVKJRYHUQPHQW¶Vattempt to control 
future oil production. Britain indeed gained significant influence with the Shahs and 
the Anglo-Persian company managed to gain concession rights in the region for over 
60 years (Engdahl, 2004). This, coupled with the discovery of North Sea oil in 1965, 
gave Britain energy security. Energy security has always been high on the political 
agenda but its importance has risen as Britain becomes increasingly dependent on 
imported oil (House of Commons, 2011). In 2000, North Sea oil production peaked 
(Gerling, 2002) while the Middle East has become unstable with new radical regimes 
resenting Western influence. 
Realizing significant risks of energy dependency on a small number of energy 
producers, the British government developed a strategy for supply diversification set 
RXWLQWKH'HSDUWPHQWRI7UDGHDQG,QGXVWU\¶V(QHUJ\:KLWH3DSHULQ2 West 
Africa became the new area of focus.  
Both Shell and BP are seeking to expand in the region with Shell continuing to 
dominate Nigeria and BP becoming heavily involved in Angola. The UK 
government has been working together with oil companies to open new markets in 
West Africa. The relationship between oil companies and the Blair government was 
SDUWLFXODUO\FORVHVLPLODUO\WR%XVK¶V$[LVRI2LOLQWKHFRQcurrent period.3 For 
example, in 1997 Prime Minister Blair made Lord Simon, former Chairman of BP, 
                                                          
1
 The San Remo Agreement was between Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Greece and Belgium to decide 
the future of former Ottoman Empire territories (the Middle East included) after its defeat in World 
War I. An Anglo-French oil agreement was also concluded at this event. In return of French support 
for the British mandate in Iraq, the agreement provided France with 25 percent of Iraqi oil (Melby, 
1981). 
2
 In, 2002, it was predicted that by 2010 at least 80 percent of British oil consumption would be 
satisfied by imports (House of Commons, 2011). This was proved true. 
3
 %XVK¶V$[LVRI2LOUHIHUVWRFORVHUHODWLRQVWRSJRYHUQPHQWRIILFLDOVRIWKH%XVKDGPLQLVWUDWLRQKDYH
with big oil companies. These include President George W. Bush and his long relationships with 
7H[DVRLOFRPSDQLHV'LFN&KHQH\¶V&(2SRVLWLRQDWRLO-service company Halliburton, and 
&RQGROHH]D5LFH¶V&(2SRVLWLRQDW&KHYURQ7KH%XVKDGPLQLVWUDWLRQZDVVHHQWREHVHUYLQJWKH
interests of oil corporations (Rutledge, 2005).  
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his Minister for European Trade and Competition. In 2000, the Head of Policy at BP, 
1LFN%XWOHUDFWHGDV%ODLU¶VLQIRUPDODGYLVRU,Q7RQ\%ODLUDSSRLnted John 
%URZQH%3¶V&(2WRWKH+RXVHRI/RUGV,QWKHVDPH\HDUWKH3ULPH0LQLVWHU¶V
Director of Government Relations left the government to become Head of 
Communications at BP (ECON Analysis AS, 2004). During the dispute over Tullow 
2LO¶VXQSDLGWD[bill to Uganda in 2011, the Foreign Secretary William Hague and 
Conservative Ministers lobbied strongly in the Foreign Office, parliament and in 
meetings with the Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni on behalf of Tullow Oil.1 A 
spokesman for Tullow Oil confirmed that the Foreign Commonwealth Office (FCO) 
has been assisting UK companies operating abroad and that Tullow has had excellent 
support from the FCO throughout its 20-year operations in Africa (Watt and Blake, 
2011).  
The international development policy is also largely responsible for UK energy 
strategy. Helping African oil-producing countries to improve governance and 
transparency enhances energy security for Britian. The Blair government, in 
particular, forged closer links between development and energy policies. It initiated 
the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative and the Commission for Africa and 
sought to promote these programmes through a combination of diplomatic efforts, 
bilateral aid assistance and multilateral financial institutions (Econ Analysis AS, 
2004).  
Generally, British energy policy towards Africa aims to increase the diversity of 
supply. This is also enhanced by the special relationship with the US. In April 2001, 
President Bush and Prime Minister Blair established the US-UK Energy Dialogue, 
specifically focusing on West Africa as an alternative supplier to the Middle East. 
Both the governments worked jointly to improve the climate for foreign investments, 
especially in Nigeria, Angola, Sao Tome and Principe and Equatorial Guinea (ibid.). 
The neo-FRQVHUYDWLYHDUJXPHQWODUJHO\IURP%XVK¶VWRSDGYLVHUVVXFKDV Paul 
Wolfowitz, has had a huge influence on the US-UK Energy dialogue. They stressed 
WKDWWKHµZDURQWHUURULVP¶FDQQRWEHGHIHDWHGZLWKRXWFXWWLQJRIIWKHWHUURULVWV¶
source of finance, which mostly comes from the Middle East oil-producing countries. 
7KLVLVZK\WKHµZDURQWHUURU¶LVQRZDOVRSURPRWHGLQ1RUWKDQG:HVW$IULFD7KH\
consider a military presence in these regions as a crucial means to secure supplies 
(Smith as quoted in Ikein, 2009: 550).   
There are a number of British governmental sectors responsible for energy-related 
issues today. The Department of Trade and Industry works to promote the oil and gas 
industry. The Department of Energy and Climate Change deals with energy and 
nuclear policy. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office helps enhance UK 
commercial interests and diplomacy overseas. The Ministry of Defence deals with 
energy-national security matters. The Department for International Development 
                                                          
1
 The dispute over unpaid tax arose after Heritage Oil sold its assets to Tullow Oil in June, 2010. 
Heritage Oil left without paying the tax leaving Tullow Oil responsible for unpaid tax of over £195 to 
the Ugandan government. The Uganda authorities stopped Tullow from working on the field and 
proceeded with the onward sale of stakes to CNOOC and Total until Tullow handed over the unpaid 
bill (Mason, 2011). 
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works to promote stable political environments in less developed countries, the 
climate required for secure oil investments.  
 
For France, energy policy has always been strongly directed by the state.1 Unlike 
other European countries which largely benefit from fuel materials (oil and gas in the 
UK, Netherlands and Norway and coal in Germany, Spain and the UK), France is 
poor in energy resources. France depends on its nuclear programme for its primary 
domestic energy but, like Britain, French energy consumption increasingly depends 
on imports.  
 
$VHQHUJ\LQGHSHQGHQFHZDVFRQVLGHUHGWREHHVVHQWLDOIRU)UDQFH¶VSROLWLFDO
independence, this led to the creation of two partly state-owned oil companies: Total 
in the Middle East and Elf in Africa. There has been strong high-level government 
involvement in promoting these companies. In the 1990s the so-FDOOHG³$IIDLUH(OI´
broke out, revealing how the state often used the company as an arm of French 
policy. 7KHWHUPµ$IIDLUH(OI¶UHODWHVWRWKH)UHQFKJRYHUQPHQWUHOD[LQJ(OI¶VWD[
payments which allowed it to write off commissions to foreign officials and other 
intermediaries, and to reward African heads of state. This not only helped secure 
licenses and support for the company, but also helped strengthen some French 
government officials and French positions in Africa (ECON Analysis AS, 2004). 
(YHQWKRXJK(OIDQG7RWDOZHUHSULYDWLVHGLQWKHVDQGWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VXVHRI
French oil companies as instruments for French diplomacy has decreased (ibid.), the 
government has still been working to promote the interests of these companies 
RYHUWO\RUWKURXJKDVKDGRZ\QHWZRUNRIµFrançafrique¶2 During the 1990s, French 
policy in Africa has also been widening its horizon beyond francophone countries. 
Similarly to Britain, French companies have enjoyed close diplomatic support from 
their home governments which often take advantage of their former colonial ties.  
 
However, due to declining economic status, France has lost its global influence and 
has faced increasing competition from the US, China and other emerging economies 
LQLWV³EDFN\DUG´ Twenty years after the San Remo agreement, the US gained 
influence in the Middle East (Melby, 1981) during WW II and later into African 
affairs during the Cold War. As the US gains greater influence in the Middle East, 
France has to ensure that it can rely on other supplies. The only place France can 
preserve its power is Africa. Thus, France has attempted to strengthen ties in the 
continent, especially with oil-rich countries like Cameroon, Gabon and Algeria 
whose governments still rely on French political-military support (Diop, 2010).3 
                                                          
1
 Energy security issues encompass work from different departments of the French government 
including the Ministries of Defence, Foreign Affairs, the Economy, Finances and Industry.   
2
 Françafrique LVWKHWHUPXVHGIRU)UDQFH¶VVSHFLDOUHODWLRQVKLSZLWK$IULFDILUVWLQDSRVLWLYH
connotation but now as a neo-colonial influence and complex economic and diplomatic relationship 
France attempts to retain with its former colonies in Africa. Françafrique started during the colonial 
SHULRGDQGKDVLQYROYHGERWKRIILFLDODQGXQGHUJURXQGQHWZRUNVLQ)UDQFH¶VKLVWRULFDOO\FXQQLQJ
dealings with authoritarian and corrupt African leaders for trading and political favours for both sides 
(Joly, 2006; Crumley, 2010).  
3
 Over 80 percent of oil production in Cameroon is in the hands of French Companies, Total and 
Perenco (New African, 2009). Total is the biggest oil company in Gabon (41.9 percent), followed by 
Shell, Marathon, and Perenco (AEO, 2009). Algeria gained control of its oil resources following 
3UHVLGHQW+RXDUL%RXPHGLHQQH¶VQDWLRQDOLVDWLRQRIDOO)UHQFKRLODQGJDVKROGLQJVLQ7KHROG
concession system was replaced by a seizure of a 51 percent share of petroleum companies. Only 
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6LPLODUWR%ULWDLQ¶VFUHDWLRQRI(,7,SURJUDPPHVDQGWKH&RPPLVVLRQIRU$IULFD
France has been seeking for ways to gain more control over vast natural resources, 
sea lanes and markets of its former colonies since the decolonization of African 
states. France created the Common Organization of the Saharan Regions 
(Organisation commune des regions sahariennes, OCRS) as a plan to support 
African entities in the Western Central Sahara as a French département. The planned 
entity comprised the boundaries of Mali, Niger, Chad and Algeria. The resources in 
this area include oil, gas and uranium which are essential for French energy supply. 
However, the plan failed in 1962 with Algerian independence and the anti-colonial 
VWUXJJOHLQ$IULFD'LRS3UHVLGHQW6DUNR]\¶VODXQFKLQJRIWKH8QLRQIRUWKH
Mediterranean in 2008 is a renewed attempt to maintain French interests in this 
region and its rich energy resources (The Economist, July, 2008). In effect, the 
colonization of Africa for resource control continues in new clothes.   
/LNH%ULWDLQ)UDQFHLVDOVRFRRSHUDWLQJZLWKWKH86LQWKHDIIDLURI$IULFD¶VRLO$V
WKH86LVWKHZRUOG¶VELJJHVWVXSHUSRZHUWKLVGLDORJXHZLOO help France retain 
power. On the other side of this relationship, France has a special place as part of the 
US global empire strategy due to the French strategic roles in their former colonial 
regions of North Africa, West Africa and Central Africa, especially through the 
µFrançafrique¶QHWZRUN)RULQVWDQFHWKH86LQLWLDWLYHµWKH1DWLRQDO(QGRZPHQWIRU
'HPRFUDF\¶1('KDVEHHQZRUNLQJWKURXJK)UDQFH¶V,QWHUQDWLRQDO)HGHUDWLRQRI
Human Rights ()pGpUDWLRQLQWHUQDWLRQDOHGHVOLJXHVGHVGURLWVGHO¶+RPPHFIDH). 
FIDH specifically focuses on North Africa where Washington and Paris share great 
ambitions. Their work has set out to undermine the African governments in question. 
The NATO war against Libya via the UN was partly an orchestrated result of the 
FIDH and the affiliated Libyan League for Human Rights (LLHR) (Ikein, 2009). 
FIDH received direct funding from NED for this mission and its other programmes 
in Africa. Apart from North Africa, these partnerships also operate in other African 
countries where FranFHKDVDUHODWLYHSRZHULQFOXGLQJ&RWHG¶,YRLUH1LJHUDQGWKH
DRC (ibid.).  
The Use of State Policies by New Players 
Having explored how Britain and France use colonial-related state policies to secure 
African oil resources, we now turn to new players incOXGLQJWKH86DQG&KLQD¶V
LQWHUYHQWLRQVDVSDUWRIWKHFRQWLQXLQJVFUDPEOHIRU$IULFD¶VRLO 
Oil became political for the US as early as 1919 when the United States Geological 
Survey estimated that in about 23 years the available oil supply in the US would be 
depleted (DeNovo, 1956). Alerted to this, the US Secretary of State, Alvey Adee, 
UHVSRQGHGZLWKQHZLQVWUXFWLRQVIRURLOVXSSOLHVKLJKOLJKWLQJµWKHYLWDOLPSRUWDQFH
of securing adequate supplies of mineral oil both for present and future needs of the 
8QLWHG6WDWHVTXRWHGLQ5XWOHGJH¶ 
During WW II, President Franklin D. Roosevelt established the US relationship to 
the Gulf States in order to ensure the free flow of oil. The victory in WW II made the 
US a world superpower. There was an industrial boom with the US, hitherto an oil 
supplier to its allies, experiencing a declining oil production in the late 1940s for the 
first time. America needed oil to maintain its political and economic hegemony. It 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Total agreed to continue its activities; the other companies left Algeria. France is now the second 
biggest European oil importer and third biggest global gas importer from Algeria (EIA, 2011a). 
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recognized the importance of seeking energy security externally. With the Soviet 
Union advancing in the subsequent Cold War period, the US began developing 
aggressive geopolitical strategies as opposed to its pre-::,,µLVRODWLRQLVW¶IRUHLJQ
policy (Paterson, Clifford et al., 2009).  
The Truman and Eisenhower administrations (1945-1960) began using American 
multinational oil companies as instruments of US foreign policy. The companies 
were assigned to supply a free flow of oil to the US and its allies at reasonable prices 
(Bromley, 1991). They were also used to channel financial support to Middle East 
regimes. Essentially, the companies were to boost US economic and political 
presence in the world in order to prevent the spread of Soviet communism (Rutledge, 
2005). Similarly, US administrations strongly promoted US oil firms. They 
persuaded local governments to offer favourable tax codes and ownership of natural 
resources and to eliminate any barriers to foreign investment (Klare, 2008). In the 
1980s, the Carter administration further strengthened the policy of international oil 
flow at home. This later became known as the µ&DUWHU'RFWULQH¶SURQRXQFLQJWKDWWKH
US would use any necessary means, including military force, to defend its oil 
LQWHUHVWV<HUJLQ7KHµ&DUWHU'RFWULQH¶KDVEHHQWKHWRXchstone of US energy 
security policy ever since and has become intertwined with other national economic 
and political policies. 
The former US administrations of George W. Bush focused US foreign policy 
particularly on oil and security, demonstrating AmericD¶VRLOWKLUVW7KH%XVK
administrations had the closest ties to oil companies in US presidential history. It 
wedded energy policies to national security through US foreign policy (Engdahl, 
7ZRSULPDU\WKHPHVRIWKH%XVKDGPLQLVWUDWLRQV¶IRUHLJQSROicy were 
VHFXULQJQHZDFFHVVHVWRRLODQGWKHFRQWLQXRXVSURPRWLRQRIµIUHHPDUNHW¶HFRQRPLF
reforms (Leech, 2006). In 2001, Bush launched the National Energy Plan (NEP), 
highlighting the extent to which oil influenced national policies. The Bush energy 
policy detailed that to secure unrestricted oil access, global alliances with major oil-
rich regions must be strengthened (ECON Analysis AS, 2004). As the US traditional 
alliances with the Middle East after September 11 were seriously shaken, Ed Royce, 
chairman of the US House of Representatives Subcommittee on Africa stressed in his 
speech the importance of adopting a new US energy priority in Africa as part of the 
US national security post-9-11 (Royce, quoted in AOPIC, 2002: 3). The growth in 
the West African oil industry has motivated this move. 
3URPRWLQJWKHVWDELOLW\RIRLOVXSSOLHVLVDPHDQVWRDVVXUH$PHULFD¶VQDWLRQDO
defence and multi-trillion-dollar economy. This, US security advisers suggest, 
requires a policy of political engagement (Kalicki and Goldwyn, 2005). The 
3HQWDJRQWHUPVWKLVHQHUJ\VWUDWHJ\DVµIXOOVSHFWUXPGRPLQDQFH¶ZLWKFRPSOHWH
control of military, economic and political developments worldwide (Engdahl, 2004: 
269). In Africa, the Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI) was launched to protect US national 
security and oil interests (Keenan, 2004).1 President Bush also directed his 
                                                          
1
 While Washington claims that Pan Sahel-Initiative is designed to combat terrorism in Algeria, 
Libya, Niger, Chad, Mali and Mauritania, this boundary resembles the resource-rich colonial entity 
France attempted to create in Africa in 1957 OCRS. The French Institute of Foreign Relations (Institut 
français des relations internationales, IFRI) openly discussed this in March, 2011. Fighting terrorism 
is seen as a façade while the real aim is to restructure Africa, establish neo-colonial order and continue 
extUDFWLQJUHVRXUFHV7KHµWHUURULVW¶JURXSV$OJHULD¶V6DODILVW*URXSIRU3UHDFKLQJDQG&RPEDW
(GSPC) and the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), which Washington claims to fight, are the 
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Secretaries of State, Commerce and Energy to bolster the US-Africa Trade and 
Economic Cooperation Forum and the US-African Energy Ministerial Process. More 
foreign direct investment in the petroleum sector of Nigeria, Angola, Equatorial 
Guinea, Gabon, Congo Brazzaville, Cameroon, Chad and the Democratic Republic 
of Congo has been pursued. The US has also offered assistance to the oil-producing 
countries of the region in improving transparency and governance as this means 
supply security for the US and increased interests for US energy companies. Despite 
this attempt, Washington stands opposed to the British government's Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative in disclosing revenue transactions of resource 
companies (ECON Analysis AS, 2004).  
The War on Terror policy has also been used as part of US energy security, 
particularly during the Bush administrations. One of WKH86JRYHUQPHQWV¶DWWHPSWV
in pursuing this policy is by seeking to curtail the exercise of the Alien Tort Claims 
Act which allows foreign victims of human rights abuses committed by US 
companies or US-listed companies overseas to plead their cases in US federal courts. 
Employing the War on Terror in these cases supports US energy interests and other 
political and economic goals, rather than preventing a calamity for mankind, as 
claimed. Several arguments submitted by the governments objecting to ATCA cases 
were contrary to human rights protection. According to Earth Rights International, 
US governmental interference in these cases has led courts to dismiss a majority of 
them (Earth Rights International, 2010).  Ultimately, the Bush administrations argued 
the entire legislation should cease to function (Apple, Bruno et al., 2004). In African-
RLOULFKFRXQWULHVWKH%XVKDGPLQLVWUDWLRQV¶LQWHUIHUHQFHVLQWKHFRXUWVLQFOXGHDFDVH
against ExxonMobil for human rights abuses concerning the Chad-Cameroon 
pipeline in 2000, the Presbyterian Sudanese case against Talisman in 2001 and two 
similar cases against oil companies accused of human rights violations in Nigeria 
(see Chapter 6). There are also several other cases against international oil companies 
operating outside Africa (See Earth Rights, 2010 for detail). While there are some 
VLJQVRISRVLWLYHFKDQJHLQ2EDPD¶VDGPLQLVWUDWLRQWKH86SRVLWLRQLQWKLVUHVSHFW
has remained unchanged. 
Deepening relations between the US and African countries is also a part of the US 
energy policy in strengthening global alliances with oil-producing countries. The US 
has developed close diplomatic ties with the leaders of oil-producing states to protect 
future interests in African oil. Top US officials were sent out to visit Nigeria, 
Angola, Gabon, Sao Tome and Principe and Equatorial Guinea during the G.W. 
Bush administrations. President Bush himself met Cameroonian President Paul Biya, 
President Teodoro Obiang Nguema of Equatorial Guinea, Angolan President Jose 
Eduardo Dos Santos and the heads of other African petro-states (Gary and Karl, 
2003). 7KH$QJRODQ3UHVLGHQW'RV6DQWRV¶YLVLWLQUHVXOWHGLQ$QJRODH[WHQGLQJ
&KHYURQ¶VFRQFHVVLRQRIEORFNIRUPRUH\HDUV7KH86HYHQSXWDVLGHHDUOLHU
FRQFHUQVRYHU(TXDWRULDO*XLQHD¶VSRRUKXPDQULJKWVUHFRUGWRUHRSHQDQHPEDVV\
there. Equatorial Guinea is the third largest producer in the Gulf of Guinea and the 
third largest site of US investment in Africa. However, the country lives under the 
                                                                                                                                                                    
same groups Washington cooperated with in pushing for regime change in Libya. By this, the US has 
adopted the old colonial pattern of dominating Africa (Ikein, 2009).  
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uncertainty about the direction its autocratic family-based rule will take (Goldwyn 
and Morrison, 2005). 
 
In 2006, the former US ambassador to Chad, Donald R. Norland, pointed out that 
FRQFHSWVRIµ$IULFD¶DQGµ86QDWLRQDOVHFXULW\¶ZHUHVWDUWLQJWREHDGGUHVVHGLQWKH
same context in the Pentagon documents for the very first time (Klare, Volman et al., 
2006). This shows that the policy-makers have become cautious of the strategic 
importance of African oil. In the US, the Corporate Council on Africa (CCA) serves 
as a mouthpiece for many US commercial and oil interests in Africa.1  
These were sRPHRIWKHµNH\PLOHVWRQHVLQWKHQHZ86VWUDWHJLFUHODWLRQVKLSZLWK
$IULFD¶)U\QDVDQG3DXOR:KLOVWWKHIHGHUDOJRYHUQPHQWOHWSULYDWHRLO
firms carry on businesses with foreign producers, it bears full responsibility for 
ensuring energy security and overseas investments. Petroleum has been treated as a 
US national security matter and thus the US has sought political approaches to gain 
dominance over such an oil-rich region of Africa. In this context, the US oil 
companies benefit from the diplomatic support of their home government for their 
operations in Africa. 
For China, it primarily uses the control of oil companies, diplomacy and a non-
interference policy in securing oil. Oil and the Chinese politics are one (Clarke, 
2008). Unlike the oil companies from the Western world which have mostly been 
privatized, the Chinese companies are still state-controlled. In 1982, the Chinese 
government founded the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) for 
offshore exploration and production (Jaffe and Lewis, 2002). In 1998, China 
restructured most state-owned fuel operations, placing them under the State Energy 
$GPLQLVWUDWLRQ&RQVHTXHQWO\WKHFRUSRUDWLRQVIXQFWLRQLQDFFRUGDQFHZLWK&KLQD¶V
national strategy. This also led to the government creating two more major oil firms: 
the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) in 1988 and the China 
Petrochemical Corporation (Sinopec) in 2000 (Taylor, 2006). CNPC was formerly 
GHVLJQHGIRURLODQGJDVH[SORUDWLRQDQGSURGXFWLRQWKHµXSVWUHDP¶RLOEXVLQess) 
ZKLOH6LQRSHFZDVUHVSRQVLEOHIRUUHILQLQJDQGGHOLYHU\WKHµGRZQVWUHDP¶RLO
business) (Nolan and Zhang, 2002). The Chinese companies are now major global 
players in the world oil industry, involved in all levels of exploration and production. 
Because large cash sums are readily available from the Chinese government for their 
National Oil Companies (NOCs), this helps Chinese companies to make swift 
business decisions which smaller private companies are unable to do. The Chinese 
government therefore greatly assists in closing the deals. 
Diplomatic ties with oil countries are a significant tool China pursues to implement 
its energy security goal. China has increased the number of diplomats, high-profile 
visits and bilateral dialogues with oil-producing African countries (Taylor, 2006). 
China established the China±Africa Cooperation Forum in 2000, with the aim of 
promoting Sino-African economic cooperation (Frynas and Paulo, 2007). The first 
Forum held in Beijing was exceptionally well attended by African ruling elites, 
exceeding any African initiatives held by other foreign and international bodies.  
 
                                                          
1
 Corporate Council on Africa acts as oil-SURPRWLQJRUJDQL]DWLRQ,WSXEOLVKHVLQYHVWRUV¶JXLGHVIRU
many African oil-rich countries in spite of the problem with governance. CCA hosts African heads of 
state in Washington, and the Africa Oil Policy Initiative Group. It has successfully encouraged US 
policymakers to pay more attention to the oil potential of the region (Gary and Karl, 2003).  
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China is increasingly using inter-government agreements to lock in African 
resources. Following are some examples where diplomacy has helped the Chinese 
compDQLHVWRVHFXUHWKHGHDOV,Q&KLQD¶V'HSXW\3ULPH0LQLVWHU=HQJ3HL\DQ
visited Angola and signed nine agreements on mineral resources, infrastructure and 
petroleum projects (Council on Foreign Relations, quoted in Frynas and Paulo, 
2007). The Chinese President Jiang Zemin made the first Chinese head of state visit 
to Nigeria in 31 years in 2004, the same year Sinopec obtained its first stake in 
1LJHULD¶VHQHUJ\VHFWRUE\VHFXULQJWKHULJKWWRGHYHORSWZREORFNVLQWKH1LJHU
Delta in conjunction with the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (DoE/EIA, 
2007, cited in Klare, 2008: 169). This was just an initial incursion. During high-level 
meetings in Beijing in 2005 and in Abuja in 2006, Presidents Hu Jintao and Obasanjo 
reportedly discussed increasing energy cooperation between the two countries as a 
major topic (Hall, 2005 as cited in Klare, 2008). At the Abuja meeting, Hu reportedly 
WROG2EDVDQMRRIKLVGHVLUHWRHVWDEOLVKD³VWUDWHJLFSDUWQHUVKLS´EHWZHHQWKHWZR
FRXQWULHVZKLFKKHWHUPHG³DWRSSULRULW\IRU&KLQD¶VIRUHLJQUHODWLRQV´&KLQD¶V
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006 as quoted in Klare, 2008: 169). In 2006, President 
Hu revisited the country and secured four oil licences in a deal worth US$4 billion. 
Beijing has adopted similar diplomatic ties with other African resource-rich 
FRXQWULHVZDVGHFODUHGWKH<HDURI$IULFD´%HKDU8UTXKDUW
gives details of significant resource deals involving Chinese companies in African 
countries. 
 
In this regard, China promotes South-South relationships, often emphasizing the 
common experiences both China and Africa share such as of historical oppression by 
the West and similar levels of economic development (Interview with Zhan in 
Taylor, 2006: 944). These have helped China gain approval and secure oil resources 
IURP$IULFDQKHDGVRIVWDWHZKLOHSURPRWLQJ&KLQD¶VJOREDOSRVLWLRQ+RZHYHU
Chinese bilateral agreements with countries in the South, rather than joint energy 
consumer-country strategies like the International Energy Agency (IEA) have been a 
cause of concern as it allows some governments to seek sensitive military equipment 
not made available by the West from China. Chinese providing of arms might fuel 
regional conflicts, as in the case of Sudan (Jaffe and Medlock, 2005). 
 
While pursuing this relationship, China takes a µQRQ-LQWHUIHUHQFH¶VWDQFHRQLQWHUQDO
politics. This is a policy specific to China and has helped China gain influence in 
African resource access.1 The Chinese leaders underline that each country is free to 
their own definition of human rights and to apply it in their own time. China argues 
that foreign nations attempting to implement democracy and humanitarian 
intervention violate the sovereignty of that country (Hanson, 2008). It insists that 
Africa and China share a common view on this, which is different from that of the 
West.  
Beijing applied this non-interference approach toward Sudan. Its reluctance to 
pressure the Sudanese government over the war in Darfur has been heavily criticized. 
China had had more leverage over Sudan than any other country because China is 
more involved with Sudan diplomatically (Downs, 2007). Therefore, China could 
                                                          
1
 Non-interference policy is a part of the Four Principles of Economic and Technological Cooperation 
which the Chinese premier announced when he visited Africa in 1982. According to these four 
principles, the political relationship between China and Africa would be based oQ³,QGHSHQGHQFH
Complete Equality, Mutual Respect and Non-LQWHUIHUHQFHLQ2WKHUV¶,QWHUQDO$IIDLUV$QVKDQ´ 
C h a p t e r  4  | page 110 
 
have pressurised Sudan to cooperate internationally. Unlike the West, China claims it 
does not mix business with politics and that the situation in Sudan is an internal affair 
(Howard, 2004). Beijing had repeatedly obstructed any discussions of economic 
sanctions by members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to pressurize 
Khartoum over the Darfur issue.  
With the Chinese non-interference policy being applied to Sudan, the state-controlled 
CNPC benefited most. With hardly any competition (due to US sanctions), CNPC 
established itself as the largest oil investor in Sudan. The highest bid is a 40 percent 
stake in the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company (GNPOC) producing most 
RIWKHFRXQWU\¶VRLO7KHVHLQYHVWPHQWVKHOSHGWUDQVIRUP6XGDQLQWRDQHWH[SRUWHURI
oil in 1999 (BP Statistical Review, 2007).    
While the Chinese oil pursuit has been considered as statist, neo-mercantilist and 
neo-colonial, this behaviour is not unique. As above-discussed, Britain, France and 
the US, as well as other energy-exporting countries, have made similar moves (Klare, 
2008). For example, Françafrique)UDQFH¶VSDWULPRQLDOUHODWLRQVKLS with Africa and 
WKH%XVKDGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶V1(31DWLRQDO(QHUJ\3ROLF\ZKHUHWKHSUHVLGHQW
assumes overall responsibility for management of energy diplomacy (NEPDG, 
2001), represent similar draconian neo-colonialist attitudes in full force. The result is 
WKDW$IULFD¶VSRVLWLRQLQWKHZRUOGUHPDLQVPDUJLQDOL]HG 
 
Political Meddling 
Apart from state policies that appear on governmental papers made available to 
public and recorded official diplomatic visits, political meddling is another type of 
political involvement foreign players use in promoting oil interests. This study 
defines these activities are: regime change, interference in internal affairs and 
financial and logistical support to corrupt regimes.1 One of the Western aims in 
political meddling in oil-rich countries is said to be to foment divisions in OPEC in 
order to undermine its stranglehold while propping up new oil-rich African 
governments that are non-OPEC states (Smith, quoted in Ikein, 2009: 550), even 
when these regimes are authoritarian. As these activities interrupt and influence the 
existing political system of the host country by strengthening or weakening it, we 
classify this type of political intervention as political meddling. As neo-colonialism 
is used in analysing continued foreign intervention in Africa, we will first examine 
the political meddling carried out by former colonial players, followed by that of the 
new players.  
 
                                                          
1
  Regime change based on Western terms, even when the effort is sincere, proves ineffective in 
African resource-rich countries which as a result of colonial balkanization are also usually multi-
ethnic. Based on Western-modelled democracy, political candidates compete during the election 
processes and they find ethnicities a strong background to draw support from. African voters tend to 
support candidates of their own ethnicity in hope of preferential treatment. In time, this deepens ethnic 
tensions and fuels factions in the country. In resource-rich multi-ethnic countries, the Western model 
of democracy is unlikely to be effective (Posner, 2007). 
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Political Meddling by Former Colonial Players 
Even after African countries became independent, European state players have 
continually attempted to influence their internal affairs. Friendly regimes which 
favour the political and economic interests of the European superpowers, regardless 
RIWKHUHJLPH¶VQDWXUHDUHSXWLQSODFHVXSSRUWHGDQGVXVWDLQHG,QWKHPRdern world 
where the idea of liberal democracy has flourished, a range of policies pursued is 
often claimed to be for promoting democracy. This claim has legitimated the 
projection of Western power (Slater, 2004).  In this regard, Bobbitt (2002), for 
example, stresses that states should not be given the option of autarky. The 
promotion of democracy is also addressed in the US-led neo-liberal reforms which 
are based on capitalist principles. This range of policies allows Western states to 
reshape and influenFHWKHJOREDOSROLWLFDODQGHFRQRPLFV\VWHPWR0DU[LVW¶VWKH
µVXSHUVWUXFWXUH¶LQZD\VZKLFKHQKDQFHWKHSRZHUDQGSURVSHULW\RIWKHFRUHE\
helping them continue exploiting the periphery. Because neo-liberal policies 
primarily focus on economic reforms, these will be discussed in greater detail in 
Chapter 5 which examines foreign economic interventions. This chapter thus 
addresses foreign attempts at imposing democracy as part of political meddling 
practices that go alongside regime change and foreign influence on existing political 
systems in African oil-rich states.  
 
One of the most successful European instruments for democracy promotion has been 
through conditionality for direct assistance programmes or trade agreements 
provided by the European Union tRµDSSURSULDWHO\SHUIRUPLQJ¶JRYHUQPHQWV7KH
friendliness of regimes seems to be placed above other more important priorities 
such as the real desires of local populations and free and fair elections. Democracy is 
imposed upon, rather than developed from within, according to diverse factors in 
each locality (Easterly, 2006). Election processes have been found to be manipulated 
in favour of candidates of the Western choice (Interview with the deputy director of 
Social Action, 6 January, 2011). Regimes hostile to the Western presence and 
threatening Western interests would often be challenged, labelled as terrorist and 
DXWKRULWDULDQDQGHYHQWXDOO\RYHUWKURZQ,QLWVQHZµGHPRFUDWLF¶FORWKHVFRORQLDOLVP
survived to sustain the interests of imperial players. In this section, we will first look 
at the political meddling of former colonial players followed by the new players in 
African oil-rich countries.  It attempts to provide samples of foreign political 
meddling which relates to oil interests in Africa. While the list of this type of 
political activities is exhaustive, some are highly secret and beyond the scope of this 
study to uncover.  
 
While Britain now claims to be a strong supporter of international humanitarian 
rights such as through the EU and UN arms embargoes, travel bans and asset freezes 
on authoritarian governments, this appears to be hypocritical, selective and/or self-
serving. For example, immediately after US trade re-opened with Libya in 2004, 
Prime Minister Blair flew to Libya to seek new relations. As Mr Blair met Gaddafi, it 
was announced that Anglo-Dutch oil giant Shell had signed a deal worth up to 
£550m for oil operation rights off the Libyan coast (BBC News, March, 2004). In 
2007, the two leaders met again to establish oil deals for BP (Chancellor, 2011). The 
PDMRULW\RIRLOPRQH\KDVSRXUHGLQWRVXSSRUW*DGGDIL¶VVWURQJKROGV%%&1HZV
March, 2004).  
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The Western efforts to support democratic regimes seem perverse. Libya is a country 
where Western political efforts on regime change have been imposed at different 
SHULRGV:KLOHSROLWLFDOFRQGLWLRQVXQGHU*DGGDIL¶VUHJLPHUHPDLQHGXQFKDQJHGRQ
the ground, the West shifted its position on Libya from hostility to affability. Their 
rhetoric supporting democracy in this case becomes questionable. It suggests that 
much political meddling in Libya has been orchestrated to serve Western interests 
rather than liberal democracy, as claimed.  
 
In Sudan, the British government has been seeking to open business there by 
courting the Omar al Bashir government, the regime guilty of massacre (ICC, 2009).1 
By this, the British government declared in 2010 the relations with Omar al-Bashir 
KDYHHQWHUHGDµQHZHSRFK¶+RZGHQ,Q-XO\+HQU\%HOOLQJKDPWKH
new minister for Africa, visited Khartoum to encourage trade ties announcing Britain 
ZRXOGEHDµFDQGLGIULHQG¶WRWKH.KDUWRXPUHJLPH,Q2FWREHUWKH8.7UDGH
and Investment Authority organized the "Opportunities in Sudan" networking event 
between high-level officials of Mr Bashir's NCP party and British officials and 
business leaders from mining companies, investment banks and security firms (ibid.).  
A brochure of the meeting said Sudan is endowed with rich oil resources and insisted 
that the country had enjoyed 20 years of political stability, deliberately ignoring the 
20-year civil war between North and South Sudan that had cost 2 million lives. The 
deeply flawed elections early in 2010 which returned Mr Bashir as president were 
followed by repressions in the country (ibid.), also did not cause any concerns for 
Britain which claims strictly guard international human rights. Foreign Office 
spokesman instead insisted that British companies were "free to pursue commercial 
opportunities in Sudan" (ibid.). The country where oil monies provide half of 
government revenues, enrich the president and his cronies while strengthening his 
RSSUHVVLYHUHJLPHDSSHDUVWRUDLVHQRHWKLFDOFRQFHUQVIRUWKH8.¶VVXSSRUWIRU
democratic progress. 
For France, French officials, oil executives and the French army remain heavily 
engaged in African political systems decades after former French colonies won 
independence. This is for both political and economic interests of France and its 
elites. As a part of its "greater France" ambition, France gives priority to African 
energy-rich countries (Algeria, Angola, Nigeria, Gabon, Cameroon and Niger) and 
those that can buy hi-tech products (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and South 
Africa) (RFI, February, 2011). A web of contacts known as Françafrique, where the 
resource monies benefit political parties and leading business leaders in Africa and 
France, has been sustained (The Economist, January, 2011). Thus, French dealings 
with leaders in these countries regardless of the nature of their regime have been 
treated with extreme caution (Boisbouvier, 2008).    
 
Consequently, France has been involved in a range of military and intelligence 
activities including FRXSVG¶pWDW, assassinations and providing cash and development 
aid to ensure selected African politicians who favour FraQFH¶VSROLWLFDODQGHFRQRPLF
presence stay in power (Verschave, 2000; Schraeder, 2001; interview with the 
president of Network Movement for Justice and Development, Sierra Leone, 15 
September, 2010). Françafrique used the growth of democracy in the 1990s for its 
                                                          
1
 6XGDQ¶VSUHVLGHQW2PDUDO-%DVKLUKDVEHHQXQGHUWKH,QWHUQDWLRQDO&ULPLQDO&RXUW¶VDUUHVWZDUUDQWV
on ten counts of crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide committed in Darfur (ICC, 2009). 
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own ends by adopting constitutional manipulation and ballot rigging so that favoured 
politicians could be officially approved (Verschave, 2001). As a result, many 
unsavoury leaders have been upheld and dictatorships in Togo, Cameroon, Gabon, 
Chad, Guinea, Mauritania, Djibouti, Niger, Benin, Ivory Coast, the Comoros and the 
Congos are legitimised (Verschave, 2000; The Economist January, 2011). Every 
government that came to power post-independence in former French colonies is said 
to have the support of France (Kebzabo, quoted on Al Jazeera, November, 2010). 
Over the course of four decades since independence, millions of euros have been 
misappropriated from oil, resources, arms and aid into financing French and African 
political-business networks (Verschave, 2000).  
 
Francois-;DYLHU9HUVFKDYHJDYHGHWDLOHGDFFRXQWVRI)UHQFKSROLWLFLDQV¶XVHRIRLO
money in conflicts and corruption in Africa such as funding politicians and oil 
corporations and crises in West and Central Africa to maintain favoured persons in 
power. This also includes the use of french security services such as in planned 
DJJUHVVLRQLQWKH&RQJR¶VZDUVDQG3UHVLGHQW'HQLV6DVVRX-1JXHVVR¶VXVXUSDWLRQRI
power (Clarke, 2008: 39). Verschave also exposed the Elf-Aquitaine scandal which 
involves top executives of giant oil companies and senior politicians such as Ronald 
Dumas and Charles Pasqua. French companies backed up by French government 
help support oppressive regimes and fund arms and militias in Africa. For further 
details see Schraeder (2001). 
 
The Democratic Republic of Congo, for example, has been under both French and, 
once, Soviet influence who sought to offer control of the state and oil to selected 
local politicians in the interests of investment stability. This forms part of a web of 
interests that have ensured political continuity which is mostly followed by 
repression, political power struggles and deprivation. It led to long-lasting ethnic 
confrontations (Clarke, 2008). In Chad, France is accused of providing authoritarian 
leader, Idriss Deby Itno, with military and logistical support when his administration 
was under rebel attack in 2008 (The Economist, January, 2011). According to French 
Defence Minister, Hervé Morin, France has had military agreements with Chad, 
providing for logistical and training support (BBC News, February, 2008). As a 
result of continued support, Chad is replacing the US companies that have been 
developing its oil industries with French companies (The Economist, January, 2011). 
 
Frequently, political meddling is carried out in secret where the web of interests 
becomes blurry and the parties involved unidentifiable. Regardless of this, the result 
is that African political systems become compromised. Western claims of democratic 
support thus become double-standards. Where politico-economic interests are low, 
political interventions, though needed in times of crisis, are unlikely. In contrast, in 
areas of geopolitical significance, regimes friendly to the West, though authoritarian, 
are sustained in power (Africa Today 06, Jun, 2011). Although Sarkozy claimed to 
renounce neo-colonial Françafrique networks as he embarked on his presidency, the 
ties between Africa and France are as tight as before (Interview with the head of 
Petroleum Exploration and Exploitation Department, Republic of Niger, 4 
November, 2010; the administrative and finance director of Les Depeches de 
Brazzaville, 7 November, 2010),Q9HUVFKDYH¶VZRUGVFrançafrique has now 
EHFRPHµPDILDIULTXH¶ZKHUHWKHZHERILQWHUHVWVEHWZHHQ)UDQFH$IULFDWhe US, 
Israel, Brazil and other parties become more complicated and exist in covert forms 
(Verschave, 2004). Political meddling, as part of neo-colonial political interventions; 
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therefore, has negative impacts on African oil-rich countries while continuing to 
enrich the neo-colonialists.  
 
Political Meddling by New Players 
After having examined continued political meddling in Africa by Britain and France, 
we now turn to political meddling by new players including the US, China and 
transnational agencies. 
As American power grew in the twentieth century, the US started expanding its 
influence and instruments for political engagements in Africa. Like its European 
counterparts, the US leaders have also pursued strategies, including military 
intervention and assi stance,  which uphold pro-American leaderships in Africa. 
Without colonial ties, America sought alternatives which allow it to gain relative 
influence and democratic development appears a legitimate instrument. Programmes 
such as the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and Agency for International 
Development (AID) - NQRZQDVµ7KH'HPRFUDF\3URJUDPPH¶- were created in the 
1980s on the basis that American efforts to promote democracy would be good for 
both the US and the host countries (Lowe, 2010). These programmes provide direct 
support and grants to various organizations and institutes both domestically and 
overseas.  
Many companies now also have democracy and governance divisions which receive 
support from NED and AID. The US Defense Department is also involved in the 
promotion of democracy. Alliances such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) and the Organization for Security in Europe (OSCE) have also played a 
crucial role in fostering democratic regimes in Africa (McFaul, Magen et al., 2007). 
'XULQJWKH%XVKDGPLQLVWUDWLRQVWKHIXQGLQJIRUWKH6WDWH'HSDUWPHQW¶V%XUHDXRI
Democracy, Human Rights and Labor increased. These instruments have 
significantly expanded efforts for promoting good government abroad. American 
spending on democracy promotion worldwide amounts to around $1.5 billion 
annually (ibid.). 
However, the US rhetoric supporting democracy appears futile when pursuing oil. 
For example, the Bush administrations provided brutal military machinery to corrupt 
regimes in West Africa, responsible for gross human rights violations and 
environmental damage (Leech, 2006). US governments do not only acknowledge 
similar ties between multinational oil companies and repressive regimes in this 
region but also often approve or further support such activities (ibid.). US support for 
Angola (since 1974); Somalia (1974-1975) and Libya (2002-2010) are evident 
examples of this. US support legitimizes and further strengthens these oppressive 
regimes, one of the factors undermining the performance of African oil-rich 
countries and contributing to the resource curse. We now explore these cases. 
Angola is one of the African oil-rich countries experiencing the most extreme battles 
between the US Liberal democracy and Soviet Communism. While the battles were 
claimed to be for ideological purposes, geopolitical interests were crucial to the 
parties involved. Following the departure of the Portuguese in 1975, a civil war 
broke out, with the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) against 
the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) and UNITA. As an 
important prize in the Cold War battle, the Soviets showered money and weapons on 
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the MPLA and Cuba provided soldiers while the Americans and South Africans did 
the same for UNITA (Interview with the Archbishop of Angola, 25 August, 2010). 
At one point there were so many planeloads of military equipment that they could 
not be distributed fast enough (Leech 2006) 
The US Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings on US involvement in 
Southern Africa revealed that the Nixon-Ford administrations provided about $60 
million in illegal support to anti-MPLA forces in Angola through the Zaire 
connection between 1974 and 1976 alone. In 1979, ex-&,$DJHQWV¶GLVFORVHGWKH
continuation of destabilisation policies in Angola under the Carter administration. 
The move was aided by chief African interest advocates, most notably Andrew 
Young and Donald McHenry, among others. By 1979, the FNLA had been defeated, 
but UNITA continued to fight in south-eastern Angola with support from South 
Africa and the US.  
In the early 1990s, the Cold War proxy battle in Angola reached its extremes. The 
03/$¶VDWWHPSWWRUHSODFHVXSSRUWIURPWKHFROODSVHG6RYLHW8QLRQIRXQGLWVHOI
increasingly reliant on oil revenues, ironically from the American oil company 
Chevron and the French state-owned Elf. The MPLA also applied to Western banks 
for credits and received hundreds of millions of dollars from the US Export-Import 
Bank, a loose arm of the US government. As the Soviet Union began to implode, the 
United States saw an opportunity to bring the war to an end and UNITA to power. In 
1991, the United States offered the Bicesse Accords to both warring sides, which 
later proved to be catastrophic for Angola. According to the Accords, an 
unrealistically early election date was set, with the MPLA allowed to maintain 
control of the transitional government so that UNITA could not be responsible for 
DQ\IDLOXUHWRGHOLYHU7KH81¶VUROHZDVNHSWWRDPLQLPXPWRDYRLGFRPSOLFDWLQJ
81,7$¶VDVVXPSWLRQof power. This plan would have been actualized if the majority 
of the Angolan people had not failed to vote for UNITA. In the legislative elections 
of 1992, the MPLA won 54 percent of assembly seats while UNITA secured only 34 
percent. In the presidential election, dos Santos won 49.6 percent of the vote against 
WKH81,7$OHDGHU-RQDV6DYLPEL¶VSHUFHQW7KH81GHFODUHGWKHHOHFWLRQV
³JHQHUDOO\IUHHDQGIDLU´81,7$WKRXJKWWKH\ZHUHDERXWWRWDNHSRZHUUHMHFWHG
the results and returned to fighting (Bridgland, 1990 as cited in Billon, 2007: 144). 
Being certain that UNITA will not resume power and that the Soviet influence over 
MPLA vanished, the US had switched its allegiance from UNITA to the MPLA, 
making its standard for support of democratic regimes questionable. The formerly 
Marxist MPLA turned to Western capital markets to pay for a war against pro-
Western rebels, who were in turn dropped by the West. The absurdist version of the 
Cold War in Angola occurred in Cabinda city. Molongo oil facility in Cabinda, 
originally built by Gulf Oil, was surrounded at the height of the civil war by a double 
layer of electrified fencing and razor wire as well as several hundred landmines, laid 
E\&XEDQVROGLHUVXQGHURUGHUVIURPWKH03/$WRSURWHFW*XOI2LO¶VRSHUDtions 
against UNITA. For years in Cabinda, a Marxist government depended on money 
from an American oil cooperation whose operations were defended by Cuban 
soldiers against attacks by an American-backed rebel army (Billon, 2007: 159). 
The already-complicated Angolan conflicts were made worse as France also became 
involved. French oil interests were shaken after the 1991 peace process failed and the 
conflict resumed. While both sides were seen to have an equal chance of victory, the 
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French government and Elf decided to follow dual policies by supporting both sides 
of the conflict (Billon, 2007: 121). For twenty-seven years Angolans had been forced 
to take sides between the ruling MPLA, founded as a Marxist liberation movement 
and backed by the Soviet Union and Cuba, or the rebel UNITA, backed at various 
times by the United States and apartheid-era South Africa. Until its end in May 1991, 
VXSSRUWIURP&ROG:DUVXSHUSRZHUULYDOVDOORZHG$QJROD¶VFLYLOZDUFRYHULQJRI
WKHFRXQWU\¶VSURYLQFHVWRLQWHQVLI\ZLWh an estimated 300,000 casualties in its 
final years (Bridgland, 1990).  
The US has been upgrading its relationship with Angola since the MPLA victory (as 
called for by the US-based Council on Foreign Relations in 2007). The newly 
upgraded relationship was evident when Angola abstained in the UN condemnation 
of the American blockade of Cuba in 1995. This is considered crucial as Angola was 
once a country that had played host to 50,000 Cuban troops fighting the US-backed 
South African Defence Forces. The AmeULFDQV¶RQFHELWWHUHQHPLHV3UHVLGHQWGRV
Santos of the MPLA now enjoyed a renewed relationship with America. In 2004 the 
:KLWH+RXVHZHOFRPHGKLPDVDQLPSRUWDQWDOO\&KLFRWHVD\V³(YHQLIWKHSDVWKDV
been difficult, relations with the US have been extremely good in the past two, three, 
IRXU\HDUV«$PHULFDLVDSULRULW\SDUWQHUVKLSIRURXULQWHUQDWLRQDOFRRSHUDWLRQ´
(Chicote quoted in, Billon, 2007: 152). Similarly, Cynthia Efird, the US ambassador 
FDOOHG$QJRODD³IULHQG´RIWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVibid.).  
$OWKRXJK$QJROD¶VJRYHUQPHQWKDVDSRRUKXPDQULJKWVUHFRUGWKH86DSSURYHVRI
its legitimacy, pursues relationship with Angola and supports the US businesses in 
the country. Following the terrorist attacks on the United States in September 2001, 
the US administration sought to diversify its oil supply outside the Middle East, with 
:HVW$IULFDQRLODPDMRUWDUJHW,QDURXQGSHUFHQWRI$QJROD¶VRLO
production was exported to the US, accounting for around 4 percent of all American 
oil imports (EIA, 2009). On a visit to Cabinda in 1997, the then US Secretary of 
State Madeleine Albright pointed out that this was higher than US imports from 
Kuwait prior to the Gulf War (which had been only 1.6 precent). Her comments were 
viewed as a warning to any threats to those supplies, confirming the American 
JRYHUQPHQW¶VUHDGLQHVVWRVHFXUHWKHP6LQFH3UHVLGHQWGRV6DQWRVPHWZLWK
IRUPHUSUHVLGHQW*HRUJH:%XVKWZLFHVHHPLQJO\XUJLQJWKDWKHVKRXOGµ7XUQD
blind eye to delaying elections (until 2006) in H[FKDQJHIRURLO%LOORQ¶
Although there has been mutual mistrust of the MPLA for its flawed human rights 
record and the US for its regime-change agenda, the relationship has strengthened 
showing that both sides are pursuing a self-serving realpolitik approach. It also 
suggests that, despite problematic governance issues, the US would not seek to 
GLVWXUE$QJROD¶Vstatus quo. 
The Horn of Africa was another African region displaying the political meddling and 
the power struggle between the USSR and the US for African oil. Although it is not 
oil-rich, the Horn of Africa is a geostrategic location vis-à-YLVWKH3HUVLDQ*XOI¶VRLO
resources, to which access must be secured. The US involvement in the Horn of 
Africa was a paradox. While Somalia invaded Ethiopia during the Cold War, the US 
not only supported this movement but also persuaded its allies to send aid to 
6RPDOLD6RPDOLDLQYDGHG2JDGHQ3URYLQFHLQ(WKLRSLDDVSDUWRIWKHµOLEHUDWLRQ¶
movement of the Somali people who lived there and their historical claims to a 
Greater Somalia (Lefebvre, 1992). This was, however, a violation of international 
law, the UN charter and the OAU charter. 
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In this conflict, the Soviet Union and Cuba supported the territorial integrity and the 
national sovereignty of Ethiopia. The US, speaking of a Soviet-Cuban threat to 
Somalia as if Ethiopia was the aggressor, persuaded Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia and 
Sudan to send aid to Somalia. Although the Soviets and Cuba may have supported 
the legitimate side, it led to the increasing dependency of Ethiopia on external actors. 
This situation showed the West to be willing to overlook international law which it 
often claims to uphold when pursuing its own national interests (Anise, 1989). In this 
case, it was to secure an open access WRWKH*XOI¶VRLOILHOGVYLD6RPDOLD/RIODQG
1992). 
Libya is another example where the line between Western claims of upholding 
democracy and their pursuit of self-LQWHUHVWEHFRPHEOXUU\$OWKRXJK/LE\D¶VUHJLPH
was oppressive, the US efforts to curb terrorism after 9/11 had relied on Libya. The 
US National Security Strategy stated that the US would ensure that Libya has the 
necessary military, law enforcement, political and financial tools to fight terrorism 
(The White House, 2002). This was used as a tRROWRHOLPLQDWH*DGGDIL¶VSROLWLFDO
opponents, many of which ended up in prison or executed (Human Rights Watch, 
2011).   
:KHQWKH86UHRSHQHGWUDGHZLWK/LE\DLQDVSDUWRI/LE\D¶VFRRSHUDWLRQLQWKH
war on terror, many Western players poured in, beginning a historical period of 
financial kickbacks and corrupt deals from which the Gaddafi regime largely 
benefited. In the same year British Prime Minister Blair and French President Chirac 
and German Chancellor Schroeder visited Libya to hail new relations with Libya 
(BBC News, March, 2004). The US officials believe this provided Gaddafi with tens 
of billions of dollars with which he paid for military hardware and enabling his 
supporters to tighten their grip and stay in power (Chancellor, 2011). Even in 
)HEUXDU\ZKHQWKHµ$UDE6SULQJ¶XQUHVWVWDUWHGLQ/LE\DRYHUPLOOLRQRI
oil were shipped in a two-week period (Blas, 2011).    
During the unrest, the US officials saw involvement in Libya justified because of the 
oil interest. Bill Richardson, the former US Energy Secretary who served as US 
ambassador to the UN, said (Richardson, quoted in Hari, 2011),  
7KHUH¶VDQRWKHULQWHUHVWDQGWKDW
VHQHUJ\/LE\DLVDPRQJWKHWRSRLO
producers in the world. You can almost say that the gas prices in the US 
going up have probably happened because of a stoppage of Libyan oil 
production ... So this is not an insignificant country and I think our 
involvement is justified. 
+RZHYHUSROLWLFDOHQJDJHPHQWVIRU/LE\D¶VRLOFRQWUROKDGEHHQGLVFXVVHGE\WRS86
officials even before the unrest started. This was shown in the document the US 
Tripoli embassy sent to the State Department in November 2007 stating,  
Libya needs to exploit its hydrocarbon resources to provide for its rapidly-
growing, relatively young population. To do so, it requires extensive foreign 
investment and participation by credible IOCs [international oil companies]. 
Reformist elements in the Libyan government and the small but growing 
private sector recognize this reality. But those who dominate Libya's political 
and economic leadership are pursuing increasingly nationalistic policies in 
WKHHQHUJ\VHFWRUWKDWFRXOGMHRSDUGL]HHIILFLHQWH[SORLWDWLRQRI/LE\D¶V
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extensive oil and gas reserves. Effective US  engagement on this issue should 
take the form of demonstrating the clear downsides to the GOL [government 
of Libya] of pursuing this approach, particularly with respect to attracting 
participation by credible international oil companies in the oil/gas sector and 
foreign direct investment (Telegraph, February, 2011).  
7KH:HVW¶VRLOLQWHUHVWVDQGFRORQLDOFKDUDFWHUVHHPDSSDUHQW(YHQEHIRUHWKH
/LE\DQFRQIOLFWVZHUHRYHU:HVWHUQOHDGHUVPHWDWWKH³)ULHQGVRI/LE\D´
FRQIHUHQFHKRVWHGLQ3DULVWRGLVFXVVWKHIXWXUHRI/LE\D¶VRLOZLWKWKHQHZ:Hstern-
EDFNHG/LE\DQUHEHOV/LE\D¶VSHRSOHKDGOLWWOHWRVD\LQGHWHUPLQLQJWKHXVHRIWKHLU
own resource (Lister, 2011). Seeing the complexity of oil-driven foreign involvement 
LQ$IULFDQFRXQWULHVWKHH[WHQWLWVFRQWULEXWLRQVWR$IULFD¶VSRRUSHUIRUPDQce or the 
resource curse seems undeniable. 
For China, one of its main, comparatively successful, strategies in Africa is non-
interference in internal affairs. Although some Chinese foreign policies seem to have 
an interventionist dimension, it remains small. Hence, only a brief discussion on this 
matter follows. For example, while China strongly advocates non-interference, it acts 
as a strong voice and often exercises (or threatens to) its veto power in the United 
Nations Security Council for countries encountering international political pressures. 
When it comes to oil-rich countries, China has sought to deepen its relationships with 
countries under US sanctions, such as Sudan and Libya (Blas, 2011). China has also 
been courting other unstable oil-producing countries in North and West Africa. As of 
January 2011, the largest African oil exports to China are from Angola, Sudan and 
Libya respectively (China Oil Web, 2011).  
China finds this strategy gives it some advantages as China finds it difficult to 
compete with more mature supermajor companies from the US, Europe and Japan. 
This would help China secure oil access. However, Chinese support of countries 
under US sanctions has created Sino-86ULYDOULHV-DIIHDQG0HGORFN&KLQD¶V
position is embracing dictators and indirectly encouraging authoritarianism across 
Africa. Although China does not aim to topple regimes or impose regime change, its 
political, business and military support does influence the political system of the host 
countries by helping to sustain the regimes in power that otherwise might not last as 
long. Nowhere is this more evident than in Sudan where other players have restricted 
access to Sudanese oil due to US sanctions. China buys two-thirds of Sudan's oil 
exports. Its business in Sudan has supported government-backed militias which 
killed more than 400,000 people and displaced a further 2.5 million (Behar, 2008).  
+RZHYHU&KLQHVHH[SDQVLRQVWUDWHJ\LQWR$IULFDLVRQO\WKHUHVXOWRI&KLQD¶VSXUVXLW
of capitalism; policies that have been persistently encouraged by all western 
countries (Interview with Zhan, in Taylor, 2006). Although the claim that China is 
now integrating the US into a new international political order where democracy is 
no longer favoured is unproven, the effects on African governance are certainly 
QHJDWLYH%HKDU&KLQD¶VQRQ-interference policies and support for corrupt 
UHJLPHVLQRUGHUWRVHFXUH$IULFD¶VRLOUHVRXUFHVFUHDWHVDOD[LQWHUQDWLRQDORUGHU
VXVWDLQV$IULFD¶VEDGJRYHUQDQFHDQGWKXVFRQWULEXWHVWR the resource curse.  
Apart from the US and China, neo-colonialism can explain transnational agencies, 
including international organizations and companies, becoming new players involved 
in African oil. This section discusses political meddling carried out by international 
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organizations, followed by that carried out by companies. International institutions 
such as the World Bank, IMF, the EU, NATO, OSCE, the G8, the UN and the OECD 
PDNHVXEVWDQWLDOHIIRUWVWRLQGXFHUHJLPHFKDQJH7KH(8¶VRIIHURIWUHDWLHVand 
special agreements has been considered particularly successful in pursuading 
political behaviour based on Western terms (McFaul, Magen et al., 2007). These 
international agencies, by engaging in political meddling, create environments for 
open access tR$IULFD¶VUHVRXUFHVE\:HVWHUQVWDWHV 
Like other players, the claims of International Organizations to support good 
governance become questionable when they also play a part in supporting corrupt 
regimes. For example, the World Bank has been involved in a dialogue with Nigerian 
authorities on a range of petroleum sector topics while contracts and payments have 
been non-transparent. Their financial support to Nigeria is easily available knowing 
that this would further problematize a rentier economy and mismanagement (Gary 
and Karl, 2003). Some international organizations are seen to serve the interests of 
superpowers rather than the common good. The World Bank, the IMF and NATO are 
seen to largely serve the interests of the US and its allies while the EU primarily 
serves the interests of its member states (Interview with the former Trade Union 
Leader of Nigeria, 9 January, 2011)7KHP\ULDGIRUHLJQSOD\HUV¶HQJDJHPHQWVLQ
political systems in return for oil interests are complex. For example, what appeared 
in the headline of an independent newspaper in Congo-Brazzaville prior to the 
meeting between US President Bush and the Congolese President Sassou-Nguesso in 
6HSWHPEHUUHSUHVHQWVWKLV,WVWDWHGµBush Wants the Oil, Sassou Wants the 
Money and the IMF audits the SNPC (state oil company) (Headline in Independent 
1HZVSDSHU%UD]]DYLOOH6HSWHPEHUTXRWHGLQ*DU\DQG.DUO¶ 
Foreign oil companies also support corrupt regimes and consequently undermine 
good governance.1 'HVSLWHWKHUHJLRQ¶VKistory of civil conflict, ruthless dictatorships 
and on-going ethnic clashes, foreign oil companies have continued to operate in West 
Africa. Foreign oil companies have worked closely with corrupt regimes in the 
region and benefited from human rights violations committed by national military 
apparatuses responsible for protecting oil operations. By this, the Western efforts to 
urge democratic progress while acknowledging and promoting their own oil 
FRPSDQLHV¶ODUJHLQYHVWPHQWVDSSHDUFRQWUDU\ 
Libya is a good example. In 2007, BP started a $900 million joint venture with 
/LE\D¶V1DWLRQDO2LO&RPSDQ\ZKLFKWRRNSODFHDIWHUDPHHWLQJEHWZHHQ*HQHUDO
Gaddafi and former British Prime Minister Tony Blair. The project money helped 
VXSSRUW*DGGDIL¶VRSSUHVVLYHUHgime (Bream and Hall, 2008). The BP investment in 
Libya may top $20 billion in 2017 (Berr, 2010).  
,Q6XGDQRLOFRPSDQLHVSURYLGHGSHUFHQWRIWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VUHYHQXHVXSXQWLO
the independence of South Sudan in 2011 when revenues were split (Clarke, 2008).2 
                                                          
1
 Major oil companies in Libya include Eni, Statoil, Occidental, OMV, Hess, Marathon, Shell, BP and 
ExxonMobil (Williams, 2011). In Nigeria, these are Shell, Mobil, Chevron and Total (Obasi, 2003). 
The leading oil companies operating in Angola include ChevronTexaco, ExxonMobil, Total, BP, 
Shell, and Agip/Eni (Mbendi, 2011a). In Sudan, these are CNPC, Petronas, Gulf, Shell and Talisman 
(Mbendi, 2011b).  
2
 Sudan and South Sudan have been involved in various negotiations since the South gained its 
independence in July, 2011. The two sides announced that their most recent talks in December, 2011 
failed to reach agreement on how to share the oil revenue.  
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Revenues flowing from these companies are known to be used for fighting wars. The 
Sudanese military spending more than doubled since the oil was produced. Talisman, 
a Canadian oil company, under this target was pressured by the NGOs and the 
churches to sell its share in the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company. The 
Chinese CNPC facing no such pressures bought these shares, making it the largest 
foreign player in Sudan with a 40 percent shareholding in the Sudanese national 
company. NGOs subsequently urged BP to divest from PetroChina, CNPC (its 
subsidiary) as the monies were seen to support the wars in Sudan. BP, with 10 
percent equity in PetroChina, and hence a diluted 2.2 percent of CNPC, was branded 
as unethical (Clarke, 2008: 203-4). Because oil revenues fuel wars, Sudanese 
churches pleaded with oil companies, the government and the international 
community to stop exploiting the oil until peace could be negotiated (Gary and Karl, 
2003: 35). The Bishop of Central Africa (quoted in Gary and Karl, 2003: 36) stated 
in 2002: 
The control of oil manna is at the centre of several battles for power in our 
region. Oil revenues have served as funding for arms purchases and to support 
private militias in certain States, sometimes with the complicity of oil companies. 
The latter have elsewhere, in their own interests, brought in financial and 
logistical support to belligerent parties in the region. 
 
Companies also play an important part in political meddling thereby supporting both 
the North and the South in the war in order to protect oil interests. Where oil 
aggravated political, ethnic, regional and religious discontent, both sides had allies 
with corporate and state oil companies to help fight the war (Clarke, 2008; 
Woldemariam, 2011). With financial and military assistance from companies, the 
government was persuaded to clear oil areas of local inhabitants, for instance around 
Bentiu. This kind of engagement supported officials in control of oil resources while 
undermining their opposition and consequently played a part in lengthening or 
intensifying the conflicts. NGOs claimed that the clearing of oil areas in Sudan was 
occasionally accompanied by ethnic cleansing, extermination practices and scorched-
earth policies (Earth Rights, 2006; The Hague Academic Coalition, 2006; 
International Humanitarian Law National Implementation, 2006). Chinese-backed 
CNPC and Talisman, for example, have been blamed for facilitating the Sudanese 
policies of ethnic killings (Downs, 2007). 
Angola is another case where multinational businesses supported two warring sides 
and had an effect on the duration and intensification of the civil war. Oil companies 
supported the MPLA while diamond companies sided with UNITA. They competed 
ILHUFHO\IRUWKHULJKWVWRH[SORLW$QJROD¶VPLQHUDOwealth. Fully aware of how the 
UHYHQXHVWKH\SURYLGHGZHQWWRIXQGWKHZDUWKH\FRQWLQXHGµEXVLQHVVDVXVXDO¶
+XPDQ5LJKWVDQG*OREDO:LWQHVVIRUH[DPSOHKDYHDUJXHGWKDWRLOFRPSDQLHV¶
non-transparent payments to the Angolan government or Angolan state-owned 
FRPSDQ\6RQDQJROSOD\DSDUWLQVWUHQJWKHQLQJ$QJROD¶VDXWKRULWDULDQUHJLPH%3
was the first company to admit such involvement. By contrast, ExxonMobil has not 
openly discussed how its activities in Angola could exacerbate the problem 
(Skjærseth, 2003). 
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In this section, we explored foreign political meddling practices and support given to 
the host governments to acquire or remain in power in order to gain relative 
influence over African oil-producing states for enhanced oil interests and control. 
TKHVHSUDFWLFHVXVHGDVDWRROWRERRVWIRUHLJQDFFHVVWR$IULFD¶VRLOXQGHUPLQHWKH
GHYHORSPHQWRI$IULFD¶VSROLWLFVDQGSOD\DODUJHSDUWLQWKHUHVRXUFHFXUVH7KHQH[W
section discusses military involvement of these players as another political approach 
employed in securing African oil. 
 
Military Involvement 
Foreign military involvement in oil-rich countries often fuels internal political 
conflicts over the allocation of oil revenues. This is particularly true when the regime 
in power monopolises such revenues, restricts the oil benefits to particular population 
groups and uses these oil revenues in programmes to oppress others. Such actions 
cause political unrest. The marginalized groups often resort to arms as it is the only 
way to obtain a larger share of oil benefits. In response, African regimes rely on large 
forces, mostly assisted by foreign players, to constrain such challenges and to remain 
in power. These aggravate the unrest and violent conflicts (Klare, Volman et al., 
2006). This section first explores military involvements carried out by former 
colonial players, followed by new players, in African oil-rich countries. 
  
Military Involvement by Former Colonial Powers 
Britain has been a key player involving in military assistance and weapons supplies 
to Africa since colonial times. The list of this kind of involvement is extensive. Here 
we examine explicitly British military involvement in African oil-rich countries 
including Libya and Nigeria (See Chapter 6 for Nigeria).  
Britain exercised huge influence in Libya even before its independence from Italy in 
1951. Britain first supported the Libyan monarchy in power. However, by the end of 
1968, Britain believed that regime change would be better for UK interests (UK 
Public Records Office, FCO 39/452, cited in Cricco, 2002: 153). Britain thus started 
to build up ties with an army officer who attempted to overthrow the monarchy. 
According to the Memorandum of October 1968, Britain decided to supply weaponry 
confidentially to the army Colonel Abdul Aziz Shalhi while a mission to train the 
Libyan army was underway (Van Genugten, 2011). However, the British plan did not 
succeed as Gaddafi, an army rival, staged a coup first. Gaddafi did not grant Britain 
preferential treatment that it had enjoyed pre-Gaddafi. Instead, he played competing 
European interests off against each other and against new Asian players in what 
seemed to be a more profitable strategy for his regime (Ibid.).  
$OWKRXJKYLROHQFHZDVSUHYDOHQWXQGHU*DGGDIL¶VUHJLPHWKH:HVWKDVVXSSRUWHd it 
with arms in order to enhance relations with Gaddafi and promote the oil and trade 
interests. The Guardian reported that Italy, France and the UK were the top three 
European countries which sold arms to Libya between 2005 and 2009 (The 
Guardian, November, 2011). The amount of arms exported to Libya from these three 
European states over the five years alone is estimated to top over £700 million. 
Additionally, Britain had provided MI6 intelligence services to Gaddafi, which were 
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mostly used to quell GaddDIL¶VRSSRVLWLRQ$EGHO+DNLP%HOKDGLDFRPPDQGHURI
the anti-Gaddafi forces in the 2011 Libyan civil war, for instance, claims that MI6 
intelligence led to years of torturing of Libyan political prisoners including himself 
(Allen and Shapman, 2011).  
France has been another key player involving in military assistance and weapons 
VXSSOLHVWR$IULFDXQFRQGLWLRQDORIWKHVWDWH¶VJRYHUQDQFHVLQFHFRORQLDOWLPHV
Twenty-three countries in Francophone Africa were tied to defence agreements with 
France. Since 1963, these agreements allowed France to intervene over thirty times 
in Africa. France also provided military training for African troops, even under 
GLFWDWRULDOUHJLPHV.URVODN+HUHZHGLVFXVVWKHFDVHRI)UDQFH¶VGLUHFWRLO-
related military involvements in Angola.  
In oil-ULFK$QJROD)UDQFHZDVDFFXVHGRIWKHµ$QJRODJDWH¶VFKHPHLQZKLFK)UHQFK
officials used intermediaries such as Pierre-Joseph Falcone and others to illegally 
supply arms to the Angolan government MPLA in 1993 and 1994 (Leech, 2006). 
This was kept secret as President Francois Mitterrand realized that members of his 
government who sympathized with the UNITA rebels would block such a deal.  
3UHVLGHQWGRV6DQWRV¶SXEOLFVWDWHPHQWWRWKHQHZ)UHQFKDPEDVVDGRUVKRZVWKH
linkages between Falcone, a Franco-Brazilian arms dealer, and the French 
JRYHUQPHQWDQGKRZ)UDQFH¶VDUPDPHQWVVXSSOLHVWR$QJRODUHVXOWHGLQLQFUHDVLQJ
cooperation in the oil sector with France. He said that Falcone:  
  
«GHDOWZLWKVHQVLWLYHPDWWHUVZLWKWKHFRQVHQWRIWKH)UHQFKDXWKRULWLHV«
which were of great utility for Angola. We interpreted his action as a gesture 
of confidence and friendship on the part of [the] French state. For that reason, 
my government took decisions that permitted the spectacular growth in 
cooperation with France in the petroleum sector and in financial and 
economic areas (Remarks by His Excellency Jose Eduardo dos Santos, 2001). 
 
However, France supplied these arms and equipment at highly inflated prices. To pay 
for the armaments, President dos Santos had to obtain loans by mortgaging the 
FRXQWU\¶VIXWXUHRLOUHYHQXHV$QJROD¶VRLOIXQGGLVDSSHDUHGZKLOHDVLJQLILFDQW
SRUWLRQRIWKHPRQH\HQGHGXSLQ3LHUUH)DOFRQH¶VVHFUHW&DULEEHDQEDQNDFFRXQW
Eventually, Falcone was arrested for illegal arms trafficking together with the French 
SUHVLGHQW¶VVRQ-HDQ-Christophe Mitterrand and others (Leech, 2006: 111). 1 
Military Involvement by New players 
New players such as the US, China and companies have also been involved in 
military activities in African countries. 
The United States is the main player having successfully systematized military 
involvements over energy and national security, resulting in a range of military 
                                                          
1
 For detailed French military interventions in Africa, see Martin (1985).  
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activities in Africa. :LWKWKH86¶VLQFUHDVLQJUHOLDQFHRQIRUHLJQRLODIWHU::II, the 
energy policies became the core of the Truman, Eisenhower and Nixon doctrines 
(Kaldor, Karl et al., 2007). This was also due to the increasing US concern in this 
period that oil was used more intensively as a strategic resource to pursue national 
iQWHUHVWV)RULQVWDQFHWKH$UDE¶VRLOHPEDUJRDIWHUWKH<RP.LSSXUZDU
protested against Western support for Israel. This led to oil price shocks, economic 
mishaps and energy crises. This provided the rationale for the Carter Doctrine, which 
assumed WKDWLWLVWKH86¶VUHVSRQVLELOLW\WRGHIHQGWKH*XOIµE\DQ\PHDQV
QHFHVVDU\LQFOXGLQJPLOLWDU\IRUFH¶.ODUH,WSODFHG86PLOLWDU\FRQWURO
of oil under the supervision of the Department of Defense and other government 
bodies responsible for national security. To facilitate US troop movements in the 
region, Carter established a Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force. These policies were 
sustained by the Reagan and Bush administrations (Kaldor, Karl et al., 2007). For 
Africa, we explore US military involvements in oil-rich region of North Africa and 
the Gulf of Guinea.  
In North Africa, the US had tried to persuade Egypt, as its proxy, to declare war on 
Libya from as early as 1986 with the Reagan administration supplying weapons, 
logistics and funds (Anise, 1989). Reagan thus hoped to install a pro-American 
regime in Libya (Biscotti, 1986).This involvement was carried out to support US 
claims that Libya was a communist and terrorist state, which was believed to hold 
one of the richest oil reserves in Africa. It also lies in a geo-strategic location 
EHWZHHQ$IULFDWKH0LGGOH(DVWDQG(XURSH*DGGDIL¶VXQIULHQGO\UHJLPHKRZHYHU
obstructed the smooth operation of American oil companies and threatened US 
energy security, particularly by seeking to work with other oil-rich states in the 
region (Time Magazine, 1986).  
However, the Egyptian President refused to take part. Similar efforts with European 
allies also failed. Had Reagan succeeded with his plan, two African countries would 
have gone to war against each other with minimal African national interests 
involved. However, Egypt later agreed to participate in a joint military exercise that 
was confrontational to Libya (Anise, 1989). Eventually, the US went ahead with a 
raid on Libya in 1986. The US militDU\DWWDFNVIRFXVHGRQERPELQJ*DGGDIL¶V
headquarters, rather than on terrorist training camps or on military barracks. This 
suggested that the 1986 invasion was designed to assassinate Gaddafi, thereby 
violating the laws of the United States which prohibit the assassination of other 
FRXQWULHV¶SROLWLFDOOHDGHUV%LVFRWWL 
$23,*¶VVWUDWHJLFUHSRUWUHFRJQL]HGWKHLPSRUWDQFHRIWKH*XOIRI*XLQHD,Q
September 2002, the US National Security Strategy Statement emphasized the 
increasing significance of energy security to US national interests. The government 
pledged to reorient its foreign policy in the Gulf of Guinea accordingly (AOPIG, 
2005). Since then, the US/European Command (EUCOM) has become increasingly 
active in West Africa and in 2003 began to implement a counterterrorism training 
programme designed in cooperation with the Department of State. In 2005, this 
evolved into the Trans-Sahara Counter-terrorism Initiative, involving eight countries, 
including Nigeria and funded at $100 million. James Forest and Matthew Sousa, US 
military strategists, called for a comprehensive approach beyond the placement of 
military hardware and deployments in the Sahel (the Trans-Sahara Counter-
Terrorism Partnership) and the Gulf of Guinea including the promoting of good 
governance and stability-building in and around Nigeria, as well as mechanisms 
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dealing with the large ungoverned spaces of the Sahel and Niger Delta (Clarke, 
2008). In early 2003, the Pentagon prepared a long-term agreement on military bases 
with two small islands, Sao Tome and Principe, see Map 3, both within the striking 
distance to the West African oilfields (Engdahl, 2004). In 2004-2005, EUCOM 
began a coastal security programme in the most oil-rich region of Africa entitled the 
Gulf of Guinea Guard, which in 2005 became AFRICOM (Goldwyn and Morrison, 
2005).  
  
Map 3: US AFRICOM in Africa 
 
 
Source: Suburban Emergency Project (2009) 
 
,QFUHDVLQJQDYDODFWLYLWLHVDUHFOHDUHYLGHQFHRI86LQWHUHVWLQ$IULFD¶VRLO.ODUH
Volman et al. (2006:302) viewed tKLVDVWKHPRVWOLNHO\VFHQDULRµIRUGLUHFW86
LQWHUYHQWLRQLQ$IULFD¶ 
In addition to naval power, the US has equipped many parts of Africa with military 
training and assistance. In 2009-2010, Nigeria and Angola together received a huge 
sum of $300 millioQZRUWKRIPLOLWDU\DLG'HPSVH\7KH:RUOG¶VOHDGLQJ
democracy Washington seems to ignore the poor human rights record in this region. 
Washington claims to act as an instrument for the global war on terrorism but, 
according to US senior officials in AOPIG, the US military involvements are there to 
ensure the free flow of oil, to maintain domestic order and resist rival challenges. 
Critics claim that the on-going US militarization of the region could amplify the 
presence of mercenaries and paramilitaries, creating conditions similar to Colombia. 
Some of these weapons have already been used by militias (Watts, 2006). The arms 
available for both government and insurgent groups have legitimized the use of 
violence in the political struggle. The US militarization in the Gulf of Guinea to 
protect the oil fields and in the north, claimed as acting against Islamic terror, has 
been considered a recipe for massive political violence (ibid.). 
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The fact that the US controls oil sea lanes in this part of the world threatens the 
interests of other superpowers. For example, China, not having colonial ties like 
European players or military strength like the US, has been pursuing different 
approaches which would give it a competitive edge. New actors and approaches have 
been linked to a new global colonialism (Maillard, 2003).  
 
For China, it seeks close military relations with African oil-producing countries, 
particularly Sudan, Angola, Libya and Nigeria (see Chapter 6 on Nigeria) (Klare, 
Volman et al., 1999). By 2007, China has participated in all seven UN missions in 
Africa countries.1  &KLQD¶VSDUWLFLSDWLRQLQ81SHDFHNHHSLQJPLVVLRQVLQ$IULFD
(1316 personnel) outweighs its total contribution elsewhere (545), reflecting the fact 
WKDW$IULFDLV&KLQD¶VSULRULW\&KLQD Military, 2006). China does not pose any 
conditionality for military aid and is a preferred partner compared to Western 
countries, according to H. E. Patrick Mazinhaka, Deputy Chairperson of the 
Commission of African Union. He further stressed China is considered a 'friend' 
rather than a partner (African Union, 2007).  
 
China views arms sales and mutual defence military as a means of advancing its 
international political power and accessing significant oil sources. From 2003 to 
2006, China's arms sales to Africa accounted for 15.4 percent of all arms transfers to 
the continent including in African oil-rich states such as Nigeria, Chad and 
Equatorial Guinea (Jaffe and Medlock, 2005). Since Chinese weapons manufacturers 
are state-owned, activities and decisioQVDUHHVSHFLDOO\FORVHWRVWDWH¶VSROLFLHV
(Anderlini, 2005). Beijing has also sent Chinese military trainers to help their 
African counterparts. Thus, China has gained important African allies in the UN - 
including Sudan, Zimbabwe and Nigeria (Hanson, 2008). Such practices have been 
criticized as destabilizing and anti-developmental as Chinese assistance is accused of 
facilitating persistent violations of human rights (Amnesty International, 2006).  
 
In Sudan, in order to make space for the 900-mile pipeline, Chinese companies were 
accused of being involved in aerial bombardment campaigns designed to eliminate 
southern Sudanese villages. Sudanese Air Force Antonovs were accused of 
repeatedly bombarding the villages, the Chinese team following with bulldozers and 
government soldiers finishing up by burning the villages. Between 1998 and 2000, 
thousands of people were displaced. Approximately 4,000 Chinese soldiers are now 
stationed along the pipeline to prevent sabotage (Ghazvinian, 2007). China has been 
flooding the Sudanese government with weapons that have been used by the armed 
forces and pro-state militias to commit atrocities against civilians (Goodman, 2004; 
Le, 2007). China also provides the Sudanese government with revenue while large 
                                                          
1
 The UN missions in Africa, in all of which China has participated include MONUC in DRC, 
UNIOSIL in Sierra Leone, UNMEE in Ethiopia and Eritrea, UNMIL in Liberia, UNMIS in Sudan, 
UNOCI in &RWHG¶,YRLUH and MINURSO in Western Sahara. The Chinese have also joined past 
missions in Namibia, Mozambique and Burundi (UN, 2011). Recent examples of Chinese military 
involvement include financial aid to the AU mission in Sudan (2006) and in Somalia (2009) and 
election monitoring in the first Sudanese multiparty elections, held in 2010. China has also supported 
regional efforts such as the New ParWQHUVKLSIRU$IULFD¶V'HYHORSPHQW1(3$'7D\ORU 
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amounts of Chinese oil from Sudan have been frequently released to the global 
market.  
 
China was criticised for its involvement in Sudan, the international image of China 
was portrayed as a resource-grabbing (Andrews-Speed and Dannreuther, 2011), neo-
colonial actor (Gary and Karl, 2003). Amnesty International declared in 2006 that 
&KLQD¶VUHODWLRQVZLWK6XGDQKDGDGYHUVHO\DIIHFWHGKXPDQULJKWVZLWKLQWKHFRXQWU\
(Dempsey, 2011). However, this kind of criticism tends to ignore the fact that China 
is in fact a rather small player in international arms market. In Sudan, the US, the UK 
and Russia have been historically bigger arms exporters than China (Hellstrom, 
2009). 
 
Apart from the state actors, many companies now invest in private security in 
African oil-rich countries including Sudan and the DRC. Mostly, private security is 
hired for the protection of assets and personnel. By providing assistance and facilities 
to repressive governments, oil companies exacerbate instability, as these are used to 
oppress the opposition. 
In Sudan, NGOs have for many years criticized the oil players in Sudan as being 
FRPSOLFLWLQWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VFLYLOZDUDQGLQWKHXQMXVWLILDEOHDEXVHRIKXPDQ
rights by supplying finance, facilities and arms. Christian Aid (Gary and Karl, 2003) 
asserted tKDWWKHFRPSDQLHV¶H[SORUDWLRQDQGSURGXFWLRQDUHGLUHFWO\IDFLOLWDWHGE\
PLOLWDU\RSHUDWLRQVRUµFOHDULQJV¶ZKLFKRIWHQXVHVFRUFKHG-earth policies, bombings 
and killings. It argued that airstrips, oil roads and other facilities were shared with the 
military and in some instances they are coordinated. Talisman, for example, was 
found to provide government military forces with company facilities and technical 
support in its aerial-bombardment of southern civilians (Harker, 2000). There have 
been several forced removals, denial of relief flights and food aid, restrictions on 
medical inflows, organized killings by the army and militias, widespread rape and 
looting, abductions, child slavery, calculated starvation, serial bombings and the 
destruction of villages, with the burning of homesteads, as well as genocide. Attacks 
on relief agencies were frequently reported. Oil companies still flourished. The 
demand for an account of oil revenue was ignored and companies generally took no 
responsibility for displacements and related violations.  
NGOs also claimed that there have been covert arms supplies shipped to Sudan with 
ODEHOVVXFKDV³3HWURQDVHTXLSPHQW´&ODUNH7KHIRUHLJQFRPSDQLHV¶
silence means assent. Their involvement contributes to perpetuating the war. In 
highlighting the extent of the damage oil companies have inflicted on Sudan, the 
FRXQWU\¶V&DWKROLF%LVKRSVVWDWHG 
Our country is poor and in need of economic development. However, oil is 
not contributing to the development. We witness this displacement of our 
flocks from their homelands, driven away by helicopter gunships, Antonov 
bombers and government troops and militias in order for oil companies to 
work in relative security. Private companies, like any other organ in the 
society, are obliged to abide by and promote respect for the principles of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Omondi, 2001: 1).  
7KHH[SORLWDWLRQRI6XGDQ¶VRLOUHVHUYHVKDVEHHQRQO\WRIXHOWKHFRXQWU\¶VRQ-going 
conflicts. In the DRC, the French oil company Elf-Aquitaine provided the former 
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President Denis Sassou-Nguesso with funds to purchase arms and militias, 
consequently helping install him in power during the Civil War in 1997-1999. The 
Civil War which was fought for the control of the petroleum rents and of the capital 
has devastated the country. Over 800,000 Congolese, approximately 30 percent of 
WKHSRSXODWLRQIOHGWKHLUKRPHVZKLOH&RQJR¶VEXVLQHVVDQGDGPLQLVWUDWLYH
infrastructure was destroyed (Gary and Karl, 2003). Elf-$TXLWDLQH¶VVXSSRUWZDV
rewarded with access to oil. The company has enjoyed particularly close relations 
with President Sassou-Nguesso and expected to boost production there (ibid.). 
Regardless of the oppressive record of the governments, the companies are ready to 
attend to their requests in order to secure the oil knowing exactly how the support is 
VSHQW7KHLUKRPHJRYHUQPHQWVDUHDZDUHRIWKHLUFRPSDQLHV¶LQYROYHPHQW$IULFDQ
locals view these involvements as double-standards, explaining that such operations 
would not occur in the developed countries elsewhere. The military means used as a 
WRROLQWKHVFUDPEOHIRU$IULFD¶VRLOKDYHODUJHO\IXHOOHGFRQIOLFWVDQGFRQVHTXHQWO\
contributed to the resource curse. 
  
Conclusion 
This chapter discussed foreign political involvement in African oil-rich countries by 
identifying the actors involved and the approaches used. The existing resource curse 
discussion has so far been only from economic and domestic political perspectives. 
This chapter provided a close examination of the international dimension in their 
LQYROYHPHQWLQ$IULFD¶VUHVRXUFHH[WUDFWLRQ:HH[DPLQHGWKHSROLWLFDOLQYROYHPHQW
of former colonial powers including Britain and France, and new actors including the 
United States, China and transnational agencies. In seeking dominance over oil-rich 
Africa, the practices of balkanizing Africa, the employment of state policies, political 
meddling and military involvements have been examined. 
Although Africa is just becoming the new energy powerhouse, it has constantly 
experienced intensive foreign engagement in order to obtain human and material 
resources long before the colonial era began. Africa has provided resources for 
Western industrialization while resource extraction brought a history of oppression, 
exploitation and violent conflicts to Africa in return. This long-term resource 
extraction process is the main obstacle to modern African states maximizing their oil 
potential for developmental progress. This chapter reveals continued foreign political 
interventions for resources, the e[WHQWRIZKLFKSOD\VDSDUWLQ$IULFD¶VIDLOXUHWR
perform well despite its promising resource endowment. The pattern suggests that 
political interventions will continue so long as Africa supplies crucial resources for 
the world such as oil.  
In the world of the free market, where some economic and political aspects are 
changing rapidly, in Africa, they remain unchanged. Foreign imperialism and 
interventions continue, leaving Africa consistently dependent on foreign players. 
Continued foreign interventions FRQWULEXWHWR$IULFD¶VODFNRIXQLW\VHOI-
determination and significant power in competitive international trade and relations. 
These conditions allow foreign powers to dictate their roles in African geopolitics. 
Having discussed the political side of foreign oil-related interventions, Chapter 5 will 
address their economic effects in oil-rich African countries. 
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-Chapter 5- 
 
Foreign Economic Interventions in African oil-rich countries 
 
)RUHLJQSOD\HUVKDYHJDLQHGFRQWURORYHU$IULFD¶VRLOQRWRQO\WKURXJKpolitical and 
military means but also through two categories of economic apparatus: financial 
involvement and business conduct. This study demonstrates that financial 
involvement includes practices such as neoliberal policies, petrodollar monetary 
order, economic sanctions, financial support and money corruption. Business 
conduct includes the circumventing of environmental standards, enclave oil 
operations and unsuitable philanthropic projects. The economic practices, though 
different in nature from political interventions (as discussed in Chapter 4), are 
equally statist. Moreover, these policies are adopted and/or imposed worldwide 
(Castoriadis and Curtis, 1991). Economic interventions are often more complex, less 
direct and involve more than a single approach and player. This chapter seeks to 
discuss foreign economic interventions in detail with direct relations to their attempts 
at securing the oil in Africa.  
It is crucial to note that beyond oil there are various similar interventions for other 
aims in Africa which undermine African political, social and economic systems, 
increase the complexity of problems and continue to obstruct any systematic oil 
development. Like most things in a society, oil industries do not exist in vacuo but 
are intertwined with domestic and international factors. The positive use of oil wealth 
requires most of these factors to contribute, especially in the continent where 
management capacities are weak. Addressing all these factors requires considerable 
work including studying all forms of historical economic, political, social and 
cultural involvements by all players, which would be extremely useful topics for 
future researchers. This thesis particularly contributes to those involvements 
concerning foreign oil interventions in Africa. The study hypothesises that this 
YDULDEOHIRUHLJQLQWHUYHQWLRQDVSDUWRIRLOSXUVXLWWHQGVWRFRQWULEXWHWR$IULFD¶V
resource curse which is displayed in economic collapse, poor governance and civil 
wars. In the presence of foreign interventions, it becomes more difficult for Africa to 
use its resources as a source of development. However, oil-related foreign 
involvement is not just a contemporary matter but a part of the scramble for Africa 
which this study argues, in Chapter 3, can be explained by neo-colonialism.  
Under financial involvement, we will first discuss neo-liberal policies as the tool 
foreign powers use in order to pursue oil interests, followed by petrodollar monetary 
order, economic sanctions, financial support and money corruption. Later in this 
chapter, business conduct including practices relating to environmental damage, 
enclave oil operations and unsuitable philanthropic projects will be explored. This 
chapter attempts to analyse the main actors implementing these policies and practices 
including Britain, France, the US, China and transnational agencies. Each actor has 
different roles, responsibilities and tools to play with. They may be dominant in one 
area of policies while dormant in others. We discuss the practices of these actors, 
where they are present, as much as possible. However, where their actions are absent 
under certain categories, they will be omitted.  
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Financial Involvement 
 
Neo-liberal Policies 
Neo-liberal policies have been the primary economic tools employed by superpowers 
since the end of WW II and became intense during the Cold War period. It is seen as 
a primary means of sustaining neo-colonialism which helps facilitate resource 
exploitation in weaker states, enhances the benefits of powerful states and leaves 
Africa more marginalized even after the independence of African states (Anise, 
1989). Neo-liberal policies involve a concatenation of several states and 
organizations and delivers in the name of international development (Bromley, 
2008). The nationalization movement, following the Bandung Conference, 
threatened multinational interests.1 Decades of wars had economic consequences and 
produced new demands for raw materials and strategic minerals that can only be 
found in the Third World. Interests in the developing world thus intensified. In the 
post-war period, governments were heavily concerned with access to strategic 
materials as the resource extraction sector was significantly growing (Sigmund, 
1980). 
Neo-liberal ideas originated from Washington, the dominant world power after 
::,,UHIHUUHGWRDVµ:DVKLQJWRQ&RQVHQVXV¶:LOOLDPVRQ7KH:HVWHUQ
concerns of declining profits in the world became a motif to stimulate the emphasis 
on monetarist policy, the assertion of the private sector and the support for capitalism 
in the global markets (Bromley, 2008). The International Financial Institutions (IFIs) 
- the IMF and the World Bank - have been the two main Washington institutions 
carrying out these tasks (Dunn, 2001), later joined by the World Trade Organization, 
Group of Eight (G8), the World Economic Forum (Perkins, 2004) and most leading 
First World states. Apart from Washington-centred institutions, European leaders 
also found seeking influence on African states via international and regional 
economic institutions increasingly easier than direct single influence on African 
VWDWHVLQWKLVSHULRG7KLVLVNQRZQDVµSUR[\SROLFLQJ¶3XJK'XQQVHHVWKLV
post-Cold War development as an increasing re-colonization of Africa. In the 1980s, 
the Reagan administration in the US and that of Thatcher in the UK particularly 
employed extensive neo-liberal policies with privatization, deregulation and 
emphasis on market forces (Slater, 2004). 
As discussed in the previous chapter, neo-liberal policies are not the same as 
QHROLEHUDOLVPLQWKHSKLORVRSKLFDOVHQVH7KHWHUPµQHR-OLEHUDO¶LVDGLVJXLVHIURPWKH
reality where policies employed are draconian, predatory and realist by nature. The 
SROLFLHVDQGSUDFWLFHVXVHGLQWKHQDPHRIµQHR-OLEHUDO¶SROLFLHVUDWKHUUeflect a new 
form of colonialism in the ways which new players such as the US, as well as other 
players, implement a mixture of policies to gain economic and political domination 
over weaker states. In contrast, neo-liberalism theory is really about international 
cooperation which promotes peace and prosperity, which, as displayed here, is not 
                                                          
1
 The Bandung Conference was held in Indonesia in 1955 after global decolonisation.  Twenty African 
and Asian countries came together to address their common interests in the struggle against 
colonialism. The famous non-aligned movement, formally established in 1961, was born here (Rist, 
7KLVµ7KLUG:RUOGLVP¶ phenomenon (Chaliand, 1978) was received as a radical political 
movement and a challenge to the Western power. 
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the case. Therefore, neo-liberalism theory is not discussed here (For a detailed 
discussion see Dunne, 2008). 
 
For neo-liberal policies, the relationships between the interventions of the US, other 
Western powers and transnational agencies in Africa are intertwined with no clear 
separation between actors. However, the US is a strong advocate of this policy. It 
often takes the lead and acts unilaterally using international agencies as their tools to 
LQWHUIHUHLQRWKHUVWDWHV¶SROLWLFVDQGHFRQRPLHV (Bromley, 2008). Neo-liberal 
policies are very effective ways to put pressure on countries to abide by their rules. 
For China, as a strong promoter of non-interference policy, the use of this policy 
choice is limited. As the engagement in neo-liberal policies is largely entangled in 
the US-centred financial institutions, we will discuss the pursuit of this policy as a 
whole, instead of by separate players.  
Generally, a neo-liberal foreign policy proposes open markets and deregulations 
arguing for drastic cuts in most government spending, except in the military sector 
(Ibid.). The state should refrain from any kind of control while international 
capitalism does its work. However, open markets are not offered on equal terms. The 
West has encouraged free trade in areas where it excels, such as manufactured goods 
and financial services, while restricting trade in areas it loses out such as in raw 
materials and textiles. This created an unequal distribution of income between 
countries (Oxfam 2002).  
7KHDSSURDFK:HVWHUQLQVWLWXWLRQVWDNHDFFRUGLQJWRWKH:HVW¶VLGHDOGHVLJQLVDOVR
neither flexible nor liberal as the policies claim to be. Particularly in the oil-rich 
nations, Western financial institutions have been directing neo-liberal reforms 
including programmes designed for the opening up of economies and their resources 
to multinational corporations and pressurizing them into offering favourable oil 
contracts to their companies (Leech, 2006; interview with the former Trade Union 
leader of Nigeria, 9 January, 2011). Although the neo-liberal policies of the Western 
powers strongly advocate privatization, they lead to the paradox of pressuring oil-
rich countries to open their resource markets and privatize their national oil 
companies whilst strongly supporting their own national oil companies such as 
Anglo-Dutch Shell and BP, French Total and American ChevronTexaco (Interview 
with the director of African Economic Research Consortium, 16 September, 2010).  
Pushing for open markets has been a primary foreign policy, particularly for the US 
ZKLFKODFNHG(XURSH¶VKLVWRULFDOFRORQLDOWLHV(FRQRPLFVWUHQJWKLVVHHQDVDZD\WR
advance American power and maintain global dominance. AOPIG (Africa Oil Policy 
Initiative Group), for example, suggests the creation of the US-Africa free trade 
agreement, the expansion of the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act and the US debt 
forgiveness attached to free market reforms, especially in sectors such as energy and 
banking (AOPIG, 2002). Despite the growing evidence that these policies only 
benefit multinational companies and Western economies while increasing poverty 
and widening living disparities for the rest, Western governments continue to 
HQGRUVHDµIUHHWUDGH¶SROLF\DURXQGWKHJOREH/HHFK6WUDQJH7KH
Bush administration pursued this policy more than most.  
6LQFHWKHVµ6WUXFWXUDO$GMXVWPHQW3URJUDPPHV¶6$3VLPSRVHGE\WKH:RUOG
Bank and the IMF as part of neo-liberal reform havHFRQWULEXWHGWR$IULFD¶V
economic collapse. The SAPs have been criticized for their complete disregard of the 
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political realities confronted by African leaders. They are usually formulated by 
international economists who know little about Africa (Schraeder, 2001). SAPs 
include devaluation of the national currency meaning an immediate decline in the 
already marginal buying power of the average citizen. They also include sudden 
privatizations and budget cuts for basic social services causing sharp reductions in 
employment and damaging health and education systems (Jones, 2006). This results 
in social exclusion, inequality and violence. The reforms led to the loss of 3.6 - 4 
million jobs and the sharp fall in real wage levels in Africa between 1985 and 1987 
when the policies were executed (ECA, 1988, cited in Jones, 2006). The rural decline 
increases the migration to towns leading to the growth of slums and urban poverty 
(Davis, 2004, cited in Jones, 2006). The spatial arrangement of the colonial social 
order dHVFULEHGE\)DQRQLVUHSURGXFHG7KHµJDWHGFRPPXQLWLHV¶RI$IULFDQHOLWHV
and expatriates are today more severely separated from the extensive and growing 
slums that run alongside (Fanon, 1967, cited in Jones, 2006). The urban problem and 
violence in the neo-OLEHUDOVLWXDWLRQLVIHOWLQ$IULFDQV¶GDLO\VWUXJJOHVWRVXUYLYH 
Loans provided by these institutions have also played a significant part in neo-
colonial control. They often come with high interest rates and tied-in conditions 
which favour the financial interests of the IMF and the World Bank while damaging 
the recipient economies (Bromley, 2008). Parts of the loans are subsidies to 
corporations of the creditor states. In effect, the weaker countries are monopolized by 
foreign corporations. Africa today pays more money every year in debt service 
payments to the IMF and World Bank than it receives in loans from them. 
Repayment of these loans keeps Africa poor and dependent on the Western partners. 
Even the best-intentioned African leaders may find themselves constrained by policy 
choices under the restrictions imposed by various players (Schraeder, 2001).  
The IFIs also support a perverse cycle of oil development by lending to deeply-
indebted oil exporters knowing that debt only supports unproductive activities or 
rent-seeking behaviours. International trade and lending policies in this circumstance 
FRQWULEXWHWRJRYHUQPHQWV¶PLVPDQDJHPHQWRIRLO, endemic corruption, 
socioeconomic inequality and conflicts (Ballentine and Nitzschke, 2005). While 
preaching export diversification as a way to escape the resource curse, IFIs routinely 
encourage extractive industries because these provide large financial returns to the 
institutions, thus locking countries into a perverse pattern (Gary and Karl, 2003). 
There is thus a need to address the structural causes RI,),V¶LQYROYHPHQWDQGWKH
poor performance of recipient countries that, wittingly or not, may reinforce the 
resource curse in the latter (Ballentine and Nitzschke, 2005).  
Neo-liberal policies are deemed to be successful economic instruments which allow 
Western players to exercise influence over weaker nations. As a result, a wide range 
of Western states and institutions has been pursuing this policy. Various programmes 
can be employed such as a requirement to reform national economic and political 
structures, aid as a reward and sanctions as punishment. H.E. Ellen Johnson Sirleaf 
(13 June, 2011), the President of Liberia, addressed this issue:1 
                                                          
1
 HE President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf is the Nobel Prize Winner and is recognized as one of the most 
committed African leaders. Her administration has tackled issues of post-war reconstruction and peace 
process, poverty and corruption as well as managing the second-fastest economic growth in the world. 
In her speech at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, she addressed the challenges of dealing 
with international players and their agenda.   
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It can be a curse to have many foreign parties and international institutions 
offering us aid and assistance. Liberia is dealing with over 100 organizations 
involved in more than 1000 projects. The goals and approaches of these 
organizations are often diverse and uncoordinated, which becomes 
overwhelming to a small post-war country like ours. Our national sovereignty 
is constrained. We do not have the freedom to make plans for federal 
spending which can obstruct any developmental progress of a country but we 
KDYHQRRSWLRQVH[FHSWIRUIROORZLQJWKHLUUHJXODWLRQV«+RZHYHUmany 
promises for wealth distribution, it is important to highlight that all external 
players are there to pursue their own agenda and interests. 
 
As discussed in Chapter 4, neo-liberal policies also include the imposition of 
Western democratic systems since democratic states are believed to be a prerequisite 
for the functioning of liberal markets. Through the promotion of neoliberal policies, 
superpowers can now have significant control over both the politics and economy of 
weaker states without the blame of colonization. It is an effective way which 
superpowers use to sustain neo-colonialism of Africa. The US, as a leading state that 
promotes liberal markets, for instance, can justify eliminating the leadership of states 
that refuse globalization. In these FLUFXPVWDQFHVWKH\µDFWHGDVDWHUPLQDWRURIWKH
GHPRFUDWLFSURFHVV¶UDWKHUWKDQµEHLQJDGLIIXVHURIGHPRFUDF\6ODWHU
When the West is involved in organizing political and economic systems of 
developing states, the latter becomes less accountable to their domestic citizens. In 
effect, neo-liberal policies obstruct democratic progress since the link between the 
government and its people which is central to representative democracy is missing 
(Hurrell and Woods, 1995). This policy option has recently been developed into the 
War on Terror. Political and military apparatuses tackling the War on Terror now 
allow aggressive neo-liberal policies to be pursued. As discussed in Chapter 4, there 
is a tentacle of state and non-state actors under US leadership. An accumulation is 
now achieved by occupation.  
This complicated web of foreign interventions is what Watts (2006:8) called 
µPLOLWDU\QHROLEHUDOLVP¶7KHUHVXOWLVDWRQHSROHDPLOLWDULO\IRUWLILHGDFFXPXODWLRQ
of the market and at the other pole recession and uneven commodification 
(Bernstein, 2004). These complex accumulation patterns are centred on the 
extraction of commodity production ± namely oil (Watts, 2006). The liberal claims in 
this respect enforce neo-colonialism in Africa while guardinJWKH:HVW¶VFDSLWDOLVW
opportunities (Curtis, 2003). 
 
Petrodollar monetary order 
Petrodollar refers to the currency the oil is priced and traded. The attempt to shape 
petrodollar monetary order has been another means of economic interventions used 
for controlling the oil flow since the end of WW II. Because petrodollar monetary 
order is designed for oil and the financial interests of the players that impose it while 
keeping Africa marginalized, this is considered neo-colonial. Petrodollar monetary 
order is mainly orchestrated by the Anglo-American coalition as the two dominant 
players in the financial banking world. The Washington-based transnational financial 
institutions, such as the World Bank and the IMF, largely help enforce the 
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functioning of their petrodollar monetary order. France, an American ally and 
leading Western lender, became a beneficiary from this strategy but its role in 
exercising this policy is small. China and its companies do not apply this policy. We 
will thus discuss the co-ordinated involvement of Britain, the US and the 
transnational agencies which help implement this policy.  
The world oil had been priced in dollars since 1945 with American oil companies 
dominating the market. The US has been a mastermind in the international monetary 
control since. However, deep economic crisis and the decoupling of dollars from 
gold in August 1971 led to the sharp fall of the dollar, affecting all American allies. 
This crisis was RQHWKDWSXOOHGWKHZRUOG¶VWRSILQDQFLDOSROLWLFDOLQVLGHUVDQG
banking executives to the Bilderberg meeting at Saltsjöbaden in Sweden, with the 
aim to design a new monetarist plan to re-create the strong dollar along with global 
political power.  
The Bilderberg meeting of 1971 was designed to use the US control of oil flows to 
tilt the balance of power back to the American financial gains.1 To achieve this goal, 
the meeting decided that setting up the Bilderberg policy to trigger a global oil 
embargo was necessary because a dramatic increase in world oil prices would lead to 
a surplus of petro-dollars. The meeting expected that enforcing this policy would 
result in a 400 percent increase in OPEC petroleum prices; and discussed plans about 
how to manage the resulting flood of petro-dollars which would threaten strategic 
relationships between oil-producing and importing countries (Engdahl, 2004). Below 
are four excerpts from the confidential protocol of the 1973 Bilderberg meeting. The 
first shows that there was discussion about the danger that inadequate control of the 
                                                          
1
 'U-RVHSK+5HWLQJHUHFRQRPLVWSROLWLFDOSKLORVRSKHUFRPPXQLVW3RODQG¶V&KDUJpG¶$IIDLUHV, 
and a major proponent of a united Europe); along with Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands, Colin 
Gubbins (former director of the British Special Operations Executive, SOE) and Gen. Walter Bedell 
Smith (former American Ambassador to Moscow, director of the CIA, and Under-secretary of State in 
the Eisenhower Administration); joined together in 1954 to organize this secret Bilderberg group. 
Created under the direction of Alastair Buchan, son of Lord Tweedsmuir, and Chairman of the 
International Institute of International Affairs; its governing council was made up of Robert Ellsworth 
(Lazard Frères), John Loudon (N. M. Rothschild), Paul Nitze (Schroeder Bank), C. L. Sulzberger 
(New York Times), Stansfield Turner (who later became CIA Director), Peter Calvocoressi (Penguin 
Books), Andrew Schoenberg (RIIA), Daniel Ellsberg and Henry Kissinger. There are about 120 
participants invited to the Bilderberg meetings. About two-thirds come from Europe and the rest are 
from North America. One-third of the participants are from government and politics, and the other 
two-thirds are from the fields of finance, industry, labour, education and communications. The 
meetings are closed to the public and the press, although a brief press conference is usually held at the 
conclusion of each meeting to reveal generally some of the topics discussed. The resort areas where 
they meet, are cleared of residents and visitors, and surrounded by soldiers, armed guards, the Secret 
Service and State and local police. The official press release for their, 2002 Conference said: 
³%LOGHUEHUJ¶VRQO\DFWLYLW\LVLWVDQQXDO&RQIHUHQFH$WWKHPHHWLQJVQRUHVROXWLRQVDUHSURSRVHGQR
YRWHVWDNHQDQGQRSROLF\VWDWHPHQWVLVVXHG´7KH\DUHMXVW³DVPDOOIOH[LEOHLQIRUPDODQGRII-the-
record international forum in which different viewpoints can be expressed and mutual understanding 
HQKDQFHG´+RZHYHU3K\OOLV6FKODIO\ZURWHLQA Choice not an Echo, that the Bilderbergers are a 
³OLWWOHFOLTXHRISRZHUIXOPHQZKRPHHWVHFUHWO\DQGSODQHYHQWVWKDWDSSHDUWRµMXVWKDSSHQ¶Schlafly 
1964).  
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financial resources of the oil-producing countries could undermine the world 
monetary system.  
The task of improving relations between energy importing countries should 
begin with consultations between Europe, the US and Japan. These three 
regions, which represented about 60 percent of the world energy 
consumption, accounted for an even greater proportion of world trade in 
energy products, as they absorbed 80 percent of world energy exports. 
Two other reasons for cooperation were bound up with the world 
responsibilities of these countries. First, an energy crisis or an increase in 
energy costs could immediately jeopardize the economic expansion of 
developing countries which had no resources of their own. Secondly, the 
misuse of inadequate control of the financial resources of the oil producing 
countries could completely disorganize and undermine the world monetary 
system (quoted in Engdahl, 2004: 132). 
 
The second excerpt addresses huge increases in the price of oil imported from the 
Middle East, a warning that dependence on this region would trigger a complete 
change of relationships between this region and oil-importing countries (Engdahl, 
2004). 
 
The cost of these oil imports would rise tremendously, with difficult 
implementations for the balance of payments of consuming countries. Serious 
problems would be caused by unprecedented foreign exchange accumulations 
of countries such as Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi. 
A complete change was underway in the political, economic, strategic and 
power relationships between the oil producing, importing and home countries 
of international oil companies and the national oil companies of producing 
and importing countries (quoted in Engdahl, 2004: 132). 
 
The third excerpt shows a projected price rise for OPEC oil of approximately 400 
percent. 
 
An American speaker pointed out that one official US estimate of the future 
delivered price had been as high as $5 a barrel ± which was now perhaps on 
the low side ± but that certain cost factors would reduce the net return to the 
producing countries by around $1. Two other American participants reported 
that the author of the estimate just referred to ± Mr. James Akins ± had 
subsequently said that the $5 figure would prove to be too low and might 
indeed range up to $10-12.50 a barrel (Bilderberg Meetings, 1973: 63, quoted 
in Estulin, 2009). 
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The fourth excerpt illustrates the Bilderberg group discussion of this scenario; that is, 
to take advantage of this oil price rise and the resultant political issues.1 
 
Reflecting on some of the figures projected above, an American participant 
was impressed with the community of interest of the OECD group and the 
vulnerable developing world in assuring the continual flow of Arab oil at a 
reasonable price. As this issue became more political, we should seek to 
capitalize on it (Bilderberg Meetings, 1973: 63, quoted in Estulin, 2009, 
emphasis added).  
 
OPEC was accused of being a cartel and thus responsible for the global economic 
crisis which followed the sharp increase in oil prices. However, Nikolas Sarkis, an 
economic energy expert and the former Goldman Sachs wealth manager suggested 
that there were other untold elements behind the incident:  
,WFDPHDVDUHDOVKRFNIRUWKHSXEOLFRSLQLRQDQGWKHJRYHUQPHQW«%XW
how come this oil exporting countries organizDWLRQGLGQ¶WGRDQ\WKLQJIRU
over 12 years? They had their headquarters in Geneva, then in Vienna. They 
had some meeting about accounting, royalties and taxes. And, all of a sudden, 
they took their courage in both hands and decided to multiply oil prices by 
four. Thinking whatever they want. But how come a group of countries, Third 
World Countries which means being politically, militarily and economically 
weak, could impose their own will to the great industrial powers of the world, 
to the United States, EuURSHDQG-DSDQ":KDWZDVWKHPDWWHUZLWKWKHP"«
The vision of facts was just play-acting. Just sheer play-DFWLQJ,WGLGQ¶W
happen this way. Never, never in the world, would OPEC have dared 
PXOWLSO\E\IRXUDQGLQFUHDVHGSULFHVHYHQE\LILWKDGQ¶WKLdden 
something (Beaurenaut and Billon, 2005).  
 
Although the implementation of the Bilderberg policy was not conclusive, these 
materials and comments revealed a relative level of Anglo-American involvement in 
attempt to control and manipulate the global flow of petrodollar which is the 
determinant of their financial and industrial gains. Sheik Yamani, the then Saudi oil 
minister, commented that the oil price rise benefited not only the OPEC but also the 
rise in profits allowed the international oil companies to invest in sources that would 
otherwise be financially unviable. He added:  
However, the oil price was very good for the oil companies. They made a 
great profit and they used that huge profit for investments to explore and 
develop alternative sources of supplies (Ibid.).  
                                                          
1
 )RUPRUHGHWDLORIWKH%LOGHUEHUJPHHWLQJDQGSDUWVRIWKLVPHHWLQJ¶VVHFUHWGRFXPHQW
including the high-profile conference participants, see Engdahl (2004: 130-135) and Estulin (2009). 
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These sources include oil fields in the North Sea and in Africa. In effect, the oil price 
rise allowed the diversification of supply sources which America and the West were 
deeply concerned.  
However, the 1974 oil price inflation, partly a result of the Bilderberg policy, led to 
enormous economic and financial shocks for the world, especially for the fragile 
countries of the South. The new oil prices combined with the 1971 dollar-gold 
decoupling and the resultant floating of exchange rates had created a worldwide 
shortage of liquidity. The Bank of Italy Chairman Guido Carli at the time noted that 
the international failure to create a new, effective, gold-free, monetary order 
confirmed the fact that it was the US monetary design which strengthened the 
dominant position of the US, American banks and their corporations in the world 
(Carli, 1976).  
In most developing countries, the oil crisis put an end to development, the ability to 
finance industrial and agriculture improvement and the hopes for a better life during 
the 1960s post-colonization. This oil crisis combined with the worst drought led to 
huge harvest shortfalls, especially in Africa and South America. Unable to finance 
food imports from the West, these developing countries faced famine, let alone 
financing the oil shock. Most of the developing economies deteriorated as a result of 
the quadrupling of primary oil prices. The account deficit of all developing countries 
rose from some $6 billion per year in the early 1970s to more than $26 billion in 
1974 and to $42 billion by 1976. The countries that were hit the hardest were among 
those with the lowest per capita income in the world (Engdahl, 2004). In the same 
period, during 1975, the New York Council on Foreign Relations, the policy driver 
behind the American liberal establishment further created policy blueprints for the 
IXWXUHRIWKHJOREDOPRQHWDU\RUGHU,WXQGHUOLQHGDGHJUHHRI³FRQWUROOHGGLV-
LQWHJUDWLRQ´LQWKHZRUOGHFRQRP\DVDOHJLWLPDWHREMHFWLYHIRUWKHV+LUVKet 
al., 1977: 55).  
$IULFD¶VHFRQRP\ZDVGDPDJHGPRVWVHYHUHO\LQFRPSDULVRQWRRWKHUUHJLRQVDVD
result of the American petro-dollar recycling strategy. The oil shocks, the 20 percent 
interest rates and collapsing industrial growth in the 1980s wrought serious damages 
on the entire continent, which still depended on exporting a few primary raw 
materials even after decolonization. In this period, the world prices of raw materials 
were falling steadily and in 1987, to the lowest levels since WW II (Michler, 1991). 
If raw materials prices had been stable, Africa would have earned a further $150 
billion during the decade of the 1980s. 
Apart from state players, transnational agencies such as the IFIs help implement the 
petrodollar monetary order designed by the Anglo-American coalition and 
consequently play a part in the economic collapse in African resource-rich countries. 
Having to borrow from the World Bank and the private banks of the industrial 
nations, developing countries which at the time were facing serious economic crisis, 
were forced to redirect funds from industrial and agricultural development projects 
into reducing the deficit of oil balance-of-payments instead. They must continue to 
pay for oil imports in dollars while the cost of their national raw materials exports 
had significantly fallen in the 1974-1975 global recession (Engdahl, 2004) and the 
IFIs insisted on the devaluation of national currencies as a condition for giving them 
loans.  
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Private Western banks also offered loans to these countries, under the Bilderberg 
µSHWURGROODUUHF\FOLQJ¶VWUDWHJ\6HH)LJXUH This strategy damaged the industrial 
and agricultural development of the less-developed regions. Any income went to 
refinance deficits, rather than to finance the important sectors of an economy. In 
1982, African countries owed creditor banks in the West approximately $73 billion. 
%\WKHHQGRIWKHGHFDGHWKURXJKGHEWµUHVFKHGXOLQJ¶DQGYDULRXV,0)HFRQRPLF
interventions, the debt spiralled up to $160 billion. In other word, these countries 
would not have been in debt given that the price for raw materials remained stable, 
especially if the petrodollar recycling strategy had not been applied (Engdahl, 2004). 
This petrodollar recycling strategy has been used until today. London/Washington-
based banks or the IFIs release loans to developing countries. These loans make up a 
large part of national revenues which are mostly taken up by Western imports at 
inflated prices. The monies then are channelled into the Western banks and then 
accumulated into loans released to the developing countries.  
 
           Figure 1: Petrodollar Recycling Strategy 
 
 
Economic sanctions 
Economic sanctions are another mechanism employed multilaterally by both former 
colonial powers and new powers mostly led by the US. As economic sanctions are 
on-going efforts by old and new players alike to exercise economic influence so that 
other states are pressurised to behave in a manner conducive to them, this is 
considered a neo-colonial practice. Internationally agreed sanctions can be imposed 
through the UN, however, occasionally, where an agreement is not met, the US goes 
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sanctions except over Taiwan (Tanner, 2007). It often opposes sanctions in other 
cases and continues to trade with countries despite sanctions by the West. Economic 
sanctions have been placed on a number of oil-producing countries to keep them 
under control. According to Bill Richardson: 
American foreign policy has long been influenced by the US need for energy 
security. As a congressman and as the permanent US  representative to the 
United Nations, I saw the United States use energy as a weapon, by sanctions 
that deny US  investors and markets to countries that threaten America or 
reject its values (Richardson, 2005: xvii). 
One African oil-rich country facing US-led economic sanctions was Libya. However, 
Libya continued major deals with Japanese, Italian, French and other foreign 
companies not bound by the US sanctions (BBC News, 2007). Libya also signed 
deals with China to build oil and gas pipelines. The British government seeing the 
loss in oil profits to other competitors took an active role in de-sanctioning Libya in 
2003. The British government had been establishing close relations with high-level 
politicians of Libya. Seeing that sanctions had not been successful in shaping 
friendly Libyan behaviour and that more diverse sources of oil had become 
increasingly necessary for American foreign policy and national security, 
Washington also sought to resolve this issue. This led the US to decide to lift 
sanctions on Libya in 2004 on the condition that Colonel Gaddafi rejected 
connection with terrorism and opened up Libya to US oil investment. Gaddafi 
stressed that emerging factors derived from the new era of globalization were behind 
WKLVPRYH7KHRLOLQGXVWU\SDWWHUQLQ/LE\DHVSHFLDOO\DIWHU*DGGDIL¶VGHDWKLVQRZ
changing with the return of Western oil companies.  
Additionally, the US had imposed sanctions on Sudan since 1997 (BBC News, 2007) 
and in 2005 the UN Security Council Committee established a resolution to oversee 
sanctions measures (UN Sudan Sanctions Committee, 2010). While the US firms 
were excluded, Sudan had still been working with Chinese, Asian and some 
European companies. Like Libya, Sudan had significant oil reserves and the US saw 
it was necessary to end the US sanctions on Sudan by bringing an end to the two 
decades of civil war. In this context, Washington was behind the agreement the 
government in Khartoum signed to share the oil wealth with the rebel south in 2004 
(Engdahl, 2004).1 The imposition of economic sanctions, thus, is rather driven by 
economic gains and energy concerns than by the promotion of democracy as 
claimed.    
Financial support  
While the West exercises sanctions as a means of economic intervention, China uses 
large financial support as the primary economic instrument for securing control. 
8QOLNHWKH:HVW&KLQD¶VJRYHUQPHQWSURYLGHVODUJHFDVKWRLWVRLOFRPSDQies and 
their financial support to the host governments is unconditional. While China is 
blamed for its unconditional aid to corrupt African regimes, the West itself has also 
been providing financial support there. Since large, unconditional, cash incentives 
are an approach specific to China and Chinese export credit to Africa is the highest, 
this section primarily focuses on China with some links with Western players 
towards the end. Although considerable amounts of cash are provided for African 
                                                          
1
 See UN Security Council Sanctions Committees, 2011 for a list of countries under the UN sanctions. 
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states, this serves rather as an incentive for African elites to accept oil deals rather 
than for developmental purposes and hence considered neo-colonial. Not only has 
this financial support not brought benefits, it has also harmed African political and 
economic syVWHPVDQGFRQWULEXWHGWR$IULFD¶VUHVRXUFHFXUVH7KLVVHFWLRQGLVFXVVHV
the linkage further.   
A specifically Chinese foreign policy is the enormous support for national companies 
in overseas investment (Lagos focus group, 15 January, 2011). Beijing provides 
ILQDQFLDOVXSSRUWWR&KLQD¶V1DWLRQDO2LO&RPSDQLHV12&VVLQFHLWUHFRJQL]HVWKHLU
disadvantageous position as latecomers in the global oil industry only starting active 
overseas operations in the 1990s compared  to some International Oil Companies 
(IOCs) who began operating over a century ago (Chengyu, 2004, cited in Downs, 
2007)1. This vast experience has given the IOCs a competitive advantage that other 
companies cannot match (Downs, 2007). One way which Beijing provides financial 
support to the NOCs is through China Eximbank (the Export-Import Bank of China), 
one of three policy banks created in 1994 to manage state-directed lending.2 China 
([LPEDQNWKHZRUOG¶VWKLUGODUJHVWH[SRUWFUHGLWDJHQF\DVVLVWV&KLQDLQIRUHLJQ
trade, finance and foreign affairs (China Eximbank, 2004, cited in Alden, 2007). This 
agency has given more loans to Africa than the Eximbank of the US, Britain and 
Japan. The loans are thirty times higher than that of the nearest rival (Alden, 2007).  
The financial support from China Eximbank comes in three forms. First, it extends 
FUHGLWWR&KLQD¶V12&VWKDWSDUWO\RUWRWDOO\IXQGRYHUVHDVSURMHFWVLQFOXGLQJQDWXUDO
resource development, with a discounted interest rate. The China National Offshore 
Oil Corporation (CNOOC) was a beneficiary of this support. In 2006, the company 
received a 10-year loan of $1.6 billion to fund the Akpo field development in Nigeria 
at an interest rate of 4.05 percent, much below the 4.68 percent ceiling set by Beijing 
for commercial lending (South China Morning Post, 2006, cited in Downs, 2007). 
Second, China Eximbank also provides financing for acquisitions abroad. Third, the 
EDQNVXSSRUWV&KLQD¶V12&VWKURXJKLQYHVWPHQWLQLQIUDVWUXFWXUHLQKRVWFRXQWULHV
which is aimed at securing oil. The obvious example is the $2 billion low-interest 
loan provided to Angola in 2004 to refinance projects primarily built by Chinese 
companies, such as the refurbishing of the Beguela railway, which facilitated 
6LQRSHF¶VHQWU\LQWRWKHFRXQWU\¶VRLOILHOGV'RZQV 53).  
&KLQD¶VFDVKWR$IULFDLVXQFRQGLWLRQDO7KLVLVDQDSSURDFKVSHFLILFWR&KLQD
Chinese loans combined with infrastructure projects and military assistance to 
African regimes flow in without requiring the regimes to respect human rights, 
                                                          
1
 7KHWHUPVµ,2&V¶UHIHUVWR large oil companies listed in the international stock markets such as BP, 
ChevronTexaco, ConocoPhilips, ENI, ExxonMobil, Royal Dutch/Shell and Total (Downs, 2007). 
2
 China Eximbank is a part of Export Credit Agencies (ECAs). ECAs are governmental or quasi-
governmental institutions, operated in most industrialized countries. Despite their significant roles in 
the global economy, their activities are little known. ECAs provide domestic exporters and their banks 
with loans; guarantees and insurance that protect exporters against loss if a foreign buyer or debtor 
defaults in payment. ECAs promote their national corporate interests aggressively. They heavily 
compete with others to support projects that benefit their domestic producers. Considerations for 
environmental and social impact are not required of them and often are neglected for projects they 
finance. ECAs have been supporters of extractive projects in developing countries, including the oil 
projects in Africa. According to the IMF, the amount of investment that ECAs support globally is 
considerably higher than the total amount of lending from the World Bank, IMF and other multilateral 
institutions combined (Gary and Karl, 2003).  
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transparenc\DQGJRRGJRYHUQDQFHXQOLNH:HVWHUQGRQRUV&KLQD¶V3UHPLHU:HQ
-LDEDRGHFODUHGWKDWµ:HGRRIIHURXUDVVLVWDQFHWR$IULFDZLWKWKHGHHSHVWVLQFHULW\
DQGZLWKRXWDQ\SROLWLFDOFRQGLWLRQV3HRSOH¶V'DLO\FLWHGLQ$OGHQ
¶&KLQD¶VIXQGLQg is largely aimed for the rights to lucrative oil concessions from 
African countries. For example, China offered Nigeria and Angola ± countries with 
decades-long relationships with Western oil companies - integrated packages of aid 
in order to increase thHLUGHDO¶VDWWUDFWLYHQHVV$QJRODLVDJRRGH[DPSOHZKHUH
&KLQD¶VXQFRQGLWLRQDODLGOLQNHGZLWK&KLQHVHRLOLQWHUHVWVXQGHUPLQHV$QJRODQ
JRRGJRYHUQDQFHDQGHFRQRPLFGHYHORSPHQW:KHQ$QJROD¶V-year civil war 
ended in 2002, Luanda prepared to work towards a financial arrangement plan with 
the IMF in return for loans from the IMF and other Paris Club donors.1 However, the 
negotiations broke down over the issue of revenue transparency in Angola. With the 
advent of China, Angola found IMF lectures about transparency less relevant (ibid.). 
Thus, Beijing secured a major stake in future Angolan oil production in 2004 in 
return of a $2 billion package of loans and aid (later increased to $4 billion) which 
includes funds for Chinese companies to build railroads, schools, roads, hospitals, 
bridges, airports, new governmental buildings and other necessary infrastructure.2 No 
amount of Western donor aid or IMF debt rescheduling can compete with the 
quantities of money and assistance that have been flowing into the Angolan treasury 
since 2002 (ibid.). 
The Chinese infrastructure projects in Africa; though comprehensive, have not 
DOZD\VEHHQVXFFHVVIXO$QJROD¶VUDLOURDGSURMHFWVZHUHKDOWHGRUIDFHGVHULRXV
delays (personal conversation with Angolan locals, International Institute of 
International Affairs, United Kingdom, 14 July, 2009).The deal came with an interest 
rate repayment of 1.5 percent over 17 years and was tied to an agreement to supply at 
first 10,000 barrels per day of crude oil, increasing later to 40,000 barrels per day, as 
well as the award of substantial construction contracts. According to Angolan 
economist José Cerqueira, 70 percent of the loans would be subcontracted to Chinese 
ILUPV7D\ORUZKLFKLVDQDODUPLQJWKUHDWWR$QJROD¶V indigenous businesses 
sector. The construction sector is one in which Angolans hope they can find work 
(United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2005, cited in 
Taylor, 2006). The IMF and UN critique that these contracts mean a lack of 
³$QJRODQFRQWHQW´ZKLFKLVGUDPDWLFDOO\FRXQWHU-productive for a country where 
local people desperately need jobs. Thus, the real cost of the loan is higher than that 
                                                          
1
 The Paris Club is an informal group of official creditors whose permanent members include 19 of 
WKHZRUOG¶VZHDOWKLHVWQDWLRQV (Gary and Karl, 2003). 
2
 Chinese fund with tied-in infrastructure projects to Chinese companies in Angola was so successful 
and repetitively employed throughout African countries that this design was later referred to as the 
µ$QJROD0RGHO¶&RUNLQ6WDWHILQDQFLDOVXSSRUWKDVKHOSHG&KLQD¶V12&VHVWDEOLVKDIRRWSULQW
in Angola thaWWKH\RWKHUZLVHPLJKWQRWKDYH&KLQD¶V12&VLQ$QJROD¶V*UHDWHU3OXWRQLDILHOGVDUH
massive (Downs, 2007). It seems unlikely that Sonangol, the Angolan NOC, would have rejected the 
GHDOVWUXFNEHWZHHQ6KHOODQG,QGLD¶V2LODQG1DWXUDO*DV&RUSRUDWLRQ/WG. (ONGC) for ONGC to 
SXUFKDVH6KHOO¶VSHUFHQ\VWDNHLQ%ORFN*UHDWHU3OXWRQLD)LHOGV,QVWHDGZLWK&KLQHVH
Eximbank extending a $2 billion loan, Sonangol decided to sell this deal to Sinopec (Downs, 2007: 
53). In another block, Block 3, once owned E\)UDQFH¶V7RWDOWKH$QJRODQDXWKRULWLHVGHFOLQHG7RWDO
a renewal in favour of Sinopec. Sonangol (the Angolan state oil corporation) has also recently agreed 
a joint venture with Sinopec to build a new refinery on the south coast of Angola, a project that 
international oil companies deemed economically unviable (Petroleum Economist, 2006, cited in 
Frynas and Paulo, 2007:239). 
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suggested by the published rates. However, the cost should still be below what 
Angola was previously paying to borrow from other sources (Taylor, 2006). 
Responding to this, the Angolan embassy announced that the deal could not be 
matched by other players, who also impose conditions that are unbearable and 
politically unacceptable. Currently, Angola LV&KLQD¶VVHFRQGODUJHVWWUDGLQJSDUWQHU
in Africa (China Daily, 2005 as cited in Taylor, 2006: 947). In 2004, bilateral trade 
totalled $4.9 billion, representing an increase of more than 113 percent from 2003. 
Chinese companies continue to look for secure oil deliveries and Angola, as sub-
6DKDUDQ$IULFD¶VVHFRQGODUJHVWRLOSURGXFHULVFHQWUDOWRWKLVSROLF\7KXVGXULQJD
recent visit by Vice-Premier Zeng Peiyang, a total of nine cooperation agreements 
with Angola were signed, three of which related to oil. One fixed a long-term supply 
RIRLOIURP6RQDQJROWR&KLQD¶V6LQRSHF)XUWKHULWZDVDQQRXQFHGWKDW6RQDQJRO
and Sinopec are to evaluate jointly an offshore oil block. Meanwhile, China has 
increased its provision of aid and soft loans. During the visit Zeng Peiyang agreed to 
provide Angola with more development aid, comprising approximately $6.3 million 
in interest-free loans (Afrol News, cited in Taylor, 2006). The Angolan ambassador 
LQ&KLQDODWHUFDOOHG%HLMLQJµDWUXHIULHQGRI$IULFD¶DQGVXJJHVted that Africa can 
QRZGHYHORSE\LWVRZQHIIRUWZLWK&KLQD¶VKHOSZKLFKXQOLNHWKH,0)GRHVQRW
demand humiliating conditions. 
However, critics say that Chinese aid to Angola reduces transparency. Douglas 
Steinberg, Angola country director for the humanitarian NGO CARE, noted that 
huge Chinese loans allow Angola not to comply with the conditions of other deals 
(Integrated Regional Information Networks, 2005, cited in Taylor, 2006). Angola 
needs to diversify its economy to increase non-oil revenues if it is to break free from 
the resource curse. However, with large inflows of Chinese cash for the oil-related 
industries, it is unclear how much incentive Angola has to diversify its economy 
(Hanson, 2008).  
Apart from Angola, China has worked to expand its presence into other African oil-
producing countries, especially Nigeria, Libya and Sudan. China ignores the issues 
of corruption, human rights violations, conflicts and autocratic regimes while doing 
business and giving aid to these countries. In fact, part of the Chinese oil strategies 
has been to invest in countries that are difficult or under sanctions (Clarke, 2008).  
In Sudan, China buys two-WKLUGVRI6XGDQ¶VRLOH[SRUWV7KH&KLQD3HWUROHXP
Engineering Construction Corporation and the Great Wall Drilling Company 
*:'&KDYHVHYHUDOVHUYLFHVWRVXSSRUW&13&¶VH[SORUDWLRQDQGGHYHORSPHQW
efforts in Sudan. These same companies also have plans to expand activities in 
Nigeria, Chad, Niger and Equatorial Guinea (Interview with the director of African 
Economic Research Consortium, 15 September, 2010). Following a $500 million 
China Eximbank loan, preferential rights to important deals in Nigeria were given to 
CNOOC in a 2006 bidding round. China's aid approach toward African leaders is 
eroding a developmental trend. This is evidenced as Edmund Daokoru, the Nigerian 
Minister of State for petroleum, indicated that right of first refusal on oil blocks will 
be awarded to the governments which offer attractive economic packages (Ashby, 
2005).1 CNPC has also been seeking to expand acreage in Algeria, Tunisia and Libya 
                                                          
1
 7KHULJKWRIILUVWUHIXVDOµJUDQWVWKHSUHIHUUHGFRPSDQ\WKHULJKWWRPDWFKWKHKLJKHVWELGZKLFKKDV
been determined in an open and competitive bidding practice. Should the company granted the right 
HOHFWQRWWRPDWFKWKHKLJKHVWELGWKHEORFNJRHVWRWKHKLJKHVWELGGHU¶9DQJXDUG0D\ 
C h a p t e r  5  | page 142 
 
(Jaffe and Medlock, 2005). In 2007, a $5 billion commitment was made for DRC 
infrastructure (Clarke, 2008). In return for the funding, which is well above other 
international loans to the DRC, China has obtained rights to extensive natural 
resources including oil, copper and cobalt (European Union Committee, 2010). This 
is critical to France which has seen the DRC as chasse gardée. Western players are 
pressured to step up with their political and economic relations with Africa as 
competition for global resources increases.  
As a whole, Chinese aid projects are now active in more than forty-five African 
FRXQWULHV&KLQHVHDUHNQRZQIRUOHDYLQJµELJIRRWSULQWV¶LQ$IULFDLQRUGHUWKH
secure agreements with African governments (President Sirleaf Speech, 2010). This 
includes prestige projects, such as a massive building - Parliament House - in 
Uganda, new offices for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Angola and in 
Mozambique, presidential palaces in Harare and in Kinshasa and stadiums in Sierra 
Leone and in the Central African Republic (Alden, 2007). Chinese aid with tied-in 
infrastructure projects enhances the attractiveness of the Chinese ventures to African 
leaders with Chinese companies often outbidding other competitors (Interview with 
the director of JGC Corporation, 5 November, 2010). For these projects, China 
provides lower labour costs with less costly managerial staff by hiring their own 
contract workers (Alden, 2007). These strategies help China secure precious 
resources, particularly oil in Africa. Observers from human rights groups to Africans 
themselves are expressing concerns over such business approaches in Africa. 
Chinese companies often underbid local firms and do not employ Africans. Their 
infrastructure deals often insist on hiring a majority of Chinese labour (Hanson, 
2008). Gabriel Ngeuma Lima, the son of the President of Equatorial Guinea and an 
Energy Ministry official, noted in this regard:  
 
If you were in our shoes - a developing country, with not a lot of funds - and 
the Chinese come and will do for three what it costs ten from others, what 
would you do? The Chinese listen better and they understand that sometimes 
you need to make sacrifices for a future gain. They'll do a hydroelectric plant 
at half the price, and, in return, they get future projects. With US companies, 
we feel more squeezed and squeezed. They just take the oil and do nothing 
else. Of course they are losing ground to the Chinese. The World Bank and 
the IMF also come. 'No, we don't need you,' the president says all the time 
(Behar, 2008: 32).  
Chinese economic approaches have helped China make diplomatic inroads into 
$IULFD0F/HDU\6HYHUDO:HVWHUQSROLF\PDNHUVYLHZ&KLQD¶VLQFUHDVLQJUROH
in Africa as more than just a commercial threat to Western businesses. There are 
concerning voices in Washington and among institutions like the World Bank and 
WKH,0)WKDW&KLQD¶VZLOOLQJQHVVWRWUDGHDQGSURYLGHXQFRQGLWLRQDODLGWRRSSUHVVLYH
African regimes will undo much of the progress that has been made on economic 
reforms, democracy and good governance in the region (Hanson, 2008). Due to 
&KLQD¶VODUJHFDVKUHVHUYHVWKH&KLQHVHJRYHUQPHQWKDVEHJXQSOD\LQJDVLJQLILFDQW
role as counter-SOD\HUWRWKH,0)&KLQD¶VORZUHTXLUHments when providing aid have 
led some countries to shun the IMF projects (Gary and Karl, 2003). 
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However, the West can be seen as equally undermining African good governance, 
IRULQVWDQFH&KHYURQ¶VDFWLYHRSHUDWLQJRIIVKRUHRI&DELQGDIURPWR
whLOHWKHFLYLOZDUUDJHGDQGWKH:HVW¶VWLHVWRFRUUXSW$IULFDQUHJLPHVLQH[FKDQJH
of oil (see Chapter 4). Western countries also put pressure on aid recipients to ensure 
contracts go to their corporations (Gary and Karl, 2003). Examples of countries of 
crossed-interests between the West and China are Sudan, Libya, Equatorial Guinea 
and Zimbabwe. This different standpoint will undoubtedly influence Western policy 
in the years ahead (Ghazvinian, 2007). 
The Western conditions recall humiliating experiences from nineteenth-century 
FRORQLDOLVPLQ$IULFDE\IRUPHU(XURSHDQSRZHUV&KLQD¶VDELOLW\WRUHFRJQL]HWKLVLV
DVXFFHVVIRULWVIRUHLJQSROLF\$OGHQ&KLQD¶VSURYLVLRQRIµQRSROLWLFDO
VWULQJV¶HFRQRPLFDLGFRXSOHGZLWKDQRQ-interference policy in politics (see Chapter 
4) are symbolic diplomacy replacing colonial-era ties and have great appeal to 
African elites. Despite this appearance, Chinese policies resemble the imperial path 
established by Europe and the United States in the earlier period by offering poor 
countries exploitative trade deals combined with aid. Chinese involvement in Africa 
is driven by self-LQWHUHVWDQGLVLPSHULDOLVWLQQDWXUH/HL:KLOHµ:HVWHUQ
colonial powers projected their power physically from ports and forts to take over 
$IULFD¶LQWKHSDVW&KLQDLVXVLQJVRIWSROLWLFR-economic approaches (Brautigam and 
Gaye, 2007: 7). However, since the days of Zhou Enlai, Chinese leaders have 
repeatedly stressed that their aid programme is not a charity but a mutual benefit 
(ibid.&KLQD¶VLQIUDVWUXFWXUDODQGLQGXVWULDOGHYHORSPHQWVDQGLWVGHEWFDQFHOODWLRQ
WR$IULFDKDYHEHHQVHHQDVPHUHHIIRUWVWREX\JRRGZLOOWRVHFXUH&KLQD¶V
DGYDQWDJH&KLQD¶VDVVLVWDQFHWR$IULFDKDVQRWUHYHUVHGWKHXQHTXDOWHUPVRIWUDGH
for which the WHVWHUQQDWLRQVKDYHEHHQEODPHG&KLQD¶VFODLPWRKHOS$IULFDODFNV
credibility considering the way it treats hundreds of millions of its own people and 
the vast regions of China that are poorer than Africa (ibid.).  
$VPHQWLRQHGLQ&KDSWHU&KLQD¶VJRYHrnment owns its oil companies. Hence, 
large financial resources are available to companies from the government. This is 
GLIIHUHQWIURP&KLQD¶VULYDOVOLNH%ULWDLQDQGWKH86DQGUHIOHFWVFORVHUHODWLRQVKLSV
between oil, national interests and Chinese diploPDF\%HFDXVH&KLQD¶VRLO
companies are state-owned, China is able to outbid the competitors in major 
contracts even if the price exceeds the commercial benefits (Lagos focus group, 15 
January, 2011; interview with Senior Counsel of Samsung Heavy Industries, 19 
January, 2011). For China, the matter of energy security comes before the 
considerations for profits and shareholders (Taylor, 2006). In contrast, international 
oil companies will only invest in projects of commercial significance (Personal 
conversation with a senior executive of an international oil investment company, 4 
October, 2010). This willingness to pursue an oil interest, even by paying inflated 
prices, threatens Western interests, especially in onshore areas and marginal oil 
fields. Deep offshore oil fields which are the most profitable investment in Africa are 
dominated by Exxon, Shell and BP due to their financial and technical capability 
(Frynas and Paulo, 2007). What the Chinese NOCs are lacking, however, they 
substitute with commercial and diplomatic components under government support 
,QWHUYLHZZLWKWKHGLUHFWRURI1LJHULD¶V'HSDUWPHQWRI3HWUROHXP5HVRXUFHV
November, 2010). 
Additionally, Chinese oil firms are more immune to public scrutiny due to being 
state owned. There is no requirement for data to be made public unlike the 
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revelations required of private companies. Chinese firms do not prioritise human 
rights, democratization or environmental protection to the extent required of Western 
ILUPV7KLVFDQEHHYLGHQFHGLQ&KLQD¶VZLOOingness to offer Angola, a country with a 
poor human rights record, a $2 billion low-interest and long-term loan in return for 
exploration and production acreage (Goldwyn and Morrison, 2005). The 
demonstration of the difference between the Western and Chinese approaches can be 
VHHQLQWKHFRQWUDGLFWLRQLQSUDFWLFHVRYHUWKHFRQFHUQVLQ.HQ\D¶VFRUUXSWLRQLVVXH
in April 2006. While the Dutch government was suspending nearly $150 million in 
aid to Kenya, China was aggressively securing a lump-sum oil exploration agreement 
in the country (BBC News Online, cited in Taylor, 2006).  
1RWZLWKVWDQGLQJ&KLQD¶VQHZDSSURDFKRIXQFRQGLWLRQDODLG&KLQDLVQRWQHZLQ
providing support to corrupt regimes. Western players through different 
organizations have also been providing support for extractive investments in 
countries with poor records even before China became active in the continent. One of 
these fundamental players is the Export Credit Agencies (ECAs). Essentially, ECAs 
provide state companies with a financial safeguard against risks when operating 
overseas. Albeit disastrous impacts of ECA-backed extractive industry projects in 
unstable countries, ECAs remain unchanged. They are reluctant to incorporate 
environmental and human rights standards or conflict-impact assessments into their 
lending decisions (Hildyard, 2005).  
The US KDVWKHZRUOG¶VODUJHVW(&$V+RZHYHUChinese export credit to Africa is 
still the highest (as discussed above), with the US coming second followed by the 
UK and Japan. Because the US export credit is significantly much higher than the 
UK and Japan, we will only consider the US here. The US has two ECAs, the 
Export-Import Bank (Exim Bank) and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation 
(OPIC). The Exim Bank is government held and, in 2001, provided support for $1.3 
billion worth of US exports in the petroleum sector (Gary and Karl, 2003). A sample 
review of 50 ECA projects in Africa from 1994 to 1999, valued at $15 billion, 
showed that the largest sector was oilfield exploration and development. Moreover, 
WKHUHLVDKLJKSURSRUWLRQRI$IULFDQRLOH[SRUWHUV¶GHEWRZHGWR(&$V(see Box 1) 
(Gary and Karl, 2003: 16). 
Box 1: African Oil Exporters and Export Credit Agency Debt 
The percentage of total external debt held by ECAs (2000): 
Country Percent 
Nigeria 71 
Gabon 55 
Congo- Brazzaville 42 
Democratic Republic of Congo 33 
Cameroon 31 
Angola 20 
Source: Environmental Defense 
 
The US Export-Import Bank, in the early 1990s, issued loans and loan guarantees to 
Angola that have benefited US oil companies operating there. Between 1983 and 
1985, Exim issued almost $410.1 million in loans and guarantees for offshore oil 
projects in Angola. In June 1998, the US Export-Import Bank guaranteed an $87 
million loan by the SocGen Bank in New York to the Angolan government to cover 
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6RQDQJRO¶VVKDUHRIWKHGHYHORSPHQWRIDQRLOZHOOLQWKHZDU-torn Cabinda. This 
means millions of dollars were lent to a repressive regime in Angola. The Export-
Import Bank provided a $64 million direct loan to Sonangol in the following year, 
for the purchase of equipment and services from more than twenty US energy 
companies, including Halliburton (Leech, 2006: 116).  Ironically, while the Reagan 
Administration was working to overthrow the MPLA government (for details see 
Chapter 4), it was providing massive export credits to the oil industry which created 
SHUFHQWRIWKH03/$¶VUHYHQXH&DUERQHOO 
,QDGGLWLRQWR$QJRODWKH:RUOG%DQNRQHRI:DVKLQJWRQ¶VPDLQLQWHUQDWLRQDO
institutions, has encouraged oil operations in the DRC, a country beset by wars and 
serious corruption and where transparency hardly exists. Oil revenues have long 
served to sustain the government. Already in 1996, at the end of the Mobutu era, a 
government budget estimated that oil revenues would reach $186 million in 1996. 
Investments and lending into such countries only result in a higher degree of rent-
seeking and corruption. Over time, earnings are used up and oil is depleted while the 
rest of population remain trapped in poverty and conflicts (Gary and Karl, 2003).  
The World Bank also proposed the Chad-Cameroon pipeline project, the largest 
construction project in sub-Saharan Africa, despite numerous cases of human rights 
abuses by the governments of those countries had been documented. While 
acknowledging that Chevron was charged with human rights violations in 1998 and 
1999 in the Nigerian Boweto versus Chevron court case (see Chapter 6), the World 
%DQNIXQGHG&KHYURQ¶V-percent investment in the Chad-Cameroon pipeline 
construction in the same period. During the Chad-Cameroon pipeline development 
project, Chevron was again found complicit in human rights violations in the two 
countries (Bustany and Wysham, 2000).  
 
Although the West claims to provide financial support to African regimes based on 
respect for human rights and transparency, loans from the Western ECAs are 
considered to be largely private and free from political conditionality (Gary and Karl, 
7KHLUFULWLFLVPRI&KLQD¶VXQFRQGLWLRQDODLGWRRSSUHVVLYH$IULFDQUHJLPHV
thus lacks significant weight. Financial support available to oppressive African 
regimes helps sustain bad governance and fuels conflict in the countries. Financial 
support, as part of foreign economic interventions in the pursuit of oil, therefore, can 
be linked to the resource curse.  
 
Money Corruption 
In addition to financial support, both former colonial and new players become deeply 
involved in vast money corruption in exchange for oil interests. This helps sustain 
and deepen the level of corruption in Africa. The corruption of oil monies in Africa 
by domestic or foreign actors is a serious problem. A minimum of $500 billion has 
been drained and stored offshore. Managed properly, such an amount could fund 
much development. This section first discusses French roles in oil-related corruption, 
followed by the US-British coalition, China and multinational companies.  
French patrimonial relationships with African elites have played a role in a series of 
corruption cases in Africa. Vershave, head of French NGO Survie, claimed French 
officials cooperated with African governments in oil-related corruption and crimes in 
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Congo, Chad and Gabon. For example, ex-Elf executive Andre Tarallo, having 
worked closely with the Gabonese government, testified to massive bribery with 
slush funds diverted to African leaders through accounts in Liechtenstein.  
Loic Le Flech-Prigent, former Elf President revealed that in exchange for preferential 
treatment for Elf operations in African countries, a list of people to receive 
commission was drawn up annually (Loic Le Flech-Prigent, cited in ECON, 2004: 
17) usually by, or with the assistance of, the heads of state of the countries involved, 
their family members and close associates (Tarallo, cited in ECON, 2004: 17). The 
list was then sent to the Ministry of the Economy so that Elf could claim tax credit 
for the expenses. The amount of commissions grew from 300 million francs in 1989 
to about 1 billion francs by 1993. Most of the money went to Gabon, followed by 
Angola, Nigeria, Congo-Brazzaville and Cameroon (ibid.). The money was 
transferred primarily through the French International Bank (Fiba) of which Elf 
RZQHGSHUFHQWDQGPXFKRIWKHUHVWE\*DERQ¶VSUHVLGHQW2PDU%RQJRibid.).1 
Renaud Van Ruymbeke, a French magistrate, reported that in March 2003 Elf 
H[HFXWLYHVSODFHGDVXPRIDURXQGPLOOLRQLQ%RQJR¶VVHFUHWEDQNDFFRXQWV
(Vershave, 2000, cited in Clarke, 2008). 2 
Some of the corrupted money returned to France in the form of kickbacks as African 
recipients were expected to make a donation to offshore accounts. The money 
corruption network became a large source of funding for a number of French 
SROLWLFDOSDUWLHVLQFOXGLQJWKH*DXOOLVW535SDUW\3UHVLGHQW6DUNR]\¶VSROLWLFDOSDUW\
and high-ranked French officials and businessmen (ECON, 2004: 17; Boisbouvier, 
2010). This financial involvement by France systematized oil-related corruption and 
consequently strengthened authoritative regimes in power in African states. 
Since the early 1980s, top-level control and management of industries and monies 
have become concentrated in the financial centres of New York and London and to a 
much lesser extent Tokyo and Frankfurt (Sassen, 2001). However, Western banks 
and governments have done literally nothing to repatriate the corrupted oil monies or 
to help African governments tackle the thievery. A top Western money-laundering 
official with extensive knowledge of Africa revealed that most investigations by 
African countries of money laundering and corruption are shunned by banks and 
governments in the developed world (Behar, 2008). The departure of these funds 
would damage their banking systems, the institution fundamental to the Western 
ZRUOG¶VHFRQRPLFDQGSROLWLFDOLQIUDVWUXFWXUH7KH86DQGWKH8.DUHWKHWRSWZR
uncooperative countries in tackling African financial corruption (Ibid.). Their 
actions, in effect, help sustain corrupted African officials and criminal business 
leaders. This problem is particularly worsened in oil-rich countries where revenues 
can be misappropriated. When the presence of oil does not provide an equitable 
distribution of wealth, this often leads to conflicts, followed by a series of political 
repressions. Essentially, the West is contributing to the resource curse.  
                                                          
1
 Fiba was closed by French judges in March, 2000. During its business period, the bank was based in 
Paris with branches in the capitals of Gabon and Congo (ECON, 2004).  
2
 See more details of French-African networks of money corruption in Verschave (2000). 
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China is now involved in large-scale, oil-related corruption in Africa. The money 
specifically targets the resource sector. Their attention to use money to secure the 
resources is more overt than other players. China views this as part of doing business 
(Interview with Fukushima, 15 January, 2011). It is known for handing out heavy 
bribes to secure its extensive oil deals in Africa. According to Transparency 
International's Bribe Payers Index, Chinese companies are the second-most likely 
(after India) to use bribery abroad (Hanson, 2008). A World Bank survey also found 
that sub-6DKDUDQ$IULFDKDVWKHJUHDWHVWH[SHFWDWLRQRIUHFHLYLQJµJLIWV¶IURPILUPVLQ
exchange of government contracts (43 percent). This mutual recognition is what 
PDNHV&KLQD¶VGHDO-making in Africa very effective (Behar, 2008). 
Apart from foreign states, multinational companies have also been involved in oil-
related corruption including briberies, secret deals and tax evasion in exchange of 
favourable oil deals (Interview with the director of African Economic Research 
Consortium, 16 September, 2010; director of JGC Corporation, 5 November, 2010; 
Chairman of Governance Technical Team, Bayelsa; Chief Executive Officer of 
Dotecon Nigeria Limited, 30 December, 2010; Lagos focus group; 15 January, 
2011). Foreign firms have made several secret oil contracts and paid secret bonuses 
with African elites offering the latter cash incentives in return for lucrative 
investments. This makes it difficult to assess their contracts, know what oil revenues 
actually accrue to governments and evaluate whether the proportion accruing to 
countries is fair. It also makes it very difficult to hold governments accountable for 
their revenue management (Gary and Karl, 2003). Global Witness (1999) heavily 
FULWLFL]HGFRUSRUDWHRLO¶VFRPSOLFLW\LQERQXVSD\PHQWVWKDWPLJKWhave helped 
ILQDQFH$QJROD¶VFLYLOZDUDQGFDOOHGIRUIXOOILQDQFLDOFRQWUDFWGLVFORVXUHV)RU
example, approximately $400-$500 million in signature bonuses for blocks 31-33 
alone disappeared (through arms purchases). Contract confidentiality was seen as 
aiding government unaccountability, official corruption and widespread poverty 
(Clarke, 2008; Leech, 2006). 
In Equatorial Guinea, companies including ExxonMobil, Hess, Marathon, Chevron, 
'HYRQDQG9DQFR(QHUJ\DUHVDLGWRVKDUHLQWKHFRXQWU\¶VUDPSDQWFRUUuption, 
according to Avin Ganesan, the director of the business and human rights programme 
at Human Rights Watch. Companies in the oil business in Equatorial Guinea have 
been anxious to improve the image of the country and play down its history of 
instability (New York Times, July, 2009). 
,Q8JDQGD(1,¶VZLOOLQJQHVVWRJLYHLQFHQWLYHVWR8JDQGDQRIILFLDOVLQH[FKDQJHIRU
oil deals, for example, makes international news (Muhumuza, 2011). Agreements 
signed between the Ugandan government and foreign oil companies, Italian firm ENI 
DQG8.FRPSDQ\7XOORZ2LOKDYHDOOHJHGO\LQYROYHGEULEHU\7KH3UHVLGHQW¶VFORVH
officials were said to be bribed in order to represent the interests of foreign oil 
companies or to influence presidential decisions. In October 2011, Prime Minister 
Amama Mbabazi, Foreign Affairs Minister Kutesa and Internal Affairs Minister 
Onek faced serious corruption charges (MP Gerald Karuhanga, cited in BBC News, 
October, 2011). The latter two confirmed they would step down from the office as 
the parliamentary committee commenced the investigation.  
In Ghana, Kosmos, a Texas oil company was allegedly involved in corruption deals 
with EO, a company set up by two political allies of former president John Kufour. 
The corruption was said to help Kosmos secure control of the Ghanaian oil block, 
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RQH¶VRI$IULFDELJJHVWUHFHQWGLVFRYHULHV$FFRUGLQJWRDVHQLRU*KDQDLDQRIILFLDO
.RVPRV¶VILQDQFLQJRI(2¶VFRVWVZDV³ZLGHO\UHJDUGHGLQWKHLQGXVWU\DVXQXVXDO´
HVSHFLDOO\DVWKHWHUPVRI.RVPRV¶VGHDOZLWKthe government and state oil group 
ZHUH³PRUHIDYRXUDEOHWR.RVPRVWKDQIURPDQ\RWKHUDJUHHPHQW´:KLOHWKH
Ghanaian authorities are investigating corruption, the US justice department is also 
understood to be probing the relationship between Kosmos and EO (Wallis, Arnold 
et al., 2010).   
Bribes paid from oil companies often allow unequal contracts that benefit small 
groups of politicians, their business associates and the companies involved while the 
mass populations lose out (Interview with the director of Nigerian Central Bank, 15 
September, 2010). The mass African populations also lose out when multinational 
corporations use their international structure to avoid paying taxes on their African 
operations. This results in revenues erosion and the impoverishment of the country. 
Furthermore, tax evasion usually involves criminal activities such as fraud and 
money laundering. For example, in August 2006, Chevron and its consortium partner 
Petronas were found guilty of unpaid back taxes worth US$450 in Chad (Reuters, 
2006). Chevron also faced charges of tax evasion in the same year in Nigeria, for 
ZKLFKWKH+RXVHRI5HSUHVHQWDWLYHV¶&RPPLWWHHRQ3HWUROHXP5HVRXUFHVRUGHUHG
Chevron to pay $492 million in settlement (This Day, August, 2006). Apart from the 
known allegations of company corruption, it is believed that there are many more 
secret deals made behind closed doors. This is carried out for commercial returns 
without any considerations of how the money would contribute to the political, 
economic and sociDOSUREOHPVRQWKHJURXQG7KHFRPSDQLHV¶SUDFWLFHVLQWKLV
context play a part in exploiting Africa and are, in effect, neo-colonial in nature.  
Having discussed foreign financial involvement as part of economic interventions 
used for enhancing their oil interests in Africa, the next sections move on to discuss 
foreign business conduct which is carried out in ways that most benefit their oil 
YHQWXUHV7KHVHSUDFWLFHVDUHGHVLJQHGIRUPD[LPXPH[WUDFWLRQRI$IULFD¶VUHVRXUFHV
by the superpowers leaving Africa poorer and worse off while enriching the latter. A 
level of control is at play, particularly with emerging Chinese influence in Africa. As 
a result, African countries remain subordinate decades after gaining their 
independence. A new era of colonialism in Africa is in full force. 
 
Business Conduct  
Foreign players employ various practices to maximize their interests in the oil 
business. Some of these practices, however, are called into question. For example, in 
the circumstances when the business interests and the risks of environmental damage 
are at odds, they would try to circumvent best practices in order to save costs. 
Foreign oil operations in Africa are also attached to exclusivity and act like an 
enclave within national economies. Philanthropic projects also serve like a 
masquerade rather than being a part of social responsibility. This section discusses 
the negative business conduct which is mainly carried out by multinational oil 
companies, another type of foreign player taking part in the neo-colonization of 
Africa.   
One of the most serious consequences of oil industries in Africa is environmental 
damage. Oil spills and gas flare from oil operations can have widespread and 
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permanent impacts on the health of local populations, their livestock, farming and 
natural biodiversity. The destruction of livelihoods contributes to the 
impoverishment of the affected regions and potentially worsens local conflicts 
(Homer-Dixon, 1999). For instance, ExxonMobil has also been blamed for 
environmental damage caused by the Mobil-led construction of a pipeline from Chad 
to Cameroon. The environmental damage has been found to have negative social and 
economic consequences (Skjærseth, 2003). 
 
The locals are further marginalized and impoverished as oil operations in Africa are 
often an enclave within the national economy bringing few benefits, if any, to the 
locals. Angola is an extreme example of an enclave sector. Despite a huge oil 
industry which provides 80 percent of national income (Oxfam, 2009), oil employs 
only about 10,000 out of over 19 million Angolans (World Bank, 2010). Most oil is 
produced offshore, loaded straight from the rigs onto tankers and shipped off to 
international markets without ever coming into contact with Angolan soil (Gary and 
Karl, 2003). Until the early 1990s, international oil companies and oil service 
companies kept their staff and installations in Angola to a minimum, preferring 
wherever possible to run their Angolan operations from overseas. Likewise, 
equipment destined for the production of oil in Angola was almost entirely 
manufactured and assembled outside the country. One of the few companies which 
did have significant installations in Angola, Chevron, maintained an enclave within 
DQHQFODYHWKHFRPSDQ\¶V$QJRODQRSHUDWLRQVUDQIURPWhe Malongo camp in 
Cabinda, which is surrounded by minefields and which expatriate staffs are 
absolutely forbidden from leaving (Ghazvinain, 2007).1 In recent years, under 
pressure from Sonangol and the Angolan government, this has begun to change. All 
of the major oil companies have now invested in office space and accommodation for 
some expatriate staff in Luanda. Nevertheless, most other supplies are still shipped in 
from abroad. Even with this expansion of oil operations on Angolan soil, the industry 
is still present only in the coastal towns of Cabinda, Soyo, Luanda, Sumbe and 
/RELWRZKLFKZHUHUDUHO\DIIHFWHGE\WKHILJKWLQJ+DG$QJROD¶VRLOLQVWDOODWLRQVODLQ
onshore and generated some benefits to locals, the war might not have lasted as long. 
However, other forms of conflicts, as in the case of Nigeria, might have been more 
likely (Watts, 2004).  
The scenario is similar in the DRC. Oil is produced onshore in the western Bas 
Congo region and offshore in the narrow wedge of Congolese territorial waters 
tucked in between Congo-Brazzaville and Angola. Near the town of Moanda, an 
onshore site where the state oil company Cohydro partners with foreign firms is an 
enclave among enclaves. It is a heavily militarized zone that is difficult to get to from 
the capital, with special permission required of anyone wishing to enter the zone, 
including government officials. Full details of operations in the zone are never made 
public. Locals have been complaining of severe environmental destruction, oil spills 
and pollution around this zone (Gary and Karl, 2003). While the DRC has gained 
                                                          
1
 Cabinda is seen as an Angolan enclave. It is not geographically connected and shares no cultural, 
ethnic, or historical connections with Angola. Cabinda and Angola became the same country when 
Portugal colonised the region (Ghazvinian, 2007). This displays the colonial neglect of indigenous 
political and social sensitivities. Drawing borders based on their own interests lead to conflicts within 
the false territory undermining any potential development progress. More than 90 percent of oil 
production in Angola comes from Cabinda. This is the region where the fights between FAA, UNITA 
and MPLA for the control of oil had been ongoing. Throughout the conflicts, Angola witnessed 
various parties intervening on different sides (see Chapter 3). 
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notoriety for a civil war dominated by looting of mineral assets (such as crude oil, 
diamonds and coltan), crude oil has continued to be exported during the civil war. 
Chevron has produced oil in the Congo since 1959, enduring political coups, country 
QDPHFKDQJHVWKH0REXWX6HVH6HNR¶VNOHSWRFUDWLFUXOHDQGWKHUHFHQWFLYLOZDU 
Although a huge amount of oil has been produced, the economic impact on locals is 
limited. Since 1976, the DRC fields have produced more than 160 million barrels of 
oil. The present production by Chevron, Unocal and Teikoku Oil of Japan and Total 
averages 24,000 barrels per day (ibid.). The only forms of compensation to villagers 
are some small relief items such as rice and beans. While the industries are massive, 
oil workers import everything and hardly leave their accommodation compound. 
Since the overthrow of Mobutu, the presidencies of Laurent Kabila and Joseph 
Kabila, have overseen increasing oil activity.1 With new reforms, the government 
hopes to encourage more oil investment. However, little of this will benefit locals. 
For a country rich in oil, the DRC still faces fuel supply problems because the only 
domestic oil refinery is unable to refine heavy Congolese crude and it still has to 
import oil from Nigeria (ibid.).  
Apart from having exclusivity in oil operations, some foreign companies, especially 
Chinese, are blamed for unsafe operating conditions (Interview with MOSOP 
programme officer, 14 January, 2011). In late 2006, Gabon forced a Chinese energy 
company to stop drilling for oil due to environmentally unsafe practices (McLeary, 
2007). Chinese firms are also being blamed for the low wages paid to local workers. 
They are also inclined to counterbalance oil trade deficits with sales of Chinese 
goods, including the sales of military equipment. This trend is already emerging in 
West Africa, potentially destabilizing the region further (Jaffe and Medlock, 2005). 
As civil societies have increasingly documented the paradoxical marginalization of 
oil-rich regions, oil companies in many parts of Africa are now actively taking part in 
social responsibility projects such as building hospitals, schools and water supplies. 
While they claim to bring community development, much of these are insufficient 
and do not consider local needs, maintenance of projects or political sensitivities 
attached to the projects or their localities. For example, when oil companies build 
roads into undeveloped land, they attract developers and other rival ethnic groups 
into rural areas, which lead to conflicts, as in Nigeria (see Chapter 6). Acting like 
public sector such as that of their local governments replaces the direct 
accountability and linkages between their governments and their people. There are 
dangers of companies involving in distributing humanitarian aids also if the 
governments seize the new resources for its own political aims by providing 
favoured groups the resources while depriving others from them (Keen, 1998). 
The same stories repeat nearly everywhere in African oil-producing countries 
including Nigeria (see Chapter 6), Chad and Sudan (Al Jazeera, 2010). This is 
particularly what locals call a double-standard practice. Western governments would 
                                                          
1
 In, 2000, ChevronTexaco announced that it would spend $75 million more to drill new wells and 
expand production in the DRC. In June, 2002, UK-based Heritage Oil signed an agreement with the 
government for the rights to exploratory drilling in the new area of 7.7 million acres in north-eastern 
Congo, contiguous with Block 3 in Uganda where Heritage sank an exploratory well later in 
September, 2002. The problem is that rebel movements opposed to the Kinshasa government currently 
control the territory, which includes the site of serious Hema-Lendu conflicts in 2003 (Gary and Karl, 
2003). Oil installations in the area will thus fuel the conflicts as revenues become both incentives and 
support for continued fighting.  
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not allow any operating companies, including their own national companies, to carry 
out such practices in their domestic territory yet are prepared to ignore reprehensible 
activities by their companies in African countries (Interview with a senior diplomat 
in the Office of the President, Petroleum Resources Unit, Sierra Leone, senior 
official in the Petroleum Exploration and Production Department, Uganda, 4 
November, 2010; 6KHOO¶VIRUPHUVHQLRURIILFLDO'HFHPEHU. As Western 
governments form strong alliances with authoritarian rulers of African oil-rich 
countries, these rulers often deliberately allow multinational oil companies to 
practice double-standards by ignoring when operating abroad the standards required 
at home (Interview with senior Shell executive, 12 January, 2011).  
Environmental damage is rarely remedied, cleaned up or compensated when it occurs 
in Africa. This scenario is further complicated when the land for oil operations have 
been acquired from the locals without proper compensation. These same practices 
would be unlikely elsewhere. Instead, as soon as there is environmental damage 
caused by oil industries in Western countries, such as oil spills in the Gulf of Mexico 
(2010) and New Zealand (2011), compensation and remediation follow. Oil 
companies are primarily demanded to create jobs for locals, subject to their 
qualifications, rather than whose men they belong to (Interview with a legal adviser, 
17January, 2011). They would be required to use local industries and services for 
their operations as much as possible. Tax evasion would not be tolerated and, where 
caught, punished. In this context where oil creates mutual wealth, building social 
projects from the oil companies becomes an irrelevant task (Omadino focus group, 5 
January, 2011; Gokana focus group, 10 January, 2011). As the leaders of the African 
countries in question allow such double-standard practices to persist, foreign 
investors often support these repressive regimes and certain groups of associated 
locals in conflicts in return (Frynas, 1998; Manby, 1999; Haufler, 2001). This can 
influence the outbreak and prolongation of conflict (Duffield, 2000).  
Asymmetries of wealth, power and knowledge between international oil companies 
and governments in Africa allow oil companies to drive hard bargains over oil profits 
while African countries lose out (Interview with the director of Nigerian Central 
Bank, 10 September, 2010). Most often they dwarf the countries where they operate. 
([[RQ0RELO¶VSURILWVRIELOOLRQLQIRUH[DPSOHDUHPRUHWKDQten times 
higher than the $1.4 billion GDP of Chad in the same year (Gary and Karl, 2003). 
This permits them to influence the decision-making of oil countries, design laws and 
manipulate legal structures in their favour (Interview with the director of Nigerian 
Central Bank, 10 September, 2010). Although African governments ultimately make 
decisions regarding oil extraction in their territory, their power to act is constrained 
by a few very powerful supermajor companies (ibid.).  
For example, in Congo where large oil revenues should have provided wealth for a 
VPDOOSRSXODWLRQRIPLOOLRQWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VZHDNQHVVXQGHUPLQHVJRRG
EDUJDLQLQJSRZHU$OWKRXJK7RWDO¶VDQG(1,$JLS¶VOLFHQFHVDUHQRZWD[HGXQGHU
Production Sharing Contract (PSC) terms, their operations are still governed by the 
very favourable 1969 &RQYHQWLRQVG¶(WDEOLVVHPHQWV, which among other advantages 
allows the companies exemption from customs duties (Gary and Karl, 2003: 35). 
Multinational oil companies in Africa thus often obtain greater shares of profits than 
in other parts of the world (ibid.). Other African oil-rich countries, especially the 
smaller and newer producers, have also experienced unequal terms of trade with the 
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multinational oil companies. These countries include Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, 
Seychelles, Ghana and Sierra Leone.1 
However, the Director of the African Economic Research Consortium, Professor Olu 
Ajakaiye (Interview, 16 September, 2010) contended that it is not the asymmetric 
power that allows foreign players to exploit Africa but that in fact foreign players 
deliberately attempts to create and enforce the global system of asymmetric power 
where Africa is kept underdeveloped. Ajakaiye further asserted that while the trade 
between China and the US is not equal due to asymmetric power, the Western world 
does not attempt to keep China underdeveloped. However, African experiences differ 
with a continuation of imperialism in a new form. Before independence, it was the 
total imperial control of African territory. Afterwards, it has been politically-
PHGLDWHGHFRQRPLFFRQWUROWDUJHWLQJ$IULFD¶VUHVRXUFHV,WZDVUDZPDWHULDOVDQG
slaves during the colonial era and it is oil, strategic minerals and African markets 
now. 
In a system similar to colonial control, Ajakaiye argued more profits from 
investments can be easily appropriated. The companies would not have to submit to 
any regulations, pay taxes or share revenues. Bribery and deals behind closed doors 
are easier, quicker and more beneficial. It is not in foreign interests for Africa to 
develop. An interview with the director of a Japanese Investment Bank in Nigeria 
confirmed this point when he revealed that foreign investors preferred the Nigerian 
military regimes as money paid to them would open doors for businesses, despite the 
whole population of Nigeria losing out (2 November, 2010).  
%\SXUVXLQJEXVLQHVVDVXVXDOLQµWURXEOHG¶HQYLURQPHQWVWKHFRPSDQLHVUHZDUG
African oil rich states for their over-dependence on petroleum, authoritarian power 
and even rent-seeking activities (Gary and Karl, 2003). While oil industries create 
massive wealth for the companies and energy security for their home states, the 
populations of African oil-rich countries become poorer, the areas of oil installations 
more violent, the governments remain oppressive and energy, as well as most basic 
necessary facilities, are still seriously lacking. This happens while Western industrial 
groups and governments are working to promote the image of friendly and stable 
investing environments in these countries. These practices are aimed at increased 
FRQWURORYHUWKHRLOLQ$IULFDDQGSURILWV,QWRGD\¶VJOREDOLVHGZRUOGUHVRXUFHVVWLOO
flow to enrich the centre states leaving the periphery states poor and oppressed just 
as during the colonial era. The mechanism of neo-colonialism is at work. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter discussed foreign economic interventions in African oil-rich countries. 
Economic interventions, in comparison to political interventions (discussed in 
Chapter 4), are more varied with the players and approaches involved becoming less 
GLUHFW,QWKHPRGHUQµOLEHUDO¶ZRUOGWKH\RIWHQFRPHLQWKHIRUPRIPXOWLODWHUDO
attempts to spread wealth and democratic freedom. While preaching privatization, in 
                                                          
1
 ,QWHUYLHZZLWK([WHUQDO'LUHFWRURI6KHOO*DERQ,QWHUYLHZZLWK*KDQD¶V0LQLVWHURI(QHUJ\
November, 2010; Interview with the RepresentatLYHIURP6LHUUD/HRQH¶V3HWUROHXP5HVRXUFHV8QLW
November, 2010; Interview with Deputy Chief Executive Officer, Seychelles Petroleum Company 
Limited and Interview with (TXDWRULDO*XLQHD¶V0LQLVWHURI3HWUROHXP1RYHPEHU, 2010. 
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the area of oil we see the Western governments maintaining strong control and 
VXSSRUWIRUWKHLUFRPSDQLHV¶DFWLYLWLHV)ROORZLQJWKHGHFOLQHRI(XURSHDQSRZHU
after WW II and the independence of former colonies soon after, the US and later 
China have increasingly become the leading global powers seeking African oil. 
/DFNLQJ(XURSH¶VFRORQLDOLQIOXHQFHWKH86XVHVLWVHFRQRPLFVWUHQJWKWKURXJKD
network of institutions to manipulate global monetary order in ways that empower 
American dollar and energy aspirations. However, these approaches are now 
increasingly questioned by weaker nations.  
7KHµVROXWLRQV¶VXJJHVWHGE\:DVKLQJWRQ-based institutions such as Structural 
Adjustment Programmes and aid are far from effective; contrarily making them 
poorer and the Western states richer. The approaches are also seen as draconian, self-
interested and impractical and only serve to sustain neo-colonialism in Africa. Seeing 
the weakness of the Western approach, as a newcomer to the African oil game, China 
deliberately employs softer terms lubricated with large, unconditional, cash 
incentives. This has helped China win over many African elites, especially those 
seeking an alternative to old colonial ties. Notwithstanding different approaches, 
China is pursuing its own interests and agenda in Africa.  
As British and French economic supremacy has passed to new players such as the 
US and China, they have found it most effective to become allies of the US and the 
US-based International Financial Institutions in implementing neo-liberal strategies, 
global monetary order and economic sanctions. British and French influence remains 
through patrimonial relationships with former African colonies. This includes a web 
of complicated business relationships that benefit the economic and political leaders 
of corrupt leaders on both sides. TKLVFKDSWHUDOVRGLVFXVVHG01&V¶EXVLQHVV
conduct in oil operations in Africa which has been implemented in ways that 
seriously undermine environmental standards, turn oil operations into enclaves and 
create social projects that are damaging rather than beneficial. Essentially, all foreign 
interventions (old and new, direct or indirect) are neo-colonial intended to keep 
$IULFDXQGHUGHYHORSHGZKLOHVXSHUSRZHUVFRQWLQXHWRUHDSEHQHILWVIURP$IULFD¶V
materials, in this case oil. The next chapter discusses oil-related foreign interventions 
in Nigeria in detail in order to assess in the last chapter whether these have brought 
the expected development to the country and Africa as a whole. 
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-Chapter 6- 
 
Neo-ǯ 
 
NigHULDLV$IULFD¶VODUJHVWRLOSURGXFHU(,$,WKDVRQHRI$IULFD¶VORQJHVW
experiences with international oil exploitation. Instead of being a success story, 
Nigeria became a classic example of the resource curse where poverty, conflicts and 
bad governance are endemic, existing alongside massive oil wealth. With an estimate 
of 400 billion dollars of oil revenues having been made, Nigeria is performing worse 
than 40 years ago (Shaxson, 2007). More than 70 percent of Nigerians now live on 
less than a dollar a day - compared to 28 percent in 1980 (US CIA, 2011). There are 
no basic life necessities, frequent fuel shortages and unreliable electricity supplies in 
most parts of a country that provides oil to large parts of the world (Maidment, 
2003).1 
This research deals with the resource curse theory which explains why resource-rich 
countries fail to perform well. Until today, the causes of the resource curse are 
mostly explained by economic mismanagement and the failure of domestic politics 
related to the oil revenues. International dimensions have been overlooked. Besides, 
theorists predominantly use contemporary aspects when explaining the resource 
curse, ignoring the Marxist historical dialectical perspective. Nigeria and Africa, as a 
whole, have been exploited and marginalized to an extent that economic and political 
systems failed, making it nearly impossible to properly manage the challenges 
attached to large oil revenues. Even developed countries like Norway and the 
Netherlands found it initially difficult to manage oil wealth. Norway today is still 
suffering one of the highest levels of Dutch Disease in the world (Gylfason, 2006).  
This thesis uses the neo-colonialism concept to hypothesise that continued 
exploitation by former colonial as well as new SOD\HUVFRQWULEXWHVWR$IULFD¶V
underdevelopment, a factor that should be included in the resource curse discussion 
since it merges the neo-colonialism concept, which is predominantly political, with 
the resource curse theory, largely explained from an economic standpoint. This 
research focuses on interventions related to oil which I categorized as political and 
economic interventions. The study applies this model to Nigeria. The political 
interventions foreign players use include the balkanization of Nigeria, the use of state 
policies, political meddling and military involvement. Foreign economic 
interventions include financial involvement, displayed in the form of neoliberal 
policies and money corruption, and the ways business is conducted in practice. 
Before discussing these interventions, an overview of Nigeria is provided.  
  
                                                          
1
 Approximately 81 million people (total Nigerian population of 150 million) do not have access to 
electricity in Nigeria (EIA, 2010) while those that do cannot rely on it since it often fails (personal 
visits to Lagos, Delta, Rivers and Bayelsa State). 
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Nigeria: overview 
 
This section provides a brief overview of Nigeria with a particular focus on the oil 
VHFWRU:HILUVWGLVFXVV1LJHULD¶VRLOLQGXVWU\IURPZKHQLWILUVWVWDUWHGDQd the 
resource curse that followed. We then present the Niger Delta, an oil-rich region, 
which predominantly suffers the curse.  
 
Oil industry 
Oil in Nigeria was discovered in 1956 in Oloibiri. Other discoveries soon followed 
and exports began in 1958. Nigeria became a strategic player in the world of oil 
geopolitics in the wake of the Biafra civil war (1967-1970). The first oil-related 
legislation can be traced back to the Colonial Mineral Ordinance (in 1914) which 
granted licences for mineral control, including oil, exclusively to Britain. As a result, 
WKH6KHOO'¶$UF\&RPSDQ\MRLQWO\RZQHGE\6KHOODQGE\%ULWLVK3HWUROHXP%3
received exclusive exploration and production rights in the whole of Nigeria. This 
monopoly was maintained until Nigeria gained independence from Britain in the 
VDQG1LJHULD¶VRLOLQGXVWU\EHFDPHPRUHRSHQWRRWKHUSOD\HUV*XOI2LOQRZ
Chevron), Elf and Agip quickly began production in Nigeria.  
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Map 1: Nigeria 
 
Source: US Central Intelligence Agency (1993) 
The majority of UHVHUYHVDUHIRXQGDORQJWKHFRXQWU\¶V1LJHU5LYHU'HOWDDQG
offshore (EIA, 2010). Average operational costs in Nigeria are around US$2.50 a 
barrel, higher than the Persian Gulf, but lower than the Gulf of Mexico and the North 
Sea. This oil is exported mainly to the US and Western Europe as shown in the 
following illustration.  
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Figure 1: Nigerian Oil Exports by Country, 2009 (Ibid.) 
 
 
With reserves estimated at close to forty billion barrels, oil accounts for 80 percent of 
government revenues, 90 percent of foreign exchange earnings, 96 percent of export 
revenues and almost half of GDP according to the IMF (ibid.).  
Most oil activities in Nigeria are carried out by European and US companies in joint 
ventures with the Nigerian state oil company, the Nigerian National Petroleum 
Corporation (NNPC), giving NNPC 55-60 percent ownership. Offshore fields are 
PRVWO\RSHUDWHGXQGHU³SURGXFWLRQVKDULQJFRQWUDFWV´36&VLQZKLFKWKH
government is not an official partner (Manby, 1999). Foreign oil companies 
operating in Nigeria include Shell, ExxonMobil, Chevron, Total, Eni/Agip, Addax 
Petroleum (recently acquired by Sinopec of China), ConocoPhilips, Petrobras, 
StatoilHydro and other smaller companies (EIA, 2010). Shell has been working in 
Nigeria since 1936 and currently operates the most nameplate oil production, 
following by ExxonMobil, Chevron, Total and Eni respectively (ibid.). 
Because of large oil interests, an increasing number of new players have entered 
1LJHULD¶VRLOLQGXVWULHV (Interview with the president of Leadership Centre for Peace, 
Integrity and Transformation (LCPIT), 2 January, 2011). This further complicates the 
relationship between oil companies, governments and the oil-producing communities 
and increases the exploitation of Nigeria (Interview with the director of Our Niger 
Delta, 13 January 2011):DWWVFRQVLGHUHG1LJHULDDQµRLOFRPSOH[¶DV\VWHPLQ
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which there is a diverse mix of forces involved in shaping and influencing business, 
ILQDQFLDOSROLWLFDOHFRQRPLFDQGVRFLDOVWUXFWXUHVRI1LJHULD¶s petro-state. These 
forces include foreign state governments, multinational companies, state companies, 
independent companies, civil societies, transnational agencies, development 
agencies, financial corporations, webs of criminality and military forces. The 
struggle for resource control which has dominated Nigeria in the last decade as the 
Niger Delta has become more problematic grows precisely from this mix of forces 
that constitute the oil complex (Watts, 2006: 12). This overwhelming struggle for oil 
is deeply engrained in Nigerian society. It is an everyday topic of discussion. Nearly 
all activities and problems are linked to oil. It takes most of the space in Nigerian 
newspapers and media coverage. 
EŝŐĞƌŝĂ ?ƐKŝůĐƵƌƐĞ 
Nigeria is a classic example of thH³UHVRXUFHFXUVH´GLVFXVVLRQ,WLVWKHULFKHVW
African oil producer but ranks 142nd RXWRIQDWLRQVRQWKH81¶V+XPDQ
Development Index (UNDP, 2010). Eighty-five percent of oil revenues accrue to one 
percent of the population. Since the oil industry became significant, income 
inequality increased strikingly and per capita income has fallen from $800 in 1980 to 
$300 today. Nigeria has performed worse than sub-Saharan Africa as a whole and 
much worse than most developing countries (Gary and Karl, 2003). For a typical 
Nigerian, basic social services such as education and medical treatment are 
unaffordable (Interview with the Anglican priest, 1 January, 2011; principal of 
Shell/NNPC joint-venture school; doctor of Chevron/ NNPC joint-venture hospital, 5 
January, 2011; members of Bodo Council of Chefs and Elders; and Chiefs of Goi 
Community, 10 January, 2011). There are regular prolonged strikes by school and 
hospital personnel resulting in overall poor education and healthcare systems 
(Personal visit in the Niger Delta). The lack of schooling and employment 
encourages youths to become involved in criminal activities surrounding the oil 
installations (Interview with Warri citizens and church leader, 5 January, 2011).  
Oil mismanagement and rent-seeking thrive in Nigeria. Monies flow into the state 
largely through the Nigerian National Oil Company (NNPC) where much is stolen or 
squandered. No fiscal rules are in place to create sustainability. As soon as the oil 
sector emerged in the late 1960s, Nigeria suffered the Dutch Disease, an economic 
malfunction which an overvalued exchange rate seriously harmed and crowded out 
the agricultural and manufacturing sectors. High vulnerability to the boom and bust 
cycles of an oil-dependent economy has made government spending and 
development schemes difficult to plan (Gary and Karl, 2003). 
Nigeria is an extreme case of a rentier state where the entire country depends heavily 
on the oil revenues to function. The tax rate is incredibly low.1 Generally, Nigerians 
do not feel as if they pay tax to the government. Unlike in Western countries, high 
tax levels hold the government responsible by citizens demanding benefits from the 
high price they pay. In Nigeria, petrol also is heavily subsidized. During a visit 
(January, 2011), oil was priced at 65 naira per litre (approximately 35 British pence). 
Furthermore, Nigeria imports nearly all products. Low tax income, heavy 
subsidization of public services and commodities and dependence on imported goods 
                                                          
1
 Individual income tax is at 1 percent, the business tax is at 5 percent and VAT is rated at 5 percent. 
However, the income tax is automatically deducted from an individual salary and VAT is already 
included in the commodity net price (Interview with the Anglican priest, Warri, 1 January, 2011). 
C h a p t e r  6  | page 159 
 
cause chronic trade deficits and heavy indebtedness. Oil revenues fund nearly all 
functions in Nigeria. In this context, national infrastructure and developmental 
projects cannot be sustained. Governmental services are low. Average Nigerians 
spend most of their income on basic facilities like water and electricity in order to 
keep their household or businesses functioning (Personal conversation the Anglican 
priest, 1 January, 2011). 
 
Niger Delta 
This oil curse is significantly deepened in the Niger Delta, home to most Nigerian oil 
assets. It supplies about 90 percent of crude oil and gas resources. Since 1975, the 
Niger Delta has accounted for over 75 percent of Nigerian export earnings. The 
region is made up of nine states in the Southeast: Abia, Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross 
River, Delta, Edo, Imo, Ondo and Rivers. See Map 2 below for the location of these 
states.  
 
 
The Niger Delta has a population of 31 million from forty ethnic groups speaking 
over 250 dialects (Congressional Research Service, 2008). More than 1,500 
communities out of a total of 5,000-6,000 host oil operations. More than 300 oil 
fields, 5,284 wells, 7,000km of pipelines, ten export terminals, 275 flow stations, ten 
Map, 2: Constituent States of 
the Niger Delta (Idemudia and 
Ite, 2006: 195) 
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gas plants, four refineries and some massive liquefied natural gas (LNG) projects are 
located in the Niger Delta (Ghazvinian, 2007; Honorary Kingsley Kemebradigha 
.XNX¶VVSHHFK-XO\6HH0DSEHORZIRU1LJHU'HOWDRLOLQIUDVWUXFWXUH
Massive oil infrastructures are found dominantly atop deeply impoverished and 
marginalized areas. 
 
 
 
 
Factors such as political and economic mismanagements are explained as part of the 
problem. However, these alone cannot explain the resource curse in Nigeria. There is 
a wide range of foreign activities carried out in order to control or appropriate 
1LJHULD¶VRLOZKLFKFRQtribute to the resource curse and further complicate the 
SUREOHP1RQHWKHOHVVOLQNDJHVEHWZHHQIRUHLJQLQWHUYHQWLRQVDQG1LJHULD¶VUHVRXUFH
curse have never been explored. This chapter aims to remedy this lack of literature 
and demonstrate that foreign interventions create damaging outcomes for Nigeria.  
 
'XHWR1LJHULD¶VVWUDWHJLFUHJLRQDOLPSRUWDQFHLWVODUJHDPRXQWRIRLODQGWKHWKUHDWV
to the stability of this oil flow (disruption, terrorism, militias and political instability), 
foreign players have increased their use of political and economic mechanisms to 
protect their oil interests. Table 1 below summarizes oil-related foreign political and 
economic interventions in Nigeria before discussing these in detail in the next 
section.   
 
Map 3: Niger Delta Oil Infrastructure 
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Table 1: Oil-related Foreign Political and Economic Interventions in Nigeria 
Foreign political involvement 
 
Foreign Economic Interventions 
 
Balkanization of Nigeria 
x Former Colonial Players:  
o British colonialists shaped Nigerian territory without 
concern for ethnic sensitivities and adopted the 
divide-and-rule strategy for full control and 
maximum resource extraction.  
x New Players:  
o &RPSDQLHVSLFNHGXSWKHFRORQLDOµGLYLGH-and-UXOH¶
strategy to ensure their oil profits. 
The Use of State Policies 
x Former Colonial Powers:  
o Both Britain and France used diplomacy in 
obstructing the passage of Petroleum Industry Bills.  
x New Players:  
o US employs foreign policy to enhance its energy 
interests and uses the War on Terror to disrupt 
ATCA court cases. 
o China uses oil diplomacy with a particular focus on 
bilateral meetings and agreements.  
Political meddling 
x Former Colonial Players:  
o Britain and France supported military governments 
by granting visas to military officials in violation of 
EU measures against Nigeria. Several meetings 
between senior state officials were held. 
 
x New Players:  
Financial Involvement 
Neoliberal Policies (Free market and privatization): 
x Former Colonial Players: Through IFIs such as the IMF 
and the World Bank, US, Britain and France imposed 
Structural Adjustment Policies as conditions of aid. China 
uses oil-for-aid programmes, which are highly 
conditional. Under neoliberal policies, resource-producing 
countries face quota restrictions and finished products 
entering Western markets are highly taxed to protect 
Western manufactured products. Raw materials from 
developing countries are low-priced while Western 
manufactured goods are expensive.     
Money Corruption: 
x Former Colonial Players and New Players: Western 
banks based in New York and London sustain illegal 
money transactions, handle the loot of Nigerian military 
dictators and allow stolen money deposits in overseas 
accounts. While China is known for massive money 
corruption with African elites, this is not done through 
:HVWHUQEDQNVEXWWKURXJKµSHUVRQDOJLIWV¶2LO
companies also use bribes and tax evasion.  
 
Business Conduct 
x New Players ± Companies: 
o Circumventing Environment Standards: Oil 
Spills and Gas Flares 
 Environmental pollution is caused by 
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o US also responded to corporate lobbying against 
sanctions on Nigerian oil. 
o International Financial Institutions provide funding 
to oppressive regimes. 
o Companies significantly influence and interfere with 
Nigerian politics, work closely with corrupt regimes 
and benefit from human rights violations committed 
by national military responsible for protecting oil 
operations.  
 
Military Involvement 
x Former Colonial Players:  
o Britain and France armed different warring sides in 
the Biafra War. Their provision of arms to Nigeria 
remains significant. 
 
x New Players:  
o US military aid is claimed to prevent attacks against 
oil facilities as well as serving as part of the War on 
Terror, especially during the Bush administrations. 
Military initiatives in Nigeria include EUCOM 
(2003), Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Initiatives 
(2005), The Gulf of Guinea Guard (2005) and 
AFRICOM (2007). US arms sales to Nigeria have 
rapidly increased.  
o Chinese involvement in Nigeria is increasing, 
especially where the Western players fail to deliver, 
EXW1LJHULDLVVWLOOQRW&KLQD¶VPDLQIRFXV 
o Multinational companies provide arms for state 
forces and security personnel. They also hire private 
security, fund military training and activities, pay 
wages and allowances, provide military equipment 
equipment failures and poor operating 
standards. 
 Companies rarely clean-up the environmental 
damage caused by oil operations properly. 
 &RPSDQLHV¶HQYLURQPHQWDOSUDFWLFHVLQWKH
Niger Delta are considerably at variance with 
their practices in the developed world 
(Environmental Racism). Global 
Memorandum of Understanding negotiated 
for lower level of operating standards.  
o Acquisition of Land: Companies are only 
required to pay rents to the federal governments 
for the acquisition of oil-bearing land. 
Negligible, if any, compensation to the local 
populations.  
o Enclave Company Operations: 
 Oil industries are capital-intensive.  
 Little local employment and that only to 
dominant tribes and leaders. Strategic 
positions are preserved for foreign 
employees. Contracts are preferentially 
given to expat companies.  
 Oil employees live and work within their 
compounds where most products are 
imported leaving no contribution or 
connection to the society and economy of 
Nigeria. 
o Philanthropic projects:  
 Projects are incomplete, poorly 
carried out and unsuitable despite 
high budget spending. Constructed 
projects lack basic facilities, 
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and facilities and often seek government protection 
for their premises and employees. Brutal JTF and 
militias are hired for security.  
 
maintenance and security. 
 Scholarships are selective and low-
value.  
 Projects do not suit the needs of 
communities but rather aim for 
sizeable expensive projects from 
which money can be siphoned-off. 
 Roads built are access roads. They 
directly link oil installations to the 
port, often crisscross sensitive 
ecological areas and do not make any 
contribution to local connections. 
 Many promises are given but few are 
fulfilled.   
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We now discuss foreign political interventions in Nigeria as displayed in the table 
above in detail before moving on to discuss foreign economic interventions in 
Nigeria in the latter part of this chapter. 
 
Foreign Political Interventions 
 
Political interventions foreign powers use in advancing their oil interests in Nigeria 
include balkanization, the use of state policies, political meddling and military 
involvement. This thesis focuses on the main players in African oil industries: Britain 
and France (former colonial players), the US, China and transnational agencies (the 
new players). Under each category of political and economic interventions, we 
discuss foreign players who tend to engage in such practices. Where a party is not 
involved, they are omitted. Due to the high level of secrecy of interventions at the 
national level, discussions of their role can be limited while more company 
involvements on the ground can be captured, verified and discussed at length. 
This section starts by discussing the balkanization of Nigeria designed for resource 
control as part of the entirety of analysing the scramble for African oil. The 
balkanization of Africa, although largely associated with colonialism, is still on-
going to a significant extent and this validates a discussion of neo-colonialism.  
 
Balkanization of Nigeria 
Although Nigeria has only experienced foreign involvement in oil industries since 
the 1960s, this scraPEOHIRU1LJHULD¶VRLOLVQRWMXVWDFXUUHQWSKHQRPHQRQEXWSDUWRI
continuing imperial attempts to gain resources, land and raw materials. Throughout 
its history, Nigeria has fallen under partial or full control of foreign players. 
%LVPDUFN¶V-85 Berlin Conference partitioned Africa into parts for several 
competing European colonialists. This balkanization of Africa legitimized full 
colonial control of Africa. Arbitrary national borders were drawn utterly based on 
European interests. Nigeria was the prize in this plan (Dike, 1965). Although Nigeria 
received independence in 1960, the balkanization of Nigeria continues, contributing 
LQWKHVKDSLQJRI1LJHULD¶VVWUXFWXUHDQGLWVSRVLWLRQLQWKHZRUOG7KLVVHFWLRQ
discusses balkanization of Nigeria as a form of political interventions by former 
colonial masters and new players seeking resource control. 
 
Balkanization of Nigeria by Former Colonial Players 
The area which is Nigeria today became a subject of European resource control from 
as early as the 16th century and later became a prize for competing colonialists and 
part of the balkanization of Africa. During the 16th-18th centuries, the Delta became 
the leading slave mart in West Africa. In the 19th century, due to the flourishing palm 
oil trade in the Niger Delta, Britain was actively involved in Nigeria in order to guard 
its interests against France and Germany. When the Landers in 1830 discovered that 
the Delta was the mouth of the River Niger, which could be used to penetrate the 
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hinterland, this became a strategic region imperialists sought to control.1 This river, 
like the Congo River, became one of the highways of imperialism in West Africa 
(Baker, 1996).  
In order to gain a footing on the banks of the Niger for trade directly linked to the sea 
(ibid.), the Royal Niger Company Chartered and Limited under Lord Lugard, had to 
repel several invasions from France and Germany (Dike, 1965). It was these battles 
between European powers over the ownership of the territories along the Niger River 
and the Congo River that led Bismarck, the German Chancellor, to convene the 
Berlin Conference in 1884 (Osunlana, 2008). In effect, the Niger territories became a 
British protectorate in 1885 (Dike, 1965). This allowed the Royal Navy to protect the 
'HOWD¶VµVHFXULW\¶ in effect ensuring that no other European country could do 
business there (Ghazvinian, 2007). The trade dominance of the Royal Niger 
Company was seen an important instrument of which British won its claims over this 
region.  
The balkanization during the Berlin Conference created false national borders. 
Nigeria would not have been one country if Britain had not wanted the largest 
country in Africa, especially in a region dominated by French influence, West Africa 
(Clarke, 2008; Interview with Dr Nnadozie, 3'HFHPEHU1LJHULD¶V
population has over 1,000 indigenous groups, diverse in languages, cultures, 
societies, religions and ways of life, some often in rivalry with others. The Muslim 
1RUWK¶VWLHVWRWKH$UDESHQLQVXODDQGWKH'HOWD.LQJGRPVLQWKHsouth shared little 
in common (Interview with director of United for Change, 30 December, 2010).  
The balkanization for maximum resource control was not only territorial, but also 
VRFLDODQGHWKQLF%ULWDLQDGRSWHGDµGLYLGH-and-UXOH¶VWUDWHJ\DPRQJ1LJHULan ethnic 
differences. This favoured the dominant groups so that they would control the 
minority groups and keep them in order (Interview with Dr Nnadozie, 31 December, 
2010). Thus, British colonial administrations placed dominant Northern tribes in 
authority and supplied them with money, means and weapons to systemize the 
oppression. The majority ethnic groups, first Fulani (in the North) and second 
Yoruba (in the Southwest, including the protectorate capital Lagos); thus, dominate 
the control of oil revenues from the Niger Delta where the minority groups such as 
Ijaws, Igbo, Urhoro, Itsekiri and Ogoni live (Interview with Chairman of Central 
Development Council for Ibaramatu Community, 2 January, 2011). Since Britain 
created the Nigerian state, the Deltans have been ruled and marginalized by both 
regional and federal governments (Manby, 1999). For instance, The Ogonis, who 
were never conquered by any of their neighbours, were forced under the rule of other 
tribes only by the British colonialists. The divide-and-rule strategy aggravated the 
use of violence and hatred between different tribes and created conflicts that had 
never existed before in Nigerian society. The call for self-determination through an 
Ogoni Bill of Rights (in 1990) was therefore a call for a return to the status quo ante 
colonialism.  Within the context of a balkanized state, some elites were forced to 
collaborate with the British in order to gain political and economic advantages 
against their rival tribe as they would accept British occupation rather than the rule of 
                                                          
1
 The British explorers, Richard Lemon Lander and his brother John, were on an expedition to West 
Africa and Nigeria with the intention of founding a trading settlement.   
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their hated rival (Osunlana, 2008). A state as balkanized as Nigeria experiences 
prolonged conflicts.  
7KHµGLYLGH-and-UXOH¶VWUDWHJ\ZDVSURYHGHIIHFWLYHIRU%ULWDLQDVWKH\KDGWRGHDO
with only a handful of people in a country as large as Nigeria while focusing on 
extracting raw materials from the land (Dike, 1965; Interview with Environmental 
Rights Action (ERA) Activist; founder of the Niger Delta Development Initiative 
Committee; Ebema farmer, 10 January, 2011). Violence was seen as the norm to 
acquire power during British rule. The result of European balkanization of Nigerian 
territory and society was that deep-rooted conflicts were never resolved. When 
colonial Britain left, it left the country with unskilled people accustomed to violence 
and with different ethnic factions sitting on top of huge oil assets in the Niger Delta 
region. This spawned one of the bloodiest civil wars in African history, the Biafra 
War (1967-1970).1 A newly independent and fractured country with weak political 
institutions will find it difficult to exercise economic control and to properly manage 
the oil wealth for the equal benefits of its people.  
Amidst the factions in Nigeria, the colonial business thrived. Corporate oil and 
foreign players continued their meddling in Nigeria throughout the Biafra Civil War 
(1967-1970), the Cold War and the present scramble for oil. Foreign exploitation 
continues.  The oil companies, in particular, are seen to sustain the balkanised 
colonial pattern of Nigeria.  
Balkanazation of Nigeria by New Players 
Since the British divide-and-rule strategy was successful in controlling resources, oil 
companies adopted this strategy. Like the British colonialists had done, companies 
favour some communities over others. They would award traditional rulers, youth 
leaders and dominant tribes with money, benefits and contracts for their favours to 
oil companies (Interview with ERA activist, 10 January, 2011). To implement the 
divide-and-UXOHµ2LOFRPSDQLHVZRXOGSD\PRQH\WRFHUWain dominant communities 
to keep RWKHUVLQFKHFN¶,QWHUYLHZZLWK%DQZRDQG,JKRGDOROHJDODGYLVHU, 17 
January, 2011). For example, before oil was drilled in Owaasa Community, Shell 
arrived and gave bribes to the traditional leaders to ensure that they would settle any 
potential disputes. That led to the death of ten villagers believed to disagree with the 
oil agreement (Interview with Owaasa local, 13 January, 2011). Agip was also 
accused in the same practice in Mbede community. That a small group of elites 
                                                          
1
 Most oil extracted in Nigeria comes from the Niger Delta where Ijaw and Igbo tribe dominate. The 
federal spending of oil revenues favoured the North because of the domination of Northern political 
HOLWHVLQ1LJHULD¶VJRYHUQPHQW7KH1LJHU'HOWD(DVWZKLFKKDGEHHQEHDULQJWKHEUXQWRIRLO
operations remained underdeveloped. Such partial spending created resentment among the Eastern 
tribes. In 1966, two idealistic young radicals (Isaac Boro and Nottingham Dick) founded the Niger 
Delta Volunteer Service and declared the Delta an independent Ijaw republic. They pronounced all oil 
contracts null and ordered oil companies to negotiate directly with the new republic. The NDVS 
managed to capture Yenagoa, the capital of Bayelsa State. Responding to the event, the Nigerian army 
quickly moved in, using equipment from Shell in quashing the new Ijaw republic. In 1967, the Igbo 
followed suit by declaring an independent Republic of Biafra in the southeast of Nigeria (Shaxson, 
2007). The army general Yakubu Gowon, seeing this as an Igbo power grab, launched a countercoup. 
This became the %LDIUD:DUWKHEORRGLHVWWKUHH\HDUVLQ1LJHULD¶VKLVWRU\ZLWKDQHVWLPDWHGWZR
million deaths (Ghazvinian, 2007).  
 
C h a p t e r  6  | page 167 
 
benefit from the oil operations whilst the majority bear its brunt, creates division and 
conflicts within the communities (Interview with Ebema farmer, 9 January, 2011).  
When there are disputes or damage caused by the oil operations, companies often 
seek contacts with communities not directly involved in hope of finding a low-cost 
settlement with those who are not directly affected. After the Trans-1LJHU3LSHOLQH¶V
oil spill in January 2011, for example, instead of negotiating the problem with the 
landlord, Shell went to another community. Companies would also provide arms for 
peoples in the communities who support their presence, often creating communal 
clashes (Interview with ERA activist, 10 January, 2011). The communities which 
used to be fishermen and farmers now breed hatred within by this strategy (ibid.). 
This resembles the pattern of the arbitrary balkanization and the ensuing conflicts in 
colonial times.  
7KHµGLYLGH-and-UXOH¶WDFWLFXVHGE\RLOFRPSDQLHVDOVRSOD\HGRXWLQWKH
violent communal conflicts, the Warri Crisis. Since before independence there have 
been tensions between the dominant Itsekiri tribe and the less prominent Urhobo and 
Ijaw surrounding the arrangements for the government of the region around Warri 
(Interview with missionary in the Delta creeks; and the Warri local man, 5 January 
2011). These conflicts partly are attributed to deliberate British attempts to play one 
ethnic group off against another during the colonial period. Shell and Chevron 
continued this by unfairly favouring the Itsekiri community when handing out 
contracts and benefits; particularly through their leader, the Olu of Warri (Manby, 
1999). For rural populations with no experience of such large amounts of benefits, 
the possibilities of receiving these benefits lead to violence (Interview with Former 
Trade Union Leader, 9 January, 2011). 
The balkanization of Nigeria contributed to Nigerian tribalism. Division and 
resentment towards other tribes are entrenched into the fibre of every Nigerian (ibid.; 
Interview with Banwo and Ighodalo legal adviser, 17 January, 2011). Today, 
Nigerians still prioritize their tribe and individualism above their nationality, largely 
FRQWULEXWLQJWRUDPSDQWFRUUXSWLRQWKHµTXLFNPRQH\¶PLQG-set, the flight of capital 
and the brain drain, the factors which prevent Nigeria from breaking the resource 
curse. The Nigerian law is still in favour of Northerners entering into political 
positions, which discourages the development of a system where skills are rewarded 
(Interview with Dr NnDGR]LH'HFHPEHU,Q1QDGR]LH¶VZRUGVDUHVXOWRI
WKLVLVWKDWµPHGLRFULW\UHLJQVLQ1LJHULDZKHQWKHPHQZKRGRQ¶WKDYHWKHVNLOOVDUH
LQFKDUJHRISHRSOHZKRGR¶7KXVWKHRLOERRPLQWKHVWDWHRISROLWLFDOHFRQRPLF
and social immaturity largely contributes to instability (Interview with Chairman of 
Governance Technical Team of Bayelsa State, 30 December, 2010). 
This section shows that the colonial balkanization of Nigeria has been sustained in 
WRGD\¶VFDSLWDOLVPLQRUGHUWRPDLQWDLQWKHIORZ of resources. This system of resource 
control undermines the strong foundation which Nigeria needs in order to properly 
manage the newfound oil wealth. It re-HQIRUFHVWKLVWKHVLV¶QHR-colonial hypothesis 
which assumes that continued interventions by both old and new players still produce 
negative impacts which perpetuate the marginalization of Africa and, in this case, 
Nigeria. 
+DYLQJGLVFXVVHGKRZFRQWLQXHGEDONDQL]DWLRQRI1LJHULD¶VWHUULWRU\DQGVRFLHWLHV
XQGHUPLQHG1LJHULD¶VSROLWLFDOVRFLDODQGHFRQRmic progress; this chapter now 
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moves on to discuss other oil-related political interventions including the use of state 
policies, political meddling and military involvement.  
 
The Use of State Policies 
Unlike the balkanization of Nigeria, new foreign players such as the US and China 
DUHDOVRDFWLYHO\LQYROYHGLQXVLQJVWDWHSROLFLHVWRJDLQPRUHFRQWURORI1LJHULD¶VRLO
Because state policies are directed from states, the discussion of companies in this 
type of intervention is irrelevant. 
The Use of State Policies by Former Colonial Players 
Due to previous colonial ties, diplomacy has been one of the main methods where 
former colonial players have a relative advantage which they use to strengthen their 
oil interests. For example, in 2008 during the passage of Nigeria Petroleum Industry 
Bills (PIB), designed to increase local ownership in the lands hosting oil operations, 
French and British officials were seen hotly engaging with top Nigerian government 
officials in order to obstruct the legislation. A senior Elf employee gave a witness 
VWDWHPHQWWRWKDWSHULRGµ)UHQFKSROLWLFLDQVWRRN1LJHULDQVHQDWRUVWR)UDQFH2Q
their several visits to Nigeria, they made a lot of statements commenting how the PIB 
LPSHGHGWKHLQGXVWU\¶,QWHUYLHZZLWK(OI6HQLRU6WDII4 January, 2011). He further 
asserted that companies also heavily resisted the passing of the PIB by lobbying the 
government, engaging in the national assembly and using propaganda in order to 
impose their own view of how the bill should be. Bribes were handed to several 
departments. Elf and Shell were heavily active in lobbying their home governments 
while putting pressure on the government of Nigeria (ibid.; interview with security 
consultant to the Nigerian Government, 17 January, 2011). For example, Shell 
announced the withdrawal of 20 Billion naira worth of investment if the Petroleum 
Industry Bill was passed (Interview with Banwo and Ighodalo legal adviser, 17 
January, 2011). The Bill eventually failed to pass leading to an outcry. To locals, this 
incident again highlighted the significant pressure foreign players impose on 
1LJHULD¶VSROLWLFVDQGHFRQRP\,QWHUYLHZZLWK(EHPDWHDFKHUDQGDQDFWLYLVW
January, 2011). The diplomatic encounter with dominant foreign players which 
resulted in the non-passage of the PIB allowed foreign players to continue exercising 
WRWDOFRQWURORI1LJHULD¶VRLOH[SRUWEXVLQHVV$FFRUGLQJWR6HQDWRU/HH0DHEDWKH
former Chairman of the Joint Committee of the National Assembly on the PIB, 
IRUHLJQWRWDOFRQWURORI1LJHULD¶Vmain industry, the oil sector, is threatening the 
VRYHUHLJQW\DQGVHFXULW\RI1LJHULDDQGDFFRXQWVIRUWKHFROODSVHRI1LJHULD¶V
economy (Alike, 2011).  
 
The Use of State Policies by New Players 
The US has also used various state policies in enhancing its oil interests globally. For 
Sub-Saharan Africa, the Africa Oil Policy Initiative Group (AOPIG) report to the US 
Congress highlighted the urgency of reshaping a new US  national security policy, 
further suggesting that such an initiative would be based on the West African 
petroleum producing states such as Nigeria, Angola, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon and 
Congo Brazzaville (Goldwyn and Morrison, 2005). According to the report, Nigeria, 
DV$PHULFD¶VODUJHVW$IULFDQWUDGLQJSDUWQHUZRXOGVHUYHDVWKHNH\DFWRUDQd 
regional economic stabilizer despite its problems with governance and transparency. 
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To gain influence in this region, the US must upgrade its relations with Nigeria 
whilst managing the attendant risks. According to this report, Nigeria is wracked by 
internal conflict and often unable to manage crime and violence within its borders 
which could lead to the breeding of terrorism and the disruption of US energy 
supplies (AOPIG, 2005: 4). The War on Terror is the new state policy frequently 
used in part to enhance US oil interests. The state intervention in the court 
proceedings arising from the Alien Tort Claims Acts (ATCA) in the guise of the War 
on Terror is an example. These Acts allow foreign victims of human rights abuses to 
sue US corporations or companies listed on the US stock market in US Federal 
Courts for human rights abuses committed overseas. 
 
Interfering in ATCA cases has been rare since the law started operating in 1979 but, 
beginning in July 2002, the Bush administration sought to curtail the ability of 
foreign nationals to seek justice in US courts. The government was frequently hostile 
to such lawsuits and has repeatedly made submissions to courts suggesting that such 
cases should be dismissed claiming that they interfere with US policies and 
compromise US interests, including the War on Terror (Human Rights Watch, 2002).  
The US government interventions in the Nigerian ATCA cases include Boweto v 
Chevron Corp (2008) and the Ogoni v Shell (2009). Bowoto v. Chevron is a lawsuit 
charging ChevronTexaco Corporation with gross violations of human rights 
including extrajudicial killings, crimes against humanity and degrading the 
environment in the Niger Delta. In May 1998, unarmed residents of the Niger Delta 
SURWHVWHGDW&KHYURQ¶VRIIVKRUH3DUDEH3ODWform, demanding that the corporation 
contribute more resources to the impoverished oil region. The protestors were shot 
and some killed by Nigerian soldiers and Chevron security personnel who were 
transported to the platform on Chevron-leased helicopters. Ogoni v. Shell is a lawsuit 
charging Shell with complicity in human rights abuses against the Ogoni people in 
Nigeria including crimes against humanity, wrongful killing and causing 
environmental damage (Center for Constitutional Rights, 2011; Interview with the 
founder of Ogoni Solidarity Forum, 6 January, 2011).  
7KH86JRYHUQPHQWV¶DWWHPSWVWRSUHYHQWWKH$7&$¶VXVHLQWKHVHFDVHVEDVHGRQ
the War on Terror policy has been seen as a smokescreen that serves US energy 
security and other political and economic goals. Instead of preventing the calamity of 
mankind as claimed, several arguments submitted by the government in objection to 
the ATCA cases were adversative to human rights protection. This policy was 
pursued more diligently during the Bush administrations in the period when the oil-
producing Middle East region became unstable. Promoting oil interests and pursuing 
energy security were central themes of the Bush administrations. See Earth Rights 
International (2010) for details. 
Apart from the US, China is also becoming a new player actively engaging in the 
region. Up until 2005, Chinese oil companies had demonstrated very little interest in 
WKH1LJHULDQRLOLQGXVWU\+RZHYHUGXHWR1LJHULD¶VODUJHUHVHUYHVDQG&KLQD¶V
rapidly rising energy need and its geopolitical strategy, this changed. Since 2005, 
increased energy co-operation between the two countries was reportedly a major 
topic between Presidents Hu and Obasanjo during high-level meetings (Hall, 2005). 
President Hu reportedly announced his desire WRHVWDEOLVKD³VWUDWHJLFSDUWQHUVKLS´
ZLWK1LJHULDZKLFKKHWHUPHG³DWRSSULRULW\IRU&KLQD¶VIRUHLJQUHODWLRQV´&KLQD¶V
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006, as quoted in Klare, 2008: 169).  In 2009 and 2010, 
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China started making large energy investments there (Andrews-Speed and 
Dannreuther, 2011).  
+RZHYHU&KLQD¶VLQYROYHPHQWLQ1LJHULDQRLOWRGD\KDVDORZSURILOHFRPSDUHGWR
their Western competitors. Nigeria was a British colony and has increasingly been an 
important oil supplier to the US. Generally, China prefers to operate in oil-rich 
countries whose markets are less penetrated by the West because this is where China 
finds its competitive advantage (ibid.). As previously discussed, these include 
countries under Western sanctions such as Sudan and Libya and in countries 
resenting Western influence, like Angola. The oil-for-infrastructure formula that has 
been so successful in Angola is a proven failure in Nigeria. As Nigeria is not the 
PDLQIRFXVIRU&KLQD¶VDUHDRILQIOXHQFHWKHGLVFXVVLRQRI&KLnese oil-related 
interventions in Nigeria remains brief. In most state policies, China often opts for the 
so-FDOOHGµRLOGLSORPDF\¶ZKLFKSULRULWL]HVELODWHUDOPHHWLQJVDQGDJUHHPHQWV 
 
Political Meddling  
 
Another approach foreign players use for enhancing their oil interests is through 
meddling in Nigerian politics. These are activities such as regime change, 
interference in internal affairs and financial and logistical support to corrupt regimes. 
Foreign players are found interfering in different levels of Nigerian politics - local 
governments, state governments and the federal government (Interview with deputy 
director of Social Action, 6 January, 2011). Elections are often manipulated. During 
the election process, oil companies, for instance, are found giving money to 
governors and promising candidates who work in their favour so that the authority 
will have vested interests in the oil companies (Interview with the former President 
of Nigerian Trade Union; 9 January, 2011). In effect, the Nigerian leadership does 
not derive power from its people and thus it is not answerable to them.  
Nigerian oil politics resembles the Axis of Oil, to misquote the Bush administration. 
Most Nigerian petroleum ministers are, and have been, oil executives, including the 
current Petroleum Minister who was a former Shell employee (Interview with 
MOSOP programme officer, 14 January, 2011; Interview with Banwo and Ighodalo 
legal adviser, 17 January, 2011). Major oil companies thus gain significant support 
from officials in strategic positions. In the process, foreign oil players have 
penetrated into the politics of Nigeria (Interview with deputy director of Social 
Action, 06 January, 2011). 
Despite Western claims of democratic support, its oil industries flourish under 
oppressive leaderships (Interview with director of Our Niger Delta, 2 January, 2012). 
The presence of Western oil industries upholds the legitimacy of these oppressive 
regimes which are further strengthened by the oil money flowing in from them 
(Interview with MOSOP programme officer, 14 January, 2011; Interview with the 
president LCPIT, 2 January, 2011). In Nigeria, bad leadership and violence have 
persisted but these have not stopped foreign players from developing ties with 
oppressive Nigerian governments. Before Obasanjo, a former military ruler, won the 
election in 1999, Nigeria had experienced an uninterrupted military dictatorship for 
nearly three decades. However, the Obasanjo government and the succeeding 
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governments have remained authoritarian and highly corrupt. Throughout Nigerian 
authoritarian regimes, oil industries have been immune significantly due to foreign 
political engagements (Manby, 1999). As these activities interrupt and influence the 
existing political system of the host country by strengthening or weakening it, I 
classify this type of political intervention as political meddling. As neo-colonialism 
is used in analysing continued foreign intervention in Africa, I will first examine the 
political meddling carried out by former colonial players, followed by that of the new 
players. Although Chinese diplomatic relations with Nigeria also contribute to the 
sustenance of its oppressive regimes and consequently influence the existing 
1LJHULDQSROLWLFDOV\VWHP&KLQD¶VUROHLQSROLWLFDOPHGGOLQJLVUHOatively 
insignificant. As discussed in Chapter 4, China strongly advocates a non-interference 
policy. Hence, no discussion of China in this context is appropriate.  
 
Political Meddling by Former Colonial Players 
Former colonial players often employ special diplomatic ties with African 
governments, even under oppressive regimes. For example, Britain, claiming special 
diplomatic relations with Nigeria, ruled out the European Parliament call for an oil 
HPEDUJRRQ1LJHULDGXULQJWKH$EDFKDJRYHUQPHQW¶VEUXWDOPilitary rule (Manby, 
0RUHRYHUWKH8.¶V'HSDUWPHQWIRU7UDGHDQG,QGXVWU\FRQWLQXHGWRVSRQVRU
WUDGHPLVVLRQVWR1LJHULDGXULQJ$EDFKD¶VUHJLPHDJDLQVWWKHZLVKHVRIWKH)RUHLJQ
and Commonwealth Office. In the same period, France and Germany repeatedly 
granted visas for visits by Nigerian officials, in violation of EU measures against 
Nigeria. In the case of France, the former petroleum minister of Nigeria, Dan Etete, 
visited on several occasions, presumably to discuss the French role in the oil industry 
LQUHVSRQVHWR(OIDQG7RWDO¶VLQWHQVLYHOREE\LQJIRULQFUHDVHGEXVLQHVVZLWK1LJHULD
In return, they were rewarded with contracts from the Nigerian government (ibid.). In 
September 1998, both British Prime Minister Tony Blair and French President 
Jacques Chirac met with General Abubakar, another military leader succeeding 
President Abacha, in order to promote trade relations (ibid.). These Western political 
engagements focusing on commercial interests rather than democratic progress 
helped uphold oppUHVVLYHUHJLPHV7KHFRQVHTXHQFHLVWKDWWKHFRXQWU\¶VVRFLDO
political and economic performance is undermined.   
 
Political Meddling by New Players 
Among foreign states, the US is accused of a leading role in political meddling in 
Nigeria. A senior official in the US state department revealed that the US would not 
let Nigeria out of control until there were alternative energy resources. The Nigerian 
SUHVLGHQWLDOILJXUHVVXEVWDQWLDOO\UHTXLUH:DVKLQJWRQ¶VEDFNLQJVLQFH:DVKLQJWRQ
frequently releases statements or employs a range of policies in promoting or 
undermining the presidential position. For example, with US support, the 
government of Buhari in 1985 was overthrown by Babangida (Interview with Rotary 
World Peace Fellow, 2 January, 2011). Many NGOs operating in Nigeria, which 
work largely on the issue of governance improvement, also cannot negatively 
question the US engagement in Nigerian politics since they receive funding from the 
US (Interview with the deputy director of Social Action, 6 January, 2011). Like 
former colonial players, the US energy giants Mobil and Chevron, were also active in 
C h a p t e r  6  | page 172 
 
lobbying the US government to fight off threats of oil sanctions against Nigeria 
through the Corporate Council on Africa (Manby, 1999).1  
Apart from state players, transnational agencies, such as international organizations 
and companies, also play a part in political meddling in Nigeria and, as a by-product, 
supporting corrupt regimes. Throughout Nigerian oppressive political history, the 
World Bank has been involved in a dialogue with Nigerian authorities on a range of 
petroleum sector topics (Interview with former Trade Union leader, 9 January, 2011). 
Although the World Bank fully understands the damaging impacts of funding the oil 
sector in corrupt countries as well as how dependence on oil is harmful to economies, 
financial support for oppressive regimes is easily available. Despite the World 
%DQN¶VUKHWRULFVXSSRUWLQJWKH81PLOOHQQLXPJRDOWRHUDGLFDWHSRYHUW\WKH:RUOG
Bank still supports non-transparent contracts and payments which mostly benefit 
political and business elites while robbing their countries of the massive revenues on 
which they predominantly depend (Gary and Karl, 2003). Thus, international 
agencies, such as the World Bank, influence the existing political system of Nigeria. 
Oppressive regimes and corruption persist.  
As for the oil companies, tKHIDFWWKDW1LJHULD¶VRLOLQGXVWU\RSHUDWHVRQMRLQW
YHQWXUHVEHWZHHQRLOFRPSDQLHVDQGWKHJRYHUQPHQWPHDQVWKDWRLOFRPSDQLHV¶
profits are in the govHUQPHQW¶VLQWHUHVWV7KHUHIRUHERWKSDUWLHVVHHNFORVHUHODWLRQV
and oil companies have an important role in influencing and interfering with 
Nigerian politics (Interview with the deputy director of Social Action, 6 January, 
2011). The government is seen to side with oil companies instead of standing by the 
Nigerian people. Concordantly, oil companies prefer to lobby from the top than to 
associate with affected communities. The result is that local communities often feel 
left out and marginalized while resource exploitation in their region permeates. 
Because the government holds vested interests in continuing oil businesses, the 
deputy director of Social Action explained that the Nigerian system is not allowed to 
freely operate to an extent which even the rule of law cannot be implemented. For 
example, the government often intervenes in court cases which the communities 
bring against oil companies. Consequently, cases are dropped and violence against 
the communities follows (Interview with director of ERA Bayelsa State, 13 January, 
2011). While the affected communities often face challenges in filing a suit due to a 
lack of knowledge and evidence of damage (such as for the quantity of oil spills and 
their effects), the companies and the government deny them access to any relevant 
reports or assessments (Personal visit and Interview with Goi Community and 
Ikarama Community, January, 2011). The oil companies will obstruct, circumvent 
and plainly violate regulations or rulings not to their benefit (Interview with the 
deputy director of Social Action, 6 January, 2011). 
On the ground, foreign oil companies have worked closely with corrupt regimes and 
benefited from human rights violations committed by the national military 
responsible for protecting oil operations (Leech, 2006; Interview with ERA project 
assistant, 6 January, 2011). The multinationals responded that as individual 
companies they cannot pressure government without the risk of losing out to other 
                                                          
1
 The Corporate Council on Africa (CCA) is a trade association, established in 1993. CCA works 
closely with governments, multilateral groXSVDQGEXVLQHVVWRUDLVH$IULFD¶VLQYHVWPHQWSURILOH,WLV
often considered to be a lobbyist organization whose work focuses on strengthening and facilitating 
the commercial relationship of the United States in Africa. 
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companies on competitive concession rights. They claim that, even if all Western 
companies acted according to the human rights foundation, the abuses could persist 
as the Chinese would gain concessions (Interview with Maersk Oil Angola general 
manager, 4 January, 2011; speech by GlobalPacific president, 1 November, 2010). 
Furthermore, a director of a Japanese investment bank revealed in an interview, after 
having operated in Nigeria for several years, that businesses preferred military rule 
because under the civilian government foreign companies face more rules, 
regulations and restrictions (5 November, 2010).  
7KHUHDUHYDULRXVVXVSLFLRQVZK\1LJHULD¶V([WUDFWLYH,QGXVWU\7UDQVSDUHQF\
Initiative (NEITI) does not have data on how much oil is produced in Nigeria and 
why the Department of Petroleum Resources does not have adequate industrial 
HTXLSPHQW7KHVHLQFOXGHFRUUXSWLRQDQGODFNRIFDSDELOLW\RQWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VVLGH
and the grand imperial scheme in keeping Nigeria underdeveloped on the foreign 
playHUV¶VLGH,QWHUYLHZZLWK02623SURJUDPPHRIILFHU, 14 January, 2011). These 
claims have some unquantifiable truths and errors to them. It is certain however that 
the lack of reliable data and sufficient industrial equipment is unacceptable as it 
allows the oil companies to get away with non-transparency and to dominate oil-
related activities with maximum profits (Interview with Ebema teacher and activist, 9 
January, 2011). Equally, the complexity of collaboration between foreign oil players 
DQG1LJHULDQHOLWHVXSKROGV1LJHULD¶VEDGJRYHUQDQFHDQGFRQWULEXWHVWRFRUUXStion 
,QWHUYLHZZLWK1LJHULDQ&HQWUDO%DQN¶VWRSRIILFLDO6HSWHPEHU+HQFH
1LJHULD¶VH[LVWLQJSROLWLFDOV\VWHPLVFRPSURPLVHG7KH1LJHULDQJRYHUQPHQW
becomes either helpless or uninterested in exerting pressure because most revenues 
derive from oil (Interview with deputy director of Social Action, 6 January, 2011). 
 
 
Military Involvement 
Another political approach used by foreign players to promote their oil interests is 
through military involvement. This can come through arms supplies, military aid and 
training, military initiatives and military deployment. We first examine British and 
French military involvement in the Biafra War following by the more contemporary 
86&KLQDDQGWKHPXOWLQDWLRQDOFRPSDQLHV¶UROHVLQPLOLWDU\LQYROYHPHQWLQ1LJHria.  
 
Military Involvement by Former Colonial Players 
1LJHULD¶V%LDIUD:DU-1970) is clear evidence of British and French 
LQYROYHPHQWLQ1LJHULD¶VFRQIOLFWVE\WKHLUPLOLWDU\VXSSRUWIRUWKHGLIIHUHQWZDUULQJ
sides with weapons in promotion of their RLOLQWHUHVWV%\WKH1LJHU'HOWD¶VRLO
DOUHDG\PDGHXSDWKLUGRI1LJHULD¶VH[SRUWV)U\QDV'XHWRSUHYLRXV%ULWLVK
colonial rule in Nigeria, British oil companies received preferential treatment, 
making them the dominant actor in Nigerian oil industries. Because of the huge oil 
interests, Britain decided to back the Nigerian government in this conflict 
(Ghazvinian, 2007). However, the conflict also presented an opportunity for France 
WREUHDN%ULWDLQ¶VWLJKWJULSRQ1LJHULD¶VRLOSURGXFWLRQ Given that France would 
receive oil shares in return if the opposition won, President Charles de Gaulle 
decided to intervene by supporting the Igbo rebels with weaponry (Interview with the 
Chairman of Central Development Council for a Niger Delta community, 2 January, 
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2011; Ghazvinian, 2007). Arms were flowing into Nigeria creating a complex web of 
FULPLQDOLW\DQGµPDILDEXVLQHVV¶DFFRUGLQJWRD1LJHULDQWRSRIILFLDO,QWHUYLHZZLWK
the director of the Nigerian Central Bank, 15 September, 2010). With military 
support, the conflict turned into a bloodbath civil war, the Biafra War, which lasted 
over three years causing countless casualties and crippling the country for many 
succeeding years. The Biafra War highlights the damaging impact of oil-related 
foreign military intervention in resource-rich countries.  
This trend has been continuous. France and Britain are still today committed to 
military support to the Nigerian government and the oil companies (Vanguard 
Newspaper of 7th July, 2009, cited in Courson, 2009). British weapons, for instance, 
have been supplied to both the Nigerian government and militia groups. For 
example, since 1991 Britain sold eighty Vickers battle tanks, CS gas and rubber 
bullets and issued over thirty export licenses for non-lethal military equipment to 
1LJHULD¶VPLOLWDU\MXQWDPXFKRIZKLFKYLRODWHG(XURSHDQ3ROLWLFDO&RRSHUDWLRQ
agreements to suspend military cooperation with Nigeria (Economist 8 July, 1995: 
60, quoted in Taylor and Williams, 2004: 47).  
Military Involvement by New Players 
$IWHUGLVFXVVLQJIRUPHUFRORQLDOSOD\HUV¶LQYROYHPHQWLQVXSSO\LQJDUPVWR1LJHULD,
will now discuss military involvement carried out by new players of which the US 
has so far been the most prominent. 
Because Nigeria is an important oil supplier to the US, military aid continued to 
reach Nigeria, especially during the Bush administrations, despite rampant human 
rights abuses by the Nigerian armed forces (Human Rights Watch, 2002). The 
purpose of military aid is to prevent attacks against oil facilities both in the Niger 
Delta region and offshore as well as to support the War on Terror. Referring to the 
possibility of the US military being deployed to help protect oil operations in 
Nigeria, US Air Force General Charles Wald, deputy commander of the US 
PLOLWDU\¶V(XURSHDQ&RPPDQGIRU(XURSHDQG$IULFDGHFODUHGµ:KHUHYHUWKHUH¶V
HYLOZHZDQWWRJHWWKHUHDQGILJKWLW«:KHUH\RXKDYHZHDOWKLI\RXGRQ¶WSURWHFW
LW\RXDUHYXOQHUDEOHWRWHUURULVWVDQGLOOHJDODUPVGHDOHUVDQGVR\RXDUHQRWVDIH´ 
(Da Costa, 2004, quoted in Leech, 2006: 116). Underlining this, the Nigerian Central 
%DQN'LUHFWRUVDLGµ7KH86PLOLWDU\DVVLVWDQFHWR1LJHULDLVSURYLGHGRQO\WRSURWHFW
WKH86LQWHUHVWV,WVLQWHUHVWLQ1LJHULDLVFOHDUWKHRLO¶3HUVRQDO,QWHUYLHZ 
September, 2010).  
In September 2002, the US government designated Nigeria a strategic partner in 
Africa in the National Security Strategy Statement. Since 2003, the US Navy has 
intensified its presence in the Gulf of Guinea. That year the US government gave the 
Nigerian military two gunboats to contain the militants in the delta (Interview with 
Mark Taylor of the State Department in Courson, 2009: 20). The United States 
European Command (EUCOM) was built to provide comprehensive security for the 
Gulf of GXLQHD(8&20¶VRSHUDWLRQVFRQVLVWRIDPDULWLPHVXUYHLOODQFHV\VWHPD
regional maritime, training, logistical support and equipment for the protection of 
energy infrastructure and as a means of curbing criminality (AOPIG, 2005). In 2005, 
this evolved into the Trans-Sahara Counter-terrorism Initiative, including seven other 
countries. The AOPIG (2005) report highlighted the importance of the US military 
involvement in the Gulf of Guinea borders disputes (of which Nigeria is a part), 
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JLYLQJWKDWWKHµ86VHFXrity objectives can be impaired if countries cannot agree on 
ZKRVHZDWHUVDUHEHLQJSDWUROOHGDQGZKRKDVWKHULJKWWRSHUPLWSDVVDJH¶ In the 
same year, EUCOM began the development of a coastal security programme entitled 
the Gulf of Guinea Guard (Goldwyn and Morrison, 2005) which sought to address 
WKHUHJLRQ¶VXQSROLFHGQDXWLFDO-mile coastline. EUCOM was expanded into 
AFRICOM (the United States Africa Command) in 2007 in order to protect US 
national interests in Africa. US arms sales to Nigeria have increased dramatically 
since 2006 (Courson, 2009). The US militarization in the south to protect the oil 
fields and in the north to control Islamic fundamentalism further fuels Nigerian 
political violence (Watts, 2006). 
1LJHULDLVQRW&KLQD¶VPDLQIRFXV1 However, its involvement is increasing. 
Particularly where the US fails to deliver, China steps in to fill the gap.  For instance, 
in 2006 when the crisis around the oil fields of the Niger Delta intensified, Nigeria 
asked Washington for additional supplieVRISDWUROERDWV:DVKLQJWRQ¶VIDLOXUH
to supply due to the US Congress blocking the request prompted Nigeria to turn to 
China for assistance. From 2006, China has provided an undisclosed number of 
MIG-21 fighters, J-7 fighters, maritime vessels, K-8 trainers and the FC-1 fighters, 
Shenyang fighter jets and missiles to the Nigerian military, along with a Chinese 
commitment to train Nigerian technicians in satellite operations. At the same time 
Nigeria awarded oil contracts to China (Alden, 2007: 26). Such purchases reflect 
declarations made by Nigerian military officials that they will increasingly turn to 
China for weapons to quell unrest within the Niger Delta (Dempsey, 2011). Stephen 
Morrison, the Africa director at the Washington-based Center for Strategic and 
,QWHUQDWLRQDO6WXGLHVFRXQWHUHG³>WKH@&KLQHVHDUHYHU\FRPSHWLWLYHSOD\HUVDQGZH
KDYHWRFRPHWRWHUPVZLWKWKDW7KH\DUHJRLQJWRSODFHVWKDWUHDOO\GRPDWWHU´7KH
Financial Times March 1, 2006). Nigeria provides, in this sense, a microcosm of the 
new scramble for Africa under military neoliberalism and the War on Terror. Some 
FULWLFVVHH1LJHULDDVWKHQH[W,UDT+RZGHQDQG6HQJXSWD¶VLQWHUYLHZZLWK*RUGRQ
Brown, 2008).  
 
Companies, another new player, also provided arms for state forces and security 
personnel under a cloak of high-level secrecy (Manby, 1999). According to 
international laws, security personnel should not be armed and they should only 
exercise within the property. Nonetheless, the reality in Nigeria is different (Personal 
visits to Lagos, Bayelsa, Rivers and Delta state). In 1996, Shell admitted that it had 
imported side arms on behalf of the Nigerian police force, for use by the 
6XSHUQXPHUDU\3ROLFHZKRJXDUG6KHOO¶VIDFLOLWLHVibid.). Additionally, the company 
stated that it sought to support more upgraded weapons in response to the 
deteriorating security situation in Nigeria. Based on transaction records, to which 
Shell admitted, Shell has also been supplying guns to the military and a huge number 
of these were used against civilians during the Ogoni Crisis in 1990-1998 (Interview 
with coordinator of Centre for Environment, Human Rights and Development, 7 
                                                          
1
 Although the Chinese military involvement in Nigeria is small in comparison to other players, it is 
important to highlight that its military involvement in the continent has been large. China has been 
providing military aid to $IULFDVLQFHWKHV'XHWR&KLQD¶VUHFHQWUDSLGO\LQFUHDVing need for 
resources, it often trades arms for oil and mineral resources in Africa in order to enhance its interests. 
Africa has become a key market for Chinese arms sales which in recent years have outstripped those 
supplied by the US. African oil-rich countries to which China mainly supplies arms include Libya, 
Sudan and Angola. Recently China was found to have provided arms for the Libyan government in 
the fight against civilian revolution (BBC News, 5 September, 2011). 
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January, 2011; MOSOP programme officer, 14 January, 2011).1 Occasionally, these 
arms directly or indirectly get through to local populations. 
Companies also hire private security, fund military training and activities, pay wages 
and allowances, provide equipment and facilities for the military and often seek 
government assistance in protecting their premises and employees. In the Niger 
Delta, security deals with the military authorities maybe a prerequisite for investment 
in the area. This encouraged the employment of private security contractors such as 
MPRI, Betac, AirScan and others (Clarke, 2008: 553). There have been numerous 
cases where these forces overreacted leading to civilian deaths. This, in turn, has 
fomented animosity across the Niger Delta toward foreign oil companies (Hueper, 
2005). 
Several violent crackdowns on peaceful protestors have been documented, including 
during the Ogoni Crisis and in Umuechem in 1990 (Manby, 1999; Interview with 
director of Our Niger Delta, 2 January, 2011).2 From 1999 until 2011, approximately 
15 more villages have been completely wiped out. Odi, a community of 5000 people, 
was razed by the military. In 2010, Ibaramatu was attacked followed in January 2011 
by Aiyakurumu (Interview with ERA director, 13 January, 2011). Chevron also 
provided facilities for the military such as the Pan-African Helicopter to transport 
military personnel and to bomb Apia and Ekia (Interview with director of Our Niger 
Delta, 2 January, 2011). There are also incidents of indiscriminate beating, killing, 
arrests, rapes, looting and destruction of villages (Interview with the Elders, teacher 
and NGO director, 9 January, 2011). There are cases in which witnesses have 
reported that company staff have directly threatened, or have been present when 
security force officers have threatened, communities if there is disruption to oil 
                                                          
1
 The Ogoni Crisis refers to the 1LJHULDQJRYHUQPHQW¶V systematic crackdown in Ogoniland from 1990 
to 1998. Since Ken Saro-Wiwa, the leader of the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People 
(MOSOP), started rounds of massive peaceful protests in 1990 against the harmful oil operations in 
the indigenous communities in the Niger Delta, MOSOP and Ogonis have been targeted (Saro-Wiwa, 
2004). The oil companies and the government have sent troops to crush local protest movements. 
6KHOO¶VRIILFLDOVKDYHDGPLWWHGWR+XPDQ5LJKWV:DWFKWKDWWKH\UHquested assistance from the 
Nigerian military authorities in the face of increasing local protests (Human Rights Watch, 1995). A 
special unit the Rivers State Internal Security Task Force was set to target Ogonis (Saro-Wiwa, 2004). 
Several abusive incidents were carried out during the Ogoni crisis (1990-1998) including the brutal 
Wasting Operations, a genocide plan against the Ogoni people. See Saro-Wiwa (2004: 23-28) for 
detailed witnesses of such accounts. Ogoni villages were repeatedly raided and extrajudicial killings, 
indiscriminate shooting, arbitrary detention, beating, rapes, looting and torture followed. According to 
former military personnel, military raids were designed to appear like communal clashes so that the 
outbreaks of violence in Ogoniland will be blamed as ethnic strife (ibid). Shell was found to provide 
military salaries, funding and equipment for these missions (ibid).  
 
In 1995, Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other leaders of MOSOP were hung. Shell was accused of having 
collaborated in the exeFXWLRQ+XPDQ5LJKWV:DWFKDOVRGHFODUHG6KHOO¶VLQYROYHPHQWLQWKH2JRQL
crisis to be complicit with human rights abuses (Human Rights Watch, 1995). Since 2006, the 
violence against Ogonis decreased significantly. In 2009, Shell finally agreed to pay £9.6 million in 
settlement for the killing of Saro-Wiwa and other MOSOP leaders (Pilkington, 2009). However, no 
justice has been secured for the loss of many other lives and the crimes committed in Ogoniland and 
other oil-producing areas of Nigeria. Independent monitoring of the situation in Ogoniland, as in other 
parts of Nigeria, is severely restricted by the government (Human Rights Watch, 1995).   
 
2
 According to Amnesty International, during the severe Umuechem crackdowns, 495 houses were 
damaged or set on fire and 80 people killed (Manby 1999).  
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production (ibid.; interview with ERA activist, 13 January, 2011&RPSDQLHV¶UHDG\
cash is always available, provoking officials to illegal, covert and overt actions 
(Saro-Wiwa, 2004). Oil companies are complicit at all stages (Interview with 
president of LCPIT, 3 January, 2011).  
The Joint Task Force (JTF) is one of the heavy security forces employed. The force 
LVFRPELQHGZLWKWKHPLOLWDU\QDYDODQGDLUIRUFHVFUHDWHGWRµTXHOO¶ERWKOHJLWLPDWH
and illegitimate protests against the oil companies (Interview with Warri local man; 2 
January, 2011; ERA activist, 10 January, 2011; Our Niger Delta director, 13 January, 
2011). The JTF personnel employed by Chevron revealed during the Human Rights 
7UDLQLQJ,QLWLDWLYHE\/&3,7WKDWWKH\ZHUHXQGHUFOHDURUGHUVWRµFUXVK¶SURWHVWRUV
in order to protect oil facilities (Interview with LCPIT president, 3 January 2011). 
Anything that obstructs the flow of oil has to be taken out. This accounts for the 
number of bloody conflicts in the region. The deployment of security forces has also 
facilitated political domination as those in power make use of them to eliminate 
opposition (Interviews with Our Niger Delta director, 13 January, 2011). This 
includes the companies arming and assisting the political parties and local militants 
in the run-up to the 1999, 2003 and 2007 elections to deliver votes and intimidate 
voters (Clarke, 2008).  
Consequently, the JTF has destroyed many communities. A security proposal by the 
Police dated 21 April 1994 showed that the local and federal governments have been 
receiving such large sums of money from the oil companies to hire the JTF that there 
was competition between the various arms of the security forces (Saro-Wiwa, 2004). 
Frequently, the JTF is found to deliberately stir up problems in order to justify 
security spending. For instance, former Ogoni members of the Shell police admitted 
that they were involved in deliberately creating conflicts between different groups of 
people and in intimidating protesters during the height of the MOSOP protests in 
1993 and 1994 (Manby, 1999).  
Oil companies are also involved with the militias who are paid in some oil-producing 
communities so that the operations can be carried out and often deployed on contract 
to provide security at oil facilities (Interview with MOSOP programme officer, 14 
January, 2011). Areas that used to be peaceful fishing and farming communities are 
now heavily militarised, traumatised and overpowered, particularly those 
surrounding oil installations (Interview with Ogoni villagers; Members of Bodo 
Council of Chiefs and Elders, 10 January, 2011; Interview with ERA Bayelsa 
director, 13 January, 2011). The press is banned from the oil-producing communities. 
According to Bisina, this is collaboration between oil companies and the local 
government while foreign governments turn a blind eye to protect their diplomatic 
and oil interests (Interview, 3 January, 2011). 
In addition to the role of individual foreign players, there is also a web of players 
involved in military support for Nigeria. Nigeria does not produce arms domestically 
so all arms for military and security personnel and the militias are provided by 
foreign players, many of which are illegally traded for smuggled crude oil (Interview 
with Social Action deputy director, 6 January, 2011; Coordinator of Centre for 
Environment, Human Rights and Development, 7 January 2011).1 Because Nigerian 
                                                          
1
 Naagbanton, an activist on the issue of arms proliferation in Nigeria, gave examples of arms used in 
Nigeria and their origin as follows: AK 47, mostly used by Nigerian militants (Interview with former 
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waters are patrolled by military gunboats, private security companies and the US-
backed navy initiatives such as AFRICOM, the consensus is that a regular 
occurrence on such a grand scale of illegal oil bunkering and arms trading is carried 
out by a web of international organised crime that colludes with government elites, 
security services, oil companies and foreign governments (Interview with former 
Nigeria Civil Defence leader, 9 January, 2011; ERA programme assistant, 9 January, 
2011; AOPIG, 2002; Manby, 1999).1 Foreign governments are said to be aware of 
the oil-for-arms trade in Nigeria because the numbers, types and destinations of arms 
produced by foreign arms manufacturers and traders are closely monitored and 
regulated by their home governments (Interview with deputy director of Social 
Action, 6 January, 2011). The availability of arms to both government and insurgent 
groups has democratized access to the means of violence (Watts, 2006). 
A large amount of weapons used during the Warri Crisis (2003), for example, came 
in exchange of the well-organized bunkered oil. During the crisis, fights broke out 
between the Itchekiri and Ijaws in Warri, mostly involving ethnic rivalries and oil 
interests. The arms used are said to have either Russian or other unidentifiable 
origins and sources (Interview with a missionary active in Ijaw and Itsekiri 
communities during the crisis, 1 January, 2011; Coordinator of Centre for 
Environment, Human Rights and Development, 7 January 2011). 
 
This section discussed continued political interventions by foreign players in order to 
enhance their oil interests and used neo-colonialism to explain continuing political 
interventions in Nigeria by different players, old and new alike. We now turn to 
examine economic interventions by foreign players to enhance their oil interests. 
 
Foreign Economic Intervention 
 
Foreign economic interventions in Nigeria include financial involvement revealed in 
the form of neoliberal policies and money corruption; and the ways business is 
conducted on the ground. As in the discussion of political approaches above, we will 
discuss foreign players active in such practices. Players not actively involved will be 
omitted from the discussion.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Nigerian Civil Defence Leader, 9 January, 2011), is said to be Russian and Chinese made. K2 has 
Korean origin while G3 is German and FA is Belgian made (Naagbanton, 6 January, 2011). 
1
 µ%XQNHULQJ¶LVDWHUPXVHGWRGHVFULEHWKHSURFHVVRIVLSKRQLQJFUXGHRLOIURPSipes and filling it 
LQWRDVKLSWREHVROGRYHUVHDVRULQEODFNPDUNHWV³,OOHJDORLOEXQNHULQJ´LVDHXSKHPLVPIRUWKHIW
DQGDFFRXQWVIRUDSSUR[LPDWHO\SHUFHQWRI1LJHULD¶VRLOSURGXFWLRQ7KRVHZKRKHDGLOOHJDORLO
bunkering have armed youth militias to defend the operations. This has contributed to violent conflicts 
in the Niger Delta (Human Rights Watch, 2003: 2).   
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Financial Involvement 
 
Neoliberal Policies 
Neoliberal policies exercised through transnational agencies such as the World Bank 
and the IMF, the so-called Washington consensus, are deemed to serve only to 
enhance global capitalist markets for Western interests (Easterly, 2006). The policies 
are top-down in the way which the pro-Western institutions impose uniform policies 
on all recipient countries whilst disregarding case-specific conditions and necessities. 
The global economic recession during the 1970s-1980s led to an economic crisis in 
Nigeria and, consequently, the post-war oil-boom (1970s) that created massive 
government expenditure and consumption came to an end. The government was 
forced to adopt an IMF/World Bank reform package - the Structural Adjustment 
Programme (SAP) - in 1986, despite public rejection. The consequence of SAP 
µVKRFNWKHUDS\¶ZDVthe deeper impoverishment of Nigeria, which was further 
compounded by military oppression, while the exploitation of oil in the Niger Delta 
was intensified (Courson, 2009). More bilateral and multilateral aid from Britain, 
France, the US and China has been flowing to African oil-rich countries than to other 
impoverished states. )RUH[DPSOH$IULFD¶VWRSRLOVXSSOLHUV1LJHULDDQG$QJRODDUH
recHLYLQJWKHODUJHVWSRUWLRQRI86DLGZKLOHRQHRI&KLQD¶VPDLQHFRQRPLF
interventions in African oil-rich countries is the oil-for-aid programme. This aid is 
highly conditional; further damaging weak economies and fuelling corruption (Klare, 
Volman et al., 2006; Easterly, 2006). 
Capitalist market-based policies have proved to make the rich states richer and the 
poor poorer. Resources flow from the periphery states to the core while the periphery 
states serve as dumping markets for manufactured goods from the core sold at 
inflated prices. The World Trade System is one which enforces and monitors this 
mechanism (Interview with former Trade Union leader, 9 January, 2011). In this 
system, Nigeria, like other raw materials producing countries, faces quota restrictions 
and high taxes on finished products to enter the Western markets while raw 
materials, such as oil, can easily be exported. This discourages exports of 
PDQXIDFWXUHGJRRGVZKLOHGHHSHQLQJWKHFRXQWU\¶VGHSHQGHQFHRQa few staple 
products, which, in the case of oil, is not a productive sector. Hence, economic 
diversification is made more difficult. Many believe that keeping Nigeria 
underdeveloped is in the interests of foreign players as 150 million Nigerians make a 
large dumping market (Interview with Warri local man, 2 January, 2011; MOSOP 
programme officer, 14 January, 2011). Without main infrastructure such as water and 
electricity and effective transport, Nigeria cannot host any significant industries. 
Government officials are accused of receiving bribes from foreign manufacturers to 
maintain the underdeveloped status quo so that significant developmental projects 
cannot be implemented (Interviews with Our Niger Delta director; Social Action 
deputy director; MOSOP programme officer; church leader; Warri local man, Niger 
Delta States, January, 2011). 
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Money Corruption 
Another foreign financial involvement comes through the support of money 
corruption including illegal money transactions and bribes. Illegal money 
transactions are carried out with the collaboration of states and international financial 
institutions. As noted previously, these institutions are based in Western countries, 
especially in London and New York. We will thus discuss this kind of intervention as 
that carried out by the Western bloc, rather than by separate players, before 
discussing bribery, which is mainly carried out by companies. The fact that China is 
not involved in the illegal money transactions through the Western-based banking 
system and that Chinese payments made to Nigerian officials are rarely recorded, the 
discussion of Chinese involvement in money corruption is omitted. 
Billions of oil dollars have been stolen by political and corporate collaboration of 
which over $80 billion ended up in private accounts abroad during the period 1973-
90 (Clarke, 2008; Interview with Chairman of Governance Technical Team, Bayelsa, 
30 December, 2010). Several attempts by Nigerian governments to stop illegal 
capital flight have been shunned by Western players whose banks store large 
amounts of illegal monies worldwide (Interview with Sonar Limited Vice Chairman, 
4 November, 2010; Elf employee, 14 January, 2011). Over 100 banks, predominantly 
Western-based, have been involved in handling the loot of the former Nigerian 
dictator Sani Abasha and other Nigerian political officials. The banks include 
Citigroup, HSBC, Barclays, NatWest, BNP Paribas, Credit Suisse, Standard 
Chartered and Deutsche Morgan Grenfell (Global Witness, 2010).  
Apart from Western state players, companies are also guilty of corruption in Nigeria 
according to Hayman, an African oil analyst of the NGO Global Witness. They 
obscure oil revenue figures, creating a predatory environment leading to social and 
political problems. As African oil revenues go up, opportunities for corruption 
increase (Thompson, 2007).  
Oil companies often reward leaders with bribes, gifts and contracts in exchange for 
oil blocks, favourable treatment, protection or permission to breach environmental 
VWDQGDUGV,QWHUYLHZZLWK6KHOO¶V)RUPHU6HQLRU2IILFLDO, 31 December, 2010; 
Ebema farmers; ERA activist, 9 January 2011). Halliburton, the US oil services 
company, admitted under investigation by the Nigerian Economic and Financial 
Crime Commission that its officials had given bribes of approximately US$ 2.4 
million to Nigerian tax officials in return for favourable tax treatment worth more 
than $14 million. Halliburton has also been charged with making illegal payments of 
DURXQGPLOOLRQWRWKHIRUPHU3UHVLGHQW6DQL$EDVKD¶VRIIVKRUHDFFRXQWVLQ
return for contracts to build a natural gas plant in Nigeria (Bakre, 2006; Interview 
with Our Niger Delta director, 2 January, 2011).  
 
A senior security consultant representing a British security company in Nigeria 
revealed that there has been massive bribery from companies regularly paid to 
Nigerian officials (Interview, 16 January, 2011). The Nigerian Ministry of Finance 
and the oil companies are closely linked. The NNPC account has still never been 
properly audited (Interview with the Director of Niger Delta Development 
Commission, 9 January, 2011). There is a serious level of corruption on both sides: 
Nigeria and foreign players alike. However, during an interview, Total denied any 
involvement with bribery and corruption (Interview with Total Senior Executive, 18 
January, 2011).  
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Companies have also been found to bribe staff in the department and organizations 
dealing with environment in order to ensure that environmental reports are positive. 
In case of oil spills, the report would ensure that the oil spills are caused by third-
party interruption, not equipment failures so that companies will not be responsible 
for compensation payments (Interview with Warri local man, 2 January, 2011; 
Coordinator for the Centre for Environment, Human Rights and Development, 07 
January, 2011; Goi Community, 10 January, 2011; ERA activists, 13 January, 2011).  
 
Additionally, companies use a number of ways to evade paying taxes such as by 
inventing large expenses and wasteful spending (Interview with Vice Chairman of 
Sonar Limited, 4 November, 2010; Chairman of Central Development Council for 
Ibaramatu Community, 2 January, 2011). In 2006, Shell, for example, was found 
guilty of unpaid tax and was forced to settle a tax liability of 17.8 million owed to the 
Federal Inland Revenue of Nigeria (Bakre, 2006). See Nwanko (1999) for details on 
funds taken, dodgy oil deals, kick-backs in state contracts and corrupted 
governmental and corporate people in this financial oil-theft. 
 
Business conduct 
Foreign economic intervention depends on individual companies and can come 
through practical businesses procedures rather than from policy-making. Companies 
aim to maximise profits by all possible means (Interview with director of Sojitz 
Global Trading Nigeria, 14 January, 2011). In Nigeria, the ways foreign oil 
FRPSDQLHVRSHUDWHDUHFRQVLGHUHGWREHµPLQGOHVV¶RIWKHHQYLURQPHQWVRFLHW\DQG
the existing law (Interview with Coordinator for the Centre for Environment, Human 
Rights and Development, 7 January, 2011). Even when Nigerians resist the use of 
such business conduct, he said, Nigerians do not have adequate power to overthrow 
the system since Nigeria is a clientilist state which depends on the oil money. Any 
person that obstructs oil from flowing has either to be co-opted or eliminated 
(Interview with Social Action deputy director, 6 January, 2011). The case of Ken 
Saro-Wiwa whose opposition to wrongful exploitation by oil companies in the Niger 
Delta ended with his execution is a classic example.  Even when companies claim to 
contribute to developmental projects and job creation, these are not sustainable and 
are provided in ways which further fuel the conflicts. Furthermore, the way 
companies seek to cut operational costs by circumventing environmental standards 
(Interview with Former Senior Officer of Shell, 31 December, 2010); acquisition of 
land; and the enclave operations do not represent the social responsibility and 
economic benefits claimed by companies (Personal visits to several oil-producing 
communities in Bayelsa, Rivers and Delata states, January, 2011). This section 
explores the ways oil companies conduct their operations in Nigeria. 
Circumventing Environmental Standards 
During the process of oil prospecting and production, the Niger Delta environment 
on which over 30 million subsistence farmers and fishermen heavily rely has been 
heavily polluted. The most prominent problems are oil spillage and gas flaring. A 
large proportion of oil spills are caused by blowouts and equipment failures. The 
hazardous waste coming from oil spills has never been properly cleaned up. 
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Companies also flare off most of the gas associated with oil operations. Such 
practices represent a profound failure to meet environmental standards. 
The Niger Delta is the third largest wetland in the world containing a number of 
delicate ecological zones of saline mangroves, sandy coastal ridge barriers, lowland 
rainforests and fresh water swamps (James, 2003). It provides a nursery for fishery 
species in the Gulf of Guinea (Brown, 2006). Thousands of miles of oil pipelines that 
criss-cross the Delta wetlands frequently release gas flares and oil spills that destroy 
habitats on a large-scale (Ghazvinian, 2007, Personal visits to the Niger Delta creeks, 
January, 2011). Oil spills cause destruction of the Niger Delta mangrove forests, the 
third largest on earth. The land that used to be prized by the imperial palm trade and 
fishing grounds for Niger Deltans is now unusable for 25-30 years in some areas 
(Osunlana, 2008; Interview with ERA activist, 10 January, 2011). In October 2006, a 
report compiled by WWF UK, the World Conservation Union and representatives 
from the federal ministry of Abuja and the Nigeria Conservation Foundation, 
announced that up to 1.5 million tons of oil has been spilled in the delta over the past 
fifty years.1 The delta is now one of the five most polluted spots in the world. 
Without the availability of firewood, water for livestock and employment from the 
oil companies, all ways of living for locals are destroyed (Interview with Warri 
church leader, 1 January, 2011; Focus group Omadino Community, 5 January, 2011; 
interview with the president of Touch-Life International, 8 January, 2011; former 
Trade Union leader; Ereme farmers and teachers, 9 January, 2011; focus group in 
Gokana village, focus group in Bodo city; Akwa Ibom local man; editor for Women 
Issues Newspaper; Ogoni local man, 10 January 2011; Owaasa local man, 12 
January, 2011; focus group Ikarama community, 13 January, 2011). Occasionally, a 
burst petroleum pipeline causes a fire outbreak, as in 1998, when over 1,200 lives 
were lost in Jesse, Delta State. Similar fires have also taken place in other rural 
communities in Delta, Lagos and Imo States (Interview with ERA Bayelsa director, 
13 January, 2011).  
The petroleum industry is the largest source of pollution and hazardous industrial 
waste in Nigeria (Marajo, 1997). According to a report by the Rivers State and the 
Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources, there were a total of 227 cases of 
oil spills between 1999 and 2000. Shell topped the list with 127 cases, followed by 
Agip Oil with 81 cases. Chevron had three cases, while ELF, Schlumberger Sedco 
Forex, Saipem and Wilbros had one case each, with 10 not untraceable to any 
particular oil companies (see Onwuemeodo, 2000). Since 2006, approximately 2,400 
oil spills have been recorded according to the Nigerian National Oil Spill Detection 
and Response Agency (NOSDRA).  
                                                          
1
 Oil spills create widespread and permanent damage to humans, environments, society and the ways 
of living in the affected communities. 0RELO¶V,GDKRSODWIRUPVSLOOLQ$NZD,ERPLQIRU
example, spread to the adjoining States of Rivers, Cross River, Edo, Delta and Ondo. The spill also 
spread to Lagos by ocean currents and into the waters of neighbouring countries: Ghana, Benin and 
Togo. Oil spills also cause permanent environmental damage. In 1999, a group of nine US 
environmental activities, academics and journalists, under the auspices of Environmental Rights 
Action/Friends of the Earth (Nigeria), visited to the Bomu-2 site in Ogoni, which experienced an oil 
well blRZRXWLQ7KH\UHSRUWHGµA 6-foot thick crust of carbonized oil material covers the soil, 
turning the area into a wasteland where only a few plants have been able to survive. Since villagers 
cannot afford bottled water and often have access to no other water source, they have no option but 
drink water that is visibly polluted and slicked with oil¶. 
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According to Alhaji Dalhatu Bayero, the former Group Managing Director of the 
NNPC and Human Rights Watch (Manby, 1999), blowouts and equipment failures 
are responsible for 40 percent of oil spills, corrosion for 11 perccent, 
maintenance/operator error 18 percent with the rest being caused by natural causes 
and third party incidents. Statistics from the Department of Petroleum Resources 
showed that 4 percent of all spills in Nigeria were caused by sabotage (ibid.). 
However, this is still hotly disputed by the communities concerned (personal visits to 
several oil-producing communities in the Niger Delta, January 2011). Because the 
Department of Petroleum Resources is close to oil companies, it could not be 
confirmed that this level of sabotage as a cause of oil spills was reliable (Manby, 
1999; Interview with Social Action deputy director, 6 January, 2011).  While 
companies mostly deny operational failures as the cause of spills, they accepted some 
of these faults. There are incidents, such as some of the major spills in Goi 
community in 2008, when Shell, after a series of environmental assessments and 
court allegations, admitted liability. However, no compensation and remediation has 
yet been forthcoming. For most other cases, oil companies claim oil spills are 
primarily caused by sabotage (Niboro, 1997).  
For Shell alone, more than 1,000 court cases have been taken for pollution in the last 
30 years. Almost all were rejected (Vidal, 2011). The same stories are told in 
communities visited including Ikarama, Omadino, Goi, Ebema and Ereme. 
Companies often cite sabotage as the cause of oil spillage without going to sites for 
further investigation (Interview with Ebema teacher and farmer, 9 January, 2011; 
Interview with ERA activist, 13 January, 2011). Community leaders are said to 
receive bribes from oil companies to say the spills are caused by sabotage. ERA 
activists and a number of villagers gave witness accounts of being locked up until 
they agreed to make a statement that the spill was caused by sabotage. This is 
because in cases of sabotage, Nigerian state policy exempts the oil companies from 
paying compensation to the victims. Even when the courts rule against the company, 
the company could appeal indefinitely. With legal delays draining communities of 
cash, the cases would eventually be settled with little compensation (Former Shell 
Lawyer revelation to the director of ERA Bayelsa, 13 January, 2011; Interview with 
spokesperson for International Projects, Friends of the Earth Netherlands, 6 January, 
2011; legal assistant for the court case Ogoni farmers VS Shell, 6 January, 2011). 
There are many reports of cases where locals are detained and beaten for requesting 
compensation (see ERA; Manby, 1999).   
A long-awaited and comprehensive UN study recently published (UNEP, 2011) 
revealed massive environmental damage caused by oil production in Ogoniland in 
the last 50 years. The UN report showed that oil companies and the Nigerian 
government had failed to meet their own standards. The process of investigation, 
reporting, clean-up and compensation is usually seriously weighted in favour of the 
companies and against the victims (Interview with Ebema farmers, 9 January, 2011; 
ERA Bayelsa director, 13 January, 2011).  
 
Clean-up contractors are often not professional as contracts are given to the 
FRPPXQLW\OHDGHUVDQGJRYHUQPHQWRIILFLDOVZKRIDYRXUWKHRLOFRPSDQLHV¶SRVLWLRQ
(Interview with Ebema teacher and activist; ERA Bayelsa director; Our Niger Delta 
director; and Social Action deputy director, January, 2011). There are also a number 
RIFDVHVZKHUHFRPSDQLHV¶DJHQWVDUHVHQWLQWRVHWILUHWRRLO-spill sites in order to 
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avoid paying compensation (Interview with ERA Bayelsa director; focus group 
Ikarama Community, -DQXDU\7KLV³FOHDQ-XS´PHWKRGQRWRQO\EUHDFKHV
international best practice (Manby, 1999), but is also very dangerous to the 
communities and damaging to the environment. The sites are often in close proximity 
to villages (Interview with ERA activist, community youth and landlord, a visit to oil 
spill sites in Ikarama community, 13 January, 2011). Some oil spills in waterways 
are dredged by buckets and emptied onto the nearby ground (Personal visit to Ebema 
community, 9 January, 2011).  
 
Another prominent poor practice of oil companies in Nigeria is gas flaring. Over 85 
percent of gas is flared off in Nigeria, compared to a fractional volume of 0.6 percent 
and 4.3 percent of gas flared in the US and UK respectively (Rowell, 1996; Manby, 
1999). Releasing gas in the atmosphere is the cheapest way to operate an oil 
operation (Interview with Banwo and Ighodalo legal adviser, 17 January, 2011). 
Companies have battled with the press and bribed politicians and NGOs in order to 
circumvent the laws. Many flares have run 24 hours a day and some have been active 
IRU\HDUVZLWKPRUHWKDQELOOLRQ86GROODUV¶ZRUWKRIJDVORVWDQQXDOO\ 
(Ebema focus group, 9 January, 2011). Approximately half the gas is flared by Shell 
(Manby, 1999). In some cases, such as in Ebosha and Ereme, gas flares are very 
close to communities (personal site visits). In any event, the flares are hardly ever 
made safe by putting up secure fencing (Interview with Ereme farmers, 9 January, 
2011). In many Niger Delta communities, gas flaring sites are numerous. Agip and 
Total have more than 15 gas flaring sites in one small Ebosha community (Interview 
with ERA programme assistant, 9 January, 2011). In and around Port Harcourt, there 
are more than 100 gas flare sites (personal visit, 9 January, 2011). With the 
FRPSDQLHV¶FODLPRISUHPLVHVWKHQHDUE\IDUPHUVORVHWKHRQO\DFFHVVURDGWRWKHLU
farms (Interview with Ebema farmers, 9 January, 2011).  
 
Companies at all times refute the damaging impacts from gas flares claiming that it is 
only the loss of a YDOXDEOHUHVRXUFH.RQLQJFLWHGLQ2VXQODQD7RWDO¶V+HDG
RI%XVLQHVVIRUH[DPSOHLQVLVWHGWKDWWKHJDVHVUHOHDVHGDUHµKHDOWK\IODUHV¶GHVSLWH
scientific reseaUFKLQGLFDWLQJRWKHUZLVH,QWHUYLHZZLWK7RWDO¶V+HDGRI%XVLQHVV
January, 2011). Gas flaring causes acid rain, respiratory problems and related health 
complications in both humans and animals (Osunlana, 2008; Ebema focus group, 9 
January, 2011). Gas flaring has been shown to severely damage crop fertility. 
Corrosion of roofs in communities hosting gas flares, such as in Iko and Ebema 
(ibid.), were shown to be faster than in other areas. It is estimated that 40 percent of 
the Delta will be uninhabitable within 30 years if no significant progress is underway 
(Manby, 1999).  
 
Other impacts of poor oil operating practices include flooding, coastal erosion, 
degradation of coastal resources and biodiversity and socio-economic problems. 
Despite decades of oil production, neither the oil companies nor the Nigerian 
government have funded an independent scientific research into the damage caused 
by oil industries (ibid.; interview with ERA programme assistant, 9 January, 2011). 
Furthermore, any protests against industrial malpractice are sure to be quelled 
(Interview with Our Niger Delta director; 2 January, 2011; and Ebema focus group, 9 
January, 2011). 
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7KHRLOFRPSDQLHV¶SUDFWLFHVLQ1LJHULDKDYHEHHQFRQGHPQHGDVDIRUPRI
³HQYLURQPHQWDOUDFLVP´LQWKDWWKHFRPSDQLHV¶HQYLURQPHQWSUDFWLFHLQthe Niger 
Delta is so much at variance with their practices in the developed world (Saro-Wiwa, 
2004; Clarke, 2008; interview with Coordinator for the Centre for Environment, 
Human Rights and Development, 7 January, 2011). While spills in the US and New 
Zealand are responded to in minutes; it takes companies weeks or more, if ever, to 
respond to pollution in the Niger Delta, which happens every day (Interview with 
legal practitioner, 17 January, 2011), and each year amounting to more than that in 
the Gulf of Mexico incident (Vidal, 2011). Shell, for instance, has been fined 1.5 
billion US dollars by the Nigerian court for a much larger scale of spills in the past 
years in Bayelsa. However, Shell has refused to pay. By dictating the outcomes of 
FRXUWFDVHVRLOFRPSDQLHVLQ&RXUVRQ¶VZRUGVµEHKDYHOLNHWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶LWVHOI
January, 2011). One of the ways oil companies circumvent this is by bribing 
Nigerian officials. Even when companies now carry out the environmental impact 
assessments, the level of compliance is considerably below the international standard 
(Interview with Chairman of Central Development Council for Ibaramatu 
Community, 2 January, 2011; LCPIT president, 3 January, 2011).  
 
Where oil companies provide social amenities, the quality is below the standard for 
their own personnel or what they would provide elsewhere in the world (Ofuoku, 
1999; Interview with Chairman of Central Development Council for Ibaramatu 
Community, 2 January, 2011). The MOSOP programme officer DVVHUWHGµ7DNHIRU
instance, in my village there are oil facilities and flow stations inside which there is 
light 24 hours; but my village is in darkness. That is what we call 
HQYLURQPHQWDOVRFLDOUDFLVP¶3RUW+DUFRXUW-DQXDU\ 
 
Whereas companies abide by the Global Memorandum of Understandings or the 
environmental standards in every other country, including developing ones like 
Malaysia and Brazil, they are battling with the Nigerian government for lower 
standards (Interview with former Senior Officer of Shell, 31 December, 2010). 
Referring to the double-standard practices, Group Managing Director CAJ 
+HUNVWU|WHUUHSOLHGDW6KHOO¶VDQQXDOPHHWLQJKHOGLQWKH1HWKHUODQGVLQWKDW
higher environmental standards could harm local economLHV+HVDLGµ6KRXOGZH
apply the higher-cost western standards, thus making the operation uncompetitive 
DQGGHSULYLQJWKHORFDOZRUNIRUFHRIMREVDQGWKHFKDQFHRIGHYHORSPHQW"¶TXRWHG
in Manby, 1999: 153). Examples of environmental damage caused by oil companies 
cited here are by no means exhaustive. See Hutchful (1985); Manby (1999); Okonta 
and Douglas (2001); Ero (1998); Mba-Afolabi (1998); Soyinka (2004) for details of 
GDPDJHFDXVHGE\FRPSDQLHV¶QRQ-compliance with international best practices.    
 
Having discussed the circumventing of international environmental standards of 
FRPSDQLHV¶RLORSHUDWLRQVLQ1LJHULDZHQRZWXUQWRGLVFXVVWKHFRPSDQLHV¶RWKHU
business conduct including the acquisition of land, enclave oil operations and 
philanthropic projects which only help enhance foreign commercial interests while 
KDUPLQJ1LJHULD¶VHFRQRPLFDQGVRFLDOV\VWHP 
 
Acquisition of Land 
Companies have been accused of illegally occupying the lands of powerless ethnic 
groups (Clarke, 2008). According to the Land Use Act, oil belongs to the 
government which automatically transfers any oil-bearing lands to the government 
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without compensation to traditional landowners for the land loss or for livelihoods 
destroyed (Interview with Our Niger Delta director, 13 January, 2011). In acquiring 
land for oil operations, companies are only required to pay rent to the federal 
government (Interview with ERA Bayelsa director, 13 January, 2011). When the 
landowners seek compensation for their loss, the companies often employ the state 
apparatus such as by putting the villagers on trial or deploying the military to 
PDLQWDLQµVHFXULW\¶IRURLORSHUDWLRQV,QWHUYLHZZLWKIRUPHU7UDGH8QLRQ/HDGHU
January, 2011). When the companies agree to provide compensation, it is most likely 
to be insignificant (Interview with Chairman of Central Development Council for 
Ibaramatu Community, 2 Janaury, 2011; Omadino focus group, 6 January, 2011). 
For example, an Agip operation-hosting area, Ebema community, received five cows 
and ten bags of rice from Agip in September 2010 for the whole community to share 
as relief items. Apart from this, villagers pointed out they had received no other 
benefits since the oil companies started drilling in their community, which was the 
cause of grievance and frustration (Focus group Gokana Village; Bodo City, 10 
January, 2011; focus group Ikarama Community, 13 January, 2011). Youths who 
cannot go to schools and have no jobs are turning to guns, according to an Ebema 
villager (Interview, 9 January, 2011). 
 
Enclave Oil Operations 
Oil industries are considered to be an enclave within the whole economy. Only a 
small number of elites receive benefits of which most are stored offshore or used for 
profligate spending (Interview GLUHFWRURI1LJHULD¶V'HSDUWPHQWRI3HWUROeum 
Resources, 1 November, 2010). It is not a labour-intensive industry and creates few 
related service industries which are so specialized that they depend heavily on high-
technology machines and a few experts, neither of which companies claim Nigeria 
can provide (Interview with Legal Adviser for Banwo and Ighodalo, 17 January, 
2011). To make matters worse, in Nigeria any employment would only be for the 
dominant tribes and their leaders (Ebema Focus group, 9 January, 2011; interview 
with director of ERA Bayelsa, 13 January, 2011; the speech by Honorary Kuku, 14 
July, 2011). Often, traditional leaders and dominant tribes have close links to military 
administrations (Interview with ERA activist, 10 January, 2011). Contracts and 
benefits awarded to them usually involve massive corruption which in turn benefits 
those in the oil companies in charge of the choice of parties receiving benefits 
(Manby, 1999).  
 
The UNDP (2006: 36) report on Human Development in the Niger Delta asserted 
that local people often cannot access the benefits from the oil industry, including 
employment. This puts the poverty rate in Southern Nigeria, covering the Niger 
Delta region, at 74.8 percent. Even if the Nigerian Law of Local Content required 40 
SHUFHQWRIIRUHLJQFRPSDQLHV¶HPSOR\Hes to be local in 2007, rising to 70 percent in 
2010, the law is not followed. When the requirement is met, strategic positions are 
preserved for foreign employees leaving the locals with menial jobs regardless of 
their qualifications (Interview with former Shell senior officer, 31 December, 2010; 
former Trade Union Leader, 9 January, 2011; international legal officer, 17 January, 
2011).  
 
Companies often claim that the reason they do not employ local people is because 
the locals are not qualified, which many contest (ibid.). Since Shell started producing 
oil from Ogoniland in 1998, no woman, however qualified, has been employed not 
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HYHQDVDµWHDJLUO¶RUµFOHDQHU¶DFFRUGLQJWR02623SURJUDPPHRIILFHU.LEDUD
Even security personnel, a job which does not require specific qualifications, is not 
available to local people. Furthermore, contracts are preferably given to expat 
companies (Interview with the Chairman of Central Development Council for 
Ibaramatu Community, 2 January, 2011; Interview with Our Niger Delta director, 2 
January, 2011). In the Niger Delta, a society which has become a mono-economic 
society depending on oil finds that its only opportunity to make a living has been 
ripped away (Interview with MOSOP programme officer, 14 January, 2011). The 
great majority of people from the minority ethnic groups of the Niger Delta have 
become deeply impoverished while the potential benefits from oil industries go to 
other dominant tribes outside or to foreigners who created widespread corruption and 
are a recipe for conflict within Nigeria.  
 
Furthermore, the ways in which oil installations are operated make no contribution or 
FRQQHFWLRQVWRWKHVRFLHW\DQGHFRQRP\RI1LJHULD0XOWLQDWLRQDOFRPSDQLHV¶
modern facilities and compounds, for example, are found situated right in the middle 
of primitive villages in the Niger Delta, with razor wire and armed guards preventing 
access by locals (Interview with the business development manager, the Onstream 
Group, 18 January, 2011; site visits to Warri Chevron and Shell compound, 5 
January, 2011; Lagos Chevron compound, 16 January, 2011). Inside the oil 
compound, everything is spotless with unobstructed running of electricity, water and 
all necessary facilities and services. All items, including simple household items, are 
imported in ship loads (Interview Chevron oil staff and housewives, 16 January, 
2011). Expat oil employees rarely leave their compound (Lagos focus group, 15 
January, 2011). When they do, it is only to go from one oil installation to another 
(Interview with Warri local man, 2 January, 2011). The roads would be blocked off 
while they are transported by bulletproof black-screened Hummer cars. The robust 
lifestyle of oil company personnel, in contrast to the abject living conditions of the 
communities, is what induces hostility and strong feelings of deprivation and 
injustice among the locals (Personal visits to Shell compounds in Omadino and the 
Mobil compound in Abia).  
 
The world inside the gated oil compounds has little contact with the world outside. 
The roads built around oil installations are only access roads while those linking the 
surrounding communities are dirt tracks (Interview with Our Niger Delta director, 13 
January, 2011). Expat employees receive significantly larger salaries than Nigerians, 
even with the same qualifications (Interview with Legal Adviser for Banwo and 
Ighodalo, 17 January, 2011). Oil employees who negotiate with the communities are 
frequently described as dismissive and hostile. With the lack of employment for, and 
contributions to, the locality, the oil industry is an economic and social enclave. 
 
Philanthropic Projects 
Oil companies claim to create development projects such as schools, healthcare 
centres and other infrastructure in rural parts of the country that might not otherwise 
have them. However, many of these projects are incomplete, poorly carried out and 
unsustainable, despite claims of high spending. 
 
The former headmaster of the Shell/NNPC school in Omadino community testified 
that the school was operating in the first few years but because there was no 
maintenance of basic supplies such as the generator and bore holes, the school could 
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no longer function. Moreover, the project did not take into account the security issues 
in Nigeria. The school and adjacent facilities, which were unfenced, invited looting 
(Interview with the former headmaster; Interview with the current headmaster of the 
school; Interview with a Warri local, 5 January, 2011). The Chevron/NNPC hospital 
built in Omadino community also lacks basic facilities such as electricity, water, a 
surgery, medicines, a laboratory and funds; as a result, maintaining its operation is 
challenging (Doctor at Omadino Community Hospital, 5 January, 2011). The situation 
LVVLPLODUWR$JLS¶VVKRUW-lived borehole project in Ebema. The main cause of the poor 
projects is explained to be that contracts are given to unqualified contractors such as 
local leaders or the cheapest bidders (Interview with Ebema farmer, 9 January, 2011).  
 
Companies also often highlight scholarships they provide to locals as a philanthropic 
contribution. Community members pointed out, however, that scholarships are usually 
selective; that is, they are allocated to ruling elites in favour of the oil employees in 
charge of awarding them. Very few scholarships go to the oil-producing communities 
in the Niger Delta (Interview with members of Bodo Council of Chiefs and Elders, 10 
January, 2011). Moreover, the amount of money for each scholarship is so low that 
tuition fees, educational materials and living costs become unsustainable (Interview 
with MOSOP programme officer, 14 January, 2011). 
 
Furthermore, many of these projects do not suit the needs of the communities where 
they are sited. Large projects, such as the building of a jetty, are preferred because 
they allow a sizeable amount of money to be siphoned off (Interview with Chairman 
of Central Development Council for Ibaramatu Community, 2 January 2011). Locals 
claim they have not been included in the process (Omadino focus group, 5 January, 
2011). Consequently, their real needs are not met and they do not feel the sense of 
ownership for the projects (Interview with Ebema teacher and farmer, 9 January, 
2011).  
 
Companies also claim to build roads in rural areas of the Niger Delta. However, the 
roads are seen as access roads directly linking oil installations to the port, often 
crisscrossing sensitive ecological areas and not contributing to local connections 
(Interview with Akpobari, 6 January, 2011; site visits in Port Harcourt; in Ereme; 
Shell LNG plant in Gbarain, January, 2011). In this way, the director of Our Niger 
Delta FRPPHQWHGµ7KHRLOFRPSDQLHVDUHVWLOODFWLQJOLNHWKHFRORQLDOLVWVZKHQWKH\
first came to Africa. They built roads to the source of raw materials and only linked 
them to the seaport for evacuation (Interview with Our Niger Delta director, 13 
January, 2011). 
 
On the ground, there is little evidence of projects, benefits and basic facilities despite 
massive oil operations that have been taking place, pointing instead to the reality of 
poverty, marginalization, pollution and conflicts derived from oil industries 
(Interview with Social Action deputy director; Ogoni local man; MOSOP programme 
officer; Omadino focus group; Ebema focus group, Bodo city focus group; Ikarama 
focus group; Gokana focus group; a Warri local man, January 2011). Personal site 
visits to Niger Delta communities confirmed malpractices by oil operations and the 
serious damage these create.1 These include areas completely covered by oil spills 
                                                          
1
 The Niger Delta communities visited included Ebema, Omadino, Ereme, Gbarain, Bayelsa, Ikarama, 
Goi, Bodo, Port Harcourt, and Warri. 
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that have never been cleaned or compensated, areas that have recently been set ablaze, 
mangrove forests completely destroyed, lands rendered infertile, huge volumes of gas 
flaring and gas leaks in the middle of communities, communities in extreme poverty 
without basic facilities such as electricity, clean water, schools or hospitals while the 
heavy military presence is overpowering and traumatizing the communities. Many 
incidents are said to have lasted for over 20 years. Livelihoods have been completely 
destroyed. There is no employment and little hope. 
 
Locals recalled that before the oil industries arrived the region was wealthy and 
peaceful with a rich natural environment (Gokana focus group; Omadino focus group; 
an interview with the president of LCPIT; MOSOP programme officer; Chairman of 
Central Development Council for Ibaramatu Community; director of ERA Bayelsa 
and director of Our Niger Delta, January 2011). An Owaasa local man GHVFULEHGµ,Q
my place (Owaasa Community), there is not a standard hospital, university or school 
but we have WKHRLO¶,QWHUYLHZZLWK2ZDDVDORFDOPDQ, 13 January, 2011). 
Companies also make many promises when they first arrive in the communities, but 
few are fulfilled. Agip, for example, promised to complete road projects in Ebema in 
2010, but in 2011 the project is yet to begin (Interview with Ebema farmer, 9 January, 
¶ 
 
Because Western governments benefit from oil, they speak out little despite 
DFNQRZOHGJLQJWKHLUFRPSDQLHV¶DEXVHVRI1LJHULD¶VHQYLURQPHQWSROLWLFVDQG
society. In effect, Western governments encourage poor practices rather than those 
based on value, equity and justice that are required in their home countries (Interview 
with Programme Director of Environment Issue Management for Shell, 30 December 
2010; legal assistant for the court case Ogoni farmers VS Shell, 6 January, 2011). The 
Western players often point out that non-Western players, precisely the Chinese, pay 
little attention to environmental and social concerns. Unlike in Angola and Sudan, the 
Chinese involvement in Nigeria is still comparatively new and marginal. Any 
assessment of the impact of their involvement remains provisional. However, there 
are already some signs that some particular Chinese approaches could undermine 
Nigerian performance. An increasing number of corrupt Nigerian officials have 
already been looking for unaccountable and non-questioning partners, exactly what 
the Chinese businesses offer (Interview with Chairman of Central Development 
Council for Ibaramatu Community, 2 January 2011). MOSOP programme officer 
DVVHUWHGµ7KRVHLQSRZHUZRXOGOLNHWRFRRSHUDWHZLWKWKH&KLQHVHWRFRYHUWKHLU
PHVV7KDW¶VWKHWUXWK¶,QWHUYLHZZLWK02623SURJUDPPHRIILFHU, 14 January, 
2011). There is no mechanism or pressure to put transactions between Nigerian and 
Chinese partners on record. For the Chinese, there are no politics. Bribes are treated 
only as gifts and a normal business matter (Interview with president of LPCIT, 3 
January, 2011; Social Action deputy director; 6 January, 2011).  
 
Furthermore, for the Western players, there are some independent mechanisms within 
civil society that monitor their practices in Nigeria. However, the checks-and-balances 
system does not exist in China making external pressure difficult to apply. The 
president of LPCIT pointed to the Chinese frequent acting against the majority in the 
UN Security Council as a cause of concern (ibid.). With oil companies being national 
companies, they become increasingly secretive. The Chinese lack of accountability 
and standards is what gives Chinese entry a competitive advantage in corrupt states 
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like Nigeria. Many worry that, for fear of losing out to the Chinese, other players may 
compromise on international best practice (Lagos focus group, 15 January, 2011).  
 
In comparison to other countries, it is easier for Chinese companies to enter the 
Nigerian economy because the Chinese government provides extensive political and 
financial support for its companies. Chinese oil companies are directly linked with 
SROLWLFV:LWKWKH&KLQHVHDXWKRULWLHV¶OHverage in policy-making, Chinese business 
projects can be rapidly enacted. Chinese projects also cost less and promise to deliver 
LQDVKRUWWLPHIUDPH7KLVDSSURDFKVXLWV1LJHULDQSUHIHUHQFHVµTXLFN fix, quick 
PRQH\¶ibid).  
 
The way Chinese investments provide cash incentives and can bid to levels 
unprofitable to other players implies that China may be more interested in promoting 
power relations and making gateways for other Chinese businesses to follow rather 
than in pure business, as it claims (Interview with Our Niger Delta Director, 2 January 
2011). To some, this resembles the expansionist previous colonization of Africa 
(Interview with Director of JGC Corporation, 5 November, 2010; Senior Counsel for 
Samsung Heavy Industries, 19 January, 2011; Our Niger Delta director, 2 January, 
2011).  
 
Furthermore, Chinese production is perceived to be of low quality and operated under 
lower standards (Interview with Chairman of Central Development Council for 
Ibaramatu Community, 2 January, 2011). There are already some unfinished projects 
(Interview with a legal officer, 17 January, 2011). Chinese companies generally 
employ a larger proportion of Chinese expats. Where there is local employment, 
welfare packages and safety standards are poor (Interview with MOSOP programme 
officer, 14 January, 2011). The Chinese business approach in the long-term 
discourages companies with good practices which are interested in investing in 
Nigeria because they are unwilling or unable to use Chinese methods and when these 
are different they find it difficult to make profits. Some companies have already 
closed their subsidiaries in Nigeria for this reason (Lagos focus group, 15 January, 
2011).  
 
There is a common fear that the Chinese entry would compromise Western standards 
and encourage deeper corruption whilst sustaining oppressive government of Nigeria 
(Interview with Programme Director of Environment Issue Management for Shell, 30 
'HFHPEHU'LUHFWRUIRU1LJHULD¶V'HSDUWPHQWRI3HWUROHXP5HVRXUFHV. 
However, it cannot be neglected that all players equally use approaches that best suit 
their political and economic interests (Lagos focus group, 15 January, 2011). All 
engagements are self-interested (Interview with Social Action deputy director, 6 
January, 2011). Whether Chinese approaches are negative or create worse outcomes 
than the Western players requires a longer period of Chinese involvement for an 
accurate assessment.  
 
The asymmetries of power in international relations help in facilitating dominant 
players to control NiJHULD¶VUHVRXUFHVZKLFKWKHLUV\VWHPDWLFH[SORLWDWLRQRI1LJHULDQ
oil helps to enforce and deepen (Interview with the director for African Economic 
Research Consortium, 16 September, 2010). A top official of the Nigerian Central 
%DQNUHYHDOHGµ7KHUHLVDn asymmetric power between foreign players and Nigerian 
players with it tilting towards foreign powers. They have the advantages because they 
C h a p t e r  6  | page 191 
 
hold the resources, technology and team of experts we can never have in obtaining the 
LQIRUPDWLRQ¶,QWHUYLHZZLWK the Director of Nigerian Central Bank, 15 September, 
2010). There is also no succession or transfers of technology and skills. Technology 
know-how is monopolized by foreign players. What deems to be strategic positions 
are reserved for expatriate players even in terrains such as the Niger Delta where 
'HOWDQH[SHUWVZRXOGEHPRUHTXDOLILHG,QWHUYLHZZLWK6KHOO¶V)RUPHU6HQLRU
Officer, 31 December, 2010).  
 
2LOFRPSDQLHVDOVRWDNHDGYDQWDJHRI1LJHULD¶VODFNRIH[SHUWLVHDQGWHFKQRORJ\E\
offering contracts on unequal terms (Interview with tRS2IILFLDORI1LJHULD¶V&HQWUDO
Bank, 15 September, 2011). According to a parliamentary member of Delta State, oil 
companies benefit more and they employ approaches which hinder Nigeria from 
achieving its oil potential (,QWHUYLHZZLWKWKH'HOWD6WDWH¶V0HPEHURI3DUOLDPHQW
November, 2010). Many company contracts still in operation were signed over 50 
years ago when Nigeria had little knowledge of the process (Interview with Social 
Action deputy director, 6 January, 2011; Our Niger Delta Director; 13 January, 2011). 
The recently enforced (in April 2010) local content requirement aims to allow Nigeria 
to maximize local profits but foreign players have been obstructive claiming 
Nigerians lack capability, making it unachievable in reality (Interview with Legal 
Practitioner for Aelex, 1 November, 2010). Despite what are considered to be unequal 
contract terms, Nigeria still achieves significantly better terms than many other 
African oil-ULFKFRXQWULHVGXHWR1LJHULD¶VPDWXUHexperiences with the oil industry 
,QWHUYLHZZLWK6HQLRU2IILFHURI1LJHULD¶V'HSDUWPHQWRI3HWUROHXP5HVRXUFHV
November, 2010; Executive Director of the Natural Petroleum Agency, Sao Tome 
and Principe, 4 November 2010). This leaves the question of how much other African 
oil-rich countries may be losing due to power and knowledge asymmetries when 
negotiating their contracts (Interview with Honorary Consul of the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands, External Director of Shell Gabon, 2 November, 2010; Senior Officer for 
6LHUUD/HRQH¶V2IILFHRIWKH3UHVLGHQW November, 2010).  
 
In addition, foreign players deliberately conceal the openness and transparency of 
business processes such as contract bidding. Other players including non-major 
companies, civil societies, the press and the public are not allowed in the process and 
Nigerian partners are not well-equipped. Eventually, Nigeria faces disadvantages in 
doing business with foreign players and challenges in keeping them accountable 
(Interview with the Director of 1LJHULDQ&HQWUDO%DQN%\WKLV6KHOO¶VIRUPHUVHQLRU
officer said, imperialism still reigns in Nigeria. Today, with crude oil as the dominant 
commodity, the relationship between the Niger Delta oil communities, the 
multinational oil corporations, foreign states and the Nigerian government remains 
largely unchanged. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
7KHVFUDPEOHIRU1LJHULD¶VRLOWRGD\LVQRWDQHZSKHQRPHQRQEXWDSDUWRI
continuing, imperialist, resource control. Corporate oil and foreign players continue to 
meddle in Nigeria throughout the colonial era, the Cold War, the Biafra War and the 
present oil scramble. However, the exploitation of the people, resource ownership 
disputes, conflicts, mindless destruction of environments and villages still 
characterize the relationship between Nigeria and foreign players. The contemporary 
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oil trade forms a new version of the traditional triangulation of a historical scramble. 
Investment comes in, oil goes out and the Delta is left deeply marginalized. It is an 
old crisis in a new form and only a close examination of the continuing scramble of 
Nigeria with a complicated web of interested players and practices can explain the 
LQWHUQDWLRQDOGLPHQVLRQVOHDGLQJWR1LJHULD¶VIDLOXUH 
 
Neo-colonialism explains continued exploitation by former colonial players as well as 
new players. This chapter explains how foreign players have employed political and 
economic mechanisms to enhance their oil interests. The political mechanisms 
employed include the balkanization of Nigeria, the use of state policies, political 
meddling and military involvement. The economic mechanisms include financial 
involvement displayed as neoliberal policies and money corruption; and the ways 
business is conducted on the ground. In the concluding chapter, the outcomes of these 
interventions are assessed revealing the link between neo-colonial interventions and 
1LJHULD¶VUHVRXUFHFXUVHZKLFKZLOOIDFLOLWDWHWKHRU\GHYHORSPHQW&RQVHTXHQWO\LW
merges neo-colonialism, which is predominantly a political concept, with the resource 
curse theory, largely explained by economic factors. I will then analyse how these 
relate to other African oil-rich countries.  
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-Chapter 7- 
 
Conclusion: Development of Resource Curse Discussion 
 
 
After having discussed foreign oil-related interventions in Africa in Chapters 4 and 5 
and particularly in Nigeria in Chapter 6, this chapter now assesses the outcome of 
such practices in order to see how they lead to the resource curse. Based on the 
resource curse theory discussed in Chapter 2, resource curse displays in the 
malfunctions in any of the following three structures: politics, the economy and 
society. When natural resources contribute to poor governance, economic collapse 
and the onset and duration of conflicts in resource-rich countries instead of creating 
the expected wealth, the countries are considered to suffer the resource curse. By 
linking continued foreign oil-related interventions in Africa to African 
underperformance, this study relates neo-colonialism to the resource curse theory.  
 
This chapter is composed of two sections. The first assesses the outcomes of 
continued foreign interventions in African oil-rich countries with a specific focus on 
Nigeria and analyses how these performances are linked to the resource curse. 
Section two thus reveals that foreign scramble explained by neo-colonialism is a 
probabilistic causal mechanism of the resource curse and must be included in the 
resource curse theory. These two sections thus serve as a part of theory development 
by linking neo-colonialism to the resource curse theory. I finish this chapter by 
concluding the research finding and establishes the linkages that explain why African 
oil-rich countries fail to perform well despite the large revenues associated with oil 
industries.  
 
 
Outcomes of Foreign Scramble for Africa: A Resource Curse 
 
This section assesses the impacts of the neo-FRORQLDOVFUDPEOHIRU$IULFD¶VRLO7KLV
concept has not been included as an indicator determining resource curse. The 
complex oil-related foreign interventions, as previously discussed, do not exist in 
vacuo but are an indispensable part of the continuing, centuries-old, scramble for 
$IULFDQUHVRXUFHV7KHSURFHVVHVLPSDFWKHDYLO\RQ$IULFD¶VSUHVHQWDQGIXWXUH
status. 
 
These scrambles for Africa can be explained by neo-colonialism, a concept which, as 
described in Chapter three, discusses the continuing system of colonial exploitation 
and dependency even after a colony achieves independence (Asante, 1989). It refers 
to the involvement of more powerful countries in the affairs of less powerful ones. 
(YHQZLWKRXWGLUHFWPLOLWDU\FRQWUROWKH\WHQGWRPDLQWDLQDµGHIDFWR¶ control over 
less powerful nations through indirect domination by political, economic, social, 
military and technical means. In other words, neo-colonialism represents the survival 
of the colonial system. Overall, neo-colonialism assumes the continued control of 
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former colonial powers as well as that of the new players and comes through political 
and economic interventions. Neo-colonial foreign interventions were first carried out 
by European powers competing for hegemony in Africa including Britain, France, 
Portugal, Italy and other less-influential European states (Anise, 1989). Later new 
global powers such as the US, the USSR and China joined Europe. The new wave of 
foreign intervention in Africa reflects the growing battle for world power. Africa 
provides global strategic resources the importance of which is increasing due to 
global scarcity and competition to secure areas for hegemonic control (ibid.). 
 
The neo-FRORQLDOLVWFRQFHSWH[SHFWVWKDWWKHFRORQLDOSRZHUV¶KLVWRU\RIH[SORLWDWLRQ
contributes to poor performance in Africa but it makes no relationships to the 
resource curse phenomenon. In this section, we use the neo-colonialist concept to 
discuss how foreign interventions under-GHYHORS$IULFD7RWDFNOH$IULFD¶VUHVRXUFH
curse problem, one has to look beyond the present period, the oil industries or the 
domestic dimension and investigate the players involved, the approaches they use 
and how the KLVWRU\RIWKLVLQYROYHPHQWDIIHFWVDQGKLQGHUV$IULFD¶VHVFDSHIURPWKH
resource curse, a hitherto unaddressed relationship.  
 
The resource curse, as discussed in Chapter 2, affects three areas: bad governance, 
economic decline and the onset and duration of conflicts. As soon as any of these 
symptoms are present, then the resource curse occurs. To fit into the framework of 
the resource curse theory, this study categorizes the malfunctions of states as a result 
of continued foreign interventions into these three areas. Under each section, the 
study discusses how Marxist theory can link the neo-colonial foreign scramble for 
$IULFD¶VUHVRXUFHVWRWKHUHVRXUFHFXUVHV\PSWRPV7KXVLWGLVSOD\VZK\QHR-
colonialism must be included in the resource curse discussion. We first look at how 
foreign scrambles contribute to poor governance in African oil-rich countries before 
moving on to examine how they lead to economic decline and conflicts. 
 
Foreign Scrambles Contribute to Poor Governance 
Africa has been the subject of foreign scrambles for resources, raw materials, human 
resources, lands and oil from before the colonial era until today. The colonial era 
OHJLWLPL]HGWKHVHVFUDPEOHVZKLFKKDYHFRQVWUDLQHG$IULFD¶VSRWHQWLDOIRUWXUQLQJLWV
resources into blessings. The development of human resources and good governance, 
which are considered as crucial means to break the resource curse, have been the 
primary factors seriously undermined by the continued scrambles for Africa. 
During the colonial era, education and administrative authority were only made 
available to the elites, the group which favoured the presence of the colonialists 
(Hodder-Williams, 1984). The education provided was not for training and skill 
development based on local needs but rather to implement the exploitative colonial 
system. Education concentrated on administration and taxation systems, in which 
new graduates would serve colonial governors and the colonial market system where 
African structures became subordinated (Interview with Ibegwu, 9 January, 2011). 
7KXVWKHGHHSHULQWHJUDWLRQRIFRORQLDOFRPPHUFLDOFRPSDQLHVLQWR$IULFD¶V
hinterland allowed greater exploitation of African people and resources.  
The colonial education system created different classes: the ruling elites and 
labourers in societies where networks of clans and social support had been engrained. 
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The exclusion of women from colonial education and administration destroyed the 
fabric of most African societies where women had played crucial roles. According to 
Ibegwu, even before the arrival of oil companies, colonialism had imposed alienating 
capitalism and the system of exploitation onto the primitive African societies (ibid.). 
As colonialism ended, the colonial aristocrats and governing officials withdrew, 
ULSSLQJRXW$IULFD¶VLQVWitutional capacity. The sudden colonial departure left Africa 
with power-hungry and poorly-educated people who struggled to fill the power 
vacuum and to control the economic stakes. The consequence was long-term poor 
governance, political instability and civil wars at worst.  
For instance, when the Portuguese left Angola in 1975, they left abruptly and took 
340,000 settlers with them. Because the indigenous peoples had not been allowed 
higher education, the country was instantly lacking in the technocrats and skilled 
personnel necessary to develop the newly-independent country. Since civil war broke 
out immediately after the Portuguese departed, Angola never had a peaceful phase 
when it could fully develop its own technocrats (Heuper, 2005). By 1998 only three 
percent of government employees had a university education. A decade-long war left 
WKHFRXQW\¶VLQIUDVWUXFWXUHLQWDWWHUVDQGWKHQDWLRQDOEXUHDXFUDF\EDUHO\DEOHWR
function. There was erroneous accountancy, widespread corruption and a lack of 
legal, fiscal or bureaucratic mechanisms to properly manage the national oil wealth. 
The lack of human resources foundation caused by colonialism thus undermined 
political and economic development in Africa. Therefore, the end of colonialism did 
not bring the expected freedom and prosperity.1 
Even though Angola appears to making progress with economic and political 
VXVWDLQDELOLW\WRGD\&KDEDO$QJROD¶VJRYHUQDQFHGHPRQVWUDWHVWKHEDFNZDUG
bureaucracy inherited from Portuguese rule. There authoritarianism spreads 
throughout society by neo-patrimonial elites whilst presidentialism continues to 
dominate a single-party system (Clarke, 2008). Angola, during the colonial period, 
resembled Fascist Portugal. It was characterized by repression and lack of press 
freedom and opposition to the government. Prior to independence, rival liberation 
movements such as the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the 
National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) and the National Union for the 
Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) had been fighting for years. Thus, the 
precipitate Portuguese departure led to civil war. Post-independence Angola had no 
PRGHORIPXOWLSDUW\SROLWLFVRUSDUOLDPHQWDU\GHPRFUDF\WRIROORZ03/$¶V
centralization is a direct inheritance from the Portuguese. When the MPLA took 
power in 1975, a highly centralized top-down presidential system took root. The 
failed coup attempt in 1977 made the regime turn to increased violence. MPLA was 
so repressive and centralized that no involvement by civil organizations or the 
Catholic Church was allowed in any negotiations including the Alvor Accords or at 
Bicesse, Lusaka or Luena. The only people having a voice in Angola were those with 
guns. In Cabinda, the colonial legacy is more vivid than elsewhere. Lacking 
opportunity for political discourse, young activists were recruited into movements 
espousing hatred and violence (Ghazvinian, 2007). Colonialism made Angola too 
                                                          
1
 Colonialism is a part of scramble for Africa of which the modern search of African oil is a part of. 
When oil-related foreign interventions are analysed, ongoing scramble cannot be overlooked as 
WRGD\¶VVFUDPEOHUHSHDWVWKHSDVW¶VFLUFOHDQd it creates conditions where new oil industries are shaped 
within.  
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weak to manage the oil, and was then further weakened by interventions by the US, 
USSR and new oil players until today.  
 
This pattern is similar to most colonized African states. Independence was not the 
culmination of carefully developed processes. The abrupt decolonisation in Africa 
resembled the sudden Roman withdrawal which led to prolonged civil wars and 
economic deterioration throughout Britain (Collier, 2007). African governance has 
endured colonial authoritarianism with Africans excluded from the electoral system 
during colonial rule after which democratic models were imposed by the West in 
their former colonies. From the beginning, colonial rule expropriated political power 
regardless of the needs of the indigenous population. The governing apparatuses 
were designed mainly to control the population and resource exploitation backed by 
police forces and colonial troops. African leaders, continuously exposed to 
authoritarian control, became familiar with government justified by force (Gordon, 
2001). One autocracy is typically replaced with another. The present poor 
governance is deeply carved into the past. The political system of post-colonial 
African states is still designed to ensure presidential, ministerial and party continuity, 
a pattern which seems likely to endure (Clarke, 2008).  
In Nigeria, elites have been following and strengthening the system that the British 
left behind rather than changing it. Nigerian governments remain authoritarian and 
reliant on heavy military force while foreign elites and companies support politicians 
who are conducive to their ways of exploitation. Oil industries have bankrolled a 
series of corrupt and authoritarian governments (Klare, Volman et al., 2006). The 
close ties that foreign oil companies have developed with Nigerian governments and 
brutal military are a significant contributor to increased human rights abuses and 
poverty (Leech, 2006). 
A considerable number of African oil-rich governments, including Nigeria, hire 
mercenaries to bolster domestic security. Often, they are hired by private companies 
themselves or in collaboration with the goverQPHQWOLNH1LJHULD¶V-RLQW7DVN)RUFH
Hiring mercenaries amounts to a substantial decrease in political sovereignty (Reno, 
1998; Francis, 1999). More than anything, the privatization of security to protect oil 
installations makes it applicable to describHPDQ\$IULFDQVWDWHVDVµIDLOHG¶&ODSKDP
and Philip, 1985; Lock, 1998; Chabal and Daloz, 1999; Hyden, 1999). Peter Lock 
JRHVDVIDUDVWRDUJXHWKDWLQVLWXDWLRQVZKHUHWKHUHDUHDQXPEHURISROLFHGµLVODQGV
RIVHFXULW\¶ZLWKLQDIRUPDOO\VRYHUHLJQVWDWHµWKHUHLVKDUGO\DUROHIRUWKHVWDWHDV
DXWRQRPRXVVHFXULW\]RQHVDUHDUHVXOWRIIUDJPHQWDWLRQ¶/RFN
Security zones already exist in the Niger Delta, Sudan, the Democratic Republic of 
Congo and Angola.  
In these African countries, foreign players share in shaping political, economic and 
military infrastructures. Under these circumstances, foreign players no longer act like 
external players but rather as a governing body of that country. This enforces a 
rentier state where the government is unaccountable for their actions while 
ultimately depending on oil industries and foreign players to uphold the functioning 
of the state. By this, the continued foreign oil exploitation of Africa contributes to the 
resource curse where government fails to function (Interview with Courson, 2 
January, 2010).  
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From the days of European naval adventurism to incomplete decolonisation and to 
WRGD\¶VVFUDPEOHDOONLQGVRILQWHUYHQWLRQKDYHWDNHQSODFHEDVHGRQVHOI-interest and 
contributing to the economic, political and social demise of Africa (Anise, 1989). As 
DUHVXOW$IULFD¶VSRZHUOHVVQHVVDOORZVWKHVDPHSDWWHUQRIFRORQLDOUHVRXUFH
exploitation to continue. Foreign companies arrive in Africa, extract the oil and 
repatriate profits to their homelands leaving Africa impoverished and oppressed. 
According to Ajakaiye, foreign players have vested interests in keeping Africa in the 
current stage to ensure maximum profit expropriation (Interview with Ajakaiye, 16 
September, 2010). Today, even oil-producing communities do not have basic life 
necessities such as water or electricity and local populations remain without a say in 
what happens in politics. Authoritarianism seems unchallengeable. In these 
circumstances, the local populations remain enslaved (Interview with Sonny, 10 
January, 2011). According to Ajakaiye, initiatives such as Publish What You Pay, 
EITI or Resource Charter will be not be solutions for Africa while the exploitation 
patterns go on to maintain this subordination with more foreign players than before 
FRPSHWLQJIRU$IULFD¶VUHVRXUFHV,QWHUYLHZ$MDNDL\H6HSWHPEHU
Interview with Comrade Ibegwura, 9 January, 2011).  
 
7KHDERYHVKRZVKRZFRQWLQXLQJIRUHLJQVFUDPEOHVIRU$IULFD¶VUHVRXUFHV
XQGHUPLQH$IULFD¶VJRYHUQDQFHRQHRIWKHUHVRXUFe curse symptoms. Next, the 
explanatory power of Marxist theory is applied to the relationship between neo-
FRORQLDOIRUHLJQVFUDPEOHVDQG$IULFD¶VSRRUJRYHUQDQFH 
 
Relevance of Marxism: The Marxist perspective on political economy is highly 
useful with its emphasis on historical dialectical materialism which explains 
continued exploitation of dominant nations over weaker nations within the global 
economic system.  
 
By giving primacy to materialism, Marxist approaches highlight the importance of 
economic conditions in shaping international relations. Economic conditions explain 
the European expansion to Africa during the mercantile phase. In the Nigerian 
context, it explains why the British Colonial Administration attempted to exercise 
power over the Niger Delta territories even before it assumed direct control in 1899 
(Osunlana, 2008). According to Hoogvelt, direct political control of the overseas 
WHUULWRULHV³ZDVRIWHQDFRQYHQLHQWPHWKRGIRURUJDQL]LQJWKHSURGXFWLRQV\VWHPVDQG
laying the infrastructure LQWKHDQFLOODU\HFRQRPLHV>DW@WKDWWLPH´+RRJYHOW
18). 
 
The rise of foreign political control and new colonial capitalist economy led to the 
WUDQVIRUPDWLRQRIWKH1LJHU'HOWD¶VWUDGLWLRQDOVRFLDOVWUXFWXUHV0DU[LVPH[SODLQV
that this exploitation of resources is central and creates class relations and struggles 
within societies (Aina, 1986). This is precisely what happened in Nigeria and in most 
colonized territories of Africa. Marxism emphasis on how materials and economic 
conditions influence politics also explains why traditional chiefs obstructed social 
FKDQJHDQGLQVWHDGFRQWLQXHGWR³VHHNWKHLUSHUVRQDODGYDQWDJHVE\DFFRPPRGDWLRQV
ZLWKLPSHULDOJRYHUQPHQWDQGZRXOGWKHUHE\SUHSDUHWKHLUHYHQWXDOGRZQIDOO´
(Davidson, 1961: 261). This is because the traditional chiefs benefitted from their 
partnership with colonial traders and officials. 
 
C h a p t e r  7  | page 198 
 
This approach provides a framework in which the pattern of control similar to, if 
more complex than, colonialism continues in the Niger Delta where crude oil 
supersedes palm oil production during the colonial era. As in colonial times, the 
Nigerian ruling class defends oil capital. Because Nigerian governments depend on 
foreign oil industries, they defend foreign oil industries by repressing all social and 
political opposition to foreign oil corporations. By reinforcing political control over 
resources, the state protects global accumulation and the interests of the transnational 
corporations, while still projecting itself as the protector of national interest and 
security in order to maintain its legitimacy (Osunlana, 2008). Both the Nigerian state 
and the oil companies see communal resistance as obstructions to wealth 
accumulation and therefore in need of complete suppression (ibid.). 
 
The Nigerian ruling elite also use the political power to generate economic power 
from crude oil which in turn helps strengthen their political position (Obi, 1997). It is 
in the utmost interests of Nigerian rulers to resist transformations of the economic 
system of exploitation put in place by the colonial powers. This enduring system 
WKHUHIRUHFRQWULEXWHVWRLQWHQVLI\LQJ1LJHULD¶VRSSUHVVLYHJRYHUQDQFH7KH0DU[LVW
perspective of historical dialectical materialism provides a basis for understanding 
how the present foreign scramEOHIRU$IULFD¶VRLODVSDUWRIWKHKLVWRULFDOVFUDPEOH
for Africa, undermines African political structures and thus can be linked to a 
symptom of the resource curse. 
 
This section discussed the IRUHLJQVFUDPEOH¶VFRQWULEXWLRQWRWKHUHVRXUFHFXUVHE\
leading to and creating bad governance, the relations for which Marxism can offer a 
basis for understanding. However, the resource curse discussion has so far ignored 
the foreign dimension in the resource curse. By addressing the linkage between these 
two variables, this study has filled the gap in the existing resource curse theory. The 
QH[WVHFWLRQPRYHVRQWRGLVFXVVKRZIRUHLJQVFUDPEOHVUHODWHWR$IULFD¶VHFRQRPLF
failure, another symptom determining the resource curse experience. 
 
Foreign Scrambles Contribute to Economic Collapse 
In addition to creating authoritarian rule in Africa, colonial administrations left 
behind weak, badly integrated and distorted economies which made Africa 
dependent on more advanced states. African sovereignty over decision-making 
becomes contingent on foreign markets and expertise. African countries trade mostly 
with superpowers such as the US, Europe and China and receive financial assistance 
from them while trade among African states is marginal, less than three percent of 
the total (Gordon, 2001).  
Depending on single markets as in colonial times, Africa still produces single 
commodities while the rest of the world is starting to diversify their exports 
(Sindzingre, 2011). Many countries produce and export the same products such as 
cocoa, ground nuts, minerals and oil as a result of Western imperial design. The 
colonial powers only focused on few types of plantation and resource extraction for 
the Western market and were not interested in developing other sectors. Africa 
suffered export diversification when the colonial powers left as there was no system 
of industries and manufacturing and the global market was too fierce to enter. Simple 
$IULFDQH[SRUWSURGXFWVIDFHGKLJKFRPSHWLWLRQDQGORZHUSULFHV7KLVOHIW$IULFD¶V
economies vulnerable and more dependent on powerful states. The production of 
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export commodities also caused population movement while affected transport 
infrastructures which primarily served to evacuate commodities from the hinterland 
to the coast for export to Europe. These transport routes, however, did not connect 
DQGLQWHJUDWHFRXQWULHV7KLVSDWWHUQVWLOOSHUVLVWVWRGD\DQGKDVOLPLWHGFRXQWULHV¶
ability to develop economically, establish political stability or implement regional 
integration (Delancey, 2001).  
In the context of weak economic and political systems, oil, instead of creating 
wealth, has led to the poverty of African oil-rich countries. For Nigeria, statistical 
evidence has shown that poverty in the Niger Delta region is much higher than the 
national average. In Oloibori, where Nigerian oil was first drilled in 1958, youth 
unemployment is now running at 50 percent (Ghazvinian, 2007). In the oil rich 
states, Bayelsa and Delta, there is one doctor for every 150,000 inhabitants. In the 
rural communities, the ratio goes up to one doctor for 250,000 inhabitants (Interview 
with Dr Koyin, 5 January, 2011). The only beneficiaries of oil wealth are the multi-
national oil companies and their shareholders. 
$V1LJHULD¶VUXOLQJFODVVFRQIRUPVWRWKHZD\VRLOLndustries are operated, as 
discussed in Chapter 6, agricultural lands, drinking water and fisheries on which 
subsistence economies depend are destroyed. Oil companies have also deprived local 
peoples of ownership and control of their lands (Personal site visits, January, 2011; 
Leech, 2006; Clarke, 2008). In effect, WKHVHSHRSOH¶VOLYHOLKRRGVDUH completely 
destroyed, which continues the vicious circle of poverty. In this context, local 
populations cannot afford education, if any schools exist, and thus employment 
becomes impossible. As money is only gathered around the oil installations, more 
youths become engaged in prostitution and criminality as the only source of income 
(Interview with Alagoa, 13 January, 2011; Interview with Elf employee, 14 January, 
2011). As well as political and economic decline, the country is also bearing the 
brunt of the costs of oil operations (Brown, 2006). Due to such political, economic 
and social problems, skilled people seek to migrate elsewhere in search of better 
lives. 
The demise of Nigerian structures makes Nigeria a hostile environment for business 
investments other than oil. Due to support the oil companies receive from Nigerian 
officials, immunity gained from enclave oil operations and the large profit margins in 
the mature of oil investment, oil industries flourish even when all sectors fail. 
Control of resources through continuous foreign interventions in Nigeria play a part 
in this. As oil is mostly the only source of foreign investment, this entrenches 
1LJHULD¶VGHSHndence on a single primary product just as in colonial times, making it 
more difficult to diversify national exports as a way of breaking the resource curse. 
The capital-intensive oil industries crowd out other tradable sectors that otherwise 
would employ mass populations. Agricultural-based economy and small-medium 
sized manufacturing which helped East Asian economies to thrive cannot survive in 
this environment. Hence, oil industries hinder viable industrial and technological 
development. These factors enforce the vicious circle of poverty and economic 
decline (Interview with Fukushima, 15 January, 2011). It will thus take longer for 
Nigeria to catch up with the development of other countries. 
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Relevance of Marxism: The poverty and economic decline of African resource-rich 
countries can be understood by the neo-Marxist dependency theory which primarily 
argues that resources are extracted from the periphery of poor underdeveloped states 
and flow towards the rich states at the centre in order to sustain their economic 
wealth. Foreign control and interventions of African countries come aiming to 
extract resources. Girvan (1976) notes that because major world powers own the 
capital and exercise power over classes and the institutions of weaker nations for the 
appropriation of resources; exploitation, pollution and underdevelopment in these 
weak nations are created. This also includes WKHH[SURSULDWLRQRISHDVDQWV¶ULJKWV
lands, waters and means of livelihood to maximise corporate profits.  
In the global capitalist system, African autonomy is undermined at the expense of the 
oil companies and imperial economic design. Economic instruments employed by 
superpowers, such as neo-liberal policies, petrodollar monetary order and economic 
sanctions (see Chapter 5) are imperatives well beyond the control of peripheral 
African states. African states are thus compelled to rely increasingly on multinational 
companies in the open markets espoused by these neo-colonial economic 
mechanisms. For this reason, African states become the defenders of multinational 
oil companies. Although free market economists suggest that full integration into the 
ZRUOGPDUNHWLVEHQHILFLDOWKHLPSRVHGLQWHJUDWLRQRI$IULFDLQWRWKHµZRUOGV\VWHP¶
has proved to benefit only the rich states while creating deeper impoverishment in 
Africa. 0DU[LVWSHUVSHFWLYHVH[SODLQWKDW$IULFD¶VLQKHUHQWZHDNQHVVLQWKHJOREDO
FDSLWDOLVWV\VWHPOHDGVWR$IULFD¶VSRRUHFRQRPLFSHUIRUPDQFH 
7KLVVHFWLRQGLVFXVVHGWKHIRUHLJQVFUDPEOHV¶FRQWULEXWLRQVWRWKHUHVRXUFHFXUse by 
leading to economic decline, the relationship which economic-centric Marxism can 
offer a basis for understanding. The next section moves on to discuss how foreign 
VFUDPEOHVUHODWHWR$IULFD¶VFRQIOLFWVDQRWKHUV\PSWRPRIWKHUHVRXUFHFXUVH 
 
Foreign Scrambles Contribute to Conflicts  
Conflicts in Africa have occurred with direct and indirect interventions from foreign 
countries (Anise, 1989). Such conditions left Africa little room to properly manage 
its oil wealth when the first significant production took start in the late 1960s. 
Growing inequalities between social classes occurred in African societies as a result 
RIFRORQLDOUXOH7KH%ULWLVKPRGHORI³LQGLUHFW´UXOHWKURXJKVR-called tribal rulers, 
as discussed in Chapter 4, increased competition EHWZHHQHWKQLFJURXSV$IULFD¶V
traditional culture and values were further corrupted by the imposition of colonial 
cultural superiority (Achebe, 1996). The locals were caught between a clash of long-
ODVWLQJ$IULFDQFXVWRPVZLWKWKHFRORQLDOLVWV¶SRZHUVYHsted in the authority of 
FRORQLDOVWDWHV&ODUNH7KHµEDONDQL]DWLRQ¶EURNH$IULFDLQWRXQLWV
convenient for governance and resource extraction. Independence gained from these 
false colonial boundaries had led to social instability and civil wars (Nkrumah, 
1968). Most African countries including Nigeria, Angola, Libya and Sudan comprise 
people from many tribes, languages, cultures, religions and economic patterns. 
Through colonial indirect rule, societies were divided. The traditional chiefs and 
dominant ethnic groups were buttressed to extort their people for the colonial benefit 
of resource extraction (Interview with Ibegwu, 9 January, 2011).   
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In some parts like the Niger Delta, areas are divided as several groups make claims 
on oil wealth. In Sudan, long-established conflicts are yet to be fully settled. Recent 
oil development has brought new conflicts on top of those from the past, creating 
greater complexity (Clarke, 2008). Even while Africa continues to fail by global 
standards, corporate oil found ways to prosper, relying on various economic and 
political forces. In unstable states, brutal military governments such as in Nigeria, 
Angola and Libya dominate over long periods. 
2LOFRPSDQLHVKDYHSLFNHGXSWKHFRORQLDOµGLYLGH-and-UXOH¶VWUDWHJ\.  In Nigeria, oil 
companies exploit ethnic factions and deliberately distribute oil benefits to dominant 
groups or parties in favour of their operations while depriving the rest of society. 
This aggravated divisions and created them within communities and families where 
divisions had never before existed and played a part in destroying Nigerian 
traditional social relationships such as the respect for elders and women (Interview 
with the Niger Delta Development Initiative Committee, 9 January, 2011). The 
damage to Nigerian culture is immeasurable and beyond recompense (Interview with 
Alagoa, 13 January, 2011).  
Africa was set out on shaky ground when substantial resource industries arose. 
Contrarily, in countries like Norway and The Netherlands, oil was found after 
democracy had been fully developed and hence these states have successfully reaped 
EHQHILWVIURPRLOUHVRXUFHV$IULFD¶VRLOGLVFRYHU\LQWKHPLGVWRIWKHGDPDJHOHIWE\
colonial powers and continued by new forms of foreign interventions thus produced 
rent-seeking, poor governance, economic mismanagement and severe social 
instability. These are explained as the symptoms of the resource curse. Securing 
$IULFD¶VUHVRXUFHVDQGRLOKDVEHHQORQJ-established but life in Africa hardly 
resembles wealth or development. Continued foreign scrambles for Africa are 
FRQVLGHUDEO\WREODPH2YHUKLVWRU\$IULFD¶VSODFHKDVEHHQVKDSHGE\DZLGHUDQJH
of competing players including Arabs, Ottomans, Portuguese, Spanish, French, 
British, US, Chinese, Soviet and Africans themselves (Clarke, 2008). These 
interventions resulted in a number of fragile dependent states or statelets and 
µFRQWUROOLQJ¶]RQHVRILQWHUHVW7KHVHSDWWHUQVGHILQHWKHODQGVFDSHLQZKLFKRLO
industries operate, setting out the still fragile future of African oil (ibid.). 
Conflicts in African oil-rich countries are also caused through the culmination of 
unaddressed grievances such as land dispossession, pollution, marginalization and 
political repression. Local populations are not treated as stakeholders but rather as an 
access to resources (Interview with Bisina, 3 January, 2011). In Nigeria, oil 
LQGXVWULHV¶LQVHQVLWLYHEXVLQHVVFRQGXFWZKLFKLVGLVSOD\HGLQWKHGLVUHJDUGIRUORFDO
environments and social institutions, has resulted in the destruction of environments, 
livelihoods and social networks, which underpin the conflicts in the Niger Delta. As 
the environmental pollution destroyed their way of life when fishing and farming 
became impossible and the oil industries created no employment for the manpower 
deprived of their lands while small elite groups or dominant tribes are rewarded and 
the local communities see living standards plunge and where no basic life facilities 
exist, frustrations mount. Youths in the oil areas have become instruments in the 
hands of politicians, rival elites, oil companies and criminals who manipulate them to 
achieve their selfish ends (Osunlana, 2008; Interview with Ebema teacher, 9 January, 
2011). 
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Grievances have led to a series of activities deployed against the companies ranging 
from peaceful demonstrations and blockades of oil facilities, to criminal activities 
such as occupations of flow stations and platforms, sabotage of pipelines, oil 
bunkering, attacks on oil installations and kidnapping of oil employees. These 
incidents provoked President Obasanjo to dispatch a large military force during his 
rule (1999-2007) to the oil-producing creeks. Since the hanging of Ken Saro-Wiwa 
in 1995 and the concurrent militarization of the Ogoni oilfields took the international 
stagHDQGDOWKRXJK2EDVDQMR¶VJRYHUQPHQWEHFDPHFLYLOLDQUXOHLQDIWHU
continuous military dictatorships, the level of oppression, violence and 
marginalization do not seem to have improved (Osunlana, 2008). Brutal security 
forces still operate and conditions across the oilfields get worse. Instead of protecting 
oil-producing communities, the government has provided security forces to the oil 
FRPSDQLHVZKLFKZHUHRIWHQXVHGIRUFUXVKLQJORFDOFRPPXQLWLHVDWWKHFRPSDQLHV¶
requests. Therefore, the oil companies are largely responsible for conflicts across the 
region (International Crisis Group, 2006; Manby, 1999).  
While it may be said that the region has a history of internal violent outbursts dating 
back to the 1950s, this was attributed largely by the colonial strategy of balkanizing 
1LJHULD¶VWHUULWRU\DQGVRFLHWLHV0RUHRYHUWKHSUHVHQFHRIRLOFRPSDQLHVLQWKH
region exacerbates communal tensions (Human Rights Watch, 2002). A prime case is 
the Ogoniland situation leading to the 1995 execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa. The 
prolonged Warri Crisis is also essentially connected to the control of oil. With the 
new millennium, conflicts became more violent and aggressive, in effect a state of 
undeclared war (Clarke, 2008). The death toll is estimated at a minimum of a 
WKRXVDQGSHRSOHHYHU\\HDUPDNLQJLWDQDUHDRIµKLJK-LQWHQVLW\FRQIOLFW¶VLPLODUWR
Chechnya and Colombia.  
Anything related to oil becomes a very sensitive issue fuelled by suspicion and 
hostility (Interview with Senior Representative of Omadino Community, 5 January, 
2011; personal experience of local agitation in Bayelsa State).  This produces a 
culture of violence in oil-producing communities displayed in the rise in threats, 
crime and the proliferation of small arms as the only way to attain compensation for 
some of the damages. Thus, the delta is now one of the most dangerous places on 
earth (Osunlana, 2008; Interview with Naagbanton, 7 January, 2011). According to 
Naagbanton, arms, such as AK-47s, come through porous borders from Chinese, 
South African, Italian, German and Belgian sources. Every community now has a 
silent army. It is expected that if the problems of proliferation are not addressed, 
armed warlords will be operating in the region turning it into a dangerous conflict 
zone where the gangs rule at the expense of development and security for all (ibid.).   
Since late 2005, resistance against the state and multinational oil corporations 
operating in the Niger Delta region has taken a more violent and sophisticated turn 
with the emergence of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta 
(MEND) and of armed struggles (Courson, 2009). MEND has sought direct 
international attention diverting it away from the Nigerian state which MEND 
perceives as being a dishonest broker due to the governmHQW¶VYHVWHGLQWHUHVWVLQLWV
role as the partner of oil multinationals exploiting the oil in the Niger Delta. This 
reflects a state of cultural, social and political breakdown and tension between 
dispossessed peasant communities and the hegemonic, trans-global, capitalist forces 
(Obi and Okwechime, 2004). In the same year, the US National Intelligence Council 
DQQRXQFHGWKHµRXWULJKWFROODSVHRI1LJHULD¶DQGWKDWWKLVZDVRQHRIWKHKLJKHVW
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µGRZQVLGHULVNV¶WKUHDWHQLQJVWDELOLW\WKURXJKRXWVXE-Saharan Africa (Ghazvinian, 
2007: 20).  
The use of violence however contributes to the vicious circle of insurgency where all 
sides feel threatened and thus need to tighten up security systems (Interview with 
Soludo, 15 September, 2010; Interview with Daniel, 10 January, 2011). In addition to 
the militarized approach employed by the government and the oil companies 
themselves in protecting oil installations, foreign governments have also provided 
military support (Courson, 2009). Foreign military involvement often fuels internal 
political conflicts over the allocation of oil revenues. This is particularly true when 
WKHUHJLPHLQSRZHUPRQRSROLVHVVXFKUHYHQXHVUHVWULFWVRWKHUSRSXODWLRQJURXSV¶
access to oil benefits and uses these oil revenues in programmes to oppress others. 
Such actions cause political unrest. The marginalized groups often resort to arms as it 
is the only way to obtain a larger share of oil benefits. In response, African regimes 
rely on heavy forces. Recently, these have been mostly assisted by the US and China 
(Klare, Volman et al., 2006). The result is often that rural isolated villages were 
found caught between the security forces hired by international oil industries, militias 
determined to disrupt oil operations and the military employed by the state 
(Ghazvinian, 2007). Numerous instances of environmental and human damage have 
been identified in African oil-rich countries by Human Rights Watch among others, a 
factor underpinning the likelihood of continued conflict there (Clarke, 2008: 94). 
 
The Relevance of Marxism: The Marxist political economy approach helps to 
explain how it is impossible for African states to relieve some grievances in the oil-
producing areas. In the system of global capitalism, the role and position of African 
states in the international political economy of oil and global relations of production 
are marginalized. African states lack the capital, technology and managerial skills 
required to establish a developmental path.  
 
0DU[LVP¶VHPSKDVLVRQGLDOHFWLFDOPDWHULDOLVPDOVRKHOps explain the emergence of 
local social struggles against the capitalist political system starting in colonial times 
until today (Osunlana, 2008). With this approach, the crises in African societies are 
viewed as the direct consequences of capitalist modes of production and 
accumulation. In this system, Marxists explain that people and their environment are 
subordinated to the forces of global capitalism (ibid.). Oil companies and their home 
governments have sought to control oil from as early as the 1910s when WW I 
entrenched oil in politics and the dominance of the world economy. The World Bank, 
the IMF, GATT and the World Trade Organization were used as economic arms to 
extend the power of globalization so that open markets for resource access would be 
created. These organizations serve as cartels for global imperial powers to penetrate 
rural areas assisted by post-colonial elites who represent them. African oil-rich 
countries were merely reduced to clientele states.  
 
In traditional African societies, local populations had birthrights to their land. With 
the arrival of colonialism and the oil industries, the new capitalist market economy 
system was introduced where indigenes lost their birthrights to land to the state and 
oil companies. Indigenes automatically became only natives who dwell in the land 
but have no rights over it. Since their lands have been deprived, local populations 
become labourers, when formerly they were landowners (Interview with Ibegwura, 9 
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January, 2011). They receive low remuneration in return for their labour. Education 
becomes unaffordable. The new capitalist forces also introduced the kind of lifestyles 
which locals cannot afford. Marxism explains that this creates social classes and 
people in the lower classes become industrial slaves as a by-product. While oil 
industries flourish, the lives of local people have been downgraded. This renders 
people hopeless. In this context, Marxists suggest social struggles will occur.  
 
According to the Marxist explanation of the capitalist mode of production, 
globalization processes would continue to increase the rate of extraction whereby 
environmental degradation and the authoritarian character of Nigerian politics would 
be worsened. This would provoke struggles over shrinking resources and the level of 
local oppression. These struggles are closely related to inter-ethnic or inter-
communal conflicts (Obi and Okwechime, 2004: 358). The Niger Delta communities 
have been transformed through global capitalism in the colonial era into ethnic 
minorities and since then alienated from the oil produced from their lands by the 
companies and the Nigerian state. The minority ethnic groups thus have generally 
perceived the companies and the state as alien predatory forces. Consequently, they 
are compelled to retreat into their small ethnic cocoons from where their identity and 
power can be relatively strengthened and some gains could be secured. In order to 
win their share of limited resources, these ethnic groups resort to wage wars against 
the state, the companies and other groups. This would also lead to ethnic politics 
whereby election processes are reduced to a competition to win resources for their 
own clans. This system would worsen democratic progress and further fuel conflicts 
(McFaul, Magen et al., 2007). The on-going crises in the Niger Delta region 
precisely illustrate the Marxist dialectical materialism perspective. 
 
The Marxist approach thus throws useful light in understanding the on-going 
struggles over control of resources and the unequal distribution of power and wealth 
and how these variables will continue to re-enforce each other in the prevailing mode 
of production. In contrast to the other theoretical perspectives which completely 
overlook the issues of equity and social relations, the Marxist approach sees these as 
central to the understanding of the deepening crises in weaker states created by the 
exploitation of human beings and resources. By and large, scholars of conflict have 
often overlooked the role of neo-colonial corporate resource scrambles in generating 
violent conflicts in developing countries. The Marxist perspective explains the 
dialectics of the crises which were largely defined by how weak African states were 
incorporated into the world capitalist system through which their resources have been 
exploited for the global market leaving them oppressed and marginalized. Therefore, 
this provides a framework to objectively explain the resource curse displayed in the 
failure of economic, political and social stability in African oil-rich countries.   
 
This thesis argues that Marxist Dependency Theory is the primary theory explaining 
why external states intervene and how this leads to negative outcomes. By 
interpretation, economic-centric Marxists would assume that oil-related foreign 
intervention in Africa is determined by the force of international capitalist markets. 
To survive in this system, they must revolutionize their means of production through 
searching for new markets, raw materials, cheap labour and higher profits. However, 
for most superpowers, the internal frontier reached the point of closure. There have 
been problems of domestic overproduction and labour conflicts. Hence, the drive to 
seek out new territories for economic development have become more manifest 
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(LaFeber, 1963). For oil, Africa becomes a subject for bourgeois nations which seek 
to achieve the revolution of production.  
 
Marxist Dependency Theory also explains that resources flow from a "periphery" of 
poor and underdeveloped states to a "core" of wealthy states, enriching the latter at 
the expense of the former (Prebisch, 1959). This process has made the political 
economies of the African countries subject to the needs of foreign powers, which 
contributes to continued underdevelopment, stagnation and instability in Africa 
(Asante, 1989). Because the peripheries become weaker and more dependent on 
richer state, dependency theory also explains foreign influence on the internal affairs 
of the peripheral powers, here the African states. According to Rodney (1972) and 
Amin (1976), these are the ways through which neo-colonialism persists. By 
explaining the process in which rich nations have continuously exploited the world 
market and thereby deprived weaker nations, Marxist variants contribute to the neo-
colonialism concept and the resource curse discussion. The complexity of neo-
FRORQLDOVWUXFWXUHVUHODWHWR$IULFD¶VXQGHUGHYHORSPHQW7KHHVVHQFHRI0DU[LVPLQ
explaining how materialism constructs forces in international relations and different 
classes in societies offers an integrated explanation that transcends all disciplines of 
social sciences, including politics, economics and anthropology (Momoh and 
Adejumobi, 1995). 
 
7KLVVHFWLRQOLQNVIRUHLJQVFUDPEOHVIRU$IULFDWR$IULFD¶VXQGHUGHYHORSPHQWZKLFK
is displayed in three fundamental areas: governance, the economy and stability. Any 
of these symptoms is defined as the resource curse phenomenon. No studies so far 
have attempted to relate foreign scrambles to the resource curse discussion hence 
superseding the ideas on why resource-rich countries fail. The resource curse is 
agreed as a crucially fundamental matter for Africa, one of the most resource-rich, 
yet poorly-performing, continents. 
 
 
Foreign Interventions and the Resource Curse: a Probabilistic Causal 
Mechanism 
 
The previous section shows that oil-related foreign interventions have an impact on 
damaging African economies, authoritarian political establishments, environmental 
degradation, poverty and conflicts. These negative impacts could be categorized as 
resource curse symptoms which display in the failures of resource-rich states to 
perform as described above. This section explains how the relationship between 
foreign interventions and the resource curse is categorized as a probabilistic causal 
mechanism. 
 
As discussed in the operationalisation section of Chapter 1, there are access 
restrictions to empirical data for this subject. While this factor obstructs developing a 
deterministic causal mechanism, establishing a probabilistic causal mechanism is 
possible and essential. This study draws data by conducting a large number of 
interviews covering multidimensional stakeholders involved in African oil industries. 
Interview methods have proved useful for developing the context of how foreign 
interventions relate to the resource curse. Interviews also give an insight into this 
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relationship; that is, how the interventions take place and how they contribute to the 
FRXQWU\¶VSHUIRUPDQFH+RZHYHUWKHUHVXOWIURPLQWHUYLHZVLVQRWLQGLFDWLYHDQGD
necessary/sufficient causal relationship cannot be based on this method alone (King, 
Keohane et al., 1994). 
 
For a necessary causal mechanism to apply, x always causes y. That is foreign 
interventions always and alone can lead to the resource curse. For the sufficient 
cause inference, the presence of x (foreign interventions) implies the presence of y 
(resource curse). However, another cause z (bad governance) may alternatively cause 
y. Thus, the presence of y does not imply the presence of x; that is, the resource curse 
may ocFXUZLWKRXWWKHSUHVHQFHRIIRUHLJQLQWHUYHQWLRQV+RZHYHUWKHVWXG\¶V
historical record shows that there is no case of oil-rich countries which suffer the 
curse without the presence of foreign interventions. The lack of public data including 
statistics and records due to the secrecy of such matters fundamentally obstructs the 
deterministic causal inference. Oil politics often involve sensitive issues including 
national security and corruption among top officials. Moreover, foreign players, such 
as China and the US, have only recently been active in the field of African oil; 
therefore, a proper assessment is unavailable. Where it is available, data produced by 
different organizations is inconsistent. There is also a lack of capacity by African 
players to produce accurate data. Moreover, given that statistical data were available, 
this type of data cannot specify whether the presence of foreign interventions and the 
resource curse are causal relationships or correlations because it cannot explain how 
intervention produces the curse.  
 
While a necessary/sufficient causal mechanism would not be sufficiently drawn out 
in order to avoid internal validity, there is high value and merit in seeking 
intervening incidents and probable impacts from a series of oil-related foreign 
interventions collected whereby a probabilistic causal mechanism can be established. 
This study attempts to eliminate possible errors attached to interviews by using a 
triangulation of methods to answer how oil-directed foreign interventions relate to 
the resource curse in African oil-rich countries. These methods are the use of 
statistical resources, document analysis, archival analysis, participant observation, 
analysis of historical secondary materials and interviewing from different contrary 
sources.  
 
,QVWHDGRIVD\LQJ³,I[WKHQ\´WKLVVWXG\LQGLFDWHV³WKHSUHVHQFHRI[LQFUHDVHVWKH
OLNHOLKRRGRUIUHTXHQF\RI\´/LHEHUVRQ7KHFULWHULDIRULQWHUSUHWLQJWKH
findings by which the study is judged successful is the likelihood of the resource 
curse occurrence--displayed in poverty, conflicts and bad governance. The 
probabilistic approach serves the exploratory purpose from which future enquiries 
will benefit. This study, therefore, asserts that the resource curse discussion must 
include foreign interventions in its deductions.  
 
:KLOHJULHYDQFHDQGJUHHGPD\FRQWULEXWHWRWKHVHFRXQWULHV¶XQGHUSHUIRUPDQFH
(Courson, 2009), this study has shown that historical factors, external forces and 
local political dynamics are entangled with these factors in the political economy of 
oil. Theories surrounding the resource curse, however, have seriously overlooked 
historical factors, external actors and the relationships of these factors and the local 
political dynamics of African oil-rich countries. There are also social, ecological and 
environmental perspectives which have not been addressed in the resource curse 
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discussion. The market force where oil is traded, the political frame of energy 
security and the international capitalist system in which nation states and weak 
resource-rich African states operate have also been left out.  
 
This study shows that the African resource curse is not only due to internal economic 
and political malfunctions, but is also part and parcel of the international system 
where weak African oil-rich countries are competitively intervened in and relatively 
controlled so that resources are fully extracted for the winning players.  Even after 
the political independence of African states in the 1960s, they have not had an 
opportunity to decide at their own pace the forms of governance and economic 
structure suitable to their conditions. Instead, policies have been imposed upon them 
and political and economic interventions continue. These are carried out by foreign 
players both through previous colonial ties, primarily France and Britain, and 
through new players such as the US, Washington-led international institutions, the 
multinational companies and the newly-arrived China. Continued foreign practices 
are considered to be neo-colonial. Regardless of whether these attempts are 
deliberately designed for control and rule, the relationship between foreign powers 
and African states and the practices used by the former for resource expropriation in 
the latter remain unchanged. By characteristics of foreign practices, rather than 
intention, neo-colonialism prevails. Whereas nationalistic founding fathers of many 
African states had to work under neo-colonial exploitation, a succession of African 
elites benefit from this system and thus resist change (Interview with Comrade 
Ibegwu, 9 January, 2011).  
 
Not only do a number of African politicians neglect the neo-colonial practices of 
foreign players, but academic scholars also rarely acknowledge the existence and 
processes of neo-colonial foreign interventions in the oil industries and how these 
UHODWHWR$IULFD¶VXQGHUSHUIRUPDQFH7KLVVWXG\ILOOVWKHJDSE\HVWDEOLVKLQJDOLQNDJH
between these two new factors. The study argues that oil-related foreign 
interventions contribute to the resource curse in this region. However, the research 
does not claim that the resource curse is caused by foreign interventions only. Rather, 
foreign interventions play a part in contributing to the resource curse which in many 
cases is entangled with the undividable complex forces of economy, politics and 
societies.  
 
,QWRGD\¶VJOREDOL]HGZRUOGZKHUHLQWHUQDWLRQDOHFRQRPLFDQGSROLWLFDODVSHFWVDUH
dynamically changing, foreign scrambles of Africa remain unchanged and will 
continue as long as Africa supplies resources for the world as crucial as oil. 
Continued foreign interventions leave Africa consistently dependent on foreign 
SOD\HUVFRQWULEXWHWR$IULFD¶VODFNRIXQLW\DQGSRZHULQthe competitive 
international sphere. These conditions allow foreign powers to dictate what roles 
WKH\FDQSOD\LQ$IULFDQJHRSROLWLFV7RDGGUHVVWKHSUREOHPRI$IULFD¶VRLOFXUVHLW
LVFUXFLDOWRORRNEDFNWRWKHKLVWRULFDOH[SORLWDWLRQRI$IULFD¶VUHVRXUFHV7KLVKHOSV
us understand the conditions in which Africa was left when the oil industries began 
and why Africa has an additional burden to other oil-rich countries to break free from 
WKHFXUVH$FDGHPLFVKDYHWULHGWRWHVWDQGH[SODLQWKHµUHVRXUFHFXUVH¶SKHQRPHQRQ
and suggest solutions through which the country can best utilize its resources for 
development. However, this important causal link where foreign scrambles 
contribute to the resource curse has been missing in the existing literature. Until this 
is filled, the way to overcome the resource curse will not be effective.  
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It is crucial to note that beyond the oil there are various similar interventions for 
RWKHUDLPVLQ$IULFDZKLFKXQGHUPLQH$IULFD¶VSROLWLFDOVRFLDODQGHFRQRPLFV\VWHP
increase the complexity of problems and continue to obstruct any systematic oil 
development. Like most things in a society, oil industries do not exist in vacuo but 
intertwined in domestic and international factors. The positive use of oil wealth 
requires most of these factors to play their contributory parts especially in the 
continent where management capacities are weak. As this thesis seeks to provide a 
regional overview and some explanations of incidents, except for Nigeria, could only 
be snapshots, it is hoped that additional research will encouraged by this study.  
 
To sum up, thLVVWXG\UHYROYHVDURXQGDIXQGDPHQWDOUHVHDUFKK\SRWKHVLVµForeign 
interventions may contribute or increase the likelihood of the resource curse¶
which is based mainly on the resource curse theory and concept of neo-colonialism. 
Apart from factors addressed by the existing literature on the resource curse, namely, 
economic malfunctions, government policies, social foundations, resource types, 
country size and initial conditions (detailed in Chapter 2), this research hypothesizes 
that foreign interventions display a strong linkage to the resource curse. If the neo-
liberal claims that foreign interventions and resource exploitation were necessary and 
beneficial for African economic and political development were correct, African 
countries would have experienced prosperity. African countries have had the greatest 
dosages of these ranging from the slave trade, colonialism and neo-colonialism. 
Instead, foreign-imposed phenomena have proved to be disastrous. Multiple foreign 
players, by globally reproducing and expanding capital through the control of oil, are 
OLQNHGWR$IULFD¶VUHVRXUFHFXUVH 
 
The theoretical approach which primarily informs the analysis in this study is that of 
Neo-Marxist dependency theory, which displays an analytical superiority over 
competing perspectives.  With this approach, we are able to situate Africa within the 
global context of superpower domination.  The current crises in Africa cannot be 
adequately understood without reference to continuing foreign control, from 
European colonial powers in the past and new players now, according to the shifts of 
global power. Marxist dialectical materialism allows us to look back over the history 
of the relations between Africa and foreign powers both materially and in regard to 
how these relationsWLPHDQGDJDLQDIIHFWDQGVKDSH$IULFD¶VVWUXFWXUH%\
GLVFXVVLQJWKHµZRUOGRUGHU¶LQWHUPVRISURGXFWLRQVWUXFWXUHWKDWOHDGVWR
exploitation, oppression, enslavement and the struggles of the lower social classes in 
weaker states, Marxist perspectives are the most relevant in helping us understand 
IRUHLJQLQWHUYHQWLRQVDQG$IULFD¶VXQGHUSHUIRUPDQFH 
 
Although realism explains the reasons behind foreign interventions, especially for 
securing critical raw materials, the reasons why foreign players intervene are not the 
focus of this thesis. The only perspective this study draws on from realist main 
assumption is that the drive to maximize power and profits would imply that foreign 
interventions in African oil-rich countries will be maintained and will intensify as 
global situations surrounding oil become more hostile.  
 
However, none of the existing theories explains specific policies and practices of 
foreign interventions with relation to the African oil industries. The foreign powers 
involved in the inteUYHQWLRQVIRU$IULFD¶VRLOWKHPHFKDQLVPWKURXJKZKLFKWKH\DUH
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carried out and the outcomes of these actions are neither addressed nor evaluated in 
these theories. Although the abovementioned Marxist strands indicate that neo-
colonialism will contribute to poor performance in Africa, it does not relate to the 
resource curse discussion which mainly assumes that resource-rich countries are 
doomed to fail. This is the gap which this study has filled by linking these theories to 
real-world practices. By applying the concept of neo-colonialism, this study compiles 
the empirical evidence of a IRUHLJQVFUDPEOHIRU$IULFD¶VRLODQGSURGXFHVDQDO\VHV
displaying how these foreign interventions are carried out, who the main players are 
and what impacts continued foreign interventions have had in Africa. The study 
examines how these impacts are related to the resource curse discussion. These 
analyses appear novel and their result is one of the main contribution areas of this 
study. 
 
7KLVWKHVLV¶VPDLQREMHFWLYHLVWRGraw linkages between the actions and impacts of 
oil-related foreign interventions and how they contribute to or increase the likelihood 
of the resource curse occurring. The finding of this thesis; that is, the scramble for 
$IULFD¶VRLOSOD\VDSDUWLQ$IULFD¶VXQGHUSHUIRUPDQFHLVOLQNHGWRWKHUHVRXUFHFXUVH
discussion in the form of a  probabilistic causal mechanism. In effect, the resource 
curse theory is refined by stating that a foreign intervention variable must be 
included and further integrated into its discussion and policy considerations. Hence, 
this study has developed hypotheses and propositions for further inquiry as it hoped 
WRGR,WLVKRSHGWKDWWKLVILQGLQJZLOOLQIOXHQFHGHEDWHVFRQFHUQLQJ$IULFD¶VRLO
boom at a moment of heightened attention.  
 
The thesis also uncovers the players and strategies involved in the global political 
economy of oil. By revealing oil-related foreign interventions in Africa, the thesis 
enhances the body of knowledge on neo-colonialism which argues that continued 
foreign interventions undermine the performance of countries being intervened. 
Furthermore, by linking neo-colonialism and the resource curse, this thesis makes 
inter-connections between political and economic theoretical disciplines customarily 
treated in isolation from each other. The studies of neo-colonialism are approached 
mainly through political science, geography and history while the resource curse is 
PDLQO\LPSOHPHQWHGE\HFRQRPLFVVFKRODUV7KHDXWKRU¶VH[SORUDWLRQRIWKHUHVRXUFH
curse phenomenon using a foreign dimension is necessarily incomplete. Yet, by 
drawing attention to both the theoretical schools in social science and to the 
empirical evidence of the increasing oil-related foreign interventions, the author 
hopes that further work will be inspired to develop at both the theoretical and the 
empirical levels.  
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Director and Assistants, Rally for Nigeria Interview 
14 September 2010 
Natural Resource 
Charter Annual 
Workshop, Oxford 
University 
 
Director of Oxford Centre for Resource 
Rich Economies (Oxcarre) 
Speech 
Co-director of OxCarre Personal 
Conversation 
 
Journalist, Polis Institute (Brazil) 
Policy Advisor, U.S. Commission on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe 
15 September 2010 
Place- as above 
Research Associate, IMF Personal 
Conversation 
 Advocacy and Communications Officer, 
Publish What You Pay  
Director of Research and Development 
Department, World Bank Institute, and 
Head of Centre for the Studies of African 
Economies, Oxford University 
Consultant, Explorim Inc. (Canada) 
Director of Nigerian Central Bank Interview 
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Policy Advisor, Ministry of Energy& 
Mineral Resources, Republic of 
Indonesia 
Interview 
 
President of Network Movement for 
Justice and Development, Sierra Leone 
16 September 2010 
Natural Resource 
Charter Annual 
Workshop, Oxford 
University 
 
'LUHFWRURI1RUZD\¶VOil for 
Development Programme, NORAD 
Speech 
Director of African Economic Research 
Consortium (Kenya) and Lecturer in 
Oxford University 
Interview 
 
Former Deputy Governor of the Bank of 
Ghana, Former Vice Presidential 
Candidate for the New Patriotic Party 
(NNP), Professor at the Centre for the 
Studies of African Economies, Oxford 
University 
 
Training and Capacity Development 
Programme Officer, Revenue Watch 
Institute 
Personal 
Conversation 
16 September 2010 
Annual Conference, 
Oxford Centre for the 
Analysis of the 
Resource Rich 
Economies 
Deputy Director General, Ministry of 
Environment Norway 
Personal 
Conversation 
 
Research Fellow at the OxCarre, Former 
Research Associate at the Department of 
Statistics Norway and in the World 
%DQN¶V'HYHORSPHQW(FRQRPLFV
Department 
19 October 2010 
(YHQWµ$IULFD$IWHUWKH
&ROG:DU¶
International Institute 
of Foreign Affairs 
Executive Director, Centre for Conflict 
Resolution, Cape Town 
Interview 
1 November 2010 
$IULFD¶V2LO:HHN
Conference, Cape 
Town, South Africa 
 
Director of Globalpacific& Partners Speech 
Legal Practitioner, Aelex (Nigeria) Interview 
 
Director, Department of Petroleum 
Resources, Nigeria 
Partner in the Energy and Projects Group, 
Templars Barristers Solicitors (Nigeria) 
Personal 
Conversation 
 Head of Business Development, Century 
Energy Services Limited (Nigeria) 
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Sales Manager Africa, WesternGeco 
(Angola) 
 
Marine Sales Account Manager Africa, 
WesternGeco (Angola) 
2 November 2010 
Place- as above 
General Manager, Japan Oil, Gas and 
Metals National Corporation  
Personal 
Conversation 
 Senior Researcher, Japan Oil, Gas and 
Metals National Corporation 
(OI¶VIRUPHU9LFH3UHVLGHQWIRU$IUica 
and President of Atlantic Seahorse 
 
Senior Business Adviser, Strategy and 
Business Intelligence Division, TOTAL 
 
Vice President Exploration Africa, 
TOTAL 
Focus Group 
Minister of Energy and Petroleum, 
Mauritania 
Interview 
 
Executive Vice-President, SeaBird 
Exploration 
Chief Economist, Ministry of Energy, 
Ghana 
Senior Business Development Manager, 
Upstream International, Shell 
Netherlands 
Personal 
Conversation 
2 November 2010 
Place- as above 
Administrative Director, Mitsubishi 
Corporation, Gabon 
Interview 
 
Honorary Consul of the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands, External Director of Shell 
Gabon 
3 November 2010 
Place- as above 
President of Total Africa Speech 
Chairman, Subcommittee on Local 
Content and Member of House of 
Representatives for Delta State, Nigeria 
Interview 
 
Geologist, Office of the President, 
Petroleum Resources Unit, Sierra Leone 
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Vice President of Sub-Sahara Africa 
ExxonMobil 
Deputy Chief Executive Officer, 
Seychelles Petroleum Company Limited 
President, FAR Limited, Oil and Gas 
Exploration Company Focused on 
Offshore West and East Africa 
Personal 
Conversation 
 
Head of Business Development, 
Schlamberger, Oil Service Company, 
South Africa 
Managing Director, Petrobras Brasileiro 
Nigeria Ltd. 
4 November 2010 
$IULFD¶VOil Week 
Conference, Cape 
Town 
Head of Petroleum Exploration and 
Exploitation Department, Ministry of 
Mines and Energy, Republic of Niger 
Interview 
 
Principal Geologist/ Development, 
Petroleum Exploration and Production 
Department, Uganda 
Head of Office of Research and 
Promotion, Ministry of Petroleum, 
Guinea 
Promotion Manager, Petrosen, 
Senegalese Department of Energy 
Executive Director, Natural Petroleum 
Agency, Sao Tome and Principe 
Business Development Coordinator, 
Energy Business Division, Mitsubishi 
Cooperation International (Europe) Plc 
Personal 
Conversation 
 
General Manager, Maersk Oil Angola AS 
Vice Chairman, Sonar Limited (Nigeria, 
South Africa and the United States) 
5 November 2010 
Place- as above 
Director, Chicxulub Geosciences Personal 
Conversation 
Head of Geophysical Department, 
Sonangol 
Interview 
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5 November 2010 
Place- as above 
 
Immanuel Mulunga, Petroleum 
Commissioner, Ministry of Mines, 
Namibia 
 
Head of Petroleum Operations, Ministry 
of Mines and Energy, Ethiopia 
Petroleum Commissioner, Ministry of 
Mines, Namibia 
 
Director, JGC Corporation (UK) Limited 
Director Operation, Ministry of 
Petroleum, Equatorial Guinea 
Personal 
Conversation 
 
Logistic and Procurement Manager, 
SouthWest Energy, Energy for Africa, 
Ethiopia 
Manager, Exploration and Production 
Business Development Division, 
Mitsubishi Corporation Exploration Co., 
Ltd. 
6 November 2010 
Place- as above 
 
Assistant General Manager, Sumitomo 
Mitsui Banking Corporation Europe 
Limited 
Personal 
Conversation 
 
Exploration and Production Business 
Development Manager, Sumitomo 
Corporation 
London Correspondent, Upstream The 
International Oil and Gas Newspaper 
Business Development Manager, Ikon 
Science 
Managing Director, Petrogas Worldwide 
(Gabon) 
Sales and Marketing Executive, Cockett 
Marine Oil Limited 
7 November 2010 
Place- as above 
Administrative and Financial Director, 
Les Dépêches de Brazzaville 
Personal 
Conversation 
 
Investment Analysts, Earth Resource 
Investment Group (ERIG), South Africa 
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Business Development Manager, Africa, 
Upstream The International Oil& Gas 
Newspaper 
Director, Spotswood Petroleum (Angola)  
Head of Oil& Gas London, Project 
Finance, Standard Bank 
Managing Director, Petrobras 
30 December 2010 
International Prayer 
Conference, Lagos 
 
Pastor of *RG¶V$OLYH0LQLVWU\DQG
Director of United for Change (NGO), 
Port Harcourt 
Interview 
                                            
Chairman of Governance Technical 
Team, Bayelsa 
Chief Executive Officer, Dotecon Nigeria 
Limited, Former Senior Officer (Head of 
Technical Section, Head of Audit, Head 
of Special Study, Head of HSE 
Operation, Programme Director of 
Environment Issue Management, State 
Licensing Manager), Shell 
31 December 2010 
Lagos 
Managing Director Praymerc Nigeria 
Ltd, Former Engineer for Shell 
Interview 
Programme Director, Ministry of 
Agriculture 
Director, Alive NGO Personal 
Conversation 
1 January 2011 
Warri, Delta State 
$QJOLFDQ3ULHVWRIµ+HLV$OLYH¶&KDSHO
and NGO Director 
Personal 
Conversation 
&KXUFK/HDGHURIµ+HLV$OLYH¶&KDSHO Interview 
2 January 2011 
Place- as above 
Warri local villager Interview 
 
Chief Executive Director, Triune 
Ventures Limited, Chairman of Central 
Development Council for Ibaramatu 
Community 
2 January 2011 
Port Harcourt and 
Bayelsa 
Director of Our Niger Delta (NGO), 
Rotary World Peace Fellow at Berkeley 
University, Lecturer at Bayelsa 
University 
 
NGO Director Dennis 
Interview 
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3 January 2011 
Effurun, Delta State 
President, Leadership Centre for Peace, 
Integrity and Transformation (LCPIT), 
NGO 
Interview 
4 January 2011 
Warri, Delta State 
Head Corporate Utilities, The Shell 
Petroleum Development Company of 
Nigeria Limited 
 
Shell engineer 
 
Chevron Personnel, Environment 
Department 
 
Missionary in the Delta creeks 
Focus Group 
5 January 2011 
Omadino Community, 
Warri South Local 
Government Area, 
Delta State 
Principal of Shell/ NNPC joint-venture 
school 
Interview 
Retired Spokesman of Omadino 
Community, Member Council of Elders 
 
0LVVLRQDU\µ+HLV$OLYH¶&KDSHO 
 
Warri Local Villager 
 
Community youths (a number of 10) 
Focus Group 
 
Hospital Doctor, 
Secretary of the Hospital Doctor, 
Shell/NNPC joint-venture Omadino 
Hospital 
Focus Group 
Hospital Lab Practitioner Interview 
6 January 2011 
Social Action, Port 
Harcourt 
Research Associate and Activist  Interview 
6 January 2011 
Environmental Rights 
Action, Friends of the 
Earth, Port Harcourt 
Project Assistant Interview 
6 January 2011 
Social Action, Port 
Harcourt 
Deputy Director, Social Action, founder 
of Ogoni Solidarity Forum  
 
Project Officer, Social Action 
Focus Group 
Coordinator/ Spokesperson International 
Projects, Friends of the Earth Netherlands 
Interview 
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6 January 2011 
Benin City 
Project Officer, Environmental Rights 
Action/ Friends of the Earth, Nigeria 
Personal 
Conversation 
7 January 2011 
Port Harcourt 
Executive-Director, Community-
Environment Development Network  
Interview 
 
Chief Executive Officer, Kenthglobal 
Consulting (Abuja) 
Coordinator, Centre for Environment, 
Human Rights and Development, Legal 
Assistant for the Court Case Ogoni VS 
Shell 
8 January 2011 
Port Harcourt 
President of Touch-Life International, 
NGO 
Personal 
Conversation 
9 January 2011 
Ebema, Rivers State 
Farmer 
 
Community Elders, the founder of the 
Niger Delta Development Initiative 
Committee, Farmer and Teacher 
 
Akwa Ibom Local 
 
Activist, Enrivonmental Rights Action, 
NGO 
Focus group 
9 January 2011 
Erema 
Former Trade Union Leader, Former 
Nigerian Civil Defense Leader, State 
Secretary, Human Rights Activist  
Interview 
10 January 2011 
Goi Community, 
Gokana, village, 
Ogoniland, Rivers State 
(affected by the oil 
VSLOOVRI6KHOO¶V%RPX
oil field) 
 
Community Chiefs (a number of 2) 
 
Villagers (a number of 10)- plaintiffs of 
oil spills in the court case against Shell in 
Netherlands 2011 and in the US 2008 
Interviews 
and focus 
group 
10 January 2011 
Bodo City, Gokana 
Local Government 
Administration, Rivers 
State 
Members of Bodo Council of Chiefs and 
Elders 
 
His Royalness Honorary King, 
Paramount Ruler 
 
Chairman Council of Traditional Rulers 
(a number of 3) 
 
Vice Chairman 
 
Secretary 
Interviews 
and focus 
group 
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Assistance Secretary 
 
Speaker/ Legal 
Speaker II 
 
Treasurer 
 
Financial Secretary 
 
Community Chiefs (a number of 5) 
10 January 2011 
Ogoniland 
Akwa Ibom Local Man 
 
Activist, Environmental Rights Action 
NGO (ERA) 
Focus group 
10 January 2011 
Port Harcourt 
Editor for Women Issues Newspaper, 
Niger Delta 
Interview 
 
11 January 2011 
Port Harcourt 
Ogoni Villager and Former Combatant 
12 January 2011 
Port Harcourt 
Local Villager from Owaasa community, 
Eko, Enogo, Southeast of Nigeria 
13 January 2011 
Bayelsa State 
Director of Our Niger Delta, NGO Interview 
13 January 2011 
ERA office, Yenegoa, 
Bayelsa State 
Director of ERA, Bayelsa State 
 
Director of Our Niger Delta 
 
ERA activists (a number of 3) 
Focus group 
13 January 2011 
Ikarama Community 
Ikarama Youth 
 
Ikarama Youth Leader and Former 
Combatant 
 
Affected Landlords in Ikarama 
Community 
 
Director of Our Niger Delta 
Focus group 
14 January 2011 
Port Harcourt 
Programme Officer, MOSOP Interview 
 Manager in Environment Quality 
Assurance Section, Elf Nigeria 
15 January 2011 
Lagos 
Second Secretary, Political Affairs and 
Human Rights, Royal Netherlands 
Embassy  
Interview 
Managing Director, Sojitz Global 
Trading Nigeria Ltd. 
 
Director, Sojitz Global Trading Nigeria 
Ltd 
 
Project Manager, Mitsubishi Shoji Kaisha 
Focus group 
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(Nigeria) Ltd 
 
Chief Executive Officer, Toyota Nigeria 
16 January 2011 
Lagos 
Manager, Nishizawa (Nigeria) Limited Personal 
Conservation 
 
Manager, Nishizawa (Nigeria) Limited 
17 January 2011 
Lagos 
Security Consultant for a British Security 
Company to the Nigerian Government 
Interview 
 
Legal Adviser, Banwo and Ighodalo 
Legal Firm Specializing in Oil 
Operations 
18 January 2011 
Total, Lagos 
General Manager, Business 
Development, TOTAL Exploration & 
Production Nigeria 
Interview 
18 January 2011 
Lagos 
Business Development Manager, The 
Onstream Group Netherlands, ASC 
Nigeria (Oil services company) 
 
Barrister, HERMON 
Focus group 
19 January 2011 
Lagos 
Senior Counsel, Legal Department, 
Samsung Heavy Industries Co., Ltd.  
Personal 
Conversation 
 Hotel Owner, Victoria Crowne Plaza 
13 May 2011 
London 
Directorate-General for Humanitarian 
Aid, The European Union 
Personal 
Conversation 
13 June 2011 
(YHQWµ7KH&KDOOHQJHV
of Post-War 
Reconstruction-The 
/LEHULDQ([SHULHQFH¶
International Institute 
of Foreign Affairs, 
London 
President of Sierra Leone Speech 
22 June 2011 
(YHQWµ1LJHULD+DOID
Century of Progress 
DQG&KDOOHQJHV¶+RXVH
of Parliament, London 
Deputy Editor, THISDAY Newspapers 
Emir of Kazaure, Ministry of Justice 
Secretary-General of the Nigerian 
Supreme Council of Islamic Affairs 
(NSCIA) 
Former Secretary-General of the 
Commonwealth of 54 nations, Former 
1LJHULD¶V)RUHLJQ0LQLVWHU
Administration of the Nigerian President  
Labour Party MP for Newcastle 
Labour MP for Streatham, South London 
Roundtable 
27 June 2011 
(YHQWµ1LJHULD¶V
Presidential Candidate for the Congress 
for Progressive Change and Former Head 
Personal 
Conversation 
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Elections: Reflections 
on the Process and 
3URVSHFWVIRU1LJHULD¶
International Institute 
of Foreign Affairs 
of State, Federal Republic of Nigeria 
14 July 2011 
(YHQWµ$PQHVW\LQWKH
Niger Delta: Sustaining 
Peace and Surmounting 
&KDOOHQJHV¶
International Institute 
of Foreign Affairs, 
London 
Special Adviser to the President of 
Nigeria on Niger Delta Affairs and 
Chairman of the Amnesty Committee 
Conference 
speech and 
Personal 
Conversation 
 
 
 
